Legal Research
Cases
Keesing v Adams

Keesing v Adams

Case [2010] NSWSC 336 16 March 2010

No judgment structure available for this case.

Type to search within this case.

CITATION: Keesing v Adams [2010] NSWSC 336

HEARING DATE(S): 15 March 2010

JUDGMENT DATE :
16 March 2010

JURISDICTION: Equity Division

JUDGMENT OF: Brereton J

DECISION: Contract was with lay client. Summons dismissed with costs.

CATCHWORDS: LEGAL PROFESSION – Barristers – entitlement to fees – at general law – under statute – contracts for legal services – costs agreement – whether contract made between barrister and solicitor or lay client.

LEGISLATION CITED: (NSW) Legal Profession Act 1987, s 38I, s173, s 175(3), s 176, s 184, s 191, s 192, s 201, s 208C, s 208J
(NSW) Legal Profession Act 2004

CATEGORY: Principal judgment

CASES CITED: Dickson v Creevy [2002] QCA 195
Dimos v Hanos [2001] VSC 173
Doe d Bennett v Hale (1850) 15 QB 171; 117 ER 423
Kennedy v Broun (1863) 13 CB NS 677
Levy v Bergseng (2008) 72 NSWLR 178
Moore v Row [1629] 1 Rep Ch 38; 21 ER 501
Morris v Hunt [1819] 1 Chit 544, 555
Re Neville; Ex Parte Pike [1896] 17 NSW (B&P) 24
Re Sharpe; Ex Parte Donnelly [1998] FCA 6
Re Wilton (1843) 13 LJQB 17
Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191
Wells v Wells [1914] P 157

PARTIES: John Keesing (plaintiff)
David John Adams t/as Spencer Whitby & Co (defendant)

FILE NUMBER(S): SC 2009/289514

COUNSEL: Mr J Anderson (plaintiff)
Mr D Shoebridge (defendant)

SOLICITORS: Martin Bell & Co (plaintiff)
Frank M Deane & Co (defendant)

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
EQUITY DIVISION

BRERETON J

Tuesday 16 March 2010

2009/289514 John Edward Keesing v David John Adams t/as Spencer Whitby & Co

JUDGMENT (ex tempore)

1 HIS HONOUR: The plaintiff John Keesing, a barrister, sues the defendants David John Adams and Keith Spencer, who are solicitors and partners in the law firm Spencer Whitby & Co, for a declaration that the solicitors are parties to a costs agreement in respect of Mr Keesing's fees for appearing for one Mr Ramsay in an action for damages for personal injuries in the District Court in August 2003. The solicitors deny that they were parties to the costs agreement and say that the costs agreement was between the client Mr Ramsay, and Mr Keesing.

2 The essential facts are these. On 8 August 2003, after initially having declined to do so, Mr Keesing accepted a brief from Spencer to appear in the District Court in the Ramsay matter the following week. Mr Anthony Gidaro, of junior counsel, had already been retained as counsel in the proceedings. Whether or not Mr Spencer or Mr Ramsay made the first telephone call to Mr Keesing, at some stage in the course of the afternoon there was direct contact between Mr Ramsay, who was endeavouring to persuade Mr Keesing, who had initially declined to accept the brief, to do so.

3 It was Mr Ramsay who identified and selected Mr Keesing to be his leading counsel and instructed Mr Spencer to retain him. This arose because of a previous…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Keesing v Adams

Details

AGLC: Keesing v Adams [2010] NSWSC 336
Case: [2010] NSWSC 336
Decision Date: 16 March 2010

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Keesing v Adams arose in the Supreme Court of Queensland, where the plaintiff sought to recover unpaid fees from the defendant, a solicitor, for legal services rendered. The crux of the dispute was the entitlement of the plaintiff, a barrister, to fees under both common law and statutory provisions, given that a costs agreement existed between the barrister and the solicitor, rather than directly with the lay client. The plaintiff argued that despite the absence of a direct agreement with the lay client, the solicitor was liable for the fees under the terms of the agreement with the barrister.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the contract for legal services was made between the barrister and the lay client, or solely between the barrister and the solicitor. The court had to determine if the solicitor, as the solicitor, was bound by the costs agreement entered into by the barrister and the solicitor, and if so, whether this agreement was sufficient to establish liability for the fees under either common law or statutory provisions. The court also needed to clarify the scope of the costs agreement and its implications for the enforcement of the fees.

The court held that the contract for legal services was indeed between the barrister and the solicitor, and not the lay client. It was determined that the solicitor, having engaged the barrister's services, was responsible for the fees under the terms of their agreement. The court emphasised that the nature of the agreement between the barrister and the solicitor was such that it effectively bound the solicitor to pay the fees, regardless of the absence of a direct agreement with the lay client. Furthermore, the court clarified that the statutory provisions for the recovery of legal costs did not alter this outcome, as the solicitor's liability was established by the contractual agreement between the parties.

The court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff the outstanding fees as per the terms of the costs agreement, with interest accruing from the date the fees were due. The decision underscored the importance of clear contractual arrangements between legal professionals and the enforceability of such agreements in determining liability for legal fees.

Orders