Keays v JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Keays v J P Morgan Administrative Services Australia Limited (No 2) [2011] FCA 547

Citation: Keays v J P Morgan Administrative Services Australia Limited (No 2) [2011] FCA 547
Parties: COLIN KEAYS v J P MORGAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AUSTRALIA LIMITED
File number: NSD 1375 of 2008
Judge: BUCHANAN J
Date of judgment: 25 May 2011
Catchwords: COSTS – application for indemnity costs – Calderbank offer – test to be applied – whether it is necessary that rejection of an offer be imprudent or plainly unreasonable – whether rejection of an offer was imprudent or unreasonable
Legislation: Federal Court Rules O 23 r 11
Cases cited: Alexander v Australian Community Pharmacy Authority (No 3) [2010] FCA 506
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (No 3) [2002] FCA 1294
Black v Lipovac (1998) 217 ALR 386
Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225
Dukemaster Pty Ltd v Bluehive Pty Ltd [2003] FCAFC 1
MGICA (1992) Pty Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 70 FCR 236
NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 2) (2001) 109 FCR 77
Olivaylle Pty Ltd v Flottweg GMBH & Co KGAA (No 5) [2009] FCA 571
Port Kembla Coal Terminal Ltd v Braverus Maritime Inc (No 2) (2004) 212 ALR 281
Ruaro v Ferrari [2008] FCA 307
Sanko Steamship Co Ltd v Sumitomo Australia Ltd [1996] FCA 22
Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2007) 244 ALR 374
Sydney Markets Limited v Sydney Flower Market Pty Limited [2002] FCA 283
Date of hearing: Heard on the papers
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 26
Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr MJ Gillis of Gillis Delaney Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr JJE Fernon SC
Solicitor for the Respondent: Freehills

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1375 of 2008

BETWEEN:

COLIN KEAYS
Applicant

AND:

J P MORGAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AUSTRALIA LIMITED
Respondent

JUDGE:

BUCHANAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 MAY 2011

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings to judgment, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the respondent’s application for indemnity costs, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 1375 of 2008

BETWEEN:

COLIN KEAYS
Applicant

AND:

J P MORGAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AUSTRALIA LIMITED
Respondent

JUDGE:

BUCHANAN J

DATE:

25 MAY 2011

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 13 April 2011 I delivered judgment in this matter dismissing the application.  I gave directions for written submissions about the question of costs.  The respondent has now sought an order for costs on an indemnity basis.  That…

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Details
Case
[2011] FCA 547
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Keays v JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Ltd (No 2) involved the applicant, Keays, and the respondent, JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Ltd. The dispute centred on an application for indemnity costs following the rejection of a Calderbank offer. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The respondent contended that the rejection of the offer led to unnecessary delays and additional costs, and therefore, the applicant should be liable for the respondent's costs on an indemnity basis.

The legal issues before the court were whether it was necessary for the rejection of an offer to be imprudent or plainly unreasonable to warrant indemnity costs and whether the rejection in this case was indeed imprudent or unreasonable. The court had to determine if the circumstances of the case were exceptional enough to warrant a departure from the usual party/party costs order.

The court found that the delays and additional costs incurred were part of the ordinary hazards of litigation and did not constitute exceptional circumstances. The court emphasised that indemnity costs are not awarded as a punishment but rather as a measure of protection for the successful party. The court concluded that the circumstances leading to the adjournment and continuation of the proceedings were not exceptional. Therefore, the court ruled that the costs should be awarded on a party/party basis, and no departure from this norm was justified.

In conclusion, the court ordered that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings to judgment on a party/party basis, to be taxed if not agreed. Conversely, the respondent was ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of the application for indemnity costs, also on a party/party basis, to be taxed if not agreed. This decision highlights the stringent criteria required for indemnity costs to be awarded, reinforcing the principle that such costs are reserved for exceptional circumstances only.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings to judgment, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the respondent’s application for indemnity costs, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Keays v JP Morgan Administrative Services Australia Ltd (No 2) involves a dispute over costs, specifically an application for indemnity costs, following a Calderbank offer. The primary facts revolve around the procedural conduct of the parties in the litigation process and the circumstances that led to the costs being disputed. The matter before the court includes the rejection of a Calderbank offer by the applicant and subsequent events leading up to the final judgment.

The case began when the applicant made a Calderbank offer to the respondent, which is a formal offer to settle a case on terms that include an undertaking as to costs. The respondent rejected this offer and proceeded to trial. The case was initially set for a hearing but was adjourned due to various discussions and considerations that arose during the proceedings. The case resumed for further hearings on a different date. Post-trial, the applicant sought indemnity costs from the respondent based on the rejected Calderbank offer and the subsequent delay in concluding the case.

The procedural history of this matter involves the initial proceedings where the applicant made a Calderbank offer to the respondent, which was subsequently rejected. The case then proceeded to trial, but due to various discussions and procedural matters, the hearings were adjourned. The case resumed on a later date, and eventually, the trial concluded. Following the judgment in favour of the applicant, the applicant applied for indemnity costs against the respondent. This application for indemnity costs was then the subject of the court's consideration in this particular decision.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The respondent argues now that the time, and its costs, were thrown away. In my view that is too strict a view of matters and one which is only available in hindsight. I think the better view is that the delay in finishing the case was part of the ordinary hazards of litigation. A study of the transcript reveals that, at about the same time, there was discussion of a number of possibilities which may have required an adjournment of the proceedings to allow the respondent some further time. Costs are not awarded against a party as a punishment. They are awarded as a measure of protection to a successful party. However, as the cases which discuss the foundation for indemnity costs consistently stress, the normal rule is that the costs of litigation are usually awarded on a party/party basis and the circumstances must fairly be described as exceptional before there will be a departure from that approach. In my view, the circumstances which led to the proceedings being adjourned on 14 December 2010, and then continuing for a further day in February rather than December, were not exceptional. No departure from the ordinary rule as to costs is justified by those events.Conclusion The result of the foregoing discussion is, in my view, that the appropriate order is that the applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings to judgment on a party/party basis, such costs to be taxed if not agreed. The respondent must pay the applicant’s costs of the respondent’s application for indemnity costs on the same basis.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court considered the argument by the respondent that the time and costs were wasted. However, the court found that such a view is only available in hindsight and that the delay in finishing the case was part of the ordinary hazards of litigation. The court noted that costs are awarded as a measure of protection to a successful party, and the normal rule is that the costs of litigation are usually awarded on a party/party basis. The court stressed that the circumstances must be fairly described as exceptional before there will be a departure from that approach. In this case, the court found that the circumstances which led to the proceedings being adjourned and the subsequent delay were not exceptional. The court concluded that no departure from the ordinary rule as to costs was justified by those events. The court cited the principles established in various cases discussing the foundation for indemnity costs, which consistently stress the need for exceptional circumstances to warrant a departure from the normal party/party basis for awarding costs. The court distinguished the current case from situations where a departure from the ordinary rule would be appropriate, based on the findings that the delay in this case was not due to any imprudence or unreasonableness on the part of the applicant.