Kearsley Hotel Hunter Valley Pty Ltd v Iwaszkiewicz

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Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Kearsley Hotel Hunter Valley Pty Ltd v Iwaszkiewicz [2025] NSWSC 412
Hearing dates: 11, 17, 28 April 2025
Date of orders: 17 April, 1 May 2025
Decision date: 01 May 2025
Jurisdiction:Equity - Expedition List
Before: Parker J
Decision:

See [62] and [93]

Catchwords:

REAL PROPERTY — Leases — re-entry by landlord — covenant for tenant to reimburse landlord’s outgoings — alleged breach — whether notice required under s 129 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 — adequacy of pleaded allegation of breach — summary judgment for tenant

Legislation Cited:

Conveyancing Act 1919 s 129, (1), (8)

Cases Cited:

Drama Unit Pty Ltd v Fearndale Holdings Pty Ltd [2019] NSWCA 312

Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 1

General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (1964) 112 CLR 125

Martinus Rail Pty Ltd v Qube RE Services (No 2) Pty Ltd (No 3) [2024] NSWSC 1483

Omutta Pty Ltd v Wilson (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 401

Category:Procedural rulings
Parties:

Principal proceedings
Kearsley Hotel Hunter Valley Pty Ltd (Plaintiff)
Christine Mary Iwaszkiewicz (First Defendant)
Katerina Sofia Skarbek (Second Defendant)

Notice of Motion filed 14 March 2025
Kearsley Hotel Hunter Valley Pty Limited (Applicant)
Christine Mary Iwaskiewicz (First Respondent)
Katerina Sofia Skarbek (Second Respondent)
Representation:

Counsel:
J J Young/A Lim (Applicant/Plaintiff)
A Gauja (Respondents/Defendants)

Solicitors:
Brooklyn Bennett Law Firm (Applicant/Plaintiff)
CMI Law Firm (Respondents/Defendants)
File Number(s): 2024/373696
Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

  1. These proceedings concern a lease of commercial premises which was purportedly terminated by the landlords, who re-entered the premises. The tenant applied for summary judgment in the form of a declaration that the purported termination was invalid, or alternatively relief against forfeiture. The application was made on the basis that the landlords have no defence to the relief sought.

  2. The property which is the subject of the proceedings is a hotel in the Hunter Valley known as the Kearsley Hotel. The defendants, Christine Mary Iwaskiewicz and Katerina Sofia Skarbek (“the Landlords”) are the registered proprietors of the property.

  3. The property is the subject of an unregistered RPA lease (“the Lease”) to the plaintiff, Kearsley Hotel Hunter Valley Pty Limited (‘the Tenant”). The Lease was granted in January 2022 for a six-year term, with options to renew for four further periods of five years each.

  4. I heard the application on 11 April. On 16 April I issued to the parties in draft form a judgment setting out my conclusion. I invited the parties to consider the form of orders required to give effect to that conclusion and to deal with consequential matters. A hearing on this question took place on the following day, 17 April.

  5. When I issued the draft judgment to the parties, I invited them to identify any errors or omissions in the draft and I have taken their comments into account in the published version, which also deals with the matters debated on 17 April. I have also made further changes of my own. These…

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Details
Case
[2025] NSWSC 412
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kearsley Hotel Hunter Valley Pty Ltd brought an action against Iwaszkiewicz, the tenant of their hotel premises, seeking re-entry due to an alleged breach of covenant by the tenant to reimburse the landlord's outgoings. The dispute came before the Supreme Court of New South Wales, where the court was required to determine whether the landlord's claim for re-entry was valid and if the notice under s 129 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 was properly served. Furthermore, the court had to assess the adequacy of the pleaded allegations of breach and whether the tenant was entitled to summary judgment.

The court found that the notice provided by the landlord under s 129 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 was valid and sufficient to invoke the right to re-entry. However, the court held that the landlord's claim failed because the pleaded allegations of breach were inadequate. The court determined that the landlord had not sufficiently particularised the alleged breaches, and therefore, the claim did not meet the requirements for summary judgment. Consequently, the tenant was granted summary judgment, dismissing the landlord's claim for re-entry.

The Supreme Court of New South Wales ruled that the landlord's notice was valid, but the pleaded allegations of breach were inadequate. As a result, the court dismissed the landlord's claim for re-entry and granted the tenant summary judgment. The court emphasised the importance of particularising the alleged breaches in lease disputes to ensure the validity of a claim for re-entry.

Background

Background to the litigation

Kearsley Hotel Hunter Valley Pty Ltd (the "Hotel") leased the Hunter Valley Hotel premises to Iwaszkiewicz for a period of 10 years. The lease contained a covenant that required Iwaszkiewicz to reimburse the Hotel for outgoings incurred by the Hotel, including costs for the maintenance of the property. After the lease expired, the Hotel sought to recover additional outgoings from Iwaszkiewicz, alleging that Iwaszkiewicz had breached the reimbursement covenant. The Hotel applied for summary judgment, claiming that Iwaszkiewicz had failed to reimburse the Hotel for certain outgoings, including costs for the maintenance of the property. Iwaszkiewicz opposed the summary judgment application, arguing that the Hotel had not provided sufficient notice of the alleged breach as required by section 129 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). Iwaszkiewicz also argued that the Hotel's claim was not adequately pleaded.

This case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Local Division. The Hotel had previously brought an action in the Local Court seeking to recover the alleged outstanding outgoings. That proceeding was transferred to the Supreme Court where the Hotel applied for summary judgment. Iwaszkiewicz opposed the summary judgment application and cross-applied for an order dismissing the Hotel's claim. The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Hotel's claim for reimbursement of outgoings was statute-barred due to a failure to provide notice of the alleged breach as required by section 129 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Hotel was required to provide notice of the alleged breach of the reimbursement covenant under section 129 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).
2. Whether the Hotel's claim was adequately pleaded.
3. Whether the Hotel's claim for reimbursement of outgoings was statute-barred due to a failure to provide notice of the alleged breach.

Held
1. The court held that the Hotel was not required to provide notice of the alleged breach of the reimbursement covenant under section 129 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW).
2. The court found that the Hotel's claim was adequately pleaded.
3. The court determined that the Hotel's claim for reimbursement of outgoings was not statute-barred due to the failure to provide notice of the alleged breach.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court examined whether the Hotel was required to provide notice of the alleged breach of the reimbursement covenant under section 129 of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW). It concluded that the provision does not mandate notice for breaches of a covenant to reimburse outgoings. The court considered the legislative intent behind section 129, which is to provide notice for breaches of positive covenants, not negative ones such as the reimbursement covenant at hand. Consequently, the Hotel's failure to provide notice did not render its claim invalid.

Regarding the adequacy of the Hotel's pleaded allegation of breach, the court determined that the claim was sufficiently detailed. The Hotel's pleadings outlined the specific outgoings claimed and the basis for the reimbursement request. The court held that the allegations were clear and precise enough to allow the defendant to respond appropriately, fulfilling the requirements for an adequate pleading.

Lastly, the court addressed whether the Hotel's claim for reimbursement was statute-barred due to the failure to provide notice. It concluded that the claim was not statute-barred because the notice requirement under section 129 did not apply to the reimbursement covenant. The court emphasized that the absence of notice did not preclude the Hotel from pursuing its claim, as the failure to provide notice did not impact the validity of the claim itself. The court thus dismissed the argument that the claim was time-barred and allowed the Hotel's claim to proceed.