KB v The King; HB v The King; LB v The King

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Criminal)

KB v THE KING; HB v THE KING; LB v THE KING

[2025] SASCA 73

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable Justice S Doyle, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice David)

3 July 2025

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS - RESPONSE TO CHARGES - PLEA OF GUILTY

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING PROCEDURE - CONCURRENT, CUMULATIVE AND ADDITIONAL SENTENCES - SENTENCES ON TWO OR MORE COUNTS

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING PROCEDURE - APPROACH TO SENTENCING PROCESS

The offending involved the victim being attacked and restrained by family members at a shopping complex carpark. She was held on either side of her body by her mother, HB, and sister, when her father, KB, proceeded to stab her twice. She was then hauled into a vehicle driven by her brother, LB, and taken against her wishes to the family home.

The appellant KB pleaded guilty to the common law offence of false imprisonment and aggravated cause serious harm with intent to cause serious harm contrary to s 23(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (‘the CLCA’). The sentencing Judge imposed a cumulative sentence of 14 years and three months’ imprisonment, with a fixed non-parole period of nine years.

The appellant HB pleaded guilty to the common law offence of false imprisonment and aggravated cause harm with intent to cause harm contrary to s 24(1) of the CLCA. The sentencing Judge imposed a single sentence of five years, nine months and 25 days’ imprisonment, with a fixed non-parole period of three years and two months.

The appellant LB pleaded guilty to the common law offence of false imprisonment, aggravated cause harm with intent to cause harm contrary to s 24(1) of the CLCA, and aggravated serious criminal trespass in a place of residence contrary to s 170(1) of the CLCA. The sentencing Judge imposed a single sentence for the s 24(1) and false imprisonment offences and ordered the sentence for the s 170(1) offence be served cumulatively. A head sentence of nine years, five months and nine days’ imprisonment was imposed, with a fixed non-parole period of six years.

In reaching the final sentences imposed for each appellant, the sentencing Judge applied a five per cent discount on account of their guilty pleas for their applicable offences.

The appellants seek permission to appeal against sentence on the basis the sentencing Judge erred in her treatment of the discounts applicable for the guilty pleas entered for the ss 23(1) and 24(1) offences; and that the sentence imposed on each appellant was manifestly excessive. Additionally, the appellant HB advances a ground of appeal in relation to various factual findings which it is contended are erroneous; and the appellant LB contends the sentencing Judge erred in her approach to concurrency and the principle of totality.

The appellants also seek the admission of fresh evidence, namely,…

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Details
Case
[2025] SASCA 73
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellants, KB, HB, and LB, appealed against their sentences imposed by the District Court. The appeals concerned the adequacy of the discounts applied to their sentences following guilty pleas. While a five per cent discount was accepted for a false imprisonment offence, each appellant argued that the five per cent discount for a "negotiated offence" was insufficient, and KB and LB further contended that the sentencing judge failed to adequately explain the reasons for departing from the maximum applicable discount.

The central legal issue before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia was the proper application of section 40 of the *Sentencing Act 2017* (SA), which governs reductions in sentences for guilty pleas. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the sentencing judge had erred in law by applying discounts that were too low, considering the stage at which the pleas were entered and the circumstances surrounding the negotiations with the prosecution. The court was also required to consider the factors outlined in section 40(5) of the Act, which a court must have regard to when determining the appropriate percentage reduction for a guilty plea.

The Full Court reasoned that section 40(3) of the *Sentencing Act 2017* (SA) sets out the maximum discounts available depending on the timing of the guilty plea. Section 40(5) then provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered when determining the actual discount. The court noted that while a five per cent discount was permissible under section 40(3)(d) for pleas entered after committal but before arraignment, or under section 40(3)(e) for pleas entered after the first arraignment date, the sentencing judge must still consider the factors in section 40(5). These factors include the stage of proceedings when the intention to plead guilty was indicated, whether negotiations occurred with the prosecution, the strength of the prosecution's case, and the presence of remorse. The court found that the sentencing judge had not adequately explained why the maximum discount was not applied, particularly in light of the circumstances of the negotiated pleas.

The Full Court allowed the appeals, quashed the sentences, and remitted the matters to the District Court for resentencing.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

While there is no challenge to the discount of five per cent for the guilty pleas to the false imprisonment offence, each appellant challenges the adequacy of the five per cent discount for the negotiated offence, and KB and LB also challenge the adequacy of the reasons, such as they are, for departing from the maximum applicable discount. Consideration Section 40(3) of the Sentencing Act relevantly provides:40—Reduction of sentences for guilty pleas in other cases… (3) Subject to this section, if a defendant has pleaded guilty to an offence or offences—(a) not more than 4 weeks after the defendant’s first court appearance in relation to the relevant offence or offences—the sentencing court may reduce the sentence that it would otherwise have imposed by—(i) in the case of a serious indictable offence—up to 25%; or(ii) in any other case—up to 35%; or(b) more than 4 weeks after the defendant’s first court appearance in relation to the relevant offence or offences but on the day of, or before, the defendant’s committal appearance in relation to the relevant offence or offences—the sentencing court may reduce the sentence that it would otherwise have imposed by—(i) in the case of a serious indictable offence—up to 15%; or(ii) in any other case—up to 25%; or(c) during the period commencing on the day after the defendant’s committal appearance in relation to the relevant offence or offences and ending immediately before the defendant is committed for trial for the offence or offences—the sentencing court may reduce the sentence that it would otherwise have imposed by—(i) in the case of a serious indictable offence—up to 10%; or(ii) in any other case—up to 15%; orNote—See also section 110(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921.(d) during the period commencing immediately after the defendant is committed for trial for the relevant offence or offences and ending immediately after the first date fixed for the arraignment of the defendant in a superior court—the sentencing court may reduce the sentence that it would otherwise have imposed by—(i)in the case of a serious indictable offence—up to 5%; or(ii) in any other case—up to 10%; or(e) during the period commencing immediately after the first date fixed for the arraignment of the defendant in a superior court in relation to the relevant offence or offences and ending at the commencement of the defendant’s trial for the relevant offence or offences—the sentencing court may, if satisfied that there is good reason to do so, reduce the sentence that it would otherwise have imposed by up to 5%. Of relevance, s 40(5) outlines the considerations that a court must have regard to when determining what discount should be applied for a plea of guilty. The section states:[3] [3] Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 40(5). (5) In determining the percentage by which a sentence for an offence is to be reduced in respect of a guilty plea made within a particular period, a court must have regard to such of the following as may be relevant:(a) whether the reduction of the defendant’s sentence by the percentage contemplated would be so disproportionate to the seriousness of the offence, or so inappropriate in the case of that particular defendant, that it would, or may, affect public confidence in the administration of justice;(b) the stage in the proceedings for the offence at which the defendant indicated an intention to plead guilty (including whether it would, in the opinion of the court, have been reasonable to expect the defendant to have done so at an earlier stage in the proceedings);(c) whether the defendant was initially charged with a different offence in respect of the same conduct and whether (and at what stage in the proceedings) negotiations occurred with the prosecution in relation to the offence charged;(d) in the case where the defendant has been charged with more than 1 offence—whether the defendant pleaded guilty to all of the offences; (e) if the defendant satisfies the court that the defendant could not reasonably have been expected to plead guilty at an earlier stage in the proceedings because of circumstances outside of the defendant’s control—that fact; (f) whether or not the defendant was made aware of any relevant matter that would have enabled the defendant to plead guilty at an earlier stage in the proceedings;(g) whether at any stage in the proceedings for the offence—(i) the defendant disputed the factual basis of the plea; and (ii) a hearing occurred in relation to the dispute; and (iii) the dispute was not resolved in favour of the defendant;(h) if the prosecution satisfies the court that the defendant intentionally concealed the commission of the offence to which the defendant’s sentence relates—that fact, and the period of time for which the concealment persisted; (i) whether the prosecution’s case against the defendant (the assessment of which should ordinarily be made by reference to evidence in the form of an affidavit, or any other documentary evidence) is so overwhelming that a reduction of the defendant’s sentence by the percentage contemplated would be so inappropriate that it would, or may, affect public confidence in the administration of justice; (j) whether any genuine remorse on behalf of the defendant for the commission of the offence is so lacking that a reduction of the defendant’s sentence by the percentage contemplated would be so inappropriate that it would, or may, affect public confidence in the administration of justice, and may have regard to any other factor or principle the court thinks relevant.