KAZIMIR Kowalski v R J Cole and Partners

[2015] HCASL 119

KAZIMIR KOWALSKI

v

R J COLE AND PARTNERS

[2015] HCASL 119
A9/2015

1. The respondent, a firm of solicitors, represented the applicant in proceedings.  Those proceedings were settled on terms which involved the making of a settlement payment into the respondent's trust account.  The respondent withdrew its fees from the settlement payment.  In 1996, the respondent applied to have its costs taxed.  Around the same time, the applicant commenced proceedings against the respondent in negligence.  The District Court of South Australia (Judge Anderson) dismissed those proceedings in 2002, determining that the respondent had been entitled to withdraw its fees.

2. In 2005, the applicant successfully applied to have the taxation application struck out for want of prosecution.  He later applied to have those orders set aside.  In 2008, the Supreme Court of South Australia (Judge Lunn) dismissed that application and ordered that the applicant not be permitted to file any further interlocutory application without making a payment into court on account of the respondent's costs.  In 2013, without having made the payment into court, the applicant applied to tax the costs claimed by the respondent, uplifting the bill of costs prepared by the respondent in its application for taxation in 1996.   

3. A Master of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Judge Dart) dismissed the application on the basis that it was an abuse of process.  Judge Dart found that the application was an attempt to re-litigate issues that had been determined adversely to the applicant, including the applicant's liability to pay the respondent's fees.  Appeals by the applicant to the Supreme Court of South Australia (Peek J) and to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Gray, Sulan and Bampton JJ) were dismissed.

4. The applicant now seeks special leave to appeal from the orders of the Full Court. The applicant does not have legal representation. The application therefore falls to be dealt with under r 41.10 of the High Court Rules 2004 (Cth).

5. We would refuse special leave to appeal.  The decision of the Full Court involved the application of well-settled principles to a question of practice and procedure, and the applicant has not identified any question of law which would warrant a grant of special leave.

6. Pursuant to r 41.10.5, we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

V.M. Bell
13 August 2015 S.J. Gageler