KAZIMIR Kowalski v Lieschke & Weatherill Lawyers

[2015] HCASL 213

KAZIMIR KOWALSKI

v

LIESCHKE & WEATHERILL LAWYERS

[2015] HCASL 213
A19/2015

1. In 1995, the respondent acted for the applicant in an appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia arising from litigation in the Workers Compensation Tribunal.  In 1996, following the hearing, the respondent rendered bills to the applicant totalling $3,536.16 and transferred to itself, in full satisfaction of its claim for costs, $2,000 that the applicant had placed in the respondent's trust account as security for costs before the appeal. 

2. On 21 May 2014, the applicant filed an application in the Supreme Court of South Australia for the fixing of legal costs in respect of the bills rendered by the respondent.  The applicant has been declared a vexatious litigant, and was given permission to pursue the application.  As the applicant's case file was destroyed by the respondent in 2006, the matter having appeared to be resolved, it was necessary for the taxation of costs to proceed by way of estimation.  A Master of the Supreme Court (Dart J) made a provisional costs order on 12 November 2014 that the bill be taxed in the sum of $2,000.  On 1 December 2014, Dart J dismissed an application for review of that order.  

3. On 19 May 2015, the Supreme Court (Bampton J) dismissed an application for a further review of the taxation, holding that there was no basis to interfere with Dart J's exercise of discretion.  Bampton J held that, upon a further review, a court will not interfere with a taxation unless it is shown that the taxing Master has made a gross mistake, and in this case there was no evidence that Dart J had erred or acted on any incorrect principle.

4. On 7 August 2015, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia (Gray, Vanstone and Kelly JJ) refused the applicant's application for permission to appeal from the decision of Bampton J.  The Court did not consider there to be any point of legal principle or public interest warranting a grant of permission, or any risk that there had been a miscarriage of justice.

5. The applicant now applies to this Court for special leave to appeal.  The draft notice of appeal does not raise any issue of principle that would justify a grant of special leave.  Moreover, there is no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision of the Full Court.  Special leave is refused.

6. Pursuant to r 41.10.5 we direct the Registrar to draw up, sign and seal an order dismissing the application.

S.M. Kiefel
10 December 2015 P.A. Keane