FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| KAVANAGH & KAVANAGH (No.2) | [2015] FCCA 3296 |
| Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – Ruling on costs application. |
| Legislation: Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989, ss.80C, 136, 136(2)(d), 141, 141(1)(n) Family Law Act 1975, s.117 |
| Cases cited: Lilley v CSR (SSAT Appeal) [2010] FMCAfam 378 Aspen v Selby [2010] FMCAfam 1130 |
| Applicant: | MR KAVANAGH |
| Respondent: | MS KAVANAGH |
| File Number: | MLC 1961 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Burchardt |
| Hearing date: | 29 September 2015 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 26 October 2015 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 18 December 2015 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Bacon |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Manby & Scott Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Smith |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Ken Smith & Associates |
ORDERS
The applicant father is to pay the respondent mother’s costs fixed at $17,664.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Kavanagh & Kavanagh (No.2) is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
MLC 1961 of 2010
| MR KAVANAGH |
Applicant
And
| MS KAVANAGH |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
On 29 September 2015, I gave judgment in this proceeding. I ordered that the Initiating Application filed by the father on 12 March 2014 be dismissed. The respondent sought costs but was not in a position to proceed with costs submissions on the day. I set a timetable for written submissions which have now been received.
The course of the proceeding
In order to understand the parties’ submissions, it is appropriate to give a brief recitation of the relevant parts of the history of the application. The Initiating Application filed on 12 March 2014 sought to set aside a Binding Child Support Agreement made between the parties dated 15 July 2010. The Initiating Application also sought final orders relating to certain parenting issues (see Final Order 3 sought in the application).
That order was the subject of a Response and Affidavit filed on 13 May 2014 by the respondent mother. Of the 21 relevant paragraphs of the Affidavit, paragraphs 13 to 21 dealt with children’s issues.
Thereafter, the applicant father abandoned paragraph 3 of the Final Orders sought in his Initiating Application at the first return date on 19 May 2014.
At that hearing, by consent, orders were made for each party to provide financial disclosure of matters set out in Annexure A, and Annexure A set out a substantial series of matters relating to financial records.
The next Court date was on 31 October 2014 when, by consent, a final hearing listed to commence on 6 November 2014 was vacated to a directions hearing on 26 February 2015 because “the parties have reached an agreement in principle to finalise matters between them, and are in the process of finalising those terms and/or a Minute of Consent Order”.
From correspondence passing between the solicitors for the parties annexed to the respondent mother’s application for costs, it is clear that the parties had instructed their solicitors to…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Kavanagh and Kavanagh (No.2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2015] FCCA 3296
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether the original decision regarding parenting orders was affected by an error of law, specifically concerning the application of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the principles of procedural fairness. The court was required to consider whether the judge at first instance had adequately considered the relevant factors and whether the orders made were in the best interests of the child.
Judge Burchardt dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the original decision. The judge reasoned that the original decision-maker had properly applied the relevant legislative provisions and had afforded procedural fairness to both parties. The court affirmed that the paramount consideration in parenting disputes is the best interests of the child, and that the original judge had demonstrably considered this principle.
The applicant father was ordered to pay the respondent mother’s costs, fixed at $17,664.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The applicant father is to pay the respondent mother’s costs fixed at $17,664.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.