Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
[2025] FedCFamC2G 336
•13 March 2025
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 336
File number: MLG 3945 of 2018 Judgment of: JUDGE GOSTENCNIK Date of judgment: 13 March 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – work skilled (subclass 457) visa – visa refused – first applicant in breach of cl 457.223 of sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) as she was not the subject to an approved nomination with a prospective employer – decision of the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) to affirm the delegate’s decision – judicial review – whether the applicants were appropriately notified of the changes to the subclass 457 visa scheme – whether the applicants received the Tribunal’s correspondence to comment on the changes to the subclass 457 visa scheme – whether the applicants were given sufficient time to procure a nomination approval – Tribunal’s decision not attended by jurisdictional error – application for judicial review dismissed Legislation: Migration Legislation Amendment (Temporary Skill Shortage Visa and Complementary Reforms) Regulations 2018 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 2, regs 2.72(10A), 2.72(AA), cls 457.223, 457.223(4), 457.223(4)(a), 457.223(4)(aa), 457.223(4A), 457.223(4AA), 457.321
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) sch 2, div 1, pt 2, item 3
Cases cited: Griffiths v The Queen [1989] HCA 39, 167 CLR 372
Hasim v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth [2013] FCA 1433, (2013) 218 FCR 25
Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 [2007] FCA 388
LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12, 98 ALJR 610
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Anotherv Peko-Wallsend Limited and Others [1986] HCA 40, 162 CLR 24
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 32 Date of last submission/s: 3 February 2025 Date of hearing: 17 February 2025 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicants: The first and second applicants appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr R O’Shannessy Solicitors for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley Solicitors for the Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
MLG 3945 of 2018 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: MANDEEP KAUR
First Applicant
VIPAN SAINI
Second Applicant
JASDEEP SINGH SAINI (and another named in the Schedule)
Third Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE GOSTENCNIK
DATE OF ORDER:
13 MARCH 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicants’ application for judicial review filed on 28 December 2018 is dismissed.
2.The first and second applicants pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $8,000.00.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judge Gostencnik
INTRODUCTION
By their application filed on 28 December 2018, the applicants seek judicial review of a decision of the former Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) made on 5 December 2018. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the (then) Minister for Immigration and Border Protection refusing to grant the first applicant a work skilled visa, and the second to fourth applicants visas because they were not members of the same family unit to an applicant who held a visa.
BACKGROUND
On 14 March 2017, the first applicant, a citizen of India, applied for a Temporary Work (Skilled) (Class UC) (Subclass 457) visa, whose sponsoring employer was ‘City Taxi Care Pty Ltd’. The second to fourth applicants were included in the visa application as members of the same family unit: Court Book (CB)1-CB16 and nominated a registered migration agent as their authorised representative and recipient for the visa application: CB6-CB7. A Minister’s delegate acknowledged receipt of the application for the four applicants on the day of lodgement, noting that the application had not yet been assessed, and that the (then) Department of Immigration and Border Protection will contact the applicants if further information is required: CB17. On 4 April 2017, the applicants completed an ‘Additional personal particulars information’ form indicating that the first applicant’s occupation is a Fleet Manager with City Taxi Care. The form enclosed supporting documents including, an English language test result and evidence of various university course completion: CB18-CB60.
By correspondence dated 27 April 2017: CB77-CB79, a delegate invited the first applicant to comment on a particular of information as provided in the visa application. The delegate informed the first applicant that her “prospective employer, CITY TAXI CARE PTY. LTD., does not have an approved nomination [for the applicant] at this time. As a result, [the applicant’s] visa application is unlikely to be successful”. The delegate’s correspondence advised that the first applicant must either contact her prospective employer to ascertain why it does not have an approved nomination for her, or in the absence of an approved nomination to: comment on the first applicant’s intention regarding the visa application; withdraw the application; or comment on any other information which the first applicant thinks is relevant. The delegate’s correspondence also advised the first applicant that:
You must respond to this invitation to comment within 28 days after you are taken to have received this letter. You should provide your response in writing.
…
If you do not reply within the timeframe specified above your application may be decided without the Department taking any further action to obtain the requested information. If you are unable to provide this information within this time you should contact us using the contact details provided below.
The delegate’s correspondence was sent by email to the migration agent’s email address as specified in the applicants’ visa application: CB7, CB77. Neither the migration agent nor the applicants responded to the delegate’s correspondence. It is uncontroversial that the application by City Taxi Care Pty Ltd for a standard business sponsor of the first applicant was not approved on 27 April 2017: CB125.
On 1 February 2018, a delegate refused the first applicant’s visa application, and a notification of the delegate’s decision was transmitted by email to the migration agent’s email address: CB80-CB86. The notification attached to the email comprised a notification letter: CB80-CB86, and a decision record: CB87-CB90. The delegate was not satisfied that the first applicant met the criterion in cl 457.223(4)(a) of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations), which then provided that:
457.223(4) The applicant meets the requirements of this subclause if:
(a)each of the following applies:
(i) a nomination of an occupation in relation to the applicant has been approved under section 140GB of the Act;
(ii) the nomination was made by a person who was a standard business sponsor at the time the nomination was approved;
(iii)the approval of the nomination has not ceased as provided for in regulation 2.75;
As the first applicant did not provide an approved nomination with a prospective employer nor respond to the delegate’s correspondence on 27 April 2017, the delegate refused to grant the first applicant the work visa. Consequently, as the second, third and fourth applicants were not members of the same family unit of a person who is the holder of a visa, the delegate was not satisfied that they met the criterion in cls 457.223 or 457.321 to the Regulations, and the dependent applicants visa application were also refused.
TRIBUNAL PROCEEDING
On 13 February 2018, the applicants applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision: CB91-CB93. The Tribunal acknowledged receipt of the application on 14 February 2018, noting that the validity of the application had not yet been assessed, and enclosed an ‘Information for review applicants’ factsheet: CB105-CB106.
The Tribunal informed the applicants on 23 February 2018 by email transmission, that the Minister announced significant changes to the skilled occupations that can be nominated and approved for the purposes of a subclass 457 visa application and that the first applicant’s nominated occupation of ‘Fleet Manager’ had been removed from the list of eligible skilled occupations. The correspondence noted that the first applicant’s visa application may no longer meet the requirements of cl 457.223(4)(aa) of Sch 2 to the Regulations, and invited the applicant to provide submissions in relation to the issue by 9 March 2018: CB111-CB112. Attached to the correspondence was a ‘Withdrawal of application – MR Division’ form for completion if the applicants no longer wished to proceed with the application: CB108-CB109, CB112.
The Tribunal sent the applicants another notification by email transmission on 21 September 2018, notifying them of further changes to the subclass 457 visa scheme. The Tribunal informed the applicants that:
On 18 March 2018, the Migration Amendment (Temporary Skill Shortage visa and Complementary Reforms) Regulations 2018 was introduced. Among other things, it repealed and replaced r.2.72 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations), which set out the criteria for nominations relating to Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa applications, and also repealed the Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa.
It is a requirement for the grant of the visa that you are the subject of an approved nomination by a standard business sponsor: cl.457.223(4) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. A review of your file suggests that you are not the subject of an approved nomination by a standard business sponsor, and that a new application for approval of a nomination in support of your Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa application can no longer be made.
Without an approved nomination, you will not meet an essential criterion for the grant of the visa. This would mean that the decision under review must be affirmed.
The Tribunal advised that if the first applicant is subject to an approved nomination, to provide evidence, or alternatively, if the applicants no longer wish to proceed with the application, to complete the withdrawal form and return it by 5 October 2018: CB114-CB115.
On 7 November 2018, the Tribunal invited the applicants to attend a hearing scheduled for 5 December 2018 to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues in their case: CB117-CB118. The invitation enclosed an ‘Information about hearings – MR Division’ factsheet, and a ‘Response to hearing invitation – MR Division’ form to confirm attendances at the hearing and requested the applicants to use the form to provide or attach any additional information the applicants wanted the Tribunal to consider. On 27 November 2018, the first applicant returned the ‘Response to hearing invitation’ form and indicated that all the applicants would attend the scheduled hearing: CB121-CB123.
The applicants attended the scheduled hearing, and the Tribunal delivered oral reasons on 5 December 2018 affirming the delegate’s decision. The Tribunal provided the applicants with a written record of the review outcome and an ‘Information about decisions – MR Division’ factsheet: CB140-CB141. The first applicant requested the Tribunal provide written reasons on 10 December 2018: CB142, and the Tribunal produced a written statement of decision and reasons (Decision) on 4 January 2019 which was transmitted to the applicants by email on the same day: CB143-CB147.
TRIBUNAL’S DECISION AND REASONS
The Tribunal set out at [1]-[2] of the Decision the nature of the application for review before it. At [3]-[4], the Tribunal notes that at the time the first applicant’s (Subclass 457) visa application was made, it was subject to the criteria in cl 457.223(4A) of Sch 2 to the Regulations, which required the applicant to have an approved nomination of an occupation by a standard business sponsor that had not ceased. The Tribunal noted that the first applicant’s claims had been made against cl 457.223(4), which applies to sponsorship for employment in an occupation by a standard business sponsor and that no claims had been made in respect of the alternative streams.
At [5] of the Decision, the Tribunal notes the first applicant’s acknowledgment that she was not subject to an approved or pending nomination for a subclause 457 visa, but claimed to have been unaware that was the case because she had not been advised by the prospective employer or its representative. The Tribunal reasons that because of changes to the subclause 457 visa scheme, since 18 March 2018 it was no longer possible to lodge a new nomination application in the subclass 457 visa scheme and the applicant was therefore unable to meet the criteria for the grant of the visa. At [6], the Tribunal reasons that as the first applicant was not then subject to an approved nomination by a standard business sponsor, the first applicant did not meet the criteria in cl 457.223(4A) of Sch 2 to the Regulations. The Tribunal noted at [7]-[8] that it had written to the first applicant to advise her that her nominated occupation was removed from the eligible skilled occupations list. The Tribunal reasoned that cl 457.223(4AA) required that the nominated occupation be specified in an instrument in writing for the purposes of regs 2.72(10A) or (AA) and as the first applicant’s occupation was no longer on the eligible skilled occupations list, she did not meet the criteria in cl 457.223, and so determined that the first applicant does not meet cl 457.223(4AA).
The Tribunal concluded that the first applicant did not meet the criterion for the visa. Consequently, as the second to fourth applicants were not members of the family unit of a person who held a (Subclass 457) visa, they did not satisfy cl 457.321 of Sch 2 to the Regulations, and the Tribunal decided at [10]-[11] of the Decision to affirm the decision under review.
CONSIDERATION
By their earlier mentioned judicial review application, the applicants’ set forth the following grounds:
1.My visa application for Subclass 457 Visa was refused by the Delegate of Minister for Department of Home Affairs for being assessed as not providing the evidence of an approved nominated position by the nominating business.
2.The nomination was refused by the Delegate of Minister for Home Affairs.
3.After having a refusal at the Department of Immigration I lodged an application for review at Administrative Appeals Tribunal for the refusal of my 457 visa application. The Tribunal made (sic) affirmed the decision of the Department of the Department of Home affairs.
4.Moreover, I think I am a victim of the system where both I and my employer being layman in immigration law, our employer’s migration consultant did not tell our employer about the hearing of our nomination application and subsequently the nomination application was refused which also resulted in the refusal of our visa application. Thus I want to request to consider my case in the light of facts where I am in trouble for none of my actions. I was not given appropriate time to meet the requirements for the approval of the new nomination application.
5.Moreover, I think that I have not been given fair representation in my current situation and arguments have not been given enough weightage whilst considering my visa application in the light of my current situation after the changes in the migration laws.
At the commencement of the hearing, I explained to the first and second applicants the nature of the Court’s judicial review jurisdiction. I explained that the Court may only grant relief if the applicants establish the Tribunal’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error and that the proceeding before the Court was not another opportunity to present a merits case nor was it a review of the merits of the Tribunal’s decision or the visa applications. I explained that jurisdictional error involved a “breach of an express or implied condition of a statutory conferral of decision-making authority” such that “it is ‘in law . . . no decision at all’ and is in that sense ‘void’”: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12, 98 ALJR 610 at [2]. And that jurisdictional error can take many different forms and that the categories are not closed. I gave some examples of jurisdictional error as including material errors by a decision maker:
(a)misunderstanding the applicable law;
(b)asking the wrong question;
(c)exceeding the bounds of reasonableness;
(d)identifying a wrong issue;
(e)ignoring relevant material;
(f)relying on irrelevant material;
(g)failing to consider a “claim” or a relevant “integer” of a claim;
(h)in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion;
(i)failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness; and
(j)showing actual or there is apprehended bias.
In a written submission lodged before the hearing and during oral submissions, the first applicant made out that which might be described as a plea to consider the position of her two children (the youngest of whom, aged 8 years, was born in Australia and knows no other home) and the dislocation that would be caused to them if the first applicant was required to return to India. The first applicant appears to accept that the Tribunal correctly determined her review application but wanted the Court to recognise the impact of refusing her application because of the immense burden for her children having to be uprooted from everything they know and placed in a foreign country that is unfamiliar to them. I empathise strongly with the applicants and the position in which they now find themselves but as I explained during the hearing, my empathy alone will not carry the day. The impact on the applicant’s children of a decision which is not attended by jurisdictional error will not carry the day. Error on the part of the Tribunal must be shown.
The first applicant also contended that during the Tribunal hearing, the applicants became aware that the “refusal of our nomination was as a result of our paperwork being insufficient and as a result of our employer or agent not providing the necessary documents required for the Nomination to continue”. The first applicant suggested that until that time “we believed that the Nomination was refused for other reasons”. By her written submission (and reiterated orally), the first applicant contended that “[at] no point was [she] adequately informed by the department of the status of the nomination application for [her] visa, nor was [she] provided with sufficient time or information to rectify any issues before the decision was made. [She] was not given proper notice regarding the removal of [her] occupation from the eligible skilled occupations list, nor was [she] provided an adequate opportunity to respond to the Tribunal’s requests for further information”.
These submissions cannot be accepted. As earlier noted, by correspondence dated 27 April 2017: CB77-CB79, dispatched by email to the migration agent’s email address as specified in the applicants’ visa application: CB7, CB77, a delegate of the Minister invited the first applicant to comment on the fact that her “prospective employer, CITY TAXI CARE PTY. LTD., [did] not have an approved nomination [for the applicant] at this time. As a result, [the applicant’s] visa application is unlikely to be successful”. The correspondence advised the first applicant that she must either contact her prospective employer to ascertain why it did not have an approved nomination for her, or in the absence of an approved nomination to comment on the applicant’s intention regarding the visa application; withdraw the application; or comment on any other information which the applicant thinks is relevant. The applicants could provide a response within 28 days after the day the email was transmitted. There was no response to the delegate’s correspondence.
During the hearing, the first applicant said that she did not receive the correspondence and that the employer’s migration agent did not provide her with the correspondence nor alert her to any requirement to respond to the delegate’s correspondence. That may be so, but the migration agent said to be the employer’s migration agent was nominated by the applicants as their representative in the visa application and the migration agent’s email address was specified by the applicants as the address to which correspondence relating to the visa application should be sent. That is what happened here. Any failure by the migration agent to pass on information received from the Minister’s delegate on behalf of the applicants, without more, does not disclose jurisdictional error. All the more so since here, the complaint is about things that happened (or did not happen) in connection with the delegate’s decision-making process, not that of the Tribunal.
In any event, as earlier noted, the Tribunal informed the applicants on 23 February 2018 by email transmission, that the Minister announced significant changes to the skilled occupations that can be nominated and approved for the purposes of a subclass 457 visa application and that the first applicant’s nominated occupation of ‘Fleet Manager’ had been removed from the list of eligible skilled occupations. The correspondence noted that the first applicant’s visa application may no longer meet the requirements of cl 457.223(4)(aa) of Sch 2 to the Regulations, and invited the applicant to provide submissions in relation to the issue by 9 March 2018. The Tribunal sent the applicants another notification by email transmission on 21 September 2018, notifying them of further changes to the subclass 457 visa scheme. The Tribunal informed the applicants, inter alia, that “[i]t is a requirement for the grant of the visa that you are the subject of an approved nomination by a standard business sponsor: cl.457.223(4) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. A review of your file suggests that you are not the subject of an approved nomination by a standard business sponsor, and that a new application for approval of a nomination in support of your Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa application can no longer be made. Without an approved nomination, you will not meet an essential criterion for the grant of the visa. This would mean that the decision under review must be affirmed”. The Tribunal advised that if the first applicant is subject to an approved nomination, to provide evidence. The Tribunal then invited the applicants to attend a hearing.
Contrary to the applicants’ contention, they were alerted by the Tribunal to the changes to the subclass 457 visa scheme and were given reasonable time in which to comment, to provide further information and to take advice about what, if any alternative visa pathways might be available to them in the circumstances. The first applicant also said that the failure to have an approved nomination was not her fault and that she had relied on her proposed employer and its migration agent to provide “the necessary documents required for the nomination to continue”. Putting to one side that the rejection of the approved nomination was not before the Tribunal, fault is not in issue. A relevant question for the Tribunal on review was whether the first applicant had an approved or pending nomination for a subclause 457 visa. She did not. Why she did not have an approved or pending nomination was immaterial. No jurisdictional error is thereby disclosed.
Returning then to the grounds of application, the first, second and third paragraphs do not contend any error and are concerned only with background information. By ground 4, the applicants contend that the prospective employer’s migration consultant did not inform the first applicant’s prospective employer about the “hearing of [their] nomination application and subsequently the nomination application was refused which also resulted in the refusal of [their] visa application”. Accordingly, the applicants contend that the first applicant was not at fault for the refusal of her application, and she was not given enough time to meet the requirements to get her nomination approved.
As the first respondent correctly contends, the nomination application was not before the Tribunal and so is not a matter before the Court. Accordingly, any failure or error in respect of the nomination application is not and cannot be subject to the judicial review application and so does not disclose jurisdictional error. For the same reasons, the applicants’ complaints about notification of the hearing of the nomination application does not advance the matter. And as the first respondent also correctly points out, although there is properly no information before the Court about the reason the sponsor's nomination was refused on 27 April 2017, the nominated occupation of Fleet Manager had been, on 18 April 2017, removed from the list of eligible skilled occupations. The removal of Fleet Manager from the list of eligible skilled occupations occurred almost 11 months before the Migration Legislation Amendment (Temporary Skill Shortage Visa and Complementary Reforms) Regulations 2018 (Cth) (Amending Regulations) commenced on 18 March 2018, the effect of which was that it was no longer possible to lodge a new nomination application in the 457-visa scheme. Consequently, and contrary to the applicants’ contention in ground 4, both the first applicant and the prospective employer had sufficient time, between the removal of ‘Fleet Manager’ as an occupation, and the commencement of the Amending Regulations, to lodge a new application with a different proposed occupation from the list of eligible skilled occupations.
Furthermore, the Tribunal relevantly informed the applicants of the changes to the scheme by correspondence dated 23 February and 21 September 2018. The correspondence dated 23 February 2018 informed the applicants that the nominated occupation of ‘Fleet Manager’ was removed from the list of eligible skilled occupations and advised that the first applicant may no longer meet the requirements for the grant of her visa. Accordingly, the applicants were invited to comment and provide submissions by 9 March 2018. By correspondence dated 21 September 2018, the Tribunal relevantly informed the applicants that the Amending Regulations were introduced on 18 March 2018 and that a requirement of the (Subclass 457) visa is that the visa applicant must be subject to an approved nomination by a business sponsor pursuant to cl 457.223(4) of Sch 2 to the Regulations. The Tribunal noted in its correspondence that the first applicant was not subject to an approved nomination by a standard business sponsor, and invited her to comment on, or provide evidence of the contrary by 5 October 2018. The applicants did not respond to the correspondence dated 23 February, nor 21 September 2018. The applicants had sufficient time to procure a nomination approval and meet the requirements of the visa grant had the first applicant acted on the information provided by the Tribunal in its 23 February 2018 correspondence. The applicants have not otherwise explained nor provided particulars about how they say the Tribunal failed to give the first applicant appropriate time.
For these reasons, the applicants’ contention that the first applicant was not provided sufficient time to get a nomination approval, as stated in ground 4, must be rejected.
By ground 5, the applicants assert that the first applicant was not given fair representation and that her arguments were not given sufficient weight in respect of the “changes in migration laws”. The applicants’ reference to “changes in migration laws” refers to the changes to the (Subclass 457) visa scheme. The applicants have not provided any particulars, nor explained which arguments the first applicant raised that were not considered. The attribution of weight is generally a matter for the administrative decision maker, although a Court may in some circumstances set aside an administrative decision because of a disproportionate or unreasonable attribution of weight, for example, if the decision maker failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance or has given excessive weight to a relevant factor of no great importance. But the preferred ground on which this is done is that the decision is "manifestly unreasonable”: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Anotherv Peko-Wallsend Limited and Others [1986] HCA 40, 162 CLR 24 at 39-41; see also Griffiths v The Queen [1989] HCA 39, 167 CLR 372 at 379; Ho v Professional Services Review Committee No 295 [2007] FCA 388 at [23]-[26] and Hasim v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth [2013] FCA 1433, (2013) 218 FCR 25 at [65].
But in the instant case, the absence of any particulars and the failure to identify any arguments advanced by the first applicant to which inadequate weight was ascribed means that ground 5 must fail. As the first respondent correctly submitted, the Tribunal was required to apply the law as at the date of its Decision and had no choice but to affirm the decision as the first applicant was not the subject of an approved nomination. And so, the decision that the Tribunal made was the only decision that was reasonably open to it on the evidence.
For completeness, the first applicant also submitted that:
(a)given the significant changes in her family’s circumstances, particularly the impact on her children’s education and well-being, she requests the Court hold the decision of the Tribunal until such time as her eldest son, completes his education in Australia; and
(b)the Court allow her a reasonable period to secure a new nomination in the aged care sector, for which she has qualified and in which she has attained sufficient experience, thus enabling her to meet the necessary criteria for a visa in the future.
Neither contention speaks to jurisdictional error and for the reasons already explained, the Tribunal’s decision is not attended by jurisdictional error. To the extent the first applicant urges the Court to delay judgment in this matter until her eldest son completes his education, that contention is rejected and would in my view amount to an abuse of judicial discretion.
Costs
The first respondent sought an award of costs in the amount of $8,000.00 directed to the first and second applicants in the event the application for judicial review failed. The applicants did not advance any cogent reason why in that event a costs order in the amount sought should not be made. Considering the history of this matter, the result, the work involved as disclosed from the filings, the length of hearing and that the amount sought is less than the amount currently fixed by item 3, Pt 2, Div 1 of Sch 2 to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), I consider the costs sought by the first respondent are reasonable and the first and second applicants should pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,000.00.
I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gostencnik. Associate:
Dated: 13 March 2025
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
MLG 3945 of 2018 Applicants
Fourth Applicant:
AVIREET KAUR SAINI
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