FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 556
Appeal from: Kaur & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 3533 File number(s): VID 2 of 2016 Judge(s): BUCHANAN J Date of judgment: 20 May 2016 Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), rr 1.61, 1.61(1), 1.61(5), 36.03, 36.03(a)(i)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 97
Cases cited: SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Trivedi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 220 FCR 169
Date of hearing: 5 May 2016 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 37 Counsel for the Appellants: The first and second appellants appeared in person and on behalf of the third appellant Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms L A Helsdon of Sparke Helmore Lawyers Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice ORDERS
VID 2 of 2016 BETWEEN: RAJWINDER KAUR
First Appellant
JAGROOP SINGH
Second Appellant
CHARANJOT SINGH CHAHAL
Third Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
BUCHANAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
20 MAY 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal filed on 4 January 2016 be dismissed.
2.The interlocutory application filed on 4 January 2016 be dismissed.
3.The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs, as taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BUCHANAN J:
Preliminary matters
The first respondent asserts that the appellants require an extension of time of five days to prosecute their appeal, and oppose any such extension. I do not agree that an extension of time is necessary.
The judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (“the FCCA”) which is under appeal was given on 9 December 2015. A notice of appeal was filed on 4 January 2016.
The timing of the present appeal to this Court was governed by r 36.03(a)(i) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)
36.03Time for filing and serving notice of appeal
An appellant must file a notice of appeal:
(a)within 21 days after:
(i)the date on which the judgment appealed from was pronounced or the order was made; or
…
However, r 1.61 provides:
1.61 Calculation of time
(1)A period of time for doing an act or thing fixed by these Rules or by an order of the Court is to be calculated in accordance with this rule.
…
(5)If the time fixed includes a day in the period starting on 24 December in a year and ending on 14 January in the next year, the day is not to be counted.
The appeal was within time.
Another issue which requires no independent attention is an interlocutory application by the appellants that the first respondent be restrained from giving effect to the judgment of the FCCA, pending hearing of the appeal to this…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2016] FCA 556
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the MRT's decision to refuse the visa applications was lawful and supported by the evidence. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the MRT correctly identified the IELTS test report form as a bogus document and whether this finding was sufficient to conclude that the primary applicant failed to meet PIC 4020. Additionally, the court examined whether the refusal of visas to the secondary applicants was justified given the primary applicant's failure to meet the visa criteria.
The court found that the MRT's decision was legally sound and properly based on the evidence. The primary applicant's failure to respond to the notice of suspicion regarding the IELTS test report form and the lack of any evidence to contradict the MRT's finding that the document was bogus supported the MRT's conclusion. The court further held that since the primary applicant did not meet the primary criteria for a visa due to the bogus document, the secondary applicants also did not meet the necessary family unit criteria. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the interlocutory application was also dismissed. The appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
This decision underscores the importance of providing accurate documentation in visa applications and the consequences of failing to substantiate claims against administrative findings. The court's ruling reinforces the need for visa applicants to engage with administrative processes and provide satisfactory explanations or evidence to counter suspicions of document falsification.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal filed on 4 January 2016 be dismissed.
2. The interlocutory application filed on 4 January 2016 be dismissed.
3. The appellants pay the first respondent’s costs, as taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Although subsequent decision-makers are not bound by the reasons of the delegate, those reasons serve to put a visa applicant on clear notice that the issues to which those reasons refer will be issues on any review (SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152 at [35]). The Migration Review Tribunal The appellants, on 9 October 2012, made an application to the Migration Review Tribunal (“the MRT”) to review the decision of the delegate. The appellants were invited to attend a hearing at the MRT on 4 June 2014, but did not do so. A telephone call was made to their nominated representative who, according to a note in the MRT’s records, informed a member of the MRT staff that the first appellant “had decided not to attend this hearing”. On 6 June 2014, the MRT then wrote to the appellants, through their nominated representative, and invited comment about the potentially bogus nature of the IELTS test report form, and its significance for the requirements of PIC 4020. There was no comment or other information provided by the appellants. The MRT concluded on 4 July 2014: Bogus document… 19.In the absence of any response or explanation from the applicants, and in light of the information on the IELTS verification records that there was no match found for the test report form that was submitted to the Department in support of the applicant’s visa application, the Tribunal reasonably suspects that the IELTS test report form 10IN041633TR122G, as given by the applicant to the Department in relation to this visa application, purports to have been but was not issued in respect of her and is therefore a bogus document within the meaning of s.97(a) of the Act. Alternatively the Tribunal reasonably suspects that that the IELTS test report form 10IN041633TR122G as given by the applicant to the Department in relation to this visa application is counterfeit and is therefore a bogus document within the meaning of s.97(b). 20.The Tribunal therefore finds that there is evidence that the applicant has given a bogus document to the Minister in relation to her visa application. It follows that the Tribunal is not satisfied that there is “no evidence” that a bogus document has been given to the Minister or the Tribunal and therefore the applicant does not meet PIC 4020(1). … Secondary applicants26.The delegate also refused visas to the secondary applicants, the partner and child of the visa applicant and who are included in her application. 27.There is no claim or any evidence before the Tribunal that the remaining applicants meet the primary criteria for the grant of the visa. In addition, to meet clause 485.321, the secondary applicant must be a member of the family unit of a person who, having satisfied the primary criteria, is the holder of a subclass 485 visa. As the applicant does not satisfy the primary criteria for a subclass 485 visa, or any other subclass, the Tribunal finds that the secondary applicants also do not satisfy clause 485.321 and, therefore, the criteria for a subclass 485 visas, or any other subclass. The Federal Circuit Court of Australia