Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 427

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: Kaur v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 964
File number: NSD 793 of 2017
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 16 March 2018
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time to file appeal from judgment of Federal Circuit Court – whether extension of time should be granted – whether grounds of appeal had sufficient merit to warrant extension of time – whether adequate explanation for delay

MIGRATION – judicial review – Partner (Class UK) visa – where application for judicial review dismissed by primary judge – whether appellant was afforded procedural fairness – appearance at Federal Circuit Court hearing by telephone – whether primary judge erred in finding that Tribunal had complied with the requirements in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Waensila (2016) 241 FCR 121 in respect of “compelling circumstances” – PIC 4020

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 43

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 359A, 359AA

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 36.03

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), cl 820.211 of Schedule 2, criteria 3001, 3003 and 3004 of Schedule 3, criterion 4020 of Schedule 4

Cases cited:

Boakye-Danquah v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2002) 116 FCR 557

Gallo v Dawson (1990) 93 ALR 479

Gallo v Dawson (No 2) (1992) 109 ALR 319

Hunter Valley Developments Proprietary Limited v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Hossain (2017) 252 FCR 31

Waensila v The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 241 FCR 121

Date of hearing: 16 March 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 44
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms E Cheesman of Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent made a submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 793 of 2017
BETWEEN:

PARAMJEET KAUR

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

16 MARCH 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application for an extension of time filed 25 May 2017 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of $2,500.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript)

WIGNEY J:

  1. This is an application for an extension of time in which to file an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.  In that judgment, the primary judge dismissed Ms Paramjeet Kaur’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which affirmed a decision of the Minister for Immigration…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 427
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Ms Kaur, a citizen of India, sought an extension of time to appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing her application for judicial review of the Minister’s refusal to grant her a Partner (Class UK) visa. The primary judge had found that the delegate of the Minister was not procedurally unfair in refusing the visa because the Tribunal had properly considered whether there were compelling circumstances to excuse the delay in lodging the application. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had failed to afford her procedural fairness and that the primary judge erred in finding that the Tribunal had complied with the requirements in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Waensila in respect of “compelling circumstances”.

The court had to determine whether the applicant’s application for an extension of time should be granted, and whether the grounds of appeal had sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time. The court also had to consider whether the applicant provided an adequate explanation for the delay in filing the application. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had failed to afford her procedural fairness and that the primary judge erred in finding that the Tribunal had complied with the requirements in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Waensila in respect of “compelling circumstances”.

The court found that the applicant had not provided an adequate explanation for the delay in filing the application, and that the grounds of appeal did not have sufficient merit to warrant an extension of time. The court held that the Tribunal had complied with the requirements in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Waensila in respect of “compelling circumstances”, and that the primary judge was correct to find that the delegate was not procedurally unfair in refusing the visa.

The application for an extension of time was dismissed. The applicant was ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs of $2,500.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application for an extension of time filed 25 May 2017 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of $2,500.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, Ms Kaur’s application for an extension of time must be dismissed.BACKGROUND Ms Kaur is a citizen of India. She first arrived in Australia on 12 April 2009 as the holder of a student visa. That substantive visa ceased on 21 September 2011. Ms Kaur applied for the partner visa that is the subject of this application on 1 May 2014. That is almost two and a half years after the expiry of her student visa. A visa applicant who is not the holder of a substantive visa at the time of application must meet certain criteria in Schedule 3 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). Relevant to the present matter, a visa applicant must satisfy Schedule 3 criteria 3001, 3003 and 3004, unless the Minister is satisfied that there are compelling reasons for not applying those criteria: cl 820.211(2)(d) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. In order to satisfy criterion 3001, the visa application must have been lodged within 28 days of the relevant day. The “relevant day” is defined in criterion 3001(2), as follows:3001(2)For the purposes of subclause (1) and of clause 3002, the relevant day, in relation to an applicant, is:(a)if the applicant held an entry permit that was valid up to and including 31 August 1994 but has not subsequently been the holder of a substantive visa – 1 September 1994; or(b)if the applicant became an illegal entrant before 1 September 1994 (whether or not clause 6002 in Schedule 6 of the Migration (1993) Regulations applied or section 195 of the Act applies) and has not, at any time on or after 1 September 1994, been the holder of a substantive visa – the day when the applicant last became an illegal entrant; or(c)if the applicant:(i)ceased to hold a substantive or criminal justice visa on or after 1 September 1994; or(ii) entered Australia unlawfully on or after 1 September 1994;whichever is the later of:(iii)the last day when the applicant held a substantive or criminal justice visa; or(iv)the day when the applicant last entered Australia unlawfully; or(d)if the last substantive visa held by the applicant was cancelled, and the Tribunal has made a decision to set aside and substitute the cancellation decision or the Minister’s decision not to revoke the cancellation – the later of:(i)the day when that last substantive visa ceased to be in effect; and(ii)the day when the applicant is taken, under sections 368C, 368D and 379C of the Act, to have been notified of the Tribunal’s decision. It may be observed that Ms Kaur’s application for the partner visa was lodged well outside 28 days of the relevant day that applied in her case. A delegate of the Minister refused to grant Ms Kaur the partner visa on the basis that there were no compelling reasons for not applying the Schedule 3 criteria. The delegate found, therefore, that Ms Kaur did not satisfy cl 820.211(2)(d) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations, an essential criterion for the grant of the visa. Ms Kaur applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. TRIBUNAL’S REVIEW AND DECISION

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ms Kaur applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision. TRIBUNAL’S REVIEW AND DECISION On 10 March 2015, the Tribunal wrote to Ms Kaur and invited her to give evidence and present arguments at a hearing. It would appear that the Tribunal also requested Ms Kaur to provide to it any information she wished to rely on to justify not applying the Schedule 3 criteria. On 21 April 2015, Ms Kaur provided the Tribunal with a number of documents, including: a report by “Psychology Pathways” dated 10 April 2015; a submission by Ms Kaur’s migration agent; translated letters purporting to be from Ms Kaur’s former father-in-law, Mr Sukar Singh, to Ms Kaur, dating from 2011 to 2015; and translated affidavits and letters purportedly sent to authorities in India in relation to alleged threats and violence towards Ms Kaur’s family. On 28 April 2015, Ms Kaur appeared at a hearing before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments. The sponsor for Ms Kaur’s partner visa did not appear at the hearing before the Tribunal. Ms Kaur gave evidence that she did not know whether her relationship with the sponsor would continue because she claimed the sponsor had been drinking and had been violent towards her. Ms Kaur gave evidence to the Tribunal concerning her circumstances, which she said were sufficiently compelling to warrant the waiver of the Schedule 3 criteria. Ms Kaur pointed, in particular, to three circumstances: first, that she feared for her safety if she were to return to India because of threats and violence from her first husband’s family, who had been violent towards her family and had made extensive threats to kill her if she returned to India; second, she had been a follower of Dera Sacha Sauda, an Indian religion, and feared harm from “Anti Dera organisations” if she returned to India; and, third, she suffered from mental health issues because of violence at the hands of her first husband, as well as her experience in detention. Ms Kaur also relied on the documentary evidence, summarised earlier, that she provided to the Tribunal in support of her claims. On 21 July 2015, following the hearing on 28 April 2015, the Tribunal wrote to Ms Kaur pursuant to s 359A of the Act (s 359A letter), inviting her to comment on information that the report from “Psychology Pathways” that she had provided to the Tribunal had been altered. Ms Kaur was advised that the psychologist who had provided the report had confirmed that the copy of the report provided to the Tribunal was different to the report written by him. The Tribunal explained that this information was relevant because public interest criterion 4020 in Schedule 4 to the Regulations (PIC 4020) required that there be no evidence that the applicant had given, or caused to be given, to the Minister or an officer of the Tribunal, a bogus document or information that was false or misleading in a material particular. The Tribunal put to the applicant that, by providing a psychologist’s report that had been altered, it appeared she had submitted a bogus document in support of her application. On the same day, the Tribunal also invited Ms Kaur to appear before it at a further hearing to be conducted on 11 August 2015. It is unclear whether Ms Kaur responded in writing to the s 359A letter. Ms Kaur did, however, attend the second hearing before the Tribunal on 11 August 2015, at which the information concerning the psychologist’s report was repeated to Ms Kaur, and she was given an opportunity to respond to it.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established