Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 779

Appeal from: Kaur & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3169
File number: VID 1360 of 2017
Judge: MIDDLETON J
Date of judgment: 25 May 2018
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Hasran v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 40

Kaur & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3169

M v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 155 FCR 333

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sun (2005) 146 FCR 498

Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1403

Yang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FMCA 890

Date of hearing: 25 May 2018
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: No Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 29
Counsel for the Appellants: The Appellants appeared in person
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr J Grant
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice, save as to costs

ORDERS

VID 1360 of 2017
BETWEEN:

SUKHNEET KAUR

First Appellant

HARDEEP SINGH

Second Appellant

EVNEET KAUR (and another named in the Schedule)

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MIDDLETON J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 MAY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal is dismissed.

2.The appellants pay to the first respondent the costs of and in connection with the appeal.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MIDDLETON J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 13 December 2017, the appellants filed a notice of appeal in relation to the orders and reasons of the Judge of the Federal Circuit Court, made on 30 November 2017 and published as Kaur & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 3169. Her Honour (the ‘primary judge’) dismissed the application for review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’) affirming a decision of a delegate of the Minister (the ‘delegate’) not to grant the applicant a Regional Employer Nomination Permanent (Class RN) (Subclass 187) visa (the ‘Visa’).

  2. Pursuant to the orders of Registrar of the Federal Court dated 12 January 2018, the appellants were to file and serve any written submissions on or before 11 May 2018.  No written submissions from the appellants were filed or served.

    BACKGROUND

  3. On 17 July 2014, the first appellant (the ‘appellant’) applied for the Visa.  The second, third and fourth appellants were included in the Visa application as members of the appellant’s family unit.  The application for the Visa was sought by the appellant in the “direct entry stream”, to work in the nominated position of “Pastry Cook” with the sponsor Leonti Investment Pty Ltd (the ‘sponsor

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 779
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection was brought by the appellants against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court which dismissed their application for judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the "Tribunal") to affirm the delegate's refusal to grant the appellants a visa. The appellants contended that the Tribunal erred in law by not offering them a hearing before making its decision. They also claimed that the Tribunal failed to take into account certain information relevant to their application, and did not give them sufficient time to lodge new sponsorship of their employment. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection ("the first respondent") argued that the appeal should be dismissed as it had no merit, and that the appellants had not properly raised certain issues in the Court below.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal erred in declining to offer the appellants a hearing before making its decision, and whether the Tribunal failed to consider relevant information or gave insufficient time to the appellants to respond. The court examined the statutory framework, particularly sections 359A, 359B, 359C and 360 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), which govern the procedures for review by the Tribunal. The court found that the Tribunal's invitation to the appellants to comment on adverse information complied with the legislative requirements. As the appellants did not respond within the prescribed period, the Tribunal was permitted to make its decision without taking further action to obtain information from the appellants. The appellants' failure to respond precluded them from appearing before the Tribunal or the Tribunal from offering them a hearing. The court concluded that the Tribunal did not fall into error in proceeding as it did.

In light of the above, the court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellants pay the first respondent's costs of and in connection with the appeal. The court held that the appeal had no substantive merit as the Tribunal's decision was in accordance with the law. The appellants' failure to properly raise certain issues in the Court below also rendered the appeal defective.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is dismissed.

2. The appellants pay to the first respondent the costs of and in connection with the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Pursuant to the orders of Registrar of the Federal Court dated 12 January 2018, the appellants were to file and serve any written submissions on or before 11 May 2018. No written submissions from the appellants were filed or served.BACKGROUND On 17 July 2014, the first appellant (the ‘appellant’) applied for the Visa. The second, third and fourth appellants were included in the Visa application as members of the appellant’s family unit. The application for the Visa was sought by the appellant in the “direct entry stream”, to work in the nominated position of “Pastry Cook” with the sponsor Leonti Investment Pty Ltd (the ‘sponsor’). In order to be granted the Visa, the appellant had to meet a range of criteria (see s 31(3) and s 65(1)(a)(ii) Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the ‘Act’)), which included cl 187.233 of Sch 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (the ‘Regulations’). Relevantly, cl 187.233 required that:(1)The position to which the application related was the position nominated in an application for approval of a nominated position under reg 5.19(4)(h)(ii) or reg 5.19(4) (as in force before 1 July 2012), and had to also be the position that was subject of the declaration required to be made as part of the Visa application (cl 187.233(1)).(2)The person who would employ the appellant be the sponsor in the application for approval (cl 187.233(2)).(3)The nomination had been approved by the Minister and had not been subsequently withdrawn (cl 187.233(3) and (4)).(4)The position was still available to the appellant (cl 187.233(5)).(5)The application for the Visa was made no more than six months after the date the Minister had approved the nomination (cl 187.233(6)). On 19 February 2015, the Department wrote to the appellant, by email sent to her appointed representative, inviting her to comment on adverse information before it, being that the sponsor’s application for approval of a position under the direct entry stream in respect of the appellant had been refused. No response was received by the Department. On 25 March 2015, the delegate refused to grant the Visa because the appellant did not meet the criterion in cl 187.233 of Sch 2 to the Regulations because the sponsor’s application for a nomination had been refused.TRIBUNAL’S PROCEEDINGS On 2 April 2015, the appellants applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision, and provided a copy of the delegate’s decision with the application for review. The appellants appointed Mr Gargandeep Singh of Vision Overseas as their registered migration agent and authorised recipient pursuant to s 379G of the Act, providing his email address as gagan@visionoverseas.com.au. On 12 April 2016, the Tribunal wrote to the appellants, by email to their representative at gagan@visionoverseas.com.au, pursuant to s 359A and s 359(2) of the Act, inviting them to comment and provide information in relation to information the Tribunal had received. That information was that on 8 April 2016, a differently constituted Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse approval of the related nomination application made by the sponsor for the position for which the appellant was proposed to be employed. The Tribunal’s letter indicated that if comment or information was not received by 26 April 2016, the Tribunal may make a decision without taking any further action to enable the appellant to appear before it, and that the appellants would lose their entitlement to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments. No response was received by the Tribunal.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 29 April 2016, the Tribunal made a decision affirming the decision under review.TRIBUNALS DECISION The Tribunal found that the appellants had failed to respond to the Tribunal’s s 359A invitation of 12 April 2016 within the prescribed period (or at all), and that pursuant to s 359C, s 360(3) and s 393A of the Act, the appellants had lost their entitlement to a hearing and the Tribunal had no power to permit them to appear (at [9]). The Tribunal considered whether to adjourn the review to allow the appellants additional time to provide further evidence, but found that it was not required to defer making its decision “indefinitely”, noting that the appellants were represented and that neither they nor their representative had provided any comments or response to the Tribunal (at [10]). The Tribunal therefore decided not to exercise its discretion to defer the review any further (at [11]). The Tribunal found that the application for approval of the nominated position relating to the appellant made by the sponsor had been refused by a delegate of the first respondent on 8 December 2014, with that decision affirmed by the Tribunal on 8 April 2016; and that the appellant had failed to provide any evidence that there was an approved nomination made by the sponsor (at [17]). The Tribunal was consequently not satisfied that there was an approved nominated position in relation to the appellant as required by cl 187.233(3) (at [17]-[18]).PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT On 15 May 2016, the appellants lodged an application for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision in the Federal Circuit Court. The application pleaded that the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error because: (1)the appellants were not given an opportunity to attend a hearing before the Tribunal; (2)the Tribunal failed to take into account the appellant’s employment with the Sponsor from July 2014 to March 2015; and (3)the Tribunal did not give the appellants time to lodge “new sponsorship of my new employment”. On 30 November 2017, the matter came before the Federal Circuit Court for hearing. The appellant appeared in person with the assistance of a Punjabi interpreter. The primary judge delivered an ex tempore judgment the same day dismissing the application. The primary judge found that the appellants had been invited by the Tribunal pursuant to s 359A and s 359(2) of the Act to comment on adverse information, and that the Tribunal’s invitation complied with the legislative requirements set out in the Act. The primary judge found that the appellants did not respond to the invitation prior to the prescribed period or at all, and that pursuant to s 359C(1) and (2) of the Act the Tribunal was permitted to make a decision without taking further action to obtain information from the appellants; and that s 359C(1) and (2), and s 360(3) of the Act precluded the applicant’s from appearing before the Tribunal, or the Tribunal from offering the appellants a hearing (at [24]). The primary judge therefore found that the Tribunal did not fall into error proceeding as it did (at [25]).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The notice of appeal contains a single ground alleging that the primary judge “applied a wrong principal of law and made an error” in relation to s 359A and s 359(2) of the Act, and incorrectly interpreted cl 187.233 and cl 187.233(1)(b) of Sch 2 of the Regulations. The first respondent submitted that the latter aspect of the ground (regarding cl 187.233 and cl 187.233(1)(b)) was not raised in the Court below and therefore requires leave, and there is in any case no error apparent in either the Tribunal or primary judge’s treatment of those provisions, with the consequences that the appeal is without any substantive merit and should be dismissed.CONSIDERATIONSections 359A and 359(2) of the Act The Tribunal’s invitation of 12 April 2016 sought the appellants’ comment pursuant to s 359A of the Act on information before it that she was not subject to an approved nomination by the Sponsor. That information was, self-evidently, information which would (and was) the reason for affirming the decision under review. The invitation complied with the legislative requirements as it:(1)Set out the particulars of the information, its relevance to the review and invited the appellants to comment in writing: s 359A(1) and s 359B(1)(b).(2)Was given to the appellants’ representative as their authorised recipient, as required by s 379G of the Act, and was given to the authorised recipient by email, being one of the methods permitted by s 379A(5) and as per s 359A(2)(a) of the Act.(3)Specified the period of time in which the appellants were required to respond to the information being the prescribed period of fourteen days from when the invitation was received: s 359B(2) of the Act read with reg 4.17 of the Regulations. The appellants did not respond to the invitation prior to the expiry of the prescribed period, or at all. In such circumstances, s 359C(1) and (2) of the Act applied, and the Tribunal was permitted to make a decision on the review without taking any further action to obtain the information or the appellant’s comment or response. Further, as s 359C(1) and (2) applied to the appellants, s 360(3) provided that in such circumstances the appellants were not entitled to appear before the Tribunal. Under s 363A, the Tribunal does not have the power to permit a person to do something they are not entitled to do, unless a provision expressly provides otherwise. Section 360 does not provide otherwise. Accordingly, through the operation of s 360(3) and 363A, the appellant’s failure to respond to the s 359A invitation precluded the Tribunal from offering the appellants a hearing; see, Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCCA 1403 at [32]-[39]; Yang v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FMCA 890 at [40]; Hasran v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 40; M v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2006) 155 FCR 333; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sun (2005) 146 FCR 498.