Kaur v Minister for Home Affairs
[2020] FCCA 206
•6 February 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| KAUR v MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS & ANOR | [2020] FCCA 206 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Application for temporary student visa – contemporaneous application for permanent residency visa – non-satisfaction of criteria requiring applicant for temporary student visa to have a genuine intention to only remain in Australia temporarily – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Sch.2, cl.500.212 |
| Cases cited: Saini v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 858 |
| Applicant: | RUPINDER PAL KAUR |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
| Second Respondent: | ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
| File Number: | BRG 523 of 2018 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Egan |
| Hearing date: | 3 February 2020 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 3 February 2020 |
| Delivered at: | Brisbane |
| Delivered on: | 6 February 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Burrow |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Chand Lawyers |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Psaltis |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Clayton Utz |
ORDERS
The name of the First Respondent be amended to read ‘Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs’.
The Amended Application for Review filed on 6 September 2018 be dismissed.
The Applicant pay the First Respondent’s costs of and incidental to the hearing and in respect of the costs thrown away relating to the adjournment of the hearing on 20 March 2019 and the further adjournment of the hearing on 25 July 2019, the total of such costs being $9,424.00.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
BRG 523 of 2018
| RUPINDER PAL KAUR |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS |
First Respondent
| ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
The applicant is a citizen of India. Her relevant study and visa history was set out in [13] and [14] of the reasons of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) as follows:
“[13] The applicant's study history is that she was granted an initial Student visa (TU573) on 29 October 2007 to study in the higher education sector. Since her arrival in Australia the applicant has completed 11 vocational courses at Diploma and/or Advanced Diploma level in: Hospitality Management; Business; Management; Marketing; Information Technology; and Leadership and Management, Certificate IV in Hospitality (Commercial Cookery) Certificates III and IV in Business and in English language but has not studied in the higher education sector.
[14] The applicant is currently enrolled in an Advanced Diploma of Hospitality Management at American College. At the completion of that program, the applicant hopes to articulate to a one-year Bachelor of Business program at Alphacrucis College, a non-university higher education provider.”
The application before the Court is for review of the decision of the Tribunal handed down on 27 April 2018 refusing the grant of a Subclass 500 (Student) Visa. The Tribunal conducted a hearing on 11 April 2018, at which time the applicant gave evidence and presented arguments. The applicant was represented by a registered migration agent at the hearing. It was indicated at the commencement of the hearing that the applicant did not require the services of an interpreter.
At [8] of its reasons, the Tribunal recorded that the issue before it was whether the applicant genuinely intended to stay in Australia temporarily or not. In that regard, clause 500.212 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (‘the Regulations’) relevantly provided as follows:
“500.212
The applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student because:
(a) the applicant intends genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily, having regard to:
(i) the applicant’s circumstances; and
(ii) the applicant’s immigration history; and
(iii) if the applicant is a minor – the intentions of a parents, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and
(iv) any other relevant matter; and
(b) the applicant intends to comply with any conditions subject to which the visa is granted, having regard to:
(i) the applicant’s record of compliance with any condition of a visa previously held by the applicant (if any); and
(ii) the applicant’s stated intention to comply with any conditions to which the visa may be subject; and
(c) of any other relevant matter.”
At [10] of its reasons, the Tribunal noted that it must have regard to the criteria as set out in Direction Number 69 when assessing the genuine temporary entrant criterion for student visa applications. It noted that such Direction required the Tribunal to have regard to a number of specified factors, namely:
·“the applicant’s circumstances in their home country, potential circumstances in Australia, and the value of the course to the applicant’s future;
·the applicant’s immigration history, including previous applications for an Australian visa or for visas to other countries, and previous travel to Australia or other countries;
·if the applicant is minor, the intentions of a parent, legal guardian or spouse of the applicant; and
·any other relevant information provided by the applicant, or information otherwise available to the decision maker, including information that may be either beneficial or unfavourable to the applicant.”
At [40] – [42] inclusive of its reasons, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not satisfy the relevant clause 500.212(a) criteria, and it affirmed the decision of the delegate in that regard. The Tribunal found:
“[40] Having weighed the applicant's circumstances in accordance with the specified matters in Direction 69, and considered all the evidence provided, including the matters above, the Tribunal is not persuaded the applicant has a genuine intention to stay temporarily in Australia. It finds her study path since arriving in Australia on a higher education visa and her academic progression since, to be inconsistent with her stated intentions of opening a school after a return to India, and concludes her study pathways are instead being utilised to extend her residency in Australia. The Tribunal also concludes that the applicant has made clear through her application for a Subclass 187 Regional Employer Nomination (Permanent) (Class RN) visa, that she is seeking to remain permanently in Australia.
[41] The Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student who intends genuinely to- stay in Australia temporarily. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds the applicant does not meet cl.500.212(a).
[42] Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student as required by cl.500.212.”
The applicant relied upon the grounds for review as set out in an Amended Application filed on 6 September 2018, save that ground 1(iii) was not pressed at the hearing. Such grounds for review as relied upon were as follows:
“Grounds of application
1. The Tribunal did not give notice to the applicant of certain issues arising in relation to the decision under review, contrary to s.360(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“Act”) and in denial of procedural fairness. Those issues were:
i) whether the applicant had a desire to obtain employment;
ii) whether the applicant’s motivation for coming to Australia and remaining in Australia was more likely related to her desire to obtain employment; and
iii) reasons for taking several courses.2. The tribunal took into account irrelevant factors and gave inappropriate weight to the Applicant having applied for subclass 500 visa.
3. The Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness by refusing to hear submissions from the Applicant’s representative at the hearing’”
Grounds 1 and 2
Mr Burrow of Counsel for the applicant submitted that grounds 1 and 2 of the application for review ought to be read together. In that regard, it was submitted on behalf of the applicant that in circumstances where the Tribunal had in part relied upon the applicant’s having made an application for a Subclass 187 Regional Employer Nomination (Permanent) (Class RN) Visa as a basis for finding that the applicant did not genuinely intend to stay in Australia temporarily, the Tribunal erred, contrary to the provisions of s. 360(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) by failing to invite the applicant to give evidence or present arguments relating to her future residency intentions. Section 360(1) of the Act provided as follows:
“Sect. 360 Tribunal must invite applicant to appear
(1) The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.”
Prior to the hearing before the Tribunal, the Tribunal invited the applicant, by a letter dated 23 March 2018, [1] to provide to the Tribunal all documents on which the applicant intended to rely for the purpose of establishing that she met the criteria for the grant of the visa. The applicant was advised that she could have a representative present at the hearing, but that such person would not ordinarily be allowed to speak on the applicant’s behalf unless there were demonstrated to be exceptional circumstances justifying such course. [2] The reference to the genuine temporary entrant criterion for student visa applications was set out in the letter, [3] and Part 2 of Direction No. 69 was also provided as an attachment. [4]
[1] Court Book (CB) pp. 168 – 183 inclusive.
[2] CB p. 171.
[3] CB p. 179.
[4] CB pp. 180 – 182 inclusive.
The question as to whether or not an applicant had, at the time of the decision, a settled intention to seek a visa inconsistent with temporary residency is a matter to be taken into account by a decision maker. In Saini v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 858 at [30] and [33], Logan J dealt with the issue as follows:
“[30] Equally, that an applicant for a Student visa may, at the time of decision, hope, for example, to undertake post-graduate study if successful in respect of the study for which the particular visa is sought, but nonetheless still leave once any further study is completed, it may be open to conclude that the visa-applicant does still have, at that time, an intention, “genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily”. The Regulations do provide for other classes of visa which may be sought on-shore so as to permit the holder of a Student visa to seek a visa which would permit a longer stay for further study or for employment. That means that, after the time of decision, there is potential for an intention to change, depending on later circumstances. It also means it is possible for there to be, at the time of decision, an intention to seek some further visa which will nonetheless lead to nothing more than further temporary residence. But if there is a settled intention, at the time of decision, later to seek a visa that will lead other than to temporary residence, that intention is not consistent with an intention “genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily”. What is required is an evaluation by the decision-maker of intention as at the time of decision.
…
[33] The Tribunal found as a fact, that, at the time of decision, Mrs Saini had an intention of seeking employment opportunities in Australia (Reasons for Decision at [16]). In conjunction with the other matters to which the Tribunal adverted, that was sufficient, reasonably, for the Tribunal not to be satisfied that, at that time, she intended, “genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily” and thus not to be satisfied that she was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student. In approaching the question of whether or not it held the satisfaction specified in cl 572.223(1), the Tribunal did not thereby address itself to the wrong question. All it did was to apply cl 572.223(1) according to its terms so as to make a decision reasonably open on the facts.”
There was no dispute at the time of the hearing before the Court that the applicant had applied for a permanent residency 187 visa. To have sought such a visa was inconsistent with the applicant’s claim that she genuinely intended to stay temporarily in Australia. The Tribunal at [15] – [31] of its reasons closely and carefully considered the long history of study undertaken by the applicant in Australia since 2007. It cannot be said that the Tribunal, when so analysing the matters of relevance before it, failed to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, as was the subject of consideration by French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZIAI [2009] 259 ALR 429 at [25] – [27], where it was said:
“[25] Although decisions in the Federal Court concerned with a failure to make obvious inquiries have led to references to a “duty to inquire”, that term is apt to direct consideration away from the question whether the decision which is under review is vitiated by jurisdictional error. The duty imposed upon the tribunal by the Migration Act is a duty to review. It may be that a failure to make an obvious inquiry about a critical fact, the existence of which is easily ascertained, could, in some circumstances, supply a sufficient link to the outcome to constitute a failure to review. If so, such a failure could give rise to jurisdictional error by constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction. It may be that failure to make such an inquiry results in a decision being affected in some other way that manifests itself as jurisdictional error. It is not necessary to explore these questions of principle in this case. There are two reasons for that.
[26] The first reason is that there was nothing on the record to indicate that any further inquiry by the tribunal, directed to the authenticity of the certificates, could have yielded a useful result. There was nothing before the Federal Magistrates Court or the Federal Court to indicate what information might be elicited if the tribunal were to undertake the inquiry which was said to be critical to the validity of its decision. The inquiry suggested was telephone contact with the persons whose mobile telephone numbers were shown on the certificates. But the question whether the certificates contained false statements as to authorship or otherwise would not be able to be determined by calls placed to those telephone numbers. If the respondents to the calls admitted to the tribunal or its officers that the certificates contained false statements, then the grounds for a decision adverse to SZIAI would have been strengthened. If the respondents said that the contents were true, it would have added nothing to the statements effectively conveyed by the certificates themselves. The second reason is that the response made by SZIAI’s solicitors to the tribunal’s letter of 14 January 2008 itself indicated the futility of further inquiry. There was nothing that SZIAI or his solicitors were able to add, beyond a bare denial of what appeared in the National Ameer’s letter. For these reasons there is no factual basis for the conclusion that the failure to inquire constituted a failure to undertake the statutory duty of review or that it was otherwise so unreasonable as to support a finding that the tribunal’s decision was infected by jurisdictional error.
[27] No issue of procedural fairness otherwise arises. SZIAI was given an opportunity to comment upon the National Ameer’s letter and did so in the limited terms indicated. To invite SZIAI to a further hearing pursuant to s 425 of the Migration Act would have been an empty exercise. There was no such obligation in any event. The National Ameer’s letter was by way of information that the tribunal considered would be a reason, or part of a reason, for affirming the decision under review. It discharged its obligation, pursuant to s 424A of the Migration Act, by giving SZIAI the opportunity to comment on that information. The letter did not raise a new issue in the sense that that term is used in s 425.”
It is clear that the applicant well knew at the time of the decision that she had made application for a permanent residency visa. [5] At the conclusion of the hearing, the applicant was asked whether she had anything further to tell the Tribunal member. The applicant replied in the negative. In such circumstances, the Tribunal was not required to ask the applicant to make further submissions in relation to a non-contentious fact. The Tribunal was not duty bound to either require further submissions or argument from the applicant. There were no exceptional circumstances requiring the Tribunal to invite the applicant’s representative to make further submissions on the applicant’s behalf.
[5] Transcript p. 18 .10 - .20. – Annexure WC-1 to Affidavit of Cartmell filed on 8 August 2019.
The principles applicable to the duties of a decision-maker when considering what constituted exceptional circumstances were set out by Thawley J in DKF17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 1963 at [12] where His Honour said:
“[12] The principles relevant for the purposes of the present appeal may be summarised in the following way:
(1) …
(2) The phrase “exceptional circumstances” is not defined. What will amount to “exceptional circumstances” is inherently incapable of exhaustive statement and must depend on the particular circumstances of the visa applicant’s case: Plaintiff M174 at [30]; AQU17 at [14]. There may be a combination of factors which constitute “exceptional circumstances” when viewed together, or one factor of itself may be sufficient for “exceptional circumstances” to exist: AQU17 at [13].
(3) The word “exceptional” is not a term of art and is to be given its ordinary meaning; circumstances are “exceptional” if they may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon; to be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare, but it cannot be one that is regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered: Plaintiff 174 at [30]; AQU17 at [13].
(4) The matters which the Authority may consider in reaching a state of satisfaction about “exceptional circumstances” to justify considering the new information are unconfined except by statutory context. They would often, perhaps usually, include matters relevant to the Authority’s satisfaction that the new information:
(a) could not have been provided to the Minister at the time of the s 65 decision (subparagraph (b)(i)); or
(b) is credible personal information which had not previously been known (subparagraph (b)(ii)): CQW17 at [48]-[49], citing BVZ16 at [9] and BBS16 at [102]-[103].
(5) Depending on the particular facts, a failure by the Authority to turn its mind to matters which are relevant to subparagraphs (b)(i) and (b)(ii) in determining whether it is satisfied that there are “exceptional circumstances” for the purposes of paragraph (a) may reveal jurisdictional error. However, that is not because those considerations are mandatory relevant considerations: AUS17 at [23]. It is a misconception that matters relevant to (b)(i) and (ii) must, in all cases, be considered by the Authority in deciding whether “exceptional circumstances” exist under s 473DD(a): AQU17 at [14]; CVV16 at [24]. The circumstances which might indicate that matters relevant to ss 473DD(b)(i) and (b)(ii) should have been considered in reaching the state of satisfaction in (a) include the nature and cogency of the material and the place of the material in the assessment of the claims: CQW17 at [52], referring to VAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCAFC 117 at [77]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT (2013) 212 FCR 99 at [112]; see also: CVV16 at [26].”
The Tribunal was under no duty to invite the applicant to further make submissions about an obvious matter not in dispute. There is no merit to Grounds 1 and 2 of the application for review.
Ground 3
As to Ground 3 of the application. Section 366A of the Act provided as follows:
“Sect. 366A Applicant may be assisted by another person while appearing before the Tribunal
(1) The applicant is entitled, while appearing before the Tribunal, to have another person (the assistance) present to assist him or her.
(2) The assistant is not entitled to present arguments to the Tribunal, or to address the Tribunal unless the Tribunal is satisfied that, because of exceptional circumstances, the assistant should be allowed to do so.
(3) Except as provided in this section, the applicant is not entitled, while appearing before the Tribunal, to be represented by another person.
(4) This section does not affect the entitlement of the applicant to engage a person to assist or represent him or her otherwise than while appearing before the Tribunal.”
As is clear from the transcript, neither the applicant nor her representative made any application to the Tribunal for any further submissions to be heard on the question of the applicant’s future residency intentions. The onus being on the applicant to produce such evidence or argument to the Tribunal as was considered relevant, the failure on the part of the applicant to do so does not demonstrate procedural unfairness on the part of the Tribunal.
Alternatively, even if the applicant had been denied procedural fairness in that regard, the Court does not consider that any procedural unfairness was material in the light of the Tribunal’s analysis of all relevant facts which went to the question of whether the applicant did or did not have a genuine intention to only remain temporarily in Australia. In that regard, the Court respectfully adopts what was said by Edelman J in Hossain v Minister for Immigration (2018) 264 CLR 123 at [69] – [72] where it was said:
“[69] The decision in SZIZO illustrates a common manner in which this concept of materiality is part of the implication that a decision will not be invalid or beyond authority where the error could not have affected the result of the decision. Another example was contemplated in the joint judgment in this Court in Kirk v Industrial Court (NSW). In that case, the erroneous reversal of the onus of proof was a jurisdictional error. However, the joint judgment observed that there may be some departures from the rules of evidence that would not warrant the grant of relief in the nature of certiorari. In other words, the joint judgment contemplated that a non-material departure from the rules of evidence might not be either a jurisdictional error or a material error of law on the face of the record.
[70] This approach to materiality as part of the implication concerning when an action by a decision maker will go beyond power can also be seen in the classic description by this Court of the range of possible jurisdictional errors in Craig v South Australia. In that case, the Court gave examples of errors of law by an administrative tribunal that could be jurisdictional errors: identifying the wrong issue; asking the wrong question; ignoring relevant material; relying upon irrelevant material; and, in some circumstances, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion. Speaking of the usual implication that arises from the statute, the Court said that if one of these errors is made:
"and the tribunal's exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it."
[71] In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf81, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ reiterated the usual implication that for an error to be jurisdictional, what "is important" is that the error is made "in a way that affects the exercise of power". More recently, in a context relevant to the availability of relief under s 75(v) of the Constitution in light of s 474 of the Migration Act, Gageler and Keane JJ described jurisdictional error as "a material breach of an express or implied condition of the valid exercise of a decision-making power conferred by that Act"82.
[72] In summary, although the issue will always be one of construction of the express or implied terms of the statute, an error will not usually be material, in this sense of affecting the exercise of power, unless there is a possibility that it could have changed the result of the exercise of power. In other words, materiality will generally require the error to deprive a person of the possibility of a successful outcome. There may be unusual circumstances where an error is so fundamental that it will be material whether or not a person is deprived of the possibility of a successful outcome. One circumstance, for reasons that could include respect for the dignity of the individual, may be an extreme case of denial of procedural fairness. Another may be the circumstance discussed by Nettle J, where a decision maker fails to exercise jurisdiction to decide a question according to the applicable criterion. No such circumstances arise on this appeal.”
In Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 363 ALR 599, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ at [45] and [46] said as follows:
“[45] Materiality, whether of a breach of procedural fairness in the case of an undisclosed notification or of a breach of an inviolable limitation governing the conduct of the review in the case of an incorrect and invalid notification, is thus in each case essential to the existence of jurisdictional error. A breach is material to a decision only if compliance could realistically have resulted in a different decision.
[46] Where materiality is in issue in an application for judicial review, and except in a case where the decision made was the only decision legally available to be made, the question of the materiality of the breach is an ordinary question of fact in respect of which the applicant bears the onus of proof. Like any ordinary question of fact, it is to be determined by inferences drawn from evidence adduced on the application.”
It cannot be said that no other rational or logical decision maker could not have made the same decision. As was said by Crennan and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130] and [135]:
“[130] In the context of the Tribunal's decision here, "illogicality" or "irrationality" sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact, it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is "clearly unjust" or "arbitrary" or "capricious" or "unreasonable" in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. The same applies in the case of an opinion that a mandated state of satisfaction has not been reached. Not every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case.
…
[135] On the probative evidence before the Tribunal, a logical or rational decision maker could have come to the same conclusion as the Tribunal. Whilst there may be varieties of illogicality and irrationality, a decision will not be illogical or irrational if there is room for a logical or rational person to reach the same decision on the material before the decision maker. A decision might be said to be illogical or irrational if only one conclusion is open on the evidence, and the decision maker does not come to that conclusion, or if the decision to which the decision maker came was simply not open on the evidence or if there is no logical connection between the evidence and the inferences or conclusions drawn. None of these applied here. It could not be said that the reasons under consideration were unintelligible or that there was an absence of logical connection between the evidence as a whole and the reasons for the decision. Nor could it be said that there was no probative material which contradicted the first respondent’s claims. There was. The Tribunal did not believe the first respondent’s claim that he had engaged in the “practice of homosexuality” in the UAE and accordingly it was not satisfied that he feared persecution if he returned to Pakistan.”
Neither could the decision be considered as legally unreasonable, or one lacking an evidence and intelligible justification, as such respective concepts were considered by Hayne, Kiefel and Bell JJ in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [66] and [76] where it was said:
“[66] This approach does not deny that there is an area within which a decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion. That area resides within the bounds of legal reasonableness. The courts are conscious of not exceeding their supervisory role by undertaking a review of the merits of an exercise of discretionary power. Properly applied, a standard of legal reasonableness does not involve substituting a court's view as to how a discretion should be exercised for that of a decision-maker. Accepting that the standard of reasonableness is not applied in this way does not, however, explain how it is to be applied and how it is to be tested.
…
[76] As to the inferences that may be drawn by an appellate court, it was said in House v The King that an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion "if upon the facts [the result] is unreasonable or plainly unjust". The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. Even where some reasons have been provided, as is the case here, it may nevertheless not be possible for a court to comprehend how the decision was arrived at. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.”
There is no merit to Ground 3 of the application for review.
No jurisdictional error has been established on the part of the Tribunal. The Amended Application for Review is dismissed.
The Court will hear the parties as to costs.
I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Egan
Associate:
Date: 6 February 2020
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
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Administrative Law
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Immigration
Legal Concepts
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Judicial Review
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Procedural Fairness
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Natural Justice
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Jurisdiction
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