Kaur (Migration)

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Kaur (Migration) [2019] AATA 4187 (29 August 2019)

DECISION RECORD

DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division

APPLICANTS:  Mrs Manpreet Kaur
Mr Gurpreet Singh
Mr Prabhroop Singh

CASE NUMBER:  1902584

HOME AFFAIRS REFERENCE(S):           BCC2018/4403686

MEMBER:Antonio Dronjic

DATE:29 August 2019

PLACE OF DECISION:  Melbourne

DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision to cancel the first named applicant’s Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa.

The Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the other applicants.

Statement made on 29 August 2019 at 5:05pm

CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – cancellation – Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visa – Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) – ground for cancellation – ceased employment with sponsor – consideration of discretion – unable to secure new nomination – purpose of visa not fulfilled – potential hardship – applicant’s son’s eligibility for citizenship – decision under review affirmed

LEGISLATION
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), s 12
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 48, 116, 140, 348
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 4, PIC 4013, 4014; Schedule 8, Condition 8107

CASES
COT15 v MIBP (No 1) (2015) 236 FCR 148
Rani & Ors v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379
Tien & Ors v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80

STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

  1. This is an application for review of a decision dated 1 February 2019 made by a delegate of the Minister for Home Affairs to cancel the first named applicant’s Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa under s.116 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).

  2. The delegate cancelled the visa under s.116(1)(b) on the basis that the first named applicant (the applicant) breached condition 8107(3)(b) as the period during which the applicant ceased employment exceeded 90 consecutive days. The issue in the present case is whether that ground for cancellation is made out, and if so, whether the visa should be cancelled.

  3. For the purposes of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s.348 of the Act, the only decision that is before the Tribunal is the decision with respect to the first named applicant. The other applicants’ visas were automatically cancelled as a consequence of that cancellation, not by a decision but by force of the operation of s.140(1) of the Act which made the cancellation of those other visas self-executing on the cancellation of the first named applicant’s visa: see Rani & Ors v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379 at 385, 393, 400; Tien & Ors v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80 at 96. As no decision was involved in the visa cancellation under s.140(1), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to them.

    Background to the cancellation of the applicant’s visa

  4. The decision record of 1 February 2019 sets out the reasons for the delegate’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa. The Tribunal summarises those reasons and findings as follows:

    ·On 1 February 2016, the applicant was granted a Subclass 457 Business (Long Stay) visa to remain valid until 1 February 2020;

    ·The standard business sponsor who nominated the applicant to work as a hairdresser was CH Luxe Pty…

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Details
Case
[2019] AATA 4187
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned the review of a decision to cancel the Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa held by the first applicant, Ms Kaur. The cancellation was a consequence of her ceasing employment with her sponsoring business, CH Luxe Pty Ltd AYF the CH Luxe Trust, on 18 April 2018, and failing to secure new employment or nomination within the prescribed 90-day period. The visas of other applicants were automatically cancelled as a consequence of the first applicant's visa cancellation, and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to review those cancellations.

The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the decision to cancel Ms Kaur's visa should be affirmed. This required the Tribunal to determine if the ground for cancellation, specifically the breach of visa condition 8107(3)(b) by exceeding the 90-day period of unemployment, was established. If the ground was established, the Tribunal then had to consider whether to exercise its discretion to cancel the visa, weighing the circumstances of the case against the reasons for not cancelling it.

The Tribunal found that Ms Kaur did not comply with condition 8107(3)(b) as she ceased employment on 18 April 2018 and remained unemployed for a period exceeding 90 consecutive days. Consequently, the ground for cancellation under s 116(1)(b) of the Act was made out. In considering the exercise of discretion, the Tribunal acknowledged the applicant's submissions regarding her son's impending Australian citizenship and her pregnancy, as well as the purpose of the Subclass 457 visa. However, the Tribunal concluded that the reasons for cancelling the visa outweighed the reasons for not cancelling it, finding that the applicant was not employed by an approved sponsor and had not been nominated for a position.

The Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel Ms Kaur's Subclass 457 visa. It also noted that it had no jurisdiction with respect to the other applicants whose visas were automatically cancelled.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the purposes of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s.348 of the Act, the only decision that is before the Tribunal is the decision with respect to the first named applicant. The other applicants’ visas were automatically cancelled as a consequence of that cancellation, not by a decision but by force of the operation of s.140(1) of the Act which made the cancellation of those other visas self-executing on the cancellation of the first named applicant’s visa: see Rani & Ors v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379 at 385, 393, 400; Tien & Ors v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80 at 96. As no decision was involved in the visa cancellation under s.140(1), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to them.Background to the cancellation of the applicant’s visa The decision record of 1 February 2019 sets out the reasons for the delegate’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa. The Tribunal summarises those reasons and findings as follows:·On 1 February 2016, the applicant was granted a Subclass 457 Business (Long Stay) visa to remain valid until 1 February 2020;·The standard business sponsor who nominated the applicant to work as a hairdresser was CH Luxe Pty Ltd AYF the CH Luxe Trust (the sponsor);·On 18 April 2018, Mr Sewak Dev Singh Gill on behalf of the sponsoring business, informed the Department that the sponsoring business ceased trading on 18 April 2018 and that the applicant ceased her employment on that day;·A notice of intention to consider cancellation (NOICC) was issued to the applicant on 24 December 2018;·The applicant did not respond to the NOICC;·On 1 February 2019, the delegate proceeded to cancel the applicant’s visa. The applicant applied to the Tribunal on 5 February 2019 for review of the visa cancellation and with her application submitted a copy of the primary decision record. On 12 June 2019, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising that it had considered all the material before it relating to the application but that it was unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone. The Tribunal invited the applicant to give oral evidence and present arguments at a hearing scheduled for 20 August 2019. On 2 July 2019, the applicant’s representative wrote to the Tribunal advising that the applicant’s son Prabhroop Singh was born in Australia and will be 10 years of age on 8 December 2019 and will assume the status of an Australian citizen on that date. The representative submitted that this fact will be relevant to future Subclass 143 parent visa matters. The Tribunal was further informed that the applicant is pregnant and expecting to give birth to her second child on 7 November 2019. On 16 August 2019, the applicant’s representative submitted:·Submissions outlining the applicant’s education and visa history in Australia and reiterating that the applicant’s son will soon become an Australian citizen pursuant to s.12(1)(b) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007. The representative outlined possible scenarios if the Tribunal affirms the primary decision and if the Tribunal re-instates the applicant’s visa. He submitted that termination of the applicant’s employment was not caused by her.He further submitted that the delegate failed to consider the issue of an Australian citizenship; that returning a person who will soon become an Australian citizen to a country to which he does not want to return, or to send his parents there without just cause will breach Australia’s obligations as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). He stated that ‘cancellation outcome of s.48 is a very significant one and ought to have been afforded greater weight’.·Copies of medical certificates confirming the applicant’s pregnancy;·A copy of the birth certificate of the applicant’s son;·Copies of the several school reports related to the applicant’s son; and ·A copy of the NOICC dated 24 December 2018.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the decision to cancel the applicant’s visa should be affirmed.CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCE Under s.116 of the Act, the Minister may cancel a visa if he or she is satisfied that certain grounds specified in that provision are made out. Relevantly to this case, these include the ground set out in s.116(1)(b). If satisfied that the ground for cancellation is made out, the decision maker must proceed to consider whether the visa should be cancelled, having regard to all the relevant circumstances, which may include matters of government policy.Does the ground for cancellation exist? A visa may be cancelled under s.116(1)(b) if the Minister or the Tribunal is satisfied that the holder did not comply with a condition of their visa. Condition 8107(3)(b) requires that if the holder ceases employment, the period during which the holder ceases employment must not exceed 90 consecutive days. In this instance condition 8107 was attached to the applicant’s visa, which was granted on 1 February 2016 and which, but for its cancellation, was valid to 1 February 2020. Based on the evidence before it, including the oral evidence from the applicant, the Tribunal finds that the applicant ceased employment with the sponsoring business on 18 April 2018. The Tribunal further finds that the period during which the visa holder ceased employment exceeded 90 consecutive days. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the applicant did not comply with condition 8107(3)(b). For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that the ground for cancellation in s.116(1)(b) exists. As that ground does not require mandatory cancellation under s.116(3), the Tribunal must proceed to consider whether the power to cancel the visa should be exercised.Consideration of discretion There are no matters specified in the Act or Regulations that must be considered in the exercise of this discretion. The Tribunal has had regard to the circumstances of this case, including matters raised by the applicant, and matters in the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3) ‘General visa cancellation powers’. The Tribunal acknowledges that, whilst it may be guided by policy, it is not bound to follow it.[1] Specifically, the Courts have held that the PAM3 guidelines constitute no more than an administrative advisory guide to decision makers in relation to the application of the Act and Regulations and that they are incapable of being elevated into legally necessary or relevant considerations. Indeed, there is judicial authority to the effect that the policy guidelines in PAM3 cannot go beyond the wording of the legislation, even where they are favourable to an applicant.[2] [1] See Brennan J in Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634.[2] See Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1429; Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168; Visnumolakala v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 1209; Alimi v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 1520; Durzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1767 at [49]; Moller v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 168 at [14]; and Sakhno v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1492 at [55].

Decision

Reasons for decision

Having had regard to the findings above and the circumstances of the case as a whole, the Tribunal is satisfied that the reasons for cancelling the visa outweigh the reasons for not cancelling the visa. The Tribunal finds that cancelling the applicant’s visa is the correct and preferable decision.DECISION The Tribunal affirms the decision to cancel the first named applicant’s Subclass 457 (Temporary Work (Skilled)) visa. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the other applicants.Antonio DronjicMember

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that the ground for cancellation in s.116(1)(b) exists. As that ground does not require mandatory cancellation under s.116(3), the Tribunal must proceed to consider whether the power to cancel the visa should be exercised.Consideration of discretion There are no matters specified in the Act or Regulations that must be considered in the exercise of this discretion. The Tribunal has had regard to the circumstances of this case, including matters raised by the applicant, and matters in the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3) ‘General visa cancellation powers’. The Tribunal acknowledges that, whilst it may be guided by policy, it is not bound to follow it.[1] Specifically, the Courts have held that the PAM3 guidelines constitute no more than an administrative advisory guide to decision makers in relation to the application of the Act and Regulations and that they are incapable of being elevated into legally necessary or relevant considerations. Indeed, there is judicial authority to the effect that the policy guidelines in PAM3 cannot go beyond the wording of the legislation, even where they are favourable to an applicant.[2] [1] See Brennan J in Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634.[2] See Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1429; Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168; Visnumolakala v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 1209; Alimi v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 1520; Durzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1767 at [49]; Moller v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 168 at [14]; and Sakhno v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1492 at [55]. Nevertheless, the Tribunal considers that the policy guidelines in PAM3 provide a useful starting point in respect of the exercise of its discretion. In considering this matter, the Tribunal has also taken into account the submissions and evidence it received from the applicant.The purpose of the visa holder’s travel to and stay in Australia The Subclass 457 visa is for skilled workers from outside Australia who have been sponsored and nominated by a business to work in Australia on a temporary basis. The Tribunal finds that the purpose of the applicant’s stay in Australia was to work for CH Luxe Pty Ltd AYF the CH Luxe Trust as a hairdresser on a temporary basis. The applicant was unfortunate to lose her job in April 2018. She decided to remain in Australia and try to find a new employer. She claims that she applied for the position of a hairdresser at two hairdressing salons but was not successful. Based on the evidence before me, I am satisfied that, as of the day of my decision, the applicant is not employed by an Australian company which is an approved standard business sponsor and which successfully nominated the applicant for a position within the business.