Kaufman and Ors and Savva
[2010] FMCAfam 954
FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| KAUFMAN & ORS & SAVVA | [2010] FMCAfam 954 |
| FAMILY LAW – Parenting – relocation – mother with mental health issues – suitability of other applicants – bests interests of children. |
| Family Law Act 1975, ss.60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61DA, 65DAA |
| MRR v GR [2010] HCA 4 |
| First Applicant: | MS KAUFMAN |
| Second Applicant: | MRS KAUFMAN |
| Third Applicant: | MS MOSS |
| Respondent: | MR SAVVA |
| File Number: | SYC 96 of 2010 |
| Judgment of: | Altobelli FM |
| Hearing dates: | 14, 15, 16 July 2010 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 16 July 2010 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 15 September 2010 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Lee |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | CBD Legal |
| Respondent: | Self represented |
| Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: | Ms Carr |
| Independent Children’s Lawyer: | Stidwill Solicitors |
ORDERS
The parents have equal shared parental responsibility for the Children [X] born in 1999 and [Y] born in 2001 (“the children”).
Up until the conclusion of School Term 4, 2010 the Children live with the Applicants and have telephone contact with the Father three times a week on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays between 5 and 6pm.
The Father is to spend time with the Children during the entire forthcoming school holidays, and in addition, any weekend in Sydney from after school on Friday, to before school on Monday, provided he gives not less than seven (7) days notice of this.
From the conclusion of School Term 4, 2010 the Children live with the Father.
The Father be permitted to relocate the Children to [omitted] [M] (a town in far northern New South Wales) in New South Wales.
Once the Children commence living with the Father, the Children spend time with the Mother in Sydney as follows:
(a)From the first Saturday until the last Saturday in each of the shorter New South Wales school holidays;
(b)For the first half of the Christmas school holidays in odd numbered years and the second half in even numbered years;
(c)During school terms from Friday afternoon until Sunday evening on the middle weekend of each term;
(d)Otherwise as agreed between the parties.
The Father is to be responsible for the Children’s travel to and from Sydney as set out in Order 6.
The Children’s travel to and from Sydney on the middle weekend of each term is to be by air and specifically as near as possible:
(a)to depart Coolangatta at 3pm on a Friday afternoon; and
(b)to depart Sydney at 5pm on a Sunday afternoon.
Whenever the Children’s travel is by air, the Father is to deliver and collect the Children to and from Coolangatta airport and the Mother is to be responsible for delivering and collecting the Children from and to Sydney airport.
Neither parent nor other Applicants physically chastise the Children and do all in their power to ensure that no other person does so.
Neither parent nor other Applicants denigrate the other or discuss these proceedings in the presence or hearing of the Children and do all in their power to ensure that no other person does so.
The Father will do all acts and things necessary to authorise the relevant personnel at the Children’s school to forward to the Mother copies of the Children’s school reports.
Each party inform the other of any illnesses the Children may suffer from time to time as soon as practicable.
Once the Children commence living with their Father, the Children are to communicate by telephone with their mother at least three times weekly on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays between 5:00pm and 6:00pm with the Father to initiate these calls to a number nominated by the Mother.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Kaufman & Others & Savva is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYC 96 of 2010
| MS KAUFMAN |
First Applicant
| MRS KAUFMAN |
Second Applicant
| MS MOSS |
Third Applicant
And
| MR SAVVA |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction and background
This case is about two children, [X] who is nearly 11 years old, and his sister [Y] who is nine years old. The applicants are their mother, their maternal grandmother and maternal aunt. The respondent is the children’s father. The applicants live with the children in an inner city suburb of Sydney. The father lives in far northern New South Wales.
The applicants propose that the children live with the mother and father in Sydney on an equal shared time alternating week basis. If, however, the father chooses not to return to Sydney, then the children would live with their mother, and spend time with the father during school holidays.
The applicants proposed that the mother’s time with the children be supervised by the maternal aunt or the maternal grandmother, or another member of the maternal family.
The evidence indicates that the mother suffers from schizo-affective disorder. Indeed, a feature of the applicants’ case was that the mother was not in a position to be able to care for the children without the assistance of the maternal grandmother, the maternal aunt, or some other member of the maternal family.
The father’s proposal, supported by the Independent Children's Lawyer, and by the Part 15 expert, Dr W, was that there be equal shared parental responsibility for the children, that they live with the father, that he be permitted to relocate them to far northern New South Wales.
The father also proposes that the children spend time with their mother during school holidays, and once during the middle of each school term, and otherwise as agreed between the parties. The father agrees to be responsible for the children’s travel to and from Sydney, and air travel is contemplated between the parties.
The mother is 39 years old. They commenced cohabitation in 1998 and married shortly before Christmas that year. The two children were born in 1999 and 2001. The parents separated in 2006 with the mother and children moving to the grandmother’s home at that time.
The children have been in school at a local, well-regarded public school for all of their schooling. For a number of years following the separation the parents had a shared care arrangement, but there were also times when both the mother and father seemed to have had exclusive care of the children.
Whilst it is possible that, and indeed I formed the impression that, the mother suffered mental health issues during the period of cohabitation, and possibly even before then, the contemporary records of her psychiatric treatment certainly go back to 2007. Between 2007 and the date of the hearing the mother had three, and possibly four, psychiatric admissions.
I have decided that it is not necessary to set out the details of those admissions in these reasons for judgment. It is unnecessary to do so and might cause unnecessary stress for the mother, and indeed the children at some future time. The fact is that it was inherent in the mother’s case, as it was presented at the hearing, that her mental condition precluded her from being solely responsible for the care of the children.
In about October 2009, at a time when I find that the mother clearly was suffering from a mental condition, she agreed with the father that he would have the primary care of the children, and both Centrelink and the Child Support Agency were informed about this. The father says that the mother initiated this, in recognition of the fact that she was unable to care for the children.
It is the father’s case that the mother also agreed that he could take the children to live with him on the paternal grandparents’ property in a rural area of far northern New South Wales. The mother’s case is that she agreed that the children could live with their father, but in Sydney.
As it turns out, I find that she did in fact signify agreement to the father that he could take the children with him to far northern New South Wales. However, she did this at a time when she was suffering from a form of mental incapacity and was clearly not in a position to give an informed consent. Nothing turns on this, in the end result.
In January 2010 the matter came before the court and, after a series of short interim hearings, orders were made for the children to live with the mother in [G] (an inner city Sydney suburb) and to spend time with the father every second day if he resided in Sydney, and otherwise during school holidays. The matter was set down for a hearing, and a Part 15 expert was appointed, Dr W, a child psychiatrist from Sydney. I will discuss his evidence below.
The father’s position in relation to relocation was that, under no circumstances, would he return to Sydney. His evidence was that he was so convinced that it was in the best interests of the children to live with him in far northern New South Wales, and the opportunities for him were so much better there than in Sydney, that he could not, under those circumstances, return to Sydney. The mother’s position, perhaps unsurprisingly, was that she could not relocate to far northern New South Wales. Given her dependence on her sister and mother, that is not surprising. There can be no doubt that the father’s stance about not returning to Sydney, under any circumstances, resulted in trenchant criticism of him by the applicants, by the Independent Children’s Lawyer, and to a lesser extent by the Part 15 expert Dr W.
The evidence
The evidence in this case consisted of the report of the Part 15 expert, Dr W dated 28 June 2010, and his oral evidence. The applicant’s case consisted of affidavits and oral evidence provided by the mother, the maternal grandmother, and the maternal aunt. The father’s case consisted of affidavits filed by him, and his oral evidence, and evidence given by his de facto partner, Ms M. Also in evidence was a considerable volume of documents produced on subpoena and, in particular, documents produced by the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, the New South Wales Police Service and the children’s school reports.
In a case where there are many relatively contentious issues, there is no need for me to make findings as to credit. No witness was lying. Each of them have different perceptions about events. But each of the witnesses seem to have acted on statements purportedly made by the children which, I find, are mostly unreliable. The mother’s perception of events was clearly clouded by her mental state. She was hospitalised at the commencement of and during the course of these proceedings, but she nonetheless gave evidence.
The issues
There is an issue in this case about the weight to be given to the Part 15 expert’s report of Dr W. These are matters principally agitated on behalf of the applicants, but there are also issues about the extent to which he relied on statements made by the children to him, and possibly made by the children to others, in reaching his final conclusions. I propose to deal with the issue of the weight to be given to the expert’s report as the first matter.
Obviously, the next issue is what is the best order, in these difficult family circumstances, that is in the best interests of the children?
I propose to discuss this by reference to the primary and additional considerations set out in section 60CC of the Family Law Act and to then consider issues of equal time, substantial and significant time, and reasonable practicability.
It seems to be the common ground between all parties that there should be an ordered for equal shared parental responsibility as between the mother and the father.
The applicable law
In determining parenting matters under Part VII of the Family Law Act the Court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration: s.60CA.
The objects and principles of Part VII are set out at s. 60B:
60B Objects of Part and principles underlying it
(1) The objects of this Part are to ensure that the best interests of children are met by:
(a) ensuring that children have the benefit of both of their parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child; and
(b) protecting children from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence; and
(c) ensuring that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential; and
(d) ensuring that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.
(2) The principles underlying these objects are that (except when it is or would be contrary to a child’s best interests):
(a) children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents, regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and
(b) children have a right to spend time on a regular basis with, and communicate on a regular basis with, both their parents and other people significant to their care, welfare and development (such as grandparents and other relatives); and
(c) parents jointly share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and
(d) parents should agree about the future parenting of their children; and
(e) children have a right to enjoy their culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture).
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (2)(e), an Aboriginal child’s or Torres Strait Islander child’s right to enjoy his or her Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture includes the right:
(a) to maintain a connection with that culture; and
(b) to have the support, opportunity and encouragement necessary:
(i) to explore the full extent of that culture, consistent with the child’s age and developmental level and the child’s views; and
(ii) to develop a positive appreciation of that culture.
At the very core of the new Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 is the creation of a presumption of equal shared parental responsibility in s.61DA. Section 61DA provides:
61DA Presumption of equal shared parental responsibility when making parenting orders
(1) When making a parenting order in relation to a child, the court must apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.
(2) The presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent of the child (or a person who lives with a parent of the child) has engaged in:
(a) abuse of the child or another child who, at the time, was a member of the parent’s family (or that other person’s family); or
(b) family violence.
(3) When the court is making an interim order, the presumption applies unless the court considers that it would not be appropriate in the circumstances for the presumption to be applied when making that order.
(4) The presumption may be rebutted by evidence that satisfies the court that it would not be in the best interests of the child for the child’s parents to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child.
If the presumption applies, I am required to consider certain things:
65DAA Court to consider child spending equal time or substantial and significant time with each parent in certain circumstances
Equal time
(1) If a parenting order provides (or is to provide) that a child’s parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, the court must:
(a) consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and
(b) consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and
(c) if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents.
Substantial and significant time
(2) If:
(a) a parenting order provides (or is to provide) that a child’s parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child; and
(b) the court does not make an order (or include a provision in the order) for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents; and
the court must:
(c) consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and
(d) consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and
(e) if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend substantial and significant time with each of the parents.
(3) will be taken to spend substantial and significant time with a parent only if:
(a) the time the child spends with the parent includes both:
(i) days that fall on weekends and holidays; and
(ii) days that do not fall on weekends or holidays; and
(b) the time the child spends with the parent allows the parent to be involved in:
(i) the child’s daily routine; and
(ii) occasions and events that are of particular significance to the child; and
(c) the time the child spends with the parent allows the child to be involved in occasions and events that are of special significance to the parent.
(4) Subsection (3) does not limit the other matters to which a court can have regard in determining whether the time a child spends with a parent would be substantial and significant.
Reasonable practicality
(5) In determining for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) whether it is reasonably practicable for a child to spend equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the child’s parents, the court must have regard to:
(a) how far apart the parents live from each other; and
(b) the parents’ current and future capacity to implement an arrangement for the child spending equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the parents; and
(c) the parents’ current and future capacity to communicate with each other and resolve difficulties that might arise in implementing an arrangement of that kind; and
(d) the impact that an arrangement of that kind would have on the child; and
(e) such other matters as the court considers relevant.
Because s.65DAA refers to the best interests of the child I must then go back to consider s.60CC which specifies how I must determine what is in a child’s best interests.
60CC How a court determines what is in a child’s best interests
Determining child’s best interests
(1) Subject to subsection (5), in determining what is in the child’s best interests, the court must consider the matters set out in subsections (2) and (3).
Primary considerations
(2) The primary considerations are:
(a) the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents; and
(b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.
Note: Making these considerations the primary ones is consistent with the objects of this Part set out in paragraphs 60B(1)(a) and (b).
Additional considerations
(3) Additional considerations are:
(a) any views expressed by the child and any factors (such as the child’s maturity or level of understanding) that the court thinks are relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s views;
(b) the nature of the relationship of the child with:
(i) each of the child’s parents; and
(ii) other persons (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);
(c) the willingness and ability of each of the child’s parents to facilitate, and encourage, a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other parent;
(d) the likely effect of any changes in the child’s circumstances, including the likely effect on the child of any separation from:
(i) either of his or her parents; or
(ii) any other child, or other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child), with whom he or she has been living;
(e) the practical difficulty and expense of a child spending time with and communicating with a parent and whether that difficulty or expense will substantially affect the child’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis;
(f) the capacity of:
(i) each of the child’s parents; and
(ii) any other person (including any grandparent or other relative of the child);
to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs;
(g) the maturity, sex, lifestyle and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the child and of either of the child’s parents, and any other characteristics of the child that the court thinks are relevant;
(h) if the child is an Aboriginal child or a Torres Strait Islander child:
(i) the child’s right to enjoy his or her Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture (including the right to enjoy that culture with other people who share that culture); and
(ii) the likely impact any proposed parenting order under this Part will have on that right;
(i) the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated by each of the child’s parents;
(j) any family violence involving the child or a member of the child’s family;
(k) any family violence order that applies to the child or a member of the child’s family, if:
(i) the order is a final order; or
(ii) the making of the order was contested by a person;
(l) whether it would be preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child;
(m) any other fact or circumstance that the court thinks is relevant.
In MRR v GR [2010] HCA 4 the High Court said
8. Sub-section (1) of s 65DAA is headed "Equal time" and provides:
"If a parenting order provides (or is to provide) that a child's parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, the court must:
(a) consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and
(b) consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and
(c) if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents." (emphasis added)
Sub-section (2) makes provision for where a parenting order provides that a child's parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child (par (a)) but the Court does not make an order for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents (par (b)). In such a circumstance the Court is obliged to:
"(c) consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and
(d) consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and
(e) if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend substantial and significant time with each of the parents."
Sub-section (3) explains what is meant by the phrase "substantial and significant time".
9. Each of sub-ss (1)(b) and (2)(d) of s 65DAA require the Court to consider whether it is reasonably practicable for the child to spend equal time or substantial and significant time with each of the parents. It is clearly intended that the Court determine that question. Sub-section (5) provides in that respect that the Court "must have regard" to certain matters, such as how far apart the parents live from each other and their capacity to implement the arrangement in question, and "such other matters as the court considers relevant", "[i]n determining for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) whether it is reasonably practicable for a child to spend equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the child's parents".
A little later in the judgment the High Court said:
13. Section 65DAA(1) is expressed in imperative terms. It obliges the Court to consider both the question whether it is in the best interests of the child to spend equal time with each of the parents (par (a)) and the question whether it is reasonably practicable that the child spend equal time with each of them (par (b)). It is only where both questions are answered in the affirmative that consideration may be given, under par (c), to the making of an order…
Weight to be given to the Part 15 expert’s report of Dr W
Dr W’s report follows a fairly common format in parenting cases before the Family Law Courts. He met with the children, their father, their mother, their maternal grandmother and the maternal aunt. Dr W’s interviews took place over three days, 27 April and 28 April 2010, and then 26 May 2010. He had the opportunity to observe the interaction between the children and the major adults in their lives.
In addition, he conducted a comprehensive review of documents produced on subpoena, the most relevant of which were documents produced by the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital dating back to 2007. In addition, however, he did have access to documents which seem to evidence the mother’s first psychiatric admission which occurred to the Prince of Wales Psychiatric Unit in September 1990. His opinion is a lengthy one, but it is important to set it out in these reasons for judgment:
i)I have come to the conclusion that this case basically represents a battle between the father and the mother’s mother and sister.
ii)I am putting considerable weight on my reading of Ms Kaufman's Medical Records.
iii)These depict her as a vulnerable individual, with a deteriorating course of psychotic breakdowns. The breakdowns have both Bipolar and Schizophrenic features, and the appropriate diagnosis is almost certainly Schizo-Affective Disorder. I comment that it is generally accepted that the Schizophrenic aspects of this disorder are primary. Psychotic symptoms have included ideas of reference and auditory hallucinations, which she has described as external, ie not within her head. She has also been described as having flat and inappropriate affect and thought blocking. These are all features that would be considered as strongly indicative of Schizophrenia. I also note that at times her voices have been telling her to kill herself. I also comment that at times of relapse she leaves home and wanders, and neglects herself. There are also comments in her hospital notes of neglecting the children.
iv)The records indicate that she lacks insight, and she does not comply with treatment, resulting in continuing dysfunction, and psychotic relapse. I note in her Affidavit of 8.1.2010 she states that she is not on any medication, nor does she have a diagnosis. This denial of having psychiatric disorder is at odds with the recorded psychiatric opinion and advice, and within weeks of her swearing this statement she was again frankly psychotic.
v)I do not accept the claims of her mother and sister that between breakdowns she is a high functioning individual. This is at odds with their considering her a vulnerable personality who needs their help and support.
vi)Even her mother’s claim in an Affidavit that the cause of the marital breakdown was Mr Savva’s verbal abuse appears to me disingenuous, when the psychiatric record is that she had suddenly asked for a divorce in a period when she was probably in the early stages of a psychotic breakdown, having developed an infatuation with a gay man, with whom she was working. Indeed her mother is recorded in the Medical Record, and in her interview with me, as giving this second account of the breakdown, with the addition of stress from how hard she was working at the time.
vii)I find the account of Ms Kaufman that Mr Savva gives in his Affidavit of 22.2.2010 to be far more credible, as it is consistent with her psychiatric record, ie that she has been a woman struggling to cope, insecure and somewhat paranoid, worrying about owning their own house, while constantly demanding to move because of her concerns over smells etc. I also accept that she had increasing difficulties coping with the demands of working and having children. There is also a continuing theme of her accusing people of playing mind games and controlling her.
viii)Ms Kaufman has expressed to me a belief that Mr Savva has a capacity to get into peoples’ minds and to control them. This in my opinion blends into some of the more delusional ideas she has displayed when psychotic, thoughts such as mind control from satellites, and I am of the opinion that this reflects her psychopathology rather than an actuality.
ix)Following the separation there is some confusion as to what time the children spent with each parent, with a suggestion of day about, with them spending more time with their father when Ms Kaufman was not well. Despite this Ms Kaufman claims to have been the primary care giver throughout. I question whether this is true.
x)I note from school records that for most of the time of shared residence the children were generally absent from school close to one day a week. The records also refer to problems with lateness. The mother has blamed the father for the absences, but the school have recorded it as an issue adversely affecting [Y]’s learning, and an issue to take up with the mother, so presumably the school saw her as responsible.
xi)In her Affidavit of 14 March 2010 Ms Kaufman claims that she had never rung up Centrelink informing them that she no longer had custody of the children. She then expresses the opinion that the father, with another female purporting to be her, had rung Centrelink. I am of the opinion that this is almost certainly the mother’s paranoid psychopathology. Clearly at times that she was feeling highly stressed she has handed the children over to his care, including signing papers for Centrelink. There are also clear statements in interview and Affidavits of her agreeing that she had handed over custody.
xii)I also comment that when I first saw her she indicated she was thinking of altering her Application for full Residence, as she had had a very stressful night with the children. I can only suspect that she is then persuaded by her mother and sister to continue to fight for full Residence.
xiii)It is clear from Ms Kaufman’s psychiatric records that there are times when she would not know what she was doing, and it is possibly the case that she does not have clear memories of what she has done in her psychotic episodes.
xiv)I of course accept that any decisions or agreements Ms Kaufman made at these times would not be legally binding. Nevertheless, I also accept that it would be reasonable for Mr Savva at these times to conclude that it was in the children’s interest to take them into his care. Nevertheless, he should then not be surprised if Ms Kaufman when feeling more in control wants them back.
xv)Nevertheless, I do accept his account of her handing over the care of the children to him at Maroubra on 13 December 2009, an account supported by other Affidavits.
…
xvi)I do accept that the father and his girlfriend have attempted to persuade the children of the advantages of living with them at [M]. I do not see this as Machiavellian manipulation, but as a well meaning attempt to rescue the children from living with a sick mother and her controlling family.
xvii)I have not had the time to fully assess the provided material in terms of all the claims and counter claims about abuse, exposure to drug culture, inappropriate conversations etc, and I did not question in interview on these matters beyond what is included in my accounts of interview. I will accept the need to possibly alter my opinions if the Court after hearing these matters concludes any of my assumptions are wrong.
xviii)I am aware of no substantive evidence that the father has ever failed to appropriately care for the children, or that he has subjected them to abuse or significantly harmful influences. I am satisfied that he has the interests of the children in mind, and that he has a reasonable level of understanding of the emotional and developmental needs of children. Furthermore he expressed no desire to exclude the mother from their life.
xix)I am aware at the time of writing this report that I have not interviewed Ms H, but I have read her Affidavit and I observed her interaction and relationship with the children. She may be young and in some regards immature, but she clearly has a good relationship with the children. I consider it likely that issues such as discussing tampons has been in response to questions from [Y], and I have no particular issue with that. Nor do I see a woman kissing a child on the lips as unacceptable.
xx)Although I have accepted that the father has probably advocated his case with the children, I am not of the opinion that this represent brainwashing or any form of coercion, and I believe the children have largely made up their own minds.
xxi)The children depict their mother as a chronically sad, inactive person with anxieties. They have also been exposed to her paranoid fears and her unexplained disappearances and hospitalizations. I do accept that Ms Kaufman makes successful attempts to engage the children in theatrical and artistic activities, but this is not the children’s overall experience of life at [G]. It is also clear that they regard their grandmother and aunt with no apparent affection or respect, seeing the grandmother as crankily controlling and interfering. I do not consider that this is a belief implanted by the father.
xxii)I have no doubt that the mother is chronically handicapped by her psychiatric disorder, mainly Schizo-Affective Disorder. There appears to have been a progression of her disability. Her condition may become stabilized while she is on a Community Treatment Order, particular if she is put on supervised injections, but it is unlikely to significantly improve, and she will probably relapse when the Order comes to an end.
xxiii)The research evidence of the effect on children of living with a schizophrenic parent is not reassuring. The condition does not prevent attachments forming, but the risk is of an anxious attachment that does not lead to a sense of security. The parent is often not emotionally responsive to the child, and depending on their mental state at the time, they may be neglectful in other ways. They may also transfer their paranoid fears to the child.
xxiv)Nevertheless, I accept that the children are attached to both parents, and want to spend time with them both. However, they quite clearly have decided that the advantages of living at [M] outweigh the fact that they would miss their mother.
xxv)In conclusion I consider the mother’s Application for full Residence with the father being excluded even when she is in hospital, and excluding him from any custodial rights, as being unreasonable.
xxvi)I also consider that the proposition that the grandmother and aunt have a substantially greater role in the life of these children than their father as also being quite unreasonable. Particularly given that I assess that any attachment or even basic respect on the part of the children seems to be absent. I also consider it probable that the grandmother is at least crankily controlling, if not at times abusive.
xxvii)Furthermore, I find it hard to avoid the conclusion that the grandmother is more motivated by a wish to support her fragile daughter, and possibly by resentment towards their father, than genuine concern for the children.
xxviii)Therefore I am satisfied that it would be in the interests of the children to reside with their father, even if this means that they would only spend time with their mother in holidays, or have Contact by phone, Internet etc.
I think that the most important aspects of Dr W’s opinion are as follows. He is almost certain that the mother suffers from schizo-affective disorder. She suffers from a deteriorating course of psychotic breakdowns, the symptoms of which are strongly indicative of schizophrenia. He expresses concern that the mother lacks insight and does not always comply with her treatment which thus results in continuing dysfunction and psychotic relapse.
An unfortunate picture is presented of a woman struggling to cope, insecure and somewhat paranoid. Dr W was critical of the father for having advocated his case with the children, but was not of the view that he had sought to brainwash them or exert any form of coercion on them. He accepts the father as being genuine in his desires to provide for a better, more stable life for the children in a rural setting in far northern New South Wales.
He describes the mother as chronically handicapped by her psychiatric disorder, a condition that is not likely to significantly improve, and will probably relapse. He expresses the risk to the children as being one of forming an anxious attachment with the mother that does not lead to a sense of security. He formed the view that whilst the maternal grandmother was an adequate carer, her principal focus was on supporting the mother. He did not believe that the maternal aunt would have an ongoing significant role in the children’s lives, because of her own life plans. Whilst he acknowledged deficits in the father, particularly in terms of his advocacy of his case before the children, his unwillingness to even contemplate a return to Sydney, and lapses in relation to his willingness to support the children’s relationship with their mother, nonetheless he concluded that the children were, on balance, better off with their father in far northern New South Wales.
Dr W was quite robustly cross-examined by Ms Carr, counsel for the independent children’s lawyer, and Mr Lee, counsel for the applicants. Neither counsel, however, succeeded in convincing Dr W to retract, or amend, the opinion that he expressed. For example, he refused to acknowledge that his conclusions, and his opinions, were based on matters asserted by the children in respect of which there was considerable doubt. He was quite firm in his evidence that these matters were not influential in his ultimate conclusions and recommendations, though he was quite convinced that the children’s expression of views about where they wanted to live were genuine, based on his experience. Dr W could not be convinced that such concerns as existed about the father’s willingness to support the ongoing relationship between the children and their mother were such that he ought to revisit his ultimate conclusions and recommendations. Dr W accepted that there was room to criticise the father in this regard, but remained satisfied that, even if the father were committed to relocate the children, he would continue to support the children’s relationship with their mother.
In the end result, I accept the evidence of Dr W, and his ultimate conclusions and recommendations. His oral evidence convinces me that the expert was so concerned about the mother’s future capacity to provide for these children, because of her psychiatric condition, and the implicit risks inherent in this, that ultimately the father’s proposal was more attuned to the children’s needs. It is clear that the expert recognised the nature and impact of the change that would occur in the children’s lives. He fully acknowledged that the children were progressing well at school. He made appropriate concessions about the weight to be given to views expressed by the children. I do not think that it can be said with any legitimacy that his ultimate conclusions are so influenced by an acceptance of and weight given to the views of the children, that the conclusion itself is vulnerable. I find the reservations he had about the long-term care of the children with their grandmother and maternal aunt to be legitimate ones. The maternal aunt’s evidence gives me no confidence that she will continue to be involved in an active daily sense in the children’s lives into the indefinite future. The maternal grandmother’s evidence confirms that, while she deeply loves and cares for the children, her first priority is caring for the mother.
He was challenged about his view that the mother’s condition was deteriorating, and could not be adequately managed by medication. I still accept his evidence in this regard. He explained that anti-psychotic drugs are reasonably effective in controlling certain symptoms of schizo-affective disorder, but do not control many of the emotional aspects of the condition, including, for example, mood swings. He asserts, and I accept, that the record of the mother’s psychiatric admissions do evidence a progressive decline in her functioning, and that this cannot be solely explained by reference to the stress caused by the proceedings. Whilst he acknowledged that the community treatment order made in relation to the mother would provide reassurance about her taking medication during its term, he had ongoing concerns about the capacity of the other applicants to monitor the mother’s medication afterwards.
In my reasons below, where I deal with the views expressed by the children, I express considerable concern about the weight that may be given to anything that the children have supposedly said, as attributed to them by any of the parties and witnesses in this case, including Dr W. My concerns in this regard were clearly put to Dr W in evidence. He emphasised that he placed little weight on the claims and counterclaims of the parties about what the children have said is happening in the maternal household and otherwise. He was, nonetheless, prepared to put weight on what he considered to be the views of the children as expressed to him, based on his observation and experience that they appeared to have been genuinely held, rather than expressed under pressure.
Ultimately, I accept the expert’s views, and recognise that they are primarily based upon the concerns that he has about the mother’s ongoing mental health.
Meaningful relationship and nature of relationships
It is common ground in this case that, at the moment, the children have a meaningful relationship with both of their mother and their father, and have good relationships with the maternal grandmother, the maternal aunt, and the father’s partner Ms M. The father’s proposal, supported by the Independent Children’s Lawyer and the Part 15 expert, Dr W, could see a substantial change in the children’s relationship with their mother, maternal aunt and maternal grandmother. There is no doubt that on the father’s proposal the children would see the mother and her family far less than they have been since the date of separation. Dr W was of the opinion that, so far as the mother was concerned, the children’s relationships with her would be maintained by school holiday and mid-term contact, as proposed by the father.
The applicants’ proposal would result in the children spending far less time with their father than they have been accustomed to since the date of separation. In this regard, and at least up until the date of the interim orders in January 2010, the father has either been their primary carer, or at least an equal-shared carer for them. From the children’s perspective, this is a “no win” situation. Whatever order I make, there will be an impact in terms of their relationship with their parents, and to a lesser extent on the other persons involved in their lives. This is an important consideration, but not necessarily determinative on the facts of this case. It will need to be considered together with all of the other relevant considerations.
Protecting the children from harm
Even though the applicants’ case raised issues in their affidavits about the safety of the children whilst in the father’s care, that is not, ultimately, the case that was advanced at the hearing and, to the extent that it was, their case is not made out on the evidence. I find that neither the maternal aunt nor the maternal grandmother had any independent basis for raising concerns about the father in this regard. Their concerns were based on matters related to them by the mother. Because of the mother’s mental health issues, her evidence about risk to the children in the father’s care is unreliable and is, in any event, inconsistent with the fact of equal-shared parenting, and her agreement that the children could live with the father as late as last year. I find, therefore, there are no issues about protecting the children from any form of harm whilst in the care of their father.
The only relevant issue about protecting the children from harm in their mother’s care is derived from her mental illness. I was left with no doubt in my mind that if the mother suffered a psychotic episode whilst responsible for the care of the children, that there would be an unacceptable risk of physical or psychological harm to them. Even though I decline in these reasons to set out the details of the mother’s past psychotic episode, it is hard to imagine that if the children were present there would not be at least the risk of neglect, let alone psychological harm to them at witnessing their mother in such a condition. The risks perceived by Dr W are set out at point 29 of his opinion and are quite poignant.
I recognise, of course, that the applicants’ case is that the mother’s time would be supervised by the maternal aunt and grandmother who would, in effect, step up to a primary care role during periods when the mother was hospitalised. I acknowledge that this is the function that they have discharged admirably, particularly during the course of this year. However, I have also indicated, I am not satisfied that the maternal aunt will be available for the children into the indefinite future, and I’m not satisfied that the maternal grandmother has the children as her first priority. I am in no way critical of either the aunt or grandmother in this regard. But the fact is that their mere willingness to step in and assume primary care, when the mother is unable to because of her mental condition, does not necessarily provide the level of protection to the children from harm that would otherwise be available in their father’s care.
This is a significant consideration, though not necessarily determinative in its own right. It will need to be considered along with the other considerations referred to in section 60CC.
Views of the children
I am not prepared to place any significant weight on any evidence advanced by any of the lay witnesses in this case about anything that the children have said. Whilst I would not describe this as a high conflict case, it is nonetheless a case where there are many complex issues in play. For example, the fact is that the children have been exposed to their mother’s mental illness for several years. They described their mother’s unavailability to them to Dr W. There is no reason for me to doubt the veracity of what they’ve said in this regard. It is not an expression of a view, per se, but a recount of an experience to someone who is a professional expert. This means that, in all likelihood, the children are acutely aware of their mother’s medical condition. This must be the case, given her recent admissions to hospital, her absences from the home, visits to hospital and so forth. This must create some insecurity for the children.
There is also no doubt that the father passionately believes that the children are better off living with him in what he considers to be an idyllic rural setting in far northern New South Wales where he can provide a stability and continuity of care, which, he asserts, has been absent in the children’s lives since separation. In a later part of this judgment, I express criticism of the father for failing to protect the children from what Dr W expressed as the advocacy of his views. Nonetheless, in the present context these two matters demonstrate the very difficult position in which these children were placed. It is no wonder, therefore, that they might have said matters to each of the parties to this litigation which was critical of another party or raised concerns about that party’s capacity to care for them. It is also not surprising that the children might have expressed certain views which rapidly changed. Thus, even though this is not a high conflict case, it is a case where the circumstances of this family makes it most unwise for the court to rely on any views the children may have expressed to the parties to this litigation.
That leaves the views expressed by the children to the family consultant on 21 January, 2010, and the views expressed to Dr W during his interviews with them. I place no weight on any expression of views to the family consultant on 21 January, 2010. The family consultant’s intervention on this day, whilst very much appreciated by the court, was a hurried one, in which views were ascertained out of context. Whilst the family consultant’s evidence was clearly of use in the context of making interim orders, it is of less weight in the context of making a final order.
As for Dr W, he was quite resolute in his evidence that he was, in effect, able to filter out what he described as the “claims and counterclaims” about what the children have said, and focus on the children’s expressed wishes about living with their father. Whilst I obviously respect the views of Dr W in this regard, having regard to all of the evidence in this case, I still remain of the view that minimal weight should be given to the views the children may have expressed, even to Dr W as the Part 15 expert. I am, in any event, satisfied that his ultimate conclusions and recommendations were not based on the children’s views.
Accordingly, the views of the children are not a consideration carrying weight in the circumstances of this case.
Willingness and ability to facilitate continuing relationship
The focus here is on the father’s willingness and ability to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the children and their mother, particularly if the court accepts his proposal. Even though the Independent Children Lawyer ultimately supports the father’s proposal, her counsel quite properly pointed out that there were grounds to be concerned about the father’s willingness in this regard. His staunch advocacy of his case to the children reflects poorly on him, in this regard. His unwillingness to deliver the children to the airport is another example. He showed a real insensitivity to the needs of his daughter by showing her the extract from her diary, even though it was probably inappropriately used by the mother as an annexure to her own affidavit.
As against this, Dr W concluded that he thought the father does have the best interests of his children at heart and would support the children’s ongoing relationship with their mother. He regarded the children’s relationship with their mother as already having a very solid foundation, and one which could be sustained over a long distance, and with significant periods of no personal contact. I have also come to the conclusion that the father is genuine, indeed passionate, about what he considers to be in the best interests of the children. Thus, whilst there is scope to be concerned about his willingness to foster the children’s relationship with their mother based on past events, I am nonetheless satisfied about his capacity to do so into the future. I detected no hint whatsoever in the father of any malice towards the mother, but rather a genuine compassion for her, and concern about the children because of her inability to provide for them.
He is probably less than compassionate and understanding about the maternal grandmother and aunt, but I am not satisfied that the nature of the children’s relationship with them is such that it could not be sustained on the father’s proposal, even if he were not supportive. I certainly intend to restrain all parties from discussing these proceedings, or denigrating the other parties, in the presence of the children.
Likely effect of change
There is no doubt that the mother’s proposal provides for the least impact on the children, except that their father will not be as present in their lives as he has been in the past. The father’s proposal presents even greater change for the children, not just in terms of their relationship with their mother, grandmother and maternal aunt, but also because of the physical changes associated with a change of home, locality, school, friends, etc. The change is particularly marked in the context of their schooling. The school where the children have attended has, I suspect, been somewhat of a haven for them, providing them with a sense of certainty, consistency and security amidst the changes in their family life, in the upheavals in the household of both the mother and their father, as well as the mother’s mental illness.
Clearly they are thriving in that environment. It is no simple matter to take them away from their school. As against this, however, the father offers what he considers to be an idyllic lifestyle for the children in a rural setting in far northern New South Wales. He is convinced that remaining on the property, which is owned by his parents, provides him with the one chance for him to obtain a better life. He asserts that he will have the opportunity to buy part of his parents’ property, which is income-producing. His evidence is that his parents will lend him the money for this to happen. He is already in occupation of a home on that property. He does not regard this as being an elevation of his own interests, above those of the children. His evidence was that he cannot stay in Sydney, that he has weighed up all the factors when he first moved up to the far north coast, and is convinced of the opportunities that exist up there. The father’s evidence was corroborated by his partner, Ms M, and his evidence is consistent with what he told Dr W.
Because of the position that the father has adopted in not returning to Sydney, under any circumstances, this means that whatever order I make there will be change in the children’s circumstances, particularly in terms of separation from one of their parents. This is an important consideration, but it needs to be weighed up against all of the other considerations in this case, particularly those derived from the mother’s mental health. I accept the father’s reasons for not returning to Sydney as being genuinely held. It was suggested in closing submissions that I could, in effect, “call his bluff” and make orders providing for the children to live with him, whether it be on a shared care or other basis, provided he return to Sydney. I decline to do so. Courts should not engage in exercises of brinkmanship. I accept the father’s reasons for not returning to Sydney as being reasonable, in the circumstances of this case. His proposals are genuinely motivated by what he considers to be best for the children, though this is not necessarily to the exclusion of the consideration of his own best interests.
In a case like this where change for the children is inevitable, there is some attraction in considering a positive change. The mother’s mental health issues loom significantly in this regard.
Issues of practical difficulty and expense associated with contact
The father’s proposal is that the children would live with him in far northern New South Wales and spend time with the mother for half of each of the shorter New South Wales school holidays, for half of the Christmas school holidays, and from Friday afternoon till Sunday evening on the middle weekend of each term. The father undertakes responsibility for the children’s travel to and from Sydney and agrees that the mid-school term weekend contact will involve travel by air, at his expense.
The mother’s proposal, should the father not return to Sydney, is that the children would spend time with the father during school holidays, and at any other time that he visits Sydney. Her proposal does not go into details about who would be responsible for travel and the cost, but I infer that the father would be responsible.
Given the stance of each of the parties, there are clear issues of practical difficulty and expense that arise from the geographical distance that will separate the children from either their father, or their mother. However, the focus of this consideration is whether this difficulty or expense will substantially affect the children’s right to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis. I find that neither of the proposals has this impact. The children have a good relationship with each their mother and father, which would not be substantially affected by a relocation. Of course, frequency would not be as great. This is an important consideration in this case, though not necessarily determinative in its own right. It will need to be considered together with the other relevant considerations.
Capacity to provide for the children’s needs
To the extent that there is any criticism of the father’s capacity as part of the applicant’s case, I do not accept the same. The fact is that for substantial periods of time since the date of separation the applicants have been content for the father either to have primary care of the children, or for him to be responsible for the shared care of the children. There is little objective evidence that gives rise to any concerns about the father’s capacity to provide for the needs of his children. I formed the view that he was passionately committed to their welfare. Even when some of his past actions may be regarded as reflecting poorly on his attitudes towards the children’s mother, I could detect no sense of malice or ill feeling towards her.
Conversely, there is a real issue in this case about the mother’s capacity to provide for the children’s needs, and all such concerns derive from her mental health. Dr W is clearly concerned about the children’s past exposure to the mother periodical incapacities, and he seemed even more concerned about continued future exposure. I share those concerns. For reasons previously mentioned, it is no answer for the applicants to say that the maternal grandmother and maternal aunt make up for any shortfall in the mother’s capacity. This is an important consideration which points towards an acceptance of the father’s proposal. It is not determinative in its own right, however, it needs to be considered with all the other considerations.
Attitudes to the children and to the responsibilities of parenthood
It is not possible to be critical about the mother’s attitudes, given her mental illness. Some criticism may justifiably be directed towards the father, particularly insofar as he has done, or failed to do, things indicative of at least an indifference towards facilitating the children’s relationship with their mother. Indeed, his steadfast refusal to return to Sydney, and thus excluding what might otherwise have been the best option for the children, possibly also reflects poorly on the father. These are matters that have already been referred to above. However, as I’ve also indicated above, Dr W believes that the father has the best interests of the children foremost in his mind, and that is implicit in his proposal to relocate the children to far northern New South Wales. Having regard to all the evidence, I agree with Dr W in this regard. The father’s attitudes about parenthood are probably not ideal. But this family does not live in an idea world. The mother’s mental illness means that next best alternatives need to be considered. Thus, this consideration will not be determinative in its own right. It will be taken into account together with all the other considerations.
Family violence
I have no doubt that the mother’s concerns about the father are genuine in her own mind. She is scared of him, and seemed to be stressed by even the thought of being in the same room as him. When the mother gave evidence, the father was in another room on another level, listening to the evidence by telephone. He did not seek to cross-examine the mother, as this was more than amply undertaken by counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer. There is no objective basis for the mother’s concerns. Indeed, and surprisingly given the tenor of the mother’s affidavits, this was not an issue that was presented as being a significant one in the mother’s oral case, and her counsel’s cross-examination of the father. Accordingly, there are no family violence issues in this case.
The order least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings
Because of the mother’s mental health issues I consider there to be real risk of re-litigation if the children were left in the care of the mother, assisted by the maternal grandmother and maternal aunt. There is a high likelihood, according to Dr W, that the mother’s condition will deteriorate. This must mean that she will have further psychotic episodes, and be hospitalised. This would shift the responsibility to care for the children to the grandmother and the maternal aunt. Whilst they may be able to provide adequate care, I am satisfied that the maternal aunt has, quite appropriately, her own life to live and is therefore not in a position to make a long-term commitment to these children. The maternal grandmother is focused primarily on the care of her daughter. This all means that there are likely to be situations in the future where the father becomes aware of problems in the mother’s mental health and will, quite properly, become concerned about the welfare of his children. The risk of this matter coming back to the court, if the children remain in Sydney, is a real one.
I recognise that there is also the risk of re-litigation if I make the order sought by the father, in that, despite his initial commitment to support the orders including meeting the cost of mid-term air travel, he may not be able to sustain the same. I am satisfied that, at the present time, he is committed to the contact arrangements he proposes. There is always the risk of re-litigation in these cases, and one can only balance the risk, having regard to the magnitude of the issues that might be re-litigated. I remain of the view that there is a greater risk of re-litigation if the children remain in Sydney, than if they move to far northern New South Wales.
Ms M
Ms M is the father’s partner. She gave evidence by way of an affidavit and was then cross-examined. She met the father last October, met the children in November and was certainly involved in a co-parenting role during the time that the children lived with the father. She describes herself as being engaged to the father, and in evidence committed herself to assisting the father in the care of the children. She suffers from epilepsy which is treated with prescription drugs. She suffered a seizure, described as a petit mal seizure, and does so from time to time, though does not lose consciousness. She denies suffering from loss of concentration or consciousness as a result of these seizures. She agrees that in September 2008, prior to knowing the father, she was depressed and attempted suicide. She has a poor relationship with her own father. She was able to corroborate the father’s evidence about his plans to acquire part of his parents’ property and to use the income.
In the applicants’ case, they raised concerns about Ms M and her capacity to assist the father in the care of the children. I do not accept that there is any legitimate basis for such concerns, after having heard the evidence of Ms M.
Considering equal time, substantial and significant time, and reasonable practicality
It is common ground between all of the parties to this litigation that there should be an order for equal shared parental responsibility This means that I am required to consider the children spending equal time, or substantial and significant time with each parent.
The mother’s proposal is for equal time in Sydney. The father has rejected this as an option, for reasons which I accept. I do not believe that if I ordered equal time in Sydney that the father would in fact return to Sydney. This would mean that the children would be in the exclusive care of the applicants and, for the reasons that I have set out above, I do not believe it is in the best interests of the children that they remain in the primary care of their mother, even with the assistance of the other applicants. In any event, I am not convinced that an equal time arrangement would be reasonably practical, even in Sydney. The mother’s mental illness would either preclude her, or has the potential to preclude her, from the day-to-day involvement in the care of the children. I have real doubts about the ability of the father and the other applicants to communicate with each other and to resolve difficulties that one would normally expect to arise in the context of an equal shared care arrangement.
On the basis that it is in the best interests of the children that they relocate to far northern New South Wales and live primarily with their father, an equal time arrangement becomes impractical because of the distance that the parents live from each other.
Accordingly, equal time is neither in the children’s best interests, nor reasonably practical, whether the children live in Sydney, or with the father in far northern New South Wales.
For the same reasons substantial and significant time is neither in the best interests of the children, nor reasonably practical, whether they live in Sydney, or in far northern New South Wales. The geographical issues preclude substantial and significant time if they live in far northern New South Wales. As I have indicated above, it is not in the best interests of the children for them to live in Sydney.
Under the circumstances, and in a case where the best option is clearly not available for reasons which I accept, the father’s proposal for school holiday contact with the mother, and one mid-term contact with the mother is the best of the available options for the children. It is a proposal that I regard to be in the best interests of the children and reasonably practical. The children are old enough, and the frequency of travel is not so great that they should not be able to cope with the same. The father proposes telephone communication three times a week on Tuesday, Thursdays and Sundays between 5 and 6 pm. He regards this as a minimum and has indicated that he is prepared to be flexible in this regard. If this level of telephone communication can be implemented and sustained, then together with the holiday and mid-term contact I am satisfied that there is every opportunity for these children to maintain good relationships with the applicants.
Implementation issues
A concern that I have is about when, precisely, to implement an order that sees the children move with their father to northern New South Wales. Whilst I regard this significant change in their lives as one which is ultimately in their best interest, I recognise it is a major change and that, in particular, it will take them away from the only school that they have known, and a school environment in which they appear to be thriving. I am also, to a lesser extent, concerned about the mother’s ability to cope in an emotional sense with the orders that I am making. By allowing some time before the orders are actually brought into effect, it might provide some reassurance in terms of her ability to cope. I therefore propose to not implement the order for the children to live with their father in far northern New South Wales until the conclusion of term 4 for the children, this year.
This leads to the issue of what contact the father should have with the children between now and then. I think it is appropriate and in the children’s best interests that they have school holidays with their father and that, in addition, he should spend time with the children on those weekends when he is in Sydney, from after school on Friday to before school on Monday, provided he notifies the mother or the other applicants of his intention to do so on not less than 7 days notice.
With the children going up to live with their father at the end of term 4, I think it is appropriate that they be given at least the first three weeks of those holidays to settle into a new life up there, before then returning to Sydney for the purposes of school holiday contact with their mother and the other applicants.
I certify that the preceding seventy-five (75) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Altobelli FM
Date: 15 September 2010
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