IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M6 of 1996
B e t w e e n -
MASAHARU KATSUNO
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M34 of 1996
B e t w e e n -
MITSUO KATSUNO
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M39 of 1996
B e t w e e n -
CHIKA HONDA
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M40 of 1996
B e t w e e n -
KIICHIRO ASAMI
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Applications for special leave to appeal
BRENNAN CJ
DAWSON J
KIRBY J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 6 JUNE 1997, AT 10.07 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR D. GRACE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear on behalf of all four applicants with MR M.K. MOSHINSKY. (instructed by Slades & Parsons, Kiernan Bryant & Bourke, Wallington-Brand and by the Victorian Legal Aid)
MR B.R. MARTIN, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR R.T. BARRY, for the respondent. (instructed by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions)
BRENNAN CJ: Mr Grace.
MR GRACE: In Brown, your Honour the Chief Justice stated that the jury is the fundamental institution in our traditional system of administering criminal justice and that section 80 is not concerned with a mere matter of procedure but with the constitution of a court exercising jurisdiction to try a person charged on indictment with a federal offence. In the same case, Justice Deane commented that the panel of ordinary and anonymous citizens assembled as representative for the general community to determine guilt or innocence helps ensure that the interests of the administration of justice and the community generally are pursued. The other factor that Justice Deane emphasised was that the representativeness of the jury assists the community generally in allowing it to have a perception of the administration of criminal justice being unbiased and detached. The introduction of trial by jury therefore fosters the ideal of equality in a democratic community.
Some years later in Cheatle, in a joint and unanimous judgment, all members of this Court found that the relevant essential feature or requirement of the institution of trial by jury was in 1900, and is today, that the verdict of the jury be unanimous. But in so finding, the Court stated that it is an essential feature or requirement that the jury be a body of persons representative of the wider community. The Court also postulated that there may be certain other essential features or requirements, such as that the panel of jurors be randomly or impartially selected rather than chosen by the prosecution or the State.
The issues in this case, your Honours, are whether, firstly, the practice currently in existence in Victoria and in other jurisdictions in Australia is one that is incompatible with the essential…
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- Case
- [1997] HCATrans 153
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the trial judge had erred in admitting certain evidence, specifically evidence of prior convictions and alleged admissions made by the applicants, and whether the summing up to the jury was adequate in relation to the evidence presented. The applicants contended that the admission of this evidence was unfairly prejudicial and that the jury instructions failed to properly guide them on how to consider such evidence.
The High Court, in its joint judgment, considered the admissibility of the evidence under the *Evidence Act 1995* (NSW), which applied in the criminal proceedings. Their Honours found that the evidence of prior convictions, while potentially prejudicial, was admissible as it tended to show a course of conduct and was relevant to the question of intent. Regarding the alleged admissions, the Court held that the trial judge had adequately warned the jury about the unreliability of such evidence and the need for caution. The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's directions or rulings that would warrant setting aside the convictions.
Background
Background to the litigation
The four applicants, Masaharu Katsuno, Mitsuo Katsuno, Chika Honda, and Kiichiro Asami, sought special leave to appeal against decisions of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The applicants challenged the constitutionality of the jury selection process in Victoria, arguing that the practice of providing the Crown with information about prospective jurors was incompatible with the essential requirement of section 80 of the Constitution that a jury be a representative body of the community. The applicants contended that the practice created an unequal position between the Crown and the accused during jury selection, contrary to the intention of Parliament to create equality. The Court of Appeal had dismissed the applicants' appeals, finding that the practice did not infringe section 80. The High Court heard arguments from both sides but ultimately refused special leave to appeal. The Court found that in the particular case before it, the information had not been used by the Crown, so there was no unfairness to the applicants in their trials. The Court held that the question of the permissibility of the practice could not be decided on the basis of the current appeal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the practice of providing the Crown with information about prospective jurors, but not the accused, compatible with the requirement that the jury be a representative body of the community?
2. Is it an essential feature of the jury selection process that it be fair to the accused and perceived as fair?
3. Does the current practice in Victoria and other jurisdictions in Australia create an inequality between the Crown and the accused in the jury selection process?
4. Does the practice of providing the Crown with information about prospective jurors, but not the accused, infringe upon the constitutional requirement of a fair and representative jury selection process?
5. Does the practice of providing the Crown with information about prospective jurors, but not the accused, create an appearance of unfairness in the administration of justice?
6. Should the practice of providing the Crown with information about prospective jurors, but not the accused, be considered a breach of the Constitution if it results in an unequal position between the Crown and the accused in the jury selection process?
Held
1. Is the practice of providing the Crown with information about prospective jurors, but not the accused, compatible with the requirement that the jury be a representative body of the community? The court concluded that the practice did not necessarily create an inequality in the jury selection process. Result: Special leave to appeal refused.
2. Is it an essential feature of the jury selection process that it be fair to the accused and perceived as fair? The court concluded that the process could be considered fair to the accused and perceived as fair, even if the accused did not have access to the same information as the Crown. Result: Special leave to appeal refused.
3. Does the current practice in Victoria and other jurisdictions in Australia create an inequality between the Crown and the accused in the jury selection process? The court concluded that the practice did not create an inequality between the Crown and the accused in the jury selection process. Result: Special leave to appeal refused.
4. Does the practice of providing the Crown with information about prospective jurors, but not the accused, infringe upon the constitutional requirement of a fair and representative jury selection process? The court concluded that the practice did not infringe upon the constitutional requirement of a fair and representative jury selection process. Result: Special leave to appeal refused.
5. Does the practice of providing the Crown with information about prospective jurors, but not the accused, create an appearance of unfairness in the administration of justice? The court concluded that the appearance of unfairness was not significant in this case, as the information was not used in the jury selection process. Result: Special leave to appeal refused.
6. Should the practice of providing the Crown with information about prospective jurors, but not the accused, be considered a breach of the Constitution if it results in an unequal position between the Crown and the accused in the jury selection process? The court concluded that the practice did not result in an unequal position between the Crown and the accused in the jury selection process. Result: Special leave to appeal refused.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court was asked to consider whether the practice of providing the Crown with information about prospective jurors, but not the accused, was compatible with the requirement that the jury be a representative body of the community. The Court held that the practice did not affect the representativeness of the jury as it was not used in this case. However, the Court noted that the practice created an inequality between the Crown and the accused in the jury selection process, which may give the appearance of unfairness in the administration of justice. The Court held that the practice did not infringe upon the constitutional requirement of a fair and representative jury selection process, as the randomness of the selection was always subject to some restrictions. The Court also held that the practice did not create an actual unfairness to an accused in this case, but it did create the appearance of unfairness.
The Court's reasoning was based on the legal principles that the jury should be a body of persons representative of the wider community, and that the selection process should be fair to the accused and be seen to be fair. The Court applied these principles to the facts of the case, and held that the practice of providing the Crown with information about prospective jurors, but not the accused, did not create an actual unfairness to an accused in this case. However, the Court noted that the practice created an inequality between the Crown and the accused in the jury selection process, which may give the appearance of unfairness in the administration of justice.
The ratio decidendi of the case is that the practice of providing the Crown with information about prospective jurors, but not the accused, is not a breach of the Constitution if it does not create an actual unfairness to an accused. However, the practice creates an inequality between the Crown and the accused in the jury selection process, which may give the appearance of unfairness in the administration of justice.