Katkarovski v State of New South Wales (NSW Police Force)

CERTIFICATE OF DETERMINATION OF MEMBER
CITATION:	Katkarovski v State of New South Wales (NSW Police Force) [2025] NSWPIC 278
APPLICANT:	Katkarvoski
RESPONDENT:	State of New South Wales (NSW Police Force)
MEMBER:	Gaius Whiffin
DATE OF DECISION:	17 June 2025
CATCHWORDS:	WORKERS COMPENSATION - Workers Compensation Act 1987; claim for psychological injury; claim amended to only request treatment expenses pursuant to section 60; whether the applicant sustained a psychological injury in accordance with section 4 as a result of exposure to traumatic employment events; AV v AW, Hancock v East Coast Timber Products Pty Limited, Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Limited, Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Limited considered; whether the respondent can establish (pursuant to section 11A) that the applicant's psychological injury was wholly or predominantly caused by reasonable action taken or proposed to be taken by it with respect to performance appraisal and/or discipline; Pirie v Franklins Limited, Department of Education and Training v Sinclair, Manly Pacific International Hotel Pty Limited v Doyle, Insurance Australia Group Services Pty Limited v Outram, Ponnan v George Weston Foods Limited, Temelkov v Kemblawarra Portugese Sports and Social Club Limited, and Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW considered; Held – applicant sustained injury in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (section 4); respondent has failed to establish its defence under section 11A; applicant is entitled to payment of his reasonably necessary expenses pursuant to section 60..
DETERMINATIONS MADE:	The Personal Injury Commission determines: 1. The applicant sustained injury, in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder, in accordance with s 4 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act), through his exposure to traumatic incidents in the course of his employment with the respondent. His employment with the respondent is the main contributing factor to the injury. The injury will be deemed to have occurred on 18 August 2024, being the first date of his incapacity as a result of the injury. 2. The respondent has failed to establish (pursuant to s 11A of the 1987 Act) that the applicant’s injury was wholly or predominantly caused by reasonable action taken or proposed to be taken by it with respect to discipline and/or performance appraisal. 3. The applicant is entitled to payment of his reasonably necessary expenses pursuant to s 60 of the 1987 Act.

STATEMENT OF REASONS

BACKGROUND

Alexander Katkarovski (the applicant) is 34-years-old. He worked for the NSW Police Force (the respondent) from the date of his attestation on 12 December 2014 until his last date of service on 15 August 2024. He has not worked since.
The applicant alleges that during the course of his employment with the respondent, he was exposed to numerous traumatic incidents (the traumatic incidents) which have led to him sustaining a psychological injury. He claimed compensation in this regard when he lodged a P902 form with the respondent on 18 August 2024.
The respondent issued a notice denying liability under s 78 of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (the 1998 Act) for the applicant's claim in relation to his alleged psychological injury, dated 8 November 2024.
As a result, the applicant has not received any weekly benefits compensation since
8 November 2024 or payment of his expenses pursuant to s 60 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act), in relation to his alleged psychological injury.
By an Application to Resolve a Dispute (ARD) filed in the Personal Injury Commission (Commission), the applicant claimed weekly benefits compensation from 8 November 2024 to date and on a continuing basis.
At a preliminary conference in these proceedings on 17 February 2025, the ARD was amended in order for the applicant to also claim a ‘general’ order pursuant to s 60 of the 1987 Act.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The parties have agreed that the following issues are in dispute and require determination in these proceedings:
(a) has the applicant sustained a psychological injury arising out of traumatic employment events - in accordance with s 4(b) of the 1987 Act, and

(b) if the answer to (a) is in the affirmative, does the respondent have a defence to the applicant’s compensation claim in relation to the injury - pursuant to s 11A(1) of the 1987 Act (performance appraisal, discipline).

PROCEDURE BEFORE THE PERSONAL INJURY COMMISSION

I am satisfied that the parties to the proceedings understand the nature of the application and the legal implications of any assertion made in the information supplied. I have used my best endeavours in attempting to bring the parties to the proceedings to a settlement acceptable to all of them. I am satisfied that the parties have had sufficient opportunity to explore settlement and that they have been unable to reach an agreed resolution of the disputes in the proceedings.
The proceedings were listed for conciliation/arbitration before me on 11 April 2025. On that occasion, Mr Misha Hammond of counsel appeared for the applicant, instructed by
Mr Jeppesen; and Mr John Gaitanis of counsel appeared for the respondent, instructed by Mr Tuxford. The applicant was present and was supported by his wife, Ms Loulou-Anne Katkarovski. The insurer of the respondent was also represented by Mr Cumulato.
Following an unsuccessful conciliation, the proceedings continued to arbitration hearing, and the parties agreed with me as to the issues in dispute in the proceedings (see paragraph 7 above).
The applicant withdrew his claim for weekly benefits compensation in the proceedings, so that his only claim in the proceedings was for his expenses pursuant to s 60 of the 1987 Act. He precisely quantified those expenses at $927.59. The respondent did not dispute the quantification of the expenses, and agreed that if the applicant was successful in the proceedings, I would make a specific award in favour of the applicant for the amount of $927.59.

EVIDENCE

Documentary evidence

The following documents were in evidence before the Commission (there being no dispute regarding their admission from either party) and considered by me in making this determination:
(a)    the ARD and its attached documents;
(b)    the respondent’s Reply (Reply) and its attached documents;
(c)    the applicant’s Application to Lodge Additional Documents dated 5 February 2025 (applicant’s first ALAD) and its attached documents - admitted as I considered the documents to be necessary to facilitate the just, quick and
cost-effective resolution of the real issues in the proceedings - in accordance with cl 67C(4) of the Personal Injury Commission Rules 2021 (the Rules);
(d) the applicant’s Application to Lodge Additional Documents dated 4 April 2025 (applicant’s second ALAD) and its attached documents - admitted as I considered the documents to be necessary to facilitate the just, quick and cost-effective resolution of the real issues in the proceedings - in accordance with cl 67C(4) of the Rules;
(e)    the respondent’s Application to Lodge Additional Documents dated 28 January 2025 (respondent’s first ALAD) and its attached documents - admitted as I considered the documents to be necessary to facilitate the just, quick and
cost-effective resolution of the real issues in the proceedings - in accordance with cl 67C(4) of the Rules, and
(f)    the respondent’s Application to Lodge Additional Documents dated 7 April 2025 (respondent’s second ALAD) and its attached documents (but only pages
216-235 inclusive, being clinical records produced by Dr Gunn) - admitted as I considered the documents to be necessary to facilitate the just, quick and
cost-effective resolution of the real issues in the proceedings - in accordance with cl 67C(4) of the Rules.

Oral evidence

There was no application by either party for oral evidence to be given in the proceedings.

Applicant’s statement and factual evidence

The applicant has provided three signed statements. The first statement was signed on
22 November 2024, and is found at page 1 of the ARD.
The applicant advises that prior to commencing his employment with the respondent, he had not sustained any psychological injuries. He was employed by the respondent in various capacities (including with Strike Force Raptor between January 2019 and April 2020, and with Raptor Squad from April 2020) for around 10 years prior to 15 August 2024, but he has not worked for the respondent since that date. He advises that during 2024, he was seconded from the Raptor Squad to a domestic violence unit for 4 ½ months, and then loaned to Central Metropolitan User Charges and Event Planning for six weeks.
He says that he has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, and he attributes the diagnosis to witnessing the traumatic incidents. He lists a number of the traumatic incidents which he was involved with, and which he describes as incidents of “death, destruction, violence, fear, and injury”. I accept this description and do not intend to describe the individual incidents myself in detail (each one having been described in detail in the applicant’s statement). The incidents listed are:
(a)    an attempted suicide at Randwick in April 2015 - involving a man with deep cuts to his arms and throat - described as “a very confronting and graphic incident”;
(b)    a death at Matraville in the first half of 2015 – involving distraught family members;
(c)    the discovery of a decomposed female corpse at Maroubra in October/November 2015 - described as: “I have never seen or smelled anything like it”;
(d)    being listed as “an officer under threat” in 2015 or 2016 - following threats being made against his family and an assault upon his brother;
(e)    a death at Prince of Wales Hospital on 26 January 2016;
(f)    a death at Prince of Wales Hospital, as well as attempting to arrange treatment for four seriously injured men – separate events which both occurred on 26 October 2016;
(g)    a death at Kingsford in October/November 2016;
(h)    a siege/hostage situation at South Maroubra in 2016 – where an offender was keeping his elderly father in a unit against his will;
(i)    a car pursuit on 8 January 2017 - his vehicle was narrowly missed and weapons were required to arrest the offenders;
(j)    a motor vehicle accident at Matraville on 25 March 2017, in which he was unable to prevent the two people in the vehicle from being burned to death, and then had to console their families at the accident scene – described as: “Not being able to save two lives left me feeling worthless, and I cannot get the image of the burning car, the burned bodies, or the woman's cries out of my mind. I have intense reoccurring flashbacks and nightmares about this incident.”;
(k)    preventing a suicide at Randwick in 2017;
(l)    being assaulted whilst dispersing a large crowd at Little Bay Beach on
25 December 2017 - following which “I detest large crowds and am always nervous and afraid of being attacked”;
(m)     a stabbing and shooting at the Maroubra Hotel on 26 January 2018;
(n)    a drug overdose outside Randwick Police Station in 2018;
(o)    restraining an offender who had hidden beneath a house in September 2018 - described as involving anxiety “not knowing if we were going into a trap”;
(p)    a motor vehicle accident at Coogee on 17 December 2018 - involving a man with life-threatening injuries;
(q)    a violent arrest of a child abuse offender at Chester Hill on 28 February 2019 - following which he received right hand injuries, which required two surgeries and left permanent scarring “which is a lasting reminder of the violent arrest”;
(r)    a confrontation at Blacktown on 27 November 2019, in which a female driving a vehicle accelerated towards him, forcing him to take evasive action, although his right leg was struck by the vehicle - described as leading to flashbacks;
(s)    witnessing a dog with its throat slit at a property at Lithgow in 2020 or 2021 – he says that as a dog owner, “I have had flashbacks of this incident which is still hard to stomach”;
(t)    a shooting murder at Condell Park on 19 October 2020 – involving the deceased lying in a pool of blood;
(u)    a motor vehicle accident at Guildford on 8 March 2021 - involving an unresponsive elderly male who was bleeding profusely and who he needed to bandage – he also needed to disperse a crowd filming the male on their mobile phones, and he was later on the same day required to assist in a raid involving two violent arrests;
(v)    a kidnapping at Revesby on 1 June 2021 or 2 June 2021 - in which the victim was badly injured and 11 offenders were arrested;
(w)   he was approached by an unknown male while he was getting out of his vehicle at Harris Park on 13 December 2021, and asked for his name and workplace – he had at the time been involved in attempting to suppress violence between two crime families, and he says that when he was approached he “honestly believed that I was going to be shot or seriously injured”;
(x)    a car fire at Parramatta on 25 October 2022;
(y)    a violent arrest at Moree in July 2023, and
(z)    a siege situation at Dulwich Hill on 29 May 2024 – involving the requirement to draw his firearm – described as: “I remember being very scared and questioning whether I had the confidence to shoot if required. Never in my career have I felt this sensitive and vulnerable.”
Apart from these 26 incidents, the applicant also advises:
“In addition, I have been involved in approximately 400-500 arrests, 500-700 raids, and attended other events such as vicious dogs attacking, violent prisoner cell extractions, animal cruelty, sieges, child neglect, mental health episodes, shootings, murders, vicious assaults, stabbings, car accidents, public order/crowd control incidents/brawls, domestic violence, and numerous hostile interactions with criminals including several assaults against me.”
The applicant says that the traumatic incidents have now caused him to now suffer from:
(a)    broken sleep and nightmares;
(b)    daytime fatigue;
(c)    vivid flashbacks;
(d)    concentration and memory difficulties;
(e)    frustration, irritability and anger;
(f)    hypervigilance;
(g)    social withdrawal;
(h)    general anxiety and depression;
(i)    loss of friendships;
(j)    interpersonal relationship issues;
(k)    self-care and personal hygiene issues;
(l)    weight gain due to physical inactivity and poor diet;
(m)     reduction in personal training activities;
(n)    nervousness in crowds, and
(o)    avoidance of driving.
The applicant says that his hypervigilance has worsened as his photograph has appeared in the media (he attaches several screenshot media images in this regard to his statement) when he has been involved in arresting dangerous criminals. He is now “constantly fearful that dangerous criminals will harm either me or my wife”.
The applicant also says that his post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms are triggered by events such as:
“…hearing news about or seeing burnt cars, the sound of revving motorcycles, large crowds, hearing sirens, seeing police in uniform, smelling rotting garbage as it reminds me of decaying bodies, seeing heavily tattooed males who may have links to Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs, and generally seeing news about police and interactions with criminals.”
In relation to his treatment, the applicant advises that:
(a)    he has seen his general practitioner (Dr Khoo) on a monthly basis since
18 August 2024;
(b)    he has seen his psychologist (Dr Gunn) weekly since 22 August 2024;
(c)    he has seen his psychiatrist (Dr Chow) every one to two months since 28 August 2024, and
(d)    he takes medication – Escitalopram, Quetiapine, and Prazosin.
The applicant’s second statement was signed on 22 November 2024, and is found at page 27 of the ARD. In this statement, the applicant denies that he failed to provide the respondent’s insurer with a detailed statement describing the traumatic incidents. He refers to communication in relation to a “23-page statement” (which does not appear to be in evidence before me) between himself, the insurer, Dr D’Abrera’s rooms and an investigator engaged by the insurer, which occurred variously on 10 October 2024, 21 October 2024, and 30 October 2024. He questions the documents that were actually provided to Dr D’Abrera in order for the doctor to diagnose him with an adjustment disorder:
“There were no medical records other than certificates of capacity enclosed with the letter of instruction; notably no practice notes from the GP or correspondence from my psychologist or psychiatrist to provide a corroborative account.”
The applicant’s third statement was signed on 3 April 2025, and is found at page 1 of the applicant’s second ALAD. In this statement, the applicant details inaccuracies that he says appear in the statements provided in the Reply by Andrew Tawadrous (Tawadrous) and Michael Smith (Smith). I will detail these inaccuracies when considering those statements.
The applicant otherwise concludes his third statement by advising:
“I was uncomfortable talking about any psychological issues in an unhealthy work environment and with people I had interpersonal relationship issues with because I was afraid that my admissions of suffering would be used against me. In hindsight, I acknowledge that I was deteriorating in silence and that my PTSD symptoms made it difficult for me to maintain relationships in both my professional and personal life, including my first marriage, which ended before I started working at Raptor.”
The applicant’s P902 form in relation to his compensation claim regarding the traumatic incidents is found at page 160 of the ARD. The form was completed by the applicant on
18 August 2024 and alleges that he has no capacity for any type of work at all. In relation to how the “incident or near miss” occurred, it is stated – “Exposure to death, violence and injury over 9 years and 8 months of policing”.
There is also another P902 form found at page 162 of the ARD. The form (which was not completed by the applicant) refers to the traumatic incident which occurred on 8 March 2021 (described by the applicant at paragraph 16(u) above), and advises – “No time loss and no medical review or treatment required”.
The ARD also contains a leave history of the applicant’s (from page 164) and the applicant’s ‘Individual Profile’ (from page 170). I have considered these documents, but in accordance with cl 67D(2) of the Rules, I do not propose to have regard to them unless specifically directed to the relevance of them to the issues requiring determination by myself, during the parties’ submissions.
Finally, the applicant relies upon two schedules of medical expenses (found at page 177 of the ARD and at page 1 of the applicant’s first ALAD). The combined amount referred to in the schedules is $927.59. Considering the agreement of the respondent (see paragraph 11 above) that if the applicant is successful in these proceedings, I am able to make a specific award in favour of him for the amount of $927.59 in relation to expenses pursuant to s 60 of the 1987 Act, I do not need to consider these schedules further.

Respondent’s statement and factual evidence

The respondent relies upon a statement from Tawadrous signed on 28 October 2024, and found at page 1 of the Reply. Tawadrous is a sergeant in the employ of the respondent.
Tawadrous says that he was the applicant’s supervisor for eight months from 9 January 2022. He says that the applicant frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the applicant’s workplace, which led to “interpersonal tensions and divisions within the unit”. He also says that he received “multiple reports of the claimant disrespecting staff and making colleagues uncomfortable”, and he accuses the applicant of making unprofessional comments. He further says that he believes the applicant’s history of taking shifts on days when the applicant was otherwise rostered off “demonstrated that he could function well in the workplace”.

Tawadrous details complaints against the applicant that he was involved in, as well as complaints made against him by the applicant:
“I was involved in several complaint matters that were investigated and subsequently resolved. Complaints against the claimant led to counselling and the aforementioned secondments [to a domestic violence unit and then to Central Metropolitan User Charges and Event Planning]. The claimant filed two complaints against me. One involved an incident with an off-duty officer while we were working together. Following our conversation with the officer, a complaint was submitted alleging that my actions were corrupt and unethical. This complaint was investigated and not sustained. The claimant applied for a user pay shift that overlapped with his rostered shift, which I declined in accordance with NSW Police SOPs and policies. He was unhappy with this decision and posted photos of my personal car in our squad chat, suggesting it shouldn’t be parked in Raptor. When I approached him to discuss the issues, the conversation escalated into an argument, during which he threatened physical confrontation because he preferred not to speak privately. Following this incident, I documented my concerns, leading to a formal complaint. This was investigated, resulting in counselling for the claimant and a requirement for both of us to attend mediation. Unfortunately, he lied during mediation, and we were unable to resolve our issues. From that point on, I communicated with his supervisors for any necessary interactions.”
Tawadrous also says that the applicant did not report “any psychological struggles linked to attending traumatic events”.
As indicated (see paragraph 23 above), the applicant’s third statement deals with Tawadrous’ statement.

The applicant advises:
(a)    he was on annual leave until late January 2022 or early February 2022, and only met Tawadrous then – he then worked under him for approximately two weeks before taking sick leave until May 2022;
(b)    he denies the allegations referred to at paragraph 30 above, stating that neither Tawadrous nor any other supervisor “ever brought up any concerns of this nature with me” - he alleges that there were interpersonal problems between Tawadrous and junior staff but that he did not say anything to “influence” his colleagues;
(c)    in relation to the extract quoted at paragraph 31 above:
“From 25 February 2024 to 1 July 2024, I completed a secondment at CMR DV High Risk Team in accordance with the capability and development rotation policy that required a secondment to a different workplace after being at the same command for 5 years. This rotation was not due to any complaints or counselling; rather, it was voluntary to participate and acquire new skills. After receiving a complaint from Raptor while on this secondment, I was moved to the userpay office which is in the same command as the DV team. Regarding this complaint, I have not received any disciplinary action including counselling and the allegations have not been upheld. The only reason for the temporary move was risk management.”;
(d)    he attaches his application for secondment to the domestic violence unit, which is dated 3 January 2024, and which advises his goal as to “engage in new skills and career development” - he also attaches a document dated 2 July 2024 in which two senior officers (Adam Johnson and Andrew Koutsoufis) advise that he worked well and had no issues during his period with the domestic violence unit;
(e)    he was only involved in one complaint with Tawadrous following a verbal argument with Tawadrous on 19 September 2022, although he did raise a formal grievance regarding Tawadrous’ decision to remove him from a team leaders course (a decision which was later overturned, allowing him to undertake the course) - he attaches a letter from the Police Association to the Raptor Squad Commander dated 7 March 2023 requesting he be allowed to undertake the course;
(f)    he attaches very complimentary reviews of his work performance dated 23 March 2021, 2 September 2021, and 23 March 2022 – completed by his then supervisor, Timothy Oldman;
(g)    he did post (to the Raptor Squad’s team chat on 12 September 2022) a photograph of Tawadrous’ car parked in a Raptor Squad allocated car spot - he says that he did not know that it was Tawadrous’ car and was just alerting others to its presence - he attaches an email dated 12 March 2022 from Joshua Hayes (in which Tawadrous was copied in) advising that personal vehicles were not to be parked in Raptor Squad allocated car spots;
(h)    in relation to the verbal argument with Tawadrous on 19 September 2022, he did not threaten physical confrontation - he was never counselled or subjected to any disciplinary action, and he voluntarily participated in a mediation with Tawadrous on 15 May 2023 – he attaches an email from Raptor Squad Commander Koutsoufis dated 29 March 2023, which advises as follows:
“I spoke with Sgt Charlotte Carter from the Respectful Workplace and Advisory Unit who will be facilitating the independent mediation between Snr Cst Katkarovski and Sgt Tawadrous yesterday. She is planning to spoke [sic] with both individually over the coming weeks and then together in an effort to resolve the issues. I also spoke with Snr Cst Katkarovski yesterday who is happy to participate in the process and is keen to resolve the issues. Sgt Tawadrous has also been made aware of the forthcoming process. He is somewhat reluctant to participate as he wants to put it all behind him however he agrees to it in an effort to resolve the issues asap.”, and
(i)    he also attaches an email from Sergeant Charlotte Carter to Commander Koutsofis dated 18 May 2023 – advising that the relevant mediation between Tawadrous and him “ended fairly positively and they both agreed to move forward with a professional relationship” - he further advises that following the mediation, he believed that “our problems were settled” as all subsequent interactions between Tawadrous and him were cordial.
The respondent next relies upon a statement from Smith signed on 2 December 2024, and found at page 5 of the Reply. Smith is also a sergeant in the employ of the respondent, working as a team leader in the respondent’s Raptor Squad.
Smith says that he was the applicant’s supervisor from February 2023 until the applicant was seconded to the domestic violence unit. He had however been in the Raptor Squad with the applicant since late 2018 or early 2019.
He says that he is “unaware of the claimant’s attendance leading up to his ceasing work as he was on a secondment”.
He refers to the applicant’s involvement in two violent arrests while working with the Raptor Squad, but otherwise only details a number of interpersonal confrontations that the applicant had:
(a)    with an “OSG Sergeant” in February 2019;
(b)    with another colleague “in OSG team whilst he was in the LOM team” – which led to a mediation;
(c)    with Elias Andreau in November 2023 - which also led to a mediation “although the claimant refused to acknowledge any issues and attempt to repair the relationship”, and
(d)    with Smith himself in late 2022 - which also led to a mediation, Smith saying: “It was later established the claimant was disgruntled as I was going for a promotion his friend was after as well as him believing I aligned myself with other previous Sergeant’s which he perceived as a political tactic to obtain promotion”.
Smith also says that the applicant did not report any psychological struggles due to the applicant’s attendance at traumatic incidents. He was not aware of any concerns which would have warranted him to check on the applicant’s welfare.
As indicated (see paragraph 23 above), the applicant’s third statement also deals with Smith’s statement.
The applicant advises:
(a)    the two violent arrests referred to in Smith’s statement are the ones described by him at paragraphs 16(o) and 16(q) above;
(b)    the incident with the “OSC Sergeant in February 2019” actually occurred on
3 February 2020 when he attempted to break up a physical confrontation between Sergeant Trueman and another police officer - the incident was investigated by the respondent’s Professional Standards Command, but he was only a witness in that investigation;
(c)    the incident described by Smith as occurring in late 2022 in fact occurred in July 2022 while the applicant was completing urgent paperwork and Smith sought his attention and then “continued to poke the back of my shoulder in an annoying manner” - the mediation referred to by Smith did not occur until 15 May 2023 following Smith’s “untrue and misleading comments” in relation to the applicant’s half-yearly performance review - following the mediation, Smith agreed to “rectify the issue” in the applicant’s next half-yearly performance review - the applicant then attaches 20 September 2023 comments that Smith made in that next performance review:
(i)referring to a misunderstanding between Smith and the applicant;
(ii)agreeing that he declined to speak to the applicant prior to the earlier performance review, and
(iii)agreeing to “expand on our communication moving forward, in order to establish a clear understanding of various topics and potential issues”;
(d)    the mediation between the applicant and Elias Andreau involved issues being raised and addressed appropriately - after the mediation, they were able to work on the same team without any further issues, and
(e)    Smith’s statement in relation to the applicant not advising of any psychological issues is incorrect considering the P902 form completed (see paragraph 26 above) in relation to the incident which occurred on 8 March 2021 (see the applicant’s description at paragraph 16(u) above) - indeed, the form mentions that Smith himself attended this incident with the applicant and another officer.
The respondent next relies upon an Interim Risk Management Plan (IRMP) that the respondent issued in relation to the applicant, and which was said to commence on 2 July 2024 but which was only signed by the applicant and the respondent’s representatives on 8 July 2024. The IRMP is found at page 13 of the Reply.
The respondent does not lead any statement evidence (from the IRMP’s monitoring officer, Jenna Haywood (Haywood), or any other representative) or any other evidence regarding the reasons for the IRMP, its nature, or its implementation. Solely from the document itself, it seems:
(a)    the applicant was placed on the IRMP due to being the subject of a misconduct investigation, relating to disclosing the respondent’s information “to the criminal element”, as well as failing to comply with the respondent’s declarable association policy in relation to his relationship with a particular (name redacted) individual;
(b)    the strategies outlined in the IRMP were temporary and did not “represent final management action”;
(c)    the applicant was to be placed outside the Raptor Squad and would perform his duties at the respondent’s Central Metropolitan Region User Charges/Events Team;

(d)    fortnightly meetings were to be held between the applicant and Haywood - for her to provide feedback and to ensure his adherence to the IRMP;
(e)    the applicant was otherwise to be monitored by his supervisors and managers in the respondent’s Central Metropolitan Region User Charges/Events Team for any substandard performance or unprofessional conduct;
(f)    the applicant was ordered not to communicate with any person involved in or suspected of being involved in the investigation against him;
(g)    the applicant was reminded of the respondent’s support services available to him, and
(h)    Haywood was to provide monthly reports (not in evidence before me) regarding progress with the IRMP.

Otherwise, the respondent relies only upon the following additional factual evidence:
(a) a P902 form completed by the applicant on 13 July 2015 (found at page 10 of the Reply) - reporting an incident where an offender’s saliva sprayed him in the face – the form states that no injury occurred and that the form is for “Notification only - no time loss or treatment”, and
(b) ‘Complaint Handling Guidelines’ (found at page 18 of the Reply) - issued by the respondent and with an effective date from 21 October 2015.
I have considered these documents, but in accordance with cl 67D(2) of the Rules, I do not propose to have regard to them unless specifically directed to the relevance of them to the issues requiring determination by myself, during the parties’ submissions.

Applicant’s medical evidence

The applicant’s solicitors arranged for Associate Professor Robertson (consultant psychiatrist) to assess the applicant. His report dated 2 December 2024 in this regard is found at page 63 of the ARD.
The doctor was provided with the applicant’s 20 November 2024 statement, but does not detail in his report all of the incidents mentioned in the statement, concentrating upon the incidents referred to at paragraphs 16(a) and 16(j) above, together with the media coverage referred to at paragraph 19 above. He also mentions an incident involving a near miss shooting of a young indigenous offender, which does not specifically seem to be mentioned in the applicant’s statement.
The doctor obtains a history of the applicant first endorsing psychiatric symptoms around 12 months prior to ceasing work with the respondent, when the applicant’s wife indicated that his behaviour had become “erratic and difficult”. The doctor records that at the time when the applicant ceased work, the applicant was “experiencing nightmares and flashbacks of the multiple incidents he had attended, irritability, hypervigilance, an exaggerated startle reflex, impaired concentration short-term memory and sleep disturbance”. The applicant was referred to consult with Dr Chow and Dr Gunn.
The doctor refers to reports that he had been provided with from Dr Chow dated
4 September 2024, from Dr Gunn dated 7 September 2024 and 24 November 2024, and from Dr D’Abrera dated 11 October 2024.
The doctor records the applicant’s current symptoms as including significant hypervigilance, self-care neglect, social withdrawal, crowd avoidance, travel restrictions, loss of friendships, forgetfulness, inattention, concentration problems, and the frequent triggering of intrusive symptoms. The doctor opines that the applicant has no current or foreseeable work capacity. On mental state examination, the doctor found the applicant’s affect to be apprehensive and anxious, and the applicant’s mood to be dysphoric.
The doctor diagnoses the applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder and comorbid major depression. He addresses the opinions provided by Dr D’Abrera:
“Mr Katkarovski’s psychological injury dates from his probationary period with accumulated traumatic stress exposure, which has led to a severe illness with a significant degree of psychosocial morbidity. I am perplexed at Dr D’Abrera’s difficulties formulating an opinion. His diagnosis of adjustment disorder appears a non-sequitur in so far as the history he obtained was consistent with the diagnosis of PTSD, and the totality of history indicated that cumulative traumatic stress exposure was the original factor to Mr Katkarovski’s psychological injury. The disciplinary matters led to no significant consequences and are an irrelevant aspect of the overall clinical picture.”
The doctor finds that the applicant had no pre-existing condition, and he opines that:
“Cumulative traumatic stress exposure through many years of operational policing was the substantial and main contributing factor to Mr Katkarovski’s chronic PTSD.”
The applicant relies upon four reports from his treating psychiatrist, Dr Chow, all of which were sent to his treating general practitioner, Dr Khoo.
In the doctor’s 4 September 2024 report (found at page 23 of the applicant’s second ALAD), the doctor obtains the following history:
“Over the years he has been exposed to many traumatic scenes…He said he has been suffering psychologically last few years especially when he was with Raptor which was a high risk unit, attending high risk shooting situations…Mentally he has completely burned out and he was at a tipping point. He was getting more aggressive at work and at home. He was getting out of control. He did not want to be a risk to someone else. He was always anxious and paranoid. He eventually could not cope and went off work…In the last month, lots of trouble sleeping, recurrent flashbacks and nightmares. He has flashbacks of a double fatal car crash. He was first on scene. The victims were burnt alive and he heard the screaming in front of him. The family was from his Macedonian background. He needed to converse with them in their nature. But it has been very traumatic.”
The doctor records that the applicant cried easily, became irritable and angry easily, was socially avoidant, had become paranoid, was triggered in crowds, was not eating healthily, was not training physically as much, had lost interest in hobbies, and had fluctuating motivation and energy. The doctor records the applicant as feeling guilty, worthless and hopeless.
The doctor notes no previous psychiatric history of the applicant’s (prior to the applicant’s employment with the respondent). He diagnoses the applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder, and advises the applicant to continue with medication and psychological treatment.
In the doctor’s 29 October 2024 report (found at page 25 of the applicant’s second ALAD), the doctor notes that the applicant’s symptoms were not as intense as previously, but that the applicant still experienced sleep disturbance, reduced nightmares, and mood fluctuations. The doctor recommends some medication changes, and advises the applicant to continue to consult with the applicant’s psychologist.
In the doctor’s 20 January 2025 report (found at page 27 of the applicant’s second ALAD), the doctor records that the applicant’s symptoms “are very much present but they have stabilised”. The symptoms fluctuated and there was still sleep disturbance. The doctor recommends that the applicant continue with medication and consultations with the applicant’s psychologist.
In the doctor’s 18 March 2025 report (found at page 29 of the applicant’s second ALAD), the doctor records that the applicant “still feels miserable and worthless”. The applicant’s situation has regressed and the applicant’s medication has been increased. The doctor notes that the applicant is not engaging in hobbies, is not exercising, is not attending to household chores, and “continues to have poor tolerance to people” which has led to verbally aggressive outbursts towards the applicant’s family. The doctor again recommends that the applicant continue with medication and consultations with the applicant’s psychologist.
The applicant also relies upon two reports that his solicitors requested from his treating psychologist, Dr Gunn, in which the psychologist answers various questions posed by the solicitors.
In the psychologist’s 24 November 2024 report (found at page 59 of the ARD), the psychologist refers to three of the applicant’s traumatic incidents (which he details in an earlier report dated 7 November 2024 – discussed at paragraph 76(b) below). He summarises his opinion and diagnosis:
“Mr Katkarovski meets DSM-5 criteria for PTSD, which is a direct result from his work as a NSW Police Officer. The recent complaint made against Mr Katkarovski was neither the cause of decline regarding his mental health or the reason he took time off work under a WorkCover claim. Mr Katkarovski’s nightmares, flashbacks and intrusive memories are all directly related to specific traumatic incidents he attended while working as a NSW Police Officer.”
The psychologist had consulted with the applicant on 12 occasions, using trauma based cognitive behavioural therapy and exposure therapy.
In the psychologist’s 4 April 2025 report (found at page 19 of the applicant’s second ALAD), he confirms:
“Mr Katkarovski meets DSM-5 criteria for PTSD…Mr Katkarovski’s symptoms include: nightmares, flashbacks, panic attacks, depressed mood, irritability with his family, intrusive memories of distressing traumatic workplace incidents, tearfulness, difficulty with focus and attention, memory concerns, severe difficulties sleeping, efforts to avoid thoughts and reminders related to past traumatic incidents, avoidance of social activities, loss of trust in others, anger/irritability, loss of interest in previously enjoyable activities, feeling detached from others, suicidal thoughts, and hypervigilance at home and in public…Katkarovski’s PTSD symptoms negatively impact his ability to engage in his activities of daily living and he continues to self-isolate, rarely leaves his home, and experiences high levels of anxiety on a daily basis.”
The psychologist advises that the applicant’s symptoms are triggered by a wide range of stimuli, and when the symptoms are triggered, the applicant experiences panic attacks. The applicant will then not leave the house and will be unmotivated for several days.

Due to the specific nature of the applicant’s post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms and the fact that “all of his symptoms are police related”, the psychologist confirms his opinion that the post-traumatic stress disorder is “a direct result from his work as a NSW Police Officer”.
The psychologist then provides a lengthy commentary regarding his disagreement with Dr D’Abrera’s opinions, explaining that the applicant’s symptoms are better explained by a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, rather than a diagnosis of adjustment disorder (as made by Dr D’Abrera). The traumatic incidents that the applicant were exposed to “meet DSM-5 criteria for Criteria A”.
In relation to the causative effect upon the applicant of the IRMP, the psychologist also disagrees with Dr D’Abrera:
“Based on my discussions with Mr Katkarovski, he had likely been experiencing PTSD for several years and had continued to work despite the severity of his symptoms and the significant negative impact on his daily functioning outside of work. This is evident by Mr Katkarovski engaging an EAP psychologist through work, approximately seven years ago. This was due to Mr Katkarovski not coping after being exposed to a traumatic workplace incident where he witnessed two young people being burnt alive in a fatal car accident. Dr D’Abrera also notes this traumatic incident in his report….Contrary to Dr D’Abrera’s opinion, my discussions with Mr Katkarovski’s suggest that the disciplinary action against Mr Katkarovski’s in June/July 2024 was not the cause of the decline in Mr Katkarovski’s mental health that led to him going off work in August 2024. Discussions during Mr Katkarovski’s sessions with me suggest that the predominant cause of Mr Katkarovski’s deterioration to his mental health, causing him to go off work in August 2024, was the worsening of his PTSD symptoms due to the duties he was required to perform whilst on secondment. Mr Katkarovski was on secondment from 2nd July to 15th August 2024 at the Head Office in the Central Metropolitan Region. During this time Mr Katkarovski was tasked with summarising approximately 30 situation reports a day to be used in management meetings. These reports involved detailed accounts of traumatic incidents such as motor vehicle accidents, shootings, murders, and sexual assaults. The nature of these traumatic incidents were closely related to traumatic workplace incidents Mr Katkarovski had previously been directly involved in. In August 2024 Mr Katkarovski’s experienced an increase in intrusive memories and nightmares of traumatic workplace incidents, his PTSD symptoms subsequently became overwhelming and Mr Katkarovski no longer had capacity to work…Furthermore, Dr D’Abrera noted that Mr Katkarovski had previously had 20 complaints made against him and that Mr Katkarovski had continued to work despite these complaints. Mr Katkarovski has also raised the point that with respect to the complaint made against him, no disciplinary action has been taken in that Mr Katkarovski has not be [sic] charged, suspended or had his employment terminated with NSWPF. Mr Katkarovski notes that the temporary move to office duties was a routine procedure for risk management/mitigation. Mr Katkarovski’s previous experience with the complaints and disciplinary process led to him to believe there would likely be a positive outcome and, although the process caused some stress, did not lead to significant negative impact to his mental health.”
Finally, the applicant relies upon medical evidence from his treating general practitioner, Dr Khoo. The doctor’s clinical file is found from page 75 of the ARD, and relevantly:
(a)    details the history provided by the applicant to the doctor during the doctor’s first consultation with him on 18 August 2024 –
“Alexander reports in his ~9.5 years of police work in the NSW Police Force (2 Years General Duties, 2 Years Uniform Proactive Team including secondments to domestic violence, then 5.5 years in Raptor Squad) he was exposed to multiple traumatic, gruesome, violent, disgusting crime scenes such as dead bodies, fatal car accidents, attempted suicides and he also faced recurring intimidation, violence and physical assault from criminals where he feared for his life/limb. He started experiencing symptoms at/around ~2015 but it was in 2017 that his symptoms really worsened as he was the first responder to a horrific car accident where he saw and smelled the victims burning alive, and and heard them screaming until they burnt to death. It did not help that he had to break the bad news to the victims' family…Forensic/Legal/Disciplinary - nil formal charges/findings past/present/ but reports currently on interim risk management plan for allegations of misconduct - this is not stressing him out in the sense of his innocence, he feels this is simply part of the quality control process to ensure that himself and his team have been above board in their police work and he is simply taking this in his stride and reports he has nothing to hide and is keen to prove this in the investigation - however, he has even been chasing the investigators to speed things up because this has been distressing for his pregnant wife and he is concerned for the health/welfare of his wife/unborn child.”;
(b)    details an extensive physical and mental examination of the applicant on
18 August 2024, together with an extensive discussion of his symptoms and how they satisfy the criteria for a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder;
(c)    contains a certificate of capacity dated 18 August 2024 (as well as another certificate of capacity dated 18 September 2024) – both of which only refer to the traumatic incidents as being causative of the applicant’s psychological injury, and
(d)    contains a referral of the applicant to Dr Gunn (as well as other referrals) – which also only refer to the traumatic incidents as being causative of the applicant’s psychological injury.
I otherwise in accordance with cl 67D(2) of the Rules, do not propose to have regard to the clinical file unless specifically directed during the parties’ submissions to other aspects of it that are relevant to the issues requiring determination by myself.

Respondent’s medical evidence

The respondent largely relies upon two medical reports provided by a consultant psychiatrist, Dr D’Abrera. The doctor’s first report is dated 11 October 2024 and found at page 40 of the ARD.
The doctor obtains the following history from the applicant:
(a)    “Alex stated that during the course of his general duties, he has been exposed to many traumatic incidents including attempted and completed suicides, bodies of the deceased, victims of car accidents, and has been the recipient of verbal and physical abuse on many occasions.”;
(b)    specifically, the doctor notes the incidents referred to at paragraphs 16(j), 16(m) and 16(z) above;
(c)    the applicant had been involved in “hundreds of arrests and raids and stressful interactions in the course of his duties” with the respondent;
(d)    the applicant believed that he had had psychological symptoms since 2015, and he advised that he had seen his general practitioner and undergone a K10 questionnaire in 2022;
(e)    the applicant received notification of a complaint about alleged misconduct – he was then subject to the IRMP and re-deployed and confined to suitable duties employment with no access to firearms - the applicant said that this “transfer to Surry Hills was ‘fine’ and that he we was ‘used to deskwork’” - he was adamant that his psychological symptoms were related to the traumatic incidents and not the complaint allegations and the subsequent IRMP;
(f)    the applicant’s psychological symptoms included sleep disturbance, fatigue, hypervigilance, flashbacks from incidents as a police officer, reduced tolerance, impaired memory and concentration, depressed mood, loss of friendships, and social withdrawal;
(g)    the applicant had sought treatment from Dr Chow and Dr Gunn since August 2024 – the doctor clarifies that he did not have access to any of their clinical records, and
(h)    the applicant had no psychiatric history prior to his employment with the respondent.
The doctor conducts a mental state examination, and advises that it is difficult to provide a diagnosis for the applicant, due to not being provided with records from the applicant’s treating medical practitioners, and due to the applicant’s reluctance “to elaborate on the sequence of events leading to the development of his reported injury and the timing of his seeking medical advice in relation to his symptoms”. He does however provide a provisional diagnosis of adjustment disorder.
When specifically questioned by the respondent’s insurer regarding causation, the doctor provides a slightly more definite opinion:
“It appears that Alex has developed an adjustment disorder in the course of his duties, and his GP signed him off on 18 August 2024. Alex has been the subject of serious misconduct allegations at work and is subject to an interim risk management plan dated July 2024 (signed 08 July). I formed a view based on available information, and on a balance of probabilities, that this disciplinary action was the predominant cause of his injury, although there was possibly also some (lesser) contribution from exposure to the traumatic events described from 2015 onwards, particularly the car accident in 2017…Given the factual evidence commissioned and in consideration of a temporal connection between the worker’s alleged injury and incapacity for work, I consider that the applicant’s condition is predominantly caused by his performance appraisal and/or discipline matters on or about 01 July 2024, when he was placed on an interim risk management plan…Had the discipline issues not arisen around 01 July 2024, I do not consider that the worker would have psychologically decompensated at or about the same time.”
The doctor considers the applicant to be totally incapacitated for work.
The doctor’s second report is dated 23 December 2024 and found at page 1 of the respondent’s first ALAD.
The doctor was provided with Associate Professor Robertson’s report and Dr Gunn’s reports dated 7 November 2024 and 24 November 2024, as well as the statements from Smith and Tawadrous. He was asked specific questions.
He maintains his opinion that the most appropriate diagnosis for the applicant is adjustment disorder. He relies upon an absence of contemporaneous medical evidence prior to August 2024, as well as the statements from Smith and Tawadrous, who do not observe any mental health issues of the applicant’s, but who instead observe instances of the applicant’s verbal and physical aggression. The doctor explains:
“His symptoms developed on a background of a long history of workplace conflict and professional complaints against the worker. There is no question that the worker is currently experiencing psychological distress and functional impairment. I am still unable to confidently make a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder despite self-reported symptoms as the totality of information instead paints a picture of a man with a low threshold for emotional dysregulation, uncontrolled anger and interpersonal conflict, predominantly with colleagues.”
The doctor also maintains his opinion that the predominant cause of the worker’s current psychological condition is the IRMP. He differentiates his opinion in this regard from the opinions of Dr Gunn and Associate Professor Robertson, stating:
“The opinions of Dr Gunn and A/Prof Robertson have not changed my views and opinions. The opinions of Dr Gunn and Professor Robertson rely heavily on the worker’s self-report. I do not doubt that the worker is currently distressed, however, based on collateral information and on the patient’s history to me, I placed a greater emphasis on his anger and irritability being related to his interpersonal conflict with colleagues and the disciplinary action taken in relation to alleged criminal conduct.”
The respondent also attaches to its Reply (at page 117) Dr Gunn’s 7 November 2024 report to its insurer. The opinions provided in this report as to diagnosis and causation are consistent with the opinions in the psychologist’s 24 November 2024 and 4 April 2025 reports. However, the applicant’s history is outlined in more detail in this report:
(a)    “Alex’s PTSD has been an accumulation of traumatic incidents experienced while serving as a NSW Police Officer. Many of these incidents have involved Alex arresting known dangerous criminals who have been involved in organised crime and murder.”;
(b)    the applicant otherwise identifies three specific traumatic incidents to the psychologist – being the incidents referred to at paragraphs 16(a), 16(j), and 16(w) above;
(c)    the applicant reports that he has had approximately 20 complaints made against him while working with the respondent, none of which were sustained - he reports such complaints were common when dealing with dangerous criminals, and he refers to the last such complaint made (which was the basis for the IRMP), and
(d)    the applicant’s life had been threatened on multiple occasions by criminals – he felt let down by the respondent over his concerns for his personal safety.
Finally, the respondent relies upon the clinical files from Dr Gunn (found from page 216 of the respondent’s second ALAD) and Australis Group, being Dr Khoo’s practice (found from page 126 of the Reply). I have considered these files but, in accordance with cl 67D(2) of the Rules, do not propose to have regard to them further unless specifically directed during the parties’ submissions to aspects of them that are relevant to the issues requiring determination by myself.
I do however note that within the clinical file from Australis Group is a report from Dr Khoo to the respondent’s insurer dated 25 October 2024 (found specifically at page 158 of the Reply). In the report, the doctor:
(a)    diagnoses the applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder - and outlines in detail the criteria met in relation to the applicant’s symptoms, in order for the diagnosis to be made;
(b)    provides a history of the applicant’s symptoms consistent with the history recorded in the doctor’s notes - see paragraph 66(a) above, and
(c)    opines that the applicant’s employment with the respondent was the “substantial and sole contributing factor” to his psychological symptoms as he “would not have had recurrent exposure to traumatic events in such manner but for his employment with the NSW Police”.

Respondent’s submissions

The respondent provided submissions orally at the arbitration hearing in the proceedings on 11 April 2025. The submissions were recorded and form part of the Commission’s record. I have fully considered them, but will not summarise them in detail in these reasons.

The respondent emphasises the continuing nature of the IRMP and the fact that it was still operative when the applicant first sought treatment for his psychological injury on
18 August 2024. It also emphasises that there had been no previous complaint by the applicant of psychological injury due to his exposure to the traumatic incidents. It makes what it concedes to be a bold submission that the applicant’s statement evidence might be viewed as a reconstruction to justify his psychological injury, in circumstances where the temporal connection between the need for treatment on 18 August 2024 and the IRMP is a “very powerful factor” and cannot be ignored.
The respondent describes the connection between the traumatic incidents and the need for treatment on 18 August 2024 to be an “implausible link”. It submits that for the applicant to establish the connection, he would need to explain why he consulted with Dr Khoo specifically on 18 August 2024 when he had not consulted with him previously regarding the traumatic incidents, when those incidents had occurred since 2015.
Instead, there is a plethora of evidence of the applicant’s complaints of psychological symptoms only after the implementation of the IRMP.
The respondent submits that in realising the importance of the temporal connection between the need for treatment on 18 August 2024 and the IRMP, Dr D’Abrera has provided the most balanced report in evidence before me. The reports of Associate Professor Robertson, as well as Drs Khoo and Chow, and Dr Gunn have only interrogated the issues “from the perspective of the applicant”. However, Dr D’Abrera has taken into account both the traumatic incidents and the IRMP.
In my evaluation of the evidence in this regard, the respondent emphasises:
(a)    the applicant’s statement evidence (see paragraph 21 above) regarding the extensive nature of his treatment since 18 August 2024;
(b)    the history obtained by Dr Chow in his 4 September 2024 report (see paragraph 53 above) that the applicant’s psychological symptoms have arisen “in the last month”;
(c)    Dr Gunn has simply accepted the applicant’s history regarding the causative link between the traumatic incidents and his psychological symptoms, rather than interrogating the facts adequately;
(d)    the statements of Tawadrous and Smith (see respectively paragraphs 30, 32 and 39 above) confirm that the applicant did not report any psychological issues from the traumatic incidents prior to 18 August 2024, and was otherwise functioning well in the workplace, and did not require welfare checks;
(e)    the lack of P902 forms regarding the traumatic incidents;
(f)    the lack of complaints in the medical evidence (especially in any treating practitioner’s clinical file) regarding psychological symptoms of the applicant’s prior to 18 August 2024;
(g)    the absence from the applicant’s statement evidence of any mention of the IRMP - which I should regard as a “concern whether to accept the applicant’s statement evidence”, and
(h)    the ignoring of the IRMP by Associate Professor Robertson – the doctor simply accepts the relevance of the traumatic events related to him by the applicant, and his opinion therefore contains “bare assertions without any explanation”.
The respondent was then questioned by me as to whether if I accepted a diagnosis that the applicant had post-traumatic stress disorder, it would accept that it was due to traumatic events. It conceded as such.
Finally, the respondent submits the IRMP to be reasonable. It was not draconian, and there is no evidence from the applicant that he considered it to be unreasonable.

Applicant’s submissions

The applicant provided submissions orally at the arbitration hearing in the proceedings on 11 April 2025. The submissions were recorded and form part of the Commission’s record. I have fully considered them, but will not summarise them in detail in these reasons.
The applicant commences by dealing with the reasonableness of the IRMP. He submits that the respondent has not met its onus of proving that reasonableness. It has not led evidence explaining why the IRMP was instituted in the first place – specifically, it has not led evidence from any of the officers who signed the plan (see paragraph 43 above). The statements that it has led in evidence from Tawadrous and Smith are irrelevant in explaining how the plan was reasonable.
The applicant then disputes the respondent’s assertions:
(a) of the lack of P902 forms – referring to the forms referred to at paragraphs 25, 26, and 44(a) above, and
(b) of the applicant’s lack of treatment prior of 18 August 2024 – referring to the EAP counselling mentioned in Dr Gunn’s 4 April 2025 report (see paragraph 65 above).
The applicant does however concede that there is no mention in his statement evidence of any treatment for psychological symptoms prior to 18 August 2024.
In relation to the significance of the IRMP, the applicant submits that there is no significant history of it given by him in his statement evidence or in his reporting to his treating practitioners, as it was not important and “almost irrelevant” to him. Such complaints as led to the IRMP were common when dealing with dangerous criminals (as he reported to Dr Gunn - see paragraph 76(c) above).

In comparison, the type of work performed by the applicant with the respondent carried “a risk of injury each and every day”. The evidence established a “history of exposure to a prolonged plethora of traumatic and dangerous incidents”. These incidents as well as the IRMP were considered by Dr Khoo during the applicant’s initial consultation with the doctor on 18 August 2024, and yet a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder due to the traumatic incidents was made at that initial consultation. The doctor then referred the applicant to a psychologist and a psychiatrist, both of whom came to the same view as Dr Khoo in relation to the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder.
The applicant was then questioned by me as to whether there was any evidence of a triggering event immediately prior to his initial consultation with Dr Khoo on 18 August 2024. He referred me to Dr Gunn’s 4 April 2025 report (see paragraph 65 above), which explained his need to summarise reports detailing traumatic events during his secondment as part of the IRMP.
In relation to Dr D’Abrera’s first report, the applicant submits that it was not provided in a ‘fair climate’ as the doctor was not provided with any medical evidence in order to provide his opinions. He could only make a provisional diagnosis of adjustment disorder due to this lack of information (see paragraph 69 above).
In relation to Dr D’Abrera’s second report, the applicant notes that he was still not provided with any evidence from Dr Chow, or Dr Khoo’s clinical file (specifically in relation to the applicant’s appointment with the doctor on 18 August 2024). He also does not seem to have been provided with the applicant’s statements which are in evidence before me. He maintains the provisional diagnosis referred to his first report, but the applicant submits that he still has some doubt in his inability to diagnose post-traumatic stress disorder. He does not reject that diagnosis outright, stating that he is “unable to confidently” make it (see paragraph 74 above).
In any case, the applicant submits that Dr D’Abrera is “out on his own” in not diagnosing the applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder, having regard to the overwhelming balance of the evidence before me. I would be satisfied by this evidence that the applicant has sustained post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the traumatic incidents.

FINDINGS AND REASONS

Has the applicant sustained a psychological injury arising out of traumatic employment events - in accordance with s 4(b) of the 1987 Act

“Injury” is defined in s 4 of the 1987 Act as follows:
“In this Act -
‘injury’ -
(a) means personal injury arising out of or in the course of employment,
(b) includes a ‘disease injury’, which means -
(i) a disease that is contracted by a worker in the course of employment but only if the employment was the main contributing factor to contracting the disease, and
(ii) the aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or deterioration in the course of employment of any disease, but only if the employment was the main contributing factor to the aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or deterioration of the disease”.
The applicant pleads in the ARD that his injury was caused “as a result of accumulation of exposure to trauma”. The applicant only pleads one injury, being a disease injury (in accordance with s 4(b) of the 1987 Act) with a deemed date of 18 August 2024, which was his first date of incapacity from the injury.
The definition of ‘main contributing factor’ is discussed at length by Snell DP in AV v AW [2020] NSWWCCPD 9 (AV), where various authorities are reviewed and where the Deputy President summarises (at [77]-[78]):
“It follows that the test of ‘main contributing factor’ involves consideration of whether there were competing causal factors (both work and non-work related) of the aggravation, and whether on a consideration of relevant causal factors the employment represented the main contributing factor.
The following may be taken from the above:
(a) The test of ‘main contributing factor’ in s 4(b)(ii) is more stringent than that in s 4(b)(ii) in its previous form, which applied in conjunction with the test in s 9A. There will be one ‘main contributing factor’ to an alleged aggravation injury.
(b) The test of ‘main contributing factor’ is one of causation. It involves consideration of the evidence overall, it is not purely a medical question. It involves an evaluative process, considering the causal factors to the aggravation, both work and non-work related. Medical evidence to address the ultimate question of whether the test of ‘main contributing factor’ is satisfied is both relevant and desirable. Its absence is not necessarily fatal, as satisfaction of the test is to be considered on the whole of the evidence.
(c) In a matter involving s 4(b)(ii) it is necessary that the employment be the main contributing factor to the aggravation, not to the underlying disease process as a whole.”
I accept the applicant’s statement evidence. It is detailed in its description of 26 specific traumatic incidents, in addition to (see paragraph 17 above) many other distressing incidents. The detail able to be provided by the applicant in this regard is supportive of the significance of the traumatic incidents to him.
The applicant’s statement evidence regarding the traumatic incidents is also consistent with the histories obtained by his treating medical practitioners, as well as by Associate Professor Robertson and Dr D’Abrera.
The respondent criticises the applicant’s statement evidence for failing to explain the effect upon him of the IRMP, but I accept the applicant’s submission in this regard (see paragraph 90 above) that he did not consider the IRMP to be overly stressful. He explained this in detail to Dr Khoo during his initial consultation with the doctor on 18 August 2024 (see paragraph 66(a) above), advising that he was taking the IRMP “in his stride” and was keen to establish his innocence regarding the complaints which led to the plan. He did however concede to the doctor that he was concerned for his wife as she was distressed with the length of time that it was taking the respondent to investigate those complaints. Further, he clearly also discussed the IRMP with Dr Gunn (see paragraph 65 above), advising the psychologist that he expected a positive outcome to the respondent’s investigations into the complaints, and that the IRMP was “routine procedure” when such complaints were made. He acknowledged to the psychologist “some stress” involved with the IRMP but that it was not leading to any “significant negative impact to his mental health”.
I also accept the applicant’s submission at paragraphs 91 and 95 above, regarding the consistency in the opinions regarding diagnosis expressed by the applicant’s treating practitioners. They all diagnose the applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder due to his exposure to the traumatic incidents. They are, in my opinion, in the best position to provide this diagnosis as they have treated the applicant extensively (Dr Chow consulting with the applicant on at least four occasions up to 18 March 2025, Dr Gunn consulting with the applicant on 12 occasions up to his 24 November 2024 report, and Dr Khoo consulting with the applicant on a monthly basis according to the applicant since 18 August 2024).
I accept that the applicant did not seek any treatment for psychological symptoms prior to
18 August 2024 (other than potentially EAP counselling) and may have seemed otherwise well at work (according to the statements from Tawadrous and Smith), but there is no suggestion that the applicant’s treating practitioners were not aware in this regard. They nevertheless had no difficulty in diagnosing post-traumatic stress disorder.
The respondent accepts (see paragraph 85 above) that any such diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder would arise from exposure to traumatic events.
Dr Chow’s diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (see paragraph 53 above) is made notwithstanding that the applicant’s psychological symptoms had increased significantly in the month prior to him consulting with the doctor.
Dr Gunn (see paragraph 62 above) details the applicant’s psychological symptoms and how their specific nature meets the criteria for a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. The opinions of Dr D’Abrera in diagnosing adjustment disorder are criticised on the basis of the relevant symptoms being “better explained” by a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder.
Importantly, Dr Gunn also (see paragraph 65 above) explains why the applicant first sought treatment for his post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms on 18 August 2024 following a worsening of the symptoms while the applicant was performing work for the respondent summarising reports containing detailed accounts of traumatic events.
In that context, I place significant weight upon the extract from Dr Gunn’s 4 April 2025 report quoted at paragraph 65 above. The psychologist is aware of all the circumstances leading to the applicant seeking medical treatment on 18 August 2024, and is forthright in his opinion regarding the applicant’s diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the traumatic incidents.
The respondent’s submissions (see particularly paragraphs 80 and 83 above) concentrated upon the temporal connection between the applicant seeking treatment for his psychological symptoms and the IRMP. I do not however find these submissions to be particularly compelling. The plan had been in operation for almost seven weeks when the applicant first sought treatment on 18 August 2024, which in itself is inconsistent with the temporal connection alleged. However, in the context of Dr Gunn’s explanation for the worsening of the applicant’s post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms due to the nature of the work that the applicant was performing immediately prior to 18 August 2024, there is in my opinion a more than sufficient explanation (as submitted to be necessary by the respondent – see paragraph 81 above) as to why the applicant first sought treatment specifically on 18 August 2024 in the context of his exposure to the traumatic incidents. I reject the respondent’s submission regarding an “implausible link” between the applicant’s exposure to the traumatic incidents and the psychological symptoms which he was experiencing when he first sought treatment on 18 August 2024.
I also give significant weight to the evidence before me from Dr Khoo. He diagnosed the applicant with post-traumatic stress disorder from his first consultation with the applicant on 18 August 2024. His clinical notes and examination on that date (see paragraphs 66(a) and 66(b) above) are extensive and refer both to the traumatic incidents and the IRMP. It is clear from the certificates of capacity issued by him as well as his referrals of the applicant (see paragraphs 66(c) and 66(d) above) that he considers the traumatic incidents to be causative of the applicant’s psychological injury, being his post-traumatic stress disorder. Further, the doctor’s report to the respondent’s insurer dated 25 October 2024 (see paragraph 78 above) provides the same opinion as to causation.
The applicant’s post-traumatic stress disorder diagnosis agreed to by Drs Chow and Khoo, as well as by Dr Gunn, is further supported by Associate Professor Robertson’s report. While Associate Professor Robertson does not specifically mention the IRMP in his report, it is clear that he was aware of it from the extract from his report quoted at paragraph 50 above. In that extract, he (consistent with Dr Gunn) also criticises Dr D’Abrera’s diagnosis of adjustment disorder on the basis of the applicant’s psychological symptoms being a “non-sequitur” with regard to adjustment disorder, but being consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder.
In relation to Dr D’Abrera’s report, I find the following:
(a)    his diagnosis of the applicant suffering adjustment disorder is inconsistent with the diagnoses agreed to by Drs Chow and Khoo, as well as by Dr Gunn and Associate Professor Robertson;
(b)    he only consulted with the applicant on one occasion, compared with the multiple occasions when the applicant consulted with Dr Gunn, and Drs Chow and Khoo;
(c)    on the one occasion when he did consult with the applicant, he had not been provided with medical evidence from the applicant’s treating practitioners, leading to him only being able to make a provisional diagnosis - see paragraph 69 above;
(d)    as indicated specifically by Dr Gunn and Associate Professor Robertson, he details symptoms of the applicant’s (see paragraph 68(f) above) which I accept as being criteria more suggestive of a post-traumatic stress disorder diagnosis;
(e)    despite the respondent’s insurer providing him with more information in order for him to provide his 23 December 2024 report, he was still not provided with any evidence from Dr Khoo or Dr Chow (except for one certificate of capacity);
(f)    he importantly does not have access to Dr Gunn’s 4 April 2025 report, which provides an explanation for the worsening of the applicant’s post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms due to the nature of the work that the applicant was performing immediately prior to 18 August 2024 ;
(g)    as a result, in my opinion, the weight to be given to his opinions is affected by them not being provided in a ‘fair climate’ – see Hancock v East Coast Timber Products Pty Limited [2011] NSWCA 11, as well as Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Limited [1985] HCA 58 and Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Limited [1984] 2 NSWLR 505;
(h)    his opinion that the applicant has not sustained post-traumatic stress disorder is not a particularly strong one – he acknowledges (see the extract quoted at paragraph 70 above) possibly some contribution to the applicant’s psychological injury from his exposure to the traumatic incidents, and he (see the extract quoted at paragraph 74 above) does not express a completely resolved opinion regarding a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, and
(i)    he relies significantly upon a temporal connection between the IRMP and the applicant first seeking medical treatment on 18 August 2024 – in circumstances where:
(i)he does not in my opinion take enough notice of the applicant’s stated (particularly to Drs Khoo and Gunn) lack of concern about the IRMP;
(ii)he does not in my opinion take enough notice of the almost 7 week gap between the commencement date of the IRMP and 18 August 2024, and
(iii)he is not aware of the worsening of the applicant’s psychological symptoms immediately prior to 18 August 2024 as a result of the work that he was then performing summarising reports regarding traumatic events.
In all the circumstances, following my evaluation of the evidence before me, I am comfortably satisfied that the applicant has met his onus in proving that he has sustained post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of his exposure to the traumatic incidents. I accept his evidence and the largely consistent evidence from Dr Chow, Dr Gunn, Dr Khoo, and Associate Professor Robertson, in this regard. While Associate Professor Robertson is the only doctor to specifically refer to the traumatic incidents as being the ‘main contributing factor’ (see paragraph 51 above), Dr Khoo uses similar terminology (the “substantial and sole contributing factor” - see paragraph 78(c) above), as does Dr Gunn (the “predominant cause of Mr Katkarovski’s deterioration to his mental health” - see paragraph 65 above). It is also clear from reading Dr Chow’s reports that he views the traumatic incidents as the only factor causative of the applicant’s post-traumatic stress disorder.
There will be a finding that the applicant has sustained a psychological injury arising out of traumatic employment events, in accordance with s 4(b) of the 1987 Act.

Does the respondent have a defence to the applicant’s compensation claim in relation to his psychological injury - pursuant to s 11A(1) of the 1987 Act (performance appraisal, discipline).

Section 11A of the 1987 Act reads as follows:
“(1) No compensation is payable under this Act in respect of an injury that is a psychological injury if the injury was wholly or predominantly caused by reasonable action taken or proposed to be taken by or on behalf of the employer with respect to transfer, demotion, promotion, performance appraisal, discipline, retrenchment or dismissal of workers or provision of employment benefits to workers.”
The respondent bears the onus of proof in establishing its defence under s 11A of the 1987 Act: Pirie v Franklins Limited [2001] NSWCC 167 and Department of Education and Training v Sinclair [2005] NSWCA 465.
In Manly Pacific International Hotel Pty Limited v Doyle [1999] NSWCA 465 (Doyle), Fitzgerald JA said (at [4]):
“Before this Court, it was not disputed that Mr Doyle's employment was a substantial cause of his psychological injury. That being so, the Compensation Court was required to decide whether (i) the whole or predominant cause of Mr Doyle's psychological injury was the appellant's action with respect to Mr Doyle's transfer from one position to another, and, (ii) if so, whether the appellant's action with respect to Mr Doyle's transfer was reasonable.”
The respondent’s defence to the applicant’s claim is that actions that it took regarding performance appraisal and/or discipline were the whole or predominant cause of his psychological injury, and that those actions were reasonable.
My interpretation of the reasoning in Doyle is that I need to determine the first issue raised by Fitzgerald JA before determining the reasonableness of the respondent’s actions. I believe that this interpretation is consistent with the decision of Wood DP in Insurance Australia Group Services Pty Limited v Outram [2019] NSWWCCPD 44 (Outram). For the reasons that follow, I do not intend to determine the reasonableness of the respondent’s actions, as I will be determining the first issue raised by Fitzgerald JA in favour of the applicant.
In relation to whether the whole cause of the applicant’s psychological injury was the respondent’s actions regarding performance appraisal and/or discipline, I am satisfied that there was another cause, being the traumatic incidents. I have already found these traumatic incidents to be causative of the injury.
In relation to whether the predominant cause of the applicant’s psychological injury was the respondent’s actions regarding performance appraisal and/or discipline, in Ponnan v George Weston Foods Limited [2007] NSWWCCPD 92, Handley ADP considered the phrase ‘predominantly caused’ and interpreted it according to its dictionary meaning of ‘mainly or principally caused’. That interpretation has been approved on multiple occasions since: see Temelkov v Kemblawarra Portuguese Sports and Social Club Limited [2008] NSWWCCPD 96 and Smith v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW [2008] NSWWCCPD 130.
In Outram, Wood DP said:
“The fact that there were other incidents that contributed to the injury is not sufficient to negate the possibility that certain actions, described by the Arbitrator as having made a ‘major’ contribution to the injury, could not be the predominant cause. Whether an action is a predominant cause must be ascertained by weighing the evidence of the effect of each of those incidents on the respondent’s psyche and the consequences that flowed from the incident. In many cases, medical evidence in respect of causation is required. As observed by Candy ADP in ISS Property Services Pty Ltd v Milovanovic, what is required is a comparison between all of the employment related contributions to the injury and those contributions that resulted from reasonable actions by the employer in respect of discipline, transfer, or other actions specified in s 11A(1).”
A comparison is therefore required between the effect of the respondent’s actions regarding performance appraisal and/or discipline upon the applicant’s psyche and the effect upon that psyche of the traumatic incidents.

In relation to the respondent’s actions regarding performance appraisal and/or discipline, the only relevant evidence before me is that contained in the IRMP. I accept from the statement evidence of Tawadrous and Smith that there had been previous interpersonal conflicts involving the applicant in the course of his employment with the respondent, as well as complaints made against him from time to time. The applicant acknowledges as such in his discussions with Dr Gunn (see paragraph 76(c) above) as well as (to an extent) in his 3 April 2025 statement. However, none of these events were submitted to be causative of the applicant’s psychological injury either by him or the respondent. The respondent’s submissions in this regard focused upon the IRMP as disciplinary and/or performance appraisal action, following complaints that were made against the applicant and the need to investigate those complaints, as detailed in the plan.
I have however already accepted the applicant’s evidence and the evidence from his treating medical practitioners regarding:
(a) the lack of significance of the IRMP in the causation of the applicant’s psychological injury, and
(b) the traumatic incidents being the main contributing factor to that injury.
I have also found the evidence of Dr D’Abrera to be problematic and not given in a ‘fair climate’. Dr D’Abrera is the only medical practitioner to opine as to the IRMP being the predominant cause of the applicant’s psychological injury. From my rejection of his evidence in this regard it follows that the respondent cannot meet its onus of establishing any defence pursuant to s 11A of the 1987 Act.
To summarise:
(a)    the applicant does not refer to the IRMP in his statement evidence at all – this is criticised by the respondent (see paragraph 84(g) above), but in the context of his documented discussions with particularly Dr Khoo and Dr Gunn, I find his lack of reference to the IRMP as reflective of his view as to its lack of significance in the causation of his psychological symptoms – a view accepted by Dr Khoo and Dr Gunn;
(b)    Associate Professor Robertson opines (see paragraph 50 above) that the “disciplinary matters led to no significant consequences and are an irrelevant aspect of the overall clinical picture”;
(c)    Dr Chow does not mention the IRMP in his reports at all - while it would have been preferable for the doctor to have been aware of the plan, his potential ignorance in this regard does not assist the respondent in meeting its onus of proof to establish a defence pursuant to s 11A of the 1987 Act;
(d)    Dr Gunn specifically compares the IRMP and the traumatic incidents as to their causative effects in relation to the applicant’s psychological condition (see paragraphs 60 and 65 above) and concludes the traumatic incidents to be the predominant cause, and
(e)    Dr Khoo (who was the first doctor to consult with the applicant in relation to his psychological symptoms) takes a history on 18 August 2024 of both the IRMP and the traumatic incidents - however, his certificates of capacity, his referrals, and his 25 October 2024 report, all solely deal with the traumatic incidents as being causative of the applicant’s psychological condition.
It should also be noted that even though (according to the history obtained from the applicant by Dr Gunn) his employment duties while he was on secondment in accordance with the IRMP involved his exposure to further traumatic incidents which led to a deterioration in his mental health, a distinction needs to be drawn between the IRMP as an action of the respondent, and the applicant’s employment conditions subsequent to its implementation (which involved the exposure to those traumatic incidents). In my opinion, the applicant’s response to those employment conditions (encountered after the implementation of the IRMP) is distinct from the respondent’s disciplinary action in implementing the IRMP. As Davies AJA explained in Doyle (at [26]):
“In this provision [s 11A of the 1987 Act], emphasis is placed upon action taken or proposed to be taken by or on behalf of the employer. The provision differentiates between the worker's psychological response to work done and required to be done in the course of employment and the worker's psychological response to action taken or proposed to be taken by or on behalf of the employer. It is only the latter circumstance which causes the provision to operate.”
and (at [27]):
“The paragraph [s 11A of the 1987 Act] is thus looking to the worker's response to the employer's action or proposed action, not to the worker's response to employment conditions encountered after a transfer, demotion, promotion, etc.”
After evaluating all the evidence and conducting the comparison required per Outram between the applicant’s reaction to the respondent’s IRMP and his reaction to the traumatic incidents, I find that the IRMP was not the main, principal, or predominant cause of his psychological injury found by me. The respondent has failed in its onus to establish any defence to the applicant’s compensation claim for his psychological injury, pursuant to s 11A of the 1987 Act.

SUMMARY

I find that the applicant sustained injury, in the form of post-traumatic stress disorder, in accordance with s 4 of the 1987 Act, through his exposure to the traumatic incidents in the course of his employment with the respondent. I find his employment with the respondent to be the main contributing factor to the injury. The injury will be deemed to have occurred on 18 August 2024, being the first date of his incapacity as a result of the injury.
I find that the respondent has failed to establish (pursuant to s 11A of the 1987 Act) that the applicant’s injury was wholly or predominantly caused by reasonable action taken or proposed to be taken by it with respect to discipline and/or performance appraisal.
I amend the ARD to delete the applicant’s claim for weekly benefits compensation – that claim being withdrawn prior to the arbitration hearing – see paragraph 11 above.
I find the applicant to be entitled to payment of his reasonably necessary expenses pursuant to s 60 of the 1987 Act.
In accordance with the agreement of the respondent (see paragraph 11 above), an award will be entered in favour of the applicant in the sum of $927.59, pursuant to s 60 of the 1987 Act.

[2025] NSWPIC 278

17 June 2025