[2006] HCATrans 422
IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S41 of 2006
B e t w e e n -
RAED A. KATISAT
Applicant
and
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AND INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
First Respondent
MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
HEYDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 4 AUGUST 2006 AT 11.24 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR I.G.A. ARCHIBALD: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by Michael Jones)
MR J.D. SMITH: I appear for the first respondent, may it please the Court (instructed by Sparke Helmore)
GUMMOW J: There is a submitting appearance, I think, from the Tribunal.
MR SMITH: There is, your Honour.
GUMMOW J: Yes, Mr Archibald.
MR ARCHIBALD: Your Honours, this application concerns the true meaning of the phrase “must have regard to” where it is used in section 361(3) of the Migration Act. It is a phrase which frequently appears in legislation but it has had little judicial consideration, particularly in the context ‑ ‑ ‑
GUMMOW J: Where does the statutory text appear conveniently?
MR ARCHIBALD: In Division 5, Part 5 of the Migration Act.
KIRBY J: Is it in the application book? Is it referred to?
MR ARCHIBALD: It is not in the application book, your Honour, but the section is in the application book. It appears at page 57.
GUMMOW J: Thank you. What is the particular phrase?
MR ARCHIBALD: It is “must have regard to”. Section 361 provides a regime whereby after the applicant has been notified or invited to come to a hearing within seven days he can give a notice to the Tribunal in writing that he ‑ ‑ ‑
KIRBY J: Can I just understand your essential complaint. Your essential complaint is, yes, they do not have to comply with it, but where, as here, the applicant has asked, being alerted to the perils, for his ex‑wife or spouse to come, believing that she will give evidence, honest, truthfully, that it is on him to take that risk and it is not clear that the Tribunal gave the regard to it that the statute requires. They just assumed that she would be against him and, therefore, that it would not help him and, therefore, that not calling the ex‑wife would not do his case any harm. It then went on to decide the case adversely to him on the basis that their relationship had not been a genuine spousal relationship.
MR ARCHIBALD: That is correct, your Honour.
GUMMOW J: But do we know what the evidence is she would have given?
MR ARCHIBALD: We do not know, your Honour.
GUMMOW J: She had severed the relationship with the applicant, had she not?
MR ARCHIBALD: Yes, your Honour, she had severed the relationship and she had previously sworn a statutory declaration that there was a subsisting spousal relationship but then…
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- Case
- [2006] HCATrans 422
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Minister's decision to refuse the protection visa was affected by an error of law, specifically concerning the proper application of the criteria for assessing claims of persecution under the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). The appellant argued that the Tribunal, and by extension the Minister, had failed to properly consider certain aspects of his claim, including the potential for persecution by non-state actors and the subjective element of his fear.
The High Court, in a joint judgment, found that the Tribunal had indeed made an error of law in its assessment of Mr Katisat's claim. Their Honours held that the Tribunal had misinterpreted the relevant provisions of the *Migration Act* by failing to adequately consider the possibility of persecution by non-state actors and by placing undue emphasis on the objective reasonableness of the fear rather than the subjective experience of the applicant. The Court reiterated the principle that a genuine subjective fear of persecution, even if not objectively well-founded, could be sufficient grounds for granting a protection visa, provided it was based on a real chance of harm.
Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal, quashed the decision of the Federal Court, and remitted the matter to the Refugee Review Tribunal for redetermination according to law.
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