Katherine Barakis v Melton City Council

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[2024] FWC 864

The attached document replaces the document previously issued with the above code on 4 April 2024.

A typographical error in the first paragraph has been amended.

Associate to Commissioner Perica

Dated 5 April 2024.

[2024] FWC 864

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009

s.365—General protections

Katherine Barakis
v

Melton City Council

(C2024/988)

COMMISSIONER PERICA

MELBOURNE, 4 APRIL 2024

Application to deal with contraventions involving dismissal

  1. Katherine Barakis (the Applicant) made an application under s 365 of the Fair Work Act 2009 alleging she was dismissed from her employment with Melton City Council (the Respondent) in contravention of Part 3-1.

Procedural history

  1. The application may have been made out of time. To deal with this threshold issue, I made directions on 12 March 2024 and listed the matter for a determinative conference on 4 April 2024.

  1. The determinative conference proceeded on 4 April 2024. The Applicant represented herself. The Respondent was represented by Mr. Christopher Charalambous of the firm Maddocks after I had granted him leave under s 596. Mr. Charalambous appeared together with Ms. Janine Thomas, the Acting Manager of People and Safety of the Respondent.

  1. For the following reasons, I have decided not to grant an extension of time and the application in this matter is therefore dismissed.

When must an application for an order granting a remedy be made?

  1. Section 366(1) provides that such an application must be made:

(a)   within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or

(b)   within such further period as the Commission allows.

Was the Application made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect?

  1. A Full Bench has stated in relation to a general protections application, “[t]he 21 day period prescribed… does not include the day on which the dismissal took effect.”[1] It is not contested the dismissal took effect on 22 January 2024. It follows the final day of the 21-day period was 12 February 2024 and ended at midnight on that day.

  1. The application was filed at 4:52 PM on 19 February 2024, seven days late. As it was not made within 21 days of the date on which the dismissal took effect, I need to consider whether it was made within such further period as the Commission allows.

  1. Under section 366(2), the Commission may allow a further period for a general protections application to be made if the Commission is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

(a)   the reason for the delay; and

(b)   any action taken by the Applicant to dispute the dismissal; and

(c)   prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and

(d)   the merits of the application; and

(e)   fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a similar position.

  1. Each of these matters must be considered in assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances.[2] I set out my consideration of each matter below.

Reason for the delay

  1. For the application to have been made within 21 days after the dismissal took effect, it needed…

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Details
Case
[2024] FWC 864
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Katherine Barakis filed an application under section 365 of the Fair Work Act 2009, alleging she was dismissed by Melton City Council in contravention of Part 3-1 of the Act. The primary issue before the Commission was whether the application was made within the requisite time limit, and if not, whether there were exceptional circumstances justifying an extension of time. The Commission was required to assess the reasons for the delay, any action taken by the Applicant to dispute the dismissal, the prejudice to the employer, the merits of the application, and the fairness between the Applicant and other persons in similar positions.

The Commission found that the application was made seven days late and that the Applicant's reasons for the delay were not exceptional. The Applicant claimed she believed she had no recourse to challenge the dismissal as she was on probation, and other reasons provided did not constitute exceptional circumstances. The Respondent argued the reasons provided were inadequate and did not establish exceptional circumstances. The Commission concluded that the reasons for the delay and the lack of action taken by the Applicant to dispute the dismissal counted against an extension of time. Other factors, such as the lack of prejudice to the employer and the neutral merits of the application, did not support an extension. The Commission was not satisfied there were exceptional circumstances under section 366(2), and therefore, the application was dismissed.

This decision highlights the stringent time limits applicable to general protections applications and the high threshold for extending these periods. The Commission emphasised that mere ignorance of the statutory time limit and incorrect assumptions about legal rights do not constitute exceptional circumstances. The outcome underscores the importance for applicants to promptly seek legal advice and file applications within the specified timeframe.

Orders

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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