Karzi v Toll Pty Ltd

The appeal concerned a claim for damages for psychiatric injury brought by the appellant, Mr Karzi, against his employer, Toll Pty Ltd. Mr Karzi alleged that he suffered a psychiatric injury as a result of verbal harassment by his co-workers. The primary judge had found that the risk of psychiatric harm to Mr Karzi was not reasonably foreseeable, and that even if it were, the employer had taken reasonable precautions to address any such risk. The appeal was heard in the Court of Appeal of New South Wales.

The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the primary judge erred in finding that the risk of psychiatric harm to Mr Karzi was not reasonably foreseeable. It also had to consider whether the primary judge erred in admitting evidence from a witness who had not been disclosed in the respondent's pre-filing statement, contrary to section 315 of the *Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998* (NSW). Further, the court considered whether a certificate of whole person impairment, which described the injury as "transient", was evidence of the permanence of the psychiatric injury for the purposes of causation. Finally, the court was asked to consider whether the primary judge erred in failing to address the appellant's case on vicarious liability, which had not been formally pleaded but was raised during the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It held that the primary judge did not err in finding that the risk of psychiatric harm was not reasonably foreseeable, particularly as Mr Karzi had not indicated to his employer that he was suffering from psychiatric harm. The court found that the employer had taken reasonable precautions to address the risk of psychiatric harm. Regarding the admission of evidence, the court noted that the appellant's own pre-filing statement did not comply with section 315 of the Act, and therefore the primary judge did not err in admitting the evidence. The court also found that the certificate of whole person impairment, describing the injury as "transient", did not establish the permanence of the injury for causation purposes. The court further held that the primary judge was not required to address the unpleaded issue of vicarious liability.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.