KARAMIAN and AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION

This matter concerned an application by Tadeh Karamian to the Tribunal for a review of a decision made by a delegate of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). The delegate had issued a permanent banning order against Mr Karamian, prohibiting him from providing financial services, performing functions as an officer of a financial services business, and controlling such an entity. ASIC relied on sections 920A(1)(d) and (da) of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth), which empower ASIC to make a banning order if it has reason to believe a person is not fit and proper, or is not adequately trained or competent, to provide financial services.

The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether the delegate's decision to impose a permanent banning order was correct or preferable, and if not, what variation to the order, if any, should be made. This involved determining the meaning of "reason to believe," "fit and proper person," "adequately trained," and "competent" within the context of the *Corporations Act* and the *Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001* (Cth). The Tribunal was also required to consider the weight to be given to character evidence, the applicant's prior good record, the impact of mental illness on his conduct, and the extent to which comparable cases could assist in its decision-making. Furthermore, the Tribunal considered whether it was required to apply ASIC's Regulatory Guide 98.

The Tribunal found that while Mr Karamian's misconduct, which included falsifying an exam result, misleading colleagues, clients, and ASIC, and providing personal advice without authorisation for nearly nine months, was deliberate and motivated by self-interest, a permanent ban was excessive. Despite the absence of financial loss to clients and extensive favourable character evidence, and acknowledging Mr Karamian's remorse and contrition, the Tribunal noted a lack of insight into the gravity of his misconduct at the time of the hearing. The Tribunal concluded that the power to make a banning order was enlivened, but that a period of seven years, commencing from the date the original order took effect, was a more appropriate duration for the ban, and corrected a minor typographical error in the original order.