Kanley (Aust) Pty Ltd v Citer Souvenirs Pty Ltd

Case

[1988] FCA 870

12 May 1988

No judgment structure available for this case.

IN TBE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA )
N E W SOUTE W A L E S DISTRICT REGISTRY 1 No. G 923 of 1988
)
GENERAL DIVISION
Between: XANLEY (AUST) PTY LIMITED

Applicant

_. And: CITER SOUVENIRS PTY LIMITED

CORAM: Einfeld J.

- DATE: 12 May 1988
PLACE:  Sydney

EX-TEMPORE JUDGMENT

These proceedin- us corn lenced in Chambers when I granted leave to serve

short notice of the application and the statement of claim making the

application returnable today.

The application sought:

(a) an interim injunction to prevent the distribution or circulation
of the letter and restrict the commercial activities of the
respondent which the applicant alleges have brought or would
Act); and

bring disadvantage to itself;

(b) other orders designed to impede what the applicant alleges to be

misleading or deceptive representations by the applicant within

the meaning of section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (the

permanent restraining orders, inter alia, designed to remedy
what the applicant alleges has already taken place at the hands
of the respondent or its representatives to the detriment of the

applicant's business.

The parties are commercial traders operating at least in Sydney. This

dispute arose when the respondent notified the applicant on 6 May 1988

by facsimile that it was proposing to send out to its Sydney customers a

letter critical of certain actions and statements of a representative of
the applicant.
On the same day, 6 May 1988, the applicant's solicitors by letter

threatened defamation proceedings and action under the Act, as well as

actions for breaches of the Anti Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) arising
out of the proposed letter - 'proposed' because at the moment the only

evidence before me suggests that it has not yet been distributed.

These stark partly novel threats were met by a first letter from the respondent on 9 May 1988 in the course of which the respondent says:

"We will have our letter to customers thoroughly scrutinized
by our legal advisers prior to despatching it to our
customers later this week."
The respondent also indicated an intention 'subject to legal advice yet

to be sought' to take action against the applicant under the Act, the

common law and what is described as 'under any other act or law that may

be relevant'. The possibilities are intriguing. In particular, the

respondent indicated a desire to pursue relief, inter alia, for breaches

of the Act, damage to its reputation, loss of income and punitive
damages. However, it extended the olive branch of

"at this early stage prior to the incurring of substantial legal costs and prior to the expense of considerable

management time a settlement out of court."

The basis of the settlement proposed was:
a payment by ,the applicant to the respondent of 'about $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 '
before 13 May 1988;
a letter in approved wording from the applicant to all their
customers apologising for their conduct towards the respondent;

an undertaking that the applicant would cease to utter untrue and malicious statements about the respondent, its employees and directors; and

an undertaking that the applicant would not, in the future, copy

the respondent's designs, nor offer for sale any such copies.

The applicant was 'generously' given 2 4 hours to respond to that offer,
failing which the respondent intended to instruct Mr. Toltz of Clayton
Utz, solicitors. No doubt apprehending that the 2 4 hours given was

moving along with unrelenting speed, the solicitors for the applicant

apparently had a conversation with the principal of the respondent on 9
May 1988 and also wrote to the respondent on he same day.
The applicant's letter of 9 May 1988 relates that in the immediately
preceding telephone conversation, the respondent had advised the

applicant's solicitor that the letter had not been sent to customers, and takes issue with some of its contents. The letter also indicates

that in the conversation, the respondent reaffirmed that it was
obtaining legal advice and sought an undertaking by '12 pm on 10 May
1988' (by which I understand the letter to be talking about 12 noon

rather than some nefarious nocturnal pursuit), that the respondent would

desist.frorn sending the letter 'in any matter (sic) or form'. I do not
know what the expression was intended to have meant. It was not

asserted at the hearing before me to have been a typographical error. If the undertaking was not received, the solicitors for the applicant indicated that they would seek an urgent injunction.

On the same day, the respondent sent a hank you note by facsimile to

the solicitors for the applicant which informed them that if the

applicant accepted the respondent's proposal to settle the matter, the

letter to customers would not be distributed. The respondent also

forecast that it would be replaced by a letter from the applicant in
accordance with the proposed terms of settlement and advised the
applicant's solicitors that there would be
"no need to seek injunctive relief and thereby add to your
client's costs. "
The second 9 May 1988 letter from the respondent proffered that the
legal advice was still not being sought pending a reply to the
respondent's first letter of 9 May 1988.
By 10 May 1988 the Sword of Damocles was about to fall. In a letter of
that date to the applicant's solicitors and expressed to be 'without
prejudice', perhaps to the 2 4 hour ultimatum earlier given for a reply,

the respondent rang down the curtain on conciliation by informing the

applicant's solicitors that it was requesting its solicitors to seek
from the Court what is described as 'a minimum damages award' of
$100,000 (thus indicating that the interest rates in the community had
risen, or the value of the dollar had fallen, rather dramatically in
that 2 4 hour period). The respondent was also seeking an award of what
is described as 'full costs' against the applicant and suitable

undertakings that the applicant cease to cause damage to the respondent.

The letter indicated a belief in the respondent that there would be no

further action until later that day, but the respondent suggested that
the parties might approach the Court for simultaneous injunctions and
notified that he certainly wished to be heard by the Court on such a

matter.

On the same day, the applicant's olicitors responded to the
circumstances and intentions indicated by the respondent i the first 9

May letter. The applicant refused the offer of settlement but extended

the time for the written undertaking to not later than 5 pm on 11 May

1988. At 4 . 5 0 pm, or thereabouts, on 11 May 1988, the respondent's

solicitors supplied a letter to the applicant's solicitor taking issue

with some of the requests or forms of requests that had been made to
their client but advising nonetheless of the respondent's undertaking
not to circulate the proposed letter o its customers.
Against that background;the respondent seeks today a dismissal of the

application and costs, arguing that because the applicant gave the

respondent until 5 pm last night to give the undertaking sought and that

the respondent gave the undertaking before the time expired, the
proceedings were and are unnecessary.
The applicant opposes these orders on two principal grounds:

1. that the undertaking profferred in the letter of 11 May from the
respondent's solicitor to the applicant's solicitor delivered
just before the end of the ultimatum period last night, is not

in terms of the undertaking sought. The undertaking was sought

in the broad and general form of 'non-distribution in a y matter
(sic) or form', whereas what has been undertaken is that it will
not be circulated to the respondent's; customers;
2.
that the applicant is still seeking substantive permanent
relief, that it wishes to amend its statement of claim, and that
there are matters in dispute between the parties which are not
dealt with by the undertaking and were not intended to be dealt
with when the undertaking was sought.

~

There is no formal application, in terms of a written document before
~ the Court, for the summary dismissal of the action, nor is there
l
~ affidavit evidence. It is agreed by the applicant that its solicitors
~
did receive the letter from the respondent's solicitors a about 4 . 5 0 pm
1
!
l on 11 May 1988, and the applicant cannot and does not deny that it
j

approached the Court for relief and received that relief before that

I

i

I time.
It is not appropriate, in my opinion, to deal with a summary dismissal
application from the bar table and without a proper application
supported by affidavit evidence such as would enable the applicant to
oppose the application with its own evidence if it wishes to do so and
cross-examine any deponents upon whom the respondent relies for such
orders. Further, the applicant seeks other orders and directions for
the further preparation of this case, and I think it should certainly be
allowed to pursue that course.
On the other hand, it does not seem to me on the face of the material
available that the action is likely to be one for substantial damages.
In the circumstances, the parties should emerge from this initial
exchange with a sense of responsibility for the costs that wili be
incurred by a long perpetuation of these proceedings against any
possible result that either party could genuinely hope to gain from the
Court.
For those reasons, I accede to the applicant’s request to give further
time for the preparation and therefore give the following directions:

The applicant is to file and serve any amended statement of
claim and application upon which it wishes to rely by not later

than 4 pm on Monday 23 May 1988.

The respondent is to file and serve any application to strike

out or for summary dismissal of the amended application and
statement of claim by not later than 4 pm, Wednesday 1 June
1988, together with any affidavits upon which it intends to rely
in those proceedings.
The applicant is to file and serve any affidavits upon which it
wishes to rely in opposition to the application for summary
relief by not later than 4 pm on Friday 10 June 1988.

!

(d) The matter is to stand over for further directions at 9.30 am on

Thursday 16 June 1988 before me on which day the parties should

be ready to argue any application for summary relief filed on

behalf of the respondent. To that end, the parties should give

each other notice by not later than Monday 13 June 1988 of the

witnesses whom it is desired to cross-examine.

The costs of today in relation to the application for permanent relief are reserved. In view of all the circumstances, it is my view that the application for interim relief was premature and that therefore the applicant should pay the respondent's costs

of that application. However, I direct that costs are not t o be
taxable or payable until the matter is before the Court on 16

June 1988 for further order in that regard.

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