Kang v Commonwealth of Australia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kang v Commonwealth of Australia [2008] FCA 1863

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 659(2)(a), 659(2)(e), 659(2)(f), 660, 661, 663, 664
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1), 25(1A), 43
Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth) s 79(2)

Kang v Attorney-General’s Department [2008] FMCA 638 referred to
Zhang v The Royal Australian Chemical Institute Inc (2005) 144 FCR 347 cited
Claveria v Pilkington Australia Ltd (2007) 167 IR 144 referred to
Robertson v South (2000) 140 IR 169 referred to
He v Lewin (2004) 137 FCR 266 cited
Council of Kangan Batman Institute of Technology and Further Education v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2007) 237 ALR 672 cited

LILI KANG v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

VID 453 OF 2008

TRACEY J
19 DECEMBER 2008
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 453 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

LILI KANG
Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 DECEMBER 2008

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


The text of entered orders can be located using eSearch on the Court’s website.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 453 OF 2008

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

LILI KANG
Appellant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE:

19 DECEMBER 2008

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Between 4 September 2006 and 28 February 2007 Ms Lili Kang was employed in the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department.  Throughout this period she was a probationary employee.  On 28 February 2007 her employment was terminated on the ground that she had failed to perform her duties at an acceptable standard. 

  2. Ms Kang considered that her employment had been terminated for reasons proscribed by the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (“the Act”). Specifically, she alleged that she had been dismissed because of a temporary absence from work due to illness and because she had filed complaints against her employer alleging breaches of applicable laws. She commenced a proceeding in the Federal Magistrates Court in which she sought re-instatement to her former position, compensation and costs. At trial, she abandoned her claim for re-instatement and advised the Court that she sought compensation and an apology. The proceeding was dismissed by the Federal Magistrate: see Kang v Attorney-General’s Department [2008] FMCA 638.

  3. The respondent (who was, by order of this Court, identified as the Commonwealth of Australia) opposed the application and sought its costs.  The Federal Magistrate did not rule on the costs application.

  4. Ms Kang lodged an appeal in this Court. The Commonwealth cross-appealed on the costs issue. The Chief Justice directed, pursuant to s 25(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the Federal Court Act”) that the appeal be heard and determined by a single…

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Details
Case
[2008] FCA 1863
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Ms Kang appealed against the decision of the Federal Magistrate who dismissed her application for unlawful termination of employment. The Commonwealth cross-appealed on the issue of costs. The appeal was heard by a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia. The primary issue before the court was whether the Federal Magistrate erred in dismissing Ms Kang's application for unlawful termination of employment. The court needed to determine whether Ms Kang's termination of employment was due to one or more of the reasons specified in s 659(2) of the Public Sector Management Act 1994 (Cth), which include temporary absence from work due to illness and the filing of a complaint against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulations. The court found that the Federal Magistrate had correctly identified the grounds of Ms Kang's application and correctly interpreted the relevant legislation. The court held that Ms Kang's complaints were made to officers within the Attorney-General's Department and not to an external body, and therefore did not fall within the scope of s 659(2)(e) of the Act. The court also found that there was no evidence to support Ms Kang's claim that she was dismissed due to her temporary absence from work due to illness. The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms Kang lodged an appeal in this Court. The Commonwealth cross-appealed on the costs issue. The Chief Justice directed, pursuant to s 25(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the Federal Court Act”) that the appeal be heard and determined by a single judge.THE BASIC FACTS It is not necessary, for the purposes of this appeal, to recount all of the facts which are recorded in the Federal Magistrate’s reasons. The following summary will suffice. Ms Kang was offered and accepted a position as a Senior Budgets Officer within the Financial Management Branch of the Financial Services Group in the Attorney-General’s Department. It was a condition of her employment that she satisfactorily completed a period of six months probation. If, during the probationary period, her work performance or conduct was not considered satisfactory her employment was subject to termination. Ms Kang’s supervisors were Mr Mark McKnight and Ms Tarnya Gersbach. In December 2006 Mr McKnight and Ms Gersbach commenced the preparation of a report on Ms Kang’s performance during the first three months of her employment. In mid December Ms Gersbach told Ms Kang that she did not feel able to complete the probationary report because Ms Kang had not, during that period, been given an opportunity to demonstrate her skill level. In particular, Ms Gersbach felt unable to assess Ms Kang against two criteria, namely, “analytical skills and sound judgment” and “ability to achieve results.” An assessment form was completed and signed by Mr McKnight but no entries were made adjacent to these two headings. In February 2007, Ms Gersbach was advised by the Department’s Human Resources Section that it was necessary to complete these sections. Ms Gersbach then completed the form and rated Ms Kang as “unsatisfactory” against each of these criteria. Ms Kang was given the report on 20 February 2007. Ms Kang was distressed by her discussions with Ms Gersbach in December. She described herself as being emotional, stressed and angry about what she regarded as unfair and unprofessional treatment. She was concerned that it was proposed to extend the initial six month probation period by a further three months. Ms Kang was observed to have been sullen and uncommunicative in the office. This led Ms Gersbach to convene a second meeting with Ms Kang shortly before the Christmas vacation. Ms Kang complained about the failure to provide an assessment report on the first three months of her probationary employment, the level of work she was being asked to perform and the failure to invite her to attend certain meetings. In January and February 2007 Ms Gersbach paid particular attention to the work being undertaken by Ms Kang. Ms Gersbach directed Ms Kang to undertake particular tasks and imposed deadlines for the completion of those tasks. Ms Kang complained that Ms Gersbach kept changing the tasks leading to Ms Kang being confused about what she was required to do. In mid February Ms Gersbach invited Ms Kang to come and discuss Ms Kang’s six month probation assessment. Ms Gersbach expressed some misgivings about the performance standards being achieved by Ms Kang. Ms Kang said that she had no problems with the work and complained that Ms Gersbach had not previously questioned her work performance. Towards the end of the meeting Ms Gersbach informed Ms Kang that she proposed to assign her a particular task. If it was performed satisfactorily it would satisfy Ms Gersbach that Ms Kang had achieved the necessary standards. The task could not, however, be commenced until 1 March 2007 by which time the six month period of probation would have expired. Ms Gersbach indicated that it would be necessary to extend the period of probation. Ms Kang did not accept this proposal and said that she wished the Human Resources Section to be involved in her probationary process. Ms Kang sent an e-mail to Mr Ross Butler, the Human Resources Manager and Mr Trevor Kennedy, the then Acting Assistant Secretary of the Department, requesting that appointments be made for her to see them.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

This ground fails.Failure to Refer to Evidence and Draw Inferences Ms Kang pointed to a number of passages in the Federal Magistrate’s reasons which she said contained incorrect statements. The first was the statement, in paragraph 8 of his Honour’s reasons, that: “[Ms Kang] says that at the time she received negative feedback from Mr McKnight about her work performance.” In this passage the Federal Magistrate was paraphrasing a passage from an affidavit affirmed by Ms Kang. In the affidavit she had said: “there was no (sic) any negative feedback mentioned about my work performance from Mr. McKnight.” It is evident that the word “no” had been omitted before the word “negative” in the sentence about which Ms Kang makes complaint. The error is one of transcription. It is evident that the Federal Magistrate had read Ms Kang’s affidavit and can be taken to have understood her point. In any event, the factual error (if there was one) could not have had any effect on the outcome of Ms Kang’s application. Ms Kang next points to certain errors in his Honour’s reasons relating to the first probation report. In paragraph 15 his Honour observed that, following an interview with Ms Gersbach on 15 December 2006, it was “apparent that Ms Kang did not take well to the report.” In paragraph 17 there is reference to a second meeting between Ms Kang and Ms Gersbach on 19 December 2006. The Federal Magistrate attributes to Ms Kang the evidence that, at that meeting, “the probation report itself” was “addressed”. It was common ground that Ms Kang did not receive a copy of the first probationary report until 20 February 2007. It was not, therefore, strictly accurate to say that she did not take well to the report or that the report had been discussed at the 19 December 2006 meeting. When the evidence is read in context it is clear enough that the references to the report are references to the performance issues which were of concern to Ms Gersbach and to Ms Gersbach’s unwillingness to complete the report after the three month period which had concluded in December 2006. What Ms Kang did not take well to was the advice, given to her by Ms Gersbach on 15 December 2006, that she did not feel able to rate Ms Kang against certain criteria. Ms Kang identified the issue discussed on 19 December 2006 as being: “[w]hy can’t you prepare probation report if it was not my fault? How did you feel if you were in my position?” The two references to the “report” are plainly ambiguous. Despite this there is nothing to suggest that the Federal Magistrate misunderstood the evidence or was led into error by a false appreciation of it. Ultimately nothing turned on whether Ms Kang had access to the report in December 2006. In paragraph 52 of his reasons the Federal Magistrate held that her case, insofar as it was founded on s 659(2)(e), disclosed no more than that she had made complaints to various individuals within the Attorney-General’s Department. One of those individuals was a Ms Sonia Kim who was the Department’s Harassment Officer. The Federal Magistrate records that Ms Kang had given evidence that she said to Ms Kim that “she [Ms Kang] was prepared to make a complaint” about her treatment during the probationary period. Ms Kang objects that her evidence was that she had told Ms Kim that she was prepared to make a formal complaint. The absence of the adjective in the Federal Magistrate’s reasons is of no account. Whether the complaint was formal or informal it was no more than a proposed complaint. Ms Kang failed in making good her claim under s 659(2)(e) because she had made no complaint to any external body.

Decision

Reasons for decision

TRACEY J
Ms Kang was notified of the termination of her employment by letter dated 28 February 2007.THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE’S DECISION The Federal Magistrate confronted a number of difficulties. The first was that the application before him failed to identify, with precision, the grounds on which Ms Kang relied. The second was that she appeared in person despite acknowledging that she had some difficulty in communicating in her second language, English. The Federal Magistrate understood, from Ms Kang’s submissions that she was alleging that the Commonwealth had contravened s 659(2) of the Act by dismissing her because of her temporary absence from work due to illness and because she had filed complaints about her employer alleging breaches of applicable laws. These were the only proscribed reasons identified in the affidavit which Ms Kang swore in support of her application. Section 659(2) of the Act stipulates that:“… an employer must not terminate an employee’s employment for any one or more of the following reasons, or for reasons including any one or more of the following reasons:(a)temporary absence from work because of illness or injury within the meaning of the regulations;(b)…(c)…(d)…(e)the filing of a complaint, or the participation in proceedings, against an employer involving alleged violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent administrative authorities;(f)race, colour, sex, sexual preference, age, physical or metal disability, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin;…” Section 663 of the Act provides that an employee who alleges a contravention of s 659 by his or her employer may seek various remedies in the Federal Magistrates Court. Section 664 contains a reverse onus provision as follows:“In any proceedings under section 663 relating to a termination of employment in contravention of section 659 for a reason (a proscribed reason) set out in a paragraph of subsection (2) of that section:(a)it is not necessary for the employee to prove that the termination was for a proscribed reason; but(b)it is a defence in the proceedings if the employer proves that the termination was for a reason or reasons that do not include a proscribed reason …” The Federal Magistrate accepted that, once Ms Kang had made the allegation that Mr Kennedy had terminated her employment for one or more of the reasons identified in s 659(2)(a) and (e), the onus fell on the Commonwealth, under s 664, to prove that the termination did not occur for a proscribed reason: see Zhang v The Royal Australian Chemical Institute Inc (2005) 144 FCR 347 at 350 [15]. The Federal Magistrate did not consider that Ms Kang had been dismissed because of absences due to illness. There was no reason why Mr Kennedy would have been aware of any of Ms Kang’s absences because of illness. It had not been put to him that he was aware of any such absences or that he had acted because of them. His Honour rejected the claim, insofar as it was based on s 659(2)(e) on the basis that it was well settled that the paragraph did not apply where all that the employee had done was to make a complaint directly to his or her employer: see Zhang at [19]-[30]; Claveria v Pilkington Australia Ltd (2007) 167 IR 144 at [110]-[112]. All of Ms Kang’s complaints about her treatment were directed to other officers within the Attorney-General’s Department.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: TRACEY J

Full text does not contain this section.