Kang and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)
[2016] AATA 829
•21 October 2016
Kang and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2016] AATA 829 (21 October 2016)
Division
GENERAL DIVISION
File Number
2015/4483
Re
Ho Il KANG
APPLICANT
And
Secretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Mr D. J. Morris, Member
Date 21 October 2016 Place Perth The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review, and, in substitution therefor, decides as follows:
i. The Applicant’s Disability Support Pension was correctly cancelled on 4 December 2014 as his assets exceeded the allowable limit;
ii. The Applicant is an attributable stakeholder and the attribution to him is 100 per cent; and
iii. The amount of the debt due and payable for the period 4 January 2007 to 2 December 2014 be remitted to the Secretary for recalculation in accordance with this Decision.
..............[Sgd]..........................................................
D. J. Morris, MemberCATCHWORDS
SOCIAL SERVICES – Disability Support Pension (DSP) – medically qualified with severe and permanent impairment – whether attributable stakeholder of trust – whether assets exceed asset test threshold for DSP – percentage of attribution – debt payable – grounds for writing off or waiver – original decision not qualified for DSP affirmed, amount of debt remitted for recalculation.
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 – s 37
Social Security Act 1991 – s 11(1) – s 1064 – s 1207C – s 1207P – s 1207V –
s 1207V(2)(a) – s 1207V(2)(b) – s 1207V(2)(ca) – s 1207X – s 1207X(2) – s 1223(1) –
s 1236 – s 1236(1A) – s 1237A – s 1237AADCASES
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Chamberlain [2002] FCA 67
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Social Security (Attributable Stakeholders and Attribution Percentages) Principles 2000
REASONS FOR DECISION
D. J. Morris, Member
21 October 2016
BACKGROUND
Mr Ho Il Kang (called in this Decision Mr Harry Kang consistent with the advice of the Applicant’s representative), was the recipient of a Disability Support Pension (DSP) from 19 April 1985. He qualified on the basis of severe impairment, namely brain damage from meningo-encephalitis contracted when he was aged 4.
That Mr Harry Kang suffers from static severe impairment is corroborated by historical and contemporary medical evidence (Exhibit A3) and is not in dispute in this hearing. There is no doubt he satisfies the medical requirements of having severe and permanent impairment.
Mr Harry Kang’s DSP was cancelled on 4 December 2014 on the basis that, he is ineligible to receive the DSP because his assets exceed those allowable under the Social Security Act 1991 (the Act) for recipients of DSP.
The decision to cancel the DSP on the grounds of ineligibility was taken by the Department of Social Services (the Department) on 4 December 2014. The complex assessment officer who made the decision also raised a debt due and payable to the Commonwealth for DSP payments from 4 January 2007 to 2 December 2014 (the Debt Period) in the amount of $163,426.44.
The Applicant, through his legal representative Mr Duncan Kang, requested a review of the decision by an Authorised Review Officer (ARO), an independent officer of the Department.
The ARO considered the original decision and on 24 February 2015 affirmed it.
The Applicant requested a review of the original decision before the Social Services and Child Support Division of this Tribunal (AAT1).
The AAT1 hearing was held on 17 July 2015.
On 4 August 2015, AAT1 affirmed the original decision.
The Applicant sought a review in the General Division of the Tribunal. The reasons for requesting this ‘second-tier’ review were set out by the Applicant’s legal representative Mr Duncan Kang as follows (PT1, page 4):
Chong Soo Kang is not the appointor of the Kang Family Trust.
Ho Il Kang is not the controller of the Kang Family Trust.
Ho Il Kang is a non-controller and assets of the trust can not be attributed to him.
The hearing proceeded on this basis.
HEARING
The hearing was held on 15 September 2016.
Mr Duncan Kang appeared, representing the Applicant, and gave affirmed evidence. Mr Tony Goldfinch appeared as Counsel for the Applicant. Mr Matt Black, of Counsel, appeared for the Respondent.
Documents submitted to the Tribunal under section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 were admitted into evidence.
The following additional documents submitted to the Tribunal by the Applicant were admitted into evidence:
·Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions numbering 15 pages dated 18 December 2015 (Exhibit A1);
·Applicant’s Statement of Contentions in Response to the Respondent’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, numbering 21 pages, dated 29 March 2016 (Exhibit A2);
·Statement of Dr David Alan Nelson, numbering 2 pages, dated 9 August 2016 (Exhibit A3);
·Statement of Mr Duncan Kang, numbering 4 pages with an attachment of 5 pages, dated 13 September 2016 (Exhibit A4);
·Minutes of a meeting of the Trustee of the Kang Family Trust held at 15 Philip Street East Fremantle WA on the 27th June 2014, of one page (Exhibit A5); and
·Copy of Transfer of Land made under the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) and associated documents relating to the sale of 8 Hoil Chon Heights, Karnup, on 4 September 2013, numbering 8 pages (Exhibit A6).
ISSUES
There are two issues before the Tribunal:
i.Whether Mr Ho Il Kang (Mr Harry Kang) is an attributable stakeholder of Kang Family Trust and, if so, whether his asset attribution percentage should be less than 100 per cent; and
ii.Whether Mr Harry Kang has a recoverable debt, due and payable to the Commonwealth, arising from the overpayment of DSP in the amount of $163,426.44.
The persons referred to in this decision are:
·Mr Ho Il Kang – Applicant (Mr Harry Kang).
·Mr Duncan Kang – Older brother of the Applicant and his legal representative.
·Mr Chong Soo Kang – Father of the Applicant.
·Mrs Dyuk-Kyong Kang – Mother of the Applicant.
·Mr Pablo Kang – younger brother of the Applicant.
THE LAW
The main architectural statute for federal Social Security law in Australia is the Social Security Act 1991 (the Act). The fundamental basis of the Social Security law is to provide benefits for qualified persons who do not have other means of income support. The Act has been amended many times since it was originally passed into law, but the fundamental basis remains as stated by the Minister for Social Security in his Second Reading Speech in the House of Representatives on 6 December 1990:
It has now become more attuned, because of the many recent amendments, to the changing social and economic environment through its development into a more active piece of legislation that targets individuals and families in genuine need while positively encouraging them toward independence of the welfare system.
There is no as-of-right entitlement to social security benefits under the Act. To receive a benefit a person must be both eligible and qualified: eligible for the particular claimed benefit in terms of the person not exceeding the threshold of assets or income, and qualified in terms of the person making the claim meeting the particular requirements for the benefit claimed. If a person has income or assets above the threshold, the person may be entitled to a part-payment of a benefit, on a sliding scale. But if the assets exceed the allowable amounts, Parliament expects the person to draw on his or her own financial resources.
In this matter, there is no argument that Mr Harry Kang does not otherwise fulfil the statutory requirements of a severe impairment for eligibility for DSP. The question is whether he is or is not eligible to receive it, in terms of his access to other financial support.
Section 1064 of the Act sets out, inter alia, the rate of DSP. It states that the rate (other than for persons who are blind) is to be calculated in accordance with the Rate Calculator at the end of that section. The Act contains provisions for qualifying individuals to be eligible for part-payment of DSP, depending on their other financial means. No arguments were advanced by the Applicant about the use of the Rate Calculator; his arguments were centred on whether or not the assets of a trust, which had in the Department’s decision taken him over the eligible means test threshold, should be attributed to him.
Section 11(1) of the Act sets out that “asset” means property or money (including property or money outside Australia).
Subsection 1223(1) of the Act states:
(1) Subject to this section, if:
(a) a social security payment is made; and
(b)a person who obtains the benefit of the payment was not entitled for any reason to obtain that benefit;
the amount of the payment is a debt due to the Commonwealth by the person and the debt is taken to arise when the person obtains the benefit of the payment.
The Applicant set out certain facts in Exhibit A1 which were accepted by the Respondent:
·The Applicant was born in 1968 and is presently 47 years old.
·The Applicant resides at a house in Philip Street, East Fremantle (‘the Philip Street property’), a property owned by the Kang Family Trust.
·The Kang Family Trust was created by Deed dated 4 December 1987 with Vameze Pty Ltd as Trustee.
·Vameze Pty Ltd is still the Trustee of the Kang Family Trust. The Applicant advised that the director of Vameze Pty Ltd is Mr Duncan Kang. The capital of Vameze Pty Ltd is two fully paid ordinary shares. One share is held by Mr Duncan Kang. The other share is held by Mr Pablo Kang.
·Mr Choo Soo Kang was formerly a director of Vameze Pty Ltd but the Applicant advised he ceased to be a director in 1989.
·Mr Duncan Kang and Mrs Dyuk-Kyong Kang reside at the Philip Street property, with the Applicant.
·The Applicant and his mother formerly lived in Sydney. They moved to Perth and into the Philip Street property in 1998.
·When the Department cancelled the Applicant’s DSP on 4 December 2014, it issued an Account Payable Notice to Mr Harry Kang claiming payment of the sum of $163,426.44. The Account Payable Notice stated that:
The correct amount of your assets from Kang Family Trust were not taken into account in the payments made to you. As such you have been overpaid the amount of $163,426.44 for the period from 4 JAN 2007 to 2 DEC 2014. We are, therefore, required to recover this amount.
In this review, the Tribunal must put itself in the shoes of the original decision maker and consider whether the original decision made was correct in law and, where the applicable legislation provides for a discretionary power, that any discretion was exercised in a preferable (i.e. correct, equitable and just) manner.
The relevant subordinate legislative instrument in this matter is the Social Security (Attributable Stakeholders and Attribution Percentages) Principles 2000 (the Principles). This instrument was made by the Secretary of the (then) Department of Family and Community Services on 11 December 2000. By the operation of the Administrative Arrangement Orders made from time to time by the Governor-General, the responsible Department for the Social SecurityAct 1991 is now the Department of Social Services and the Principles are applicable to the Secretary of that Department.
Part 3.18 of the Act deals with how the assets and income of a private company or trust is attributed to a person if several conditions are met.
The Kang Family Trust was established in 1987 by the Applicant’s father Mr Chong Soo Kang. The Trust Deed provides that the eligible beneficiaries means any children, grandchildren and great grandchildren of Mr Chong Soo Kang, and the spouse of any child of the father, but the Deed specifically excludes the father or his legal representatives, the settlor or any trustee or former trustee from being an eligible beneficiary (PT11 pp 251 and 252).
That Deed provides at clause 16(a) (PT11 pp 263-265) that the powers to remove the trustee and to appoint a new trustee or trustees resides with Mr Chong Soo Kang during his lifetime and upon his death those powers of removal and appointment shall vest in the legal personal representatives of the father.
Section 1207C of the Act provides that in determining whether a trust is a designated private trust, or whether a company is a controlled private company in relation to an individual, or whether a trust is a controlled private trust in relation to an individual, or whether a trust is a concessional primary production trust in relation to an individual, a relative of the individual is an ‘associate’ of the individual.
Section 1207P of the Act provides that a trust is a “designated private trust” unless all of the following conditions are satisfied:
·The trust is a fixed trust;
·The units in the trust are held by 50 or more persons;
·The trust was not created, continued in existence or operated under a scheme that was entered into or carried out for the sole or dominant purpose of enabling any individual or individuals to avoid the application of this Part and/or Division 11A of Part IIIB of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act; or
·The trust is a complying superannuation fund; or
·The trust is a fund in a specified class of trusts that has been excluded by the Secretary.
None of these exclusions applies to the Kang Family Trust. Accordingly, by force of the Act, it is a “designated private trust” under section 1207P of the Act.
The next step is to consider the application of the ‘control test’ set out in section 1207V of the Act.
The Respondent contended that the Applicant passes the control test because an associate (as defined under section 1207C of the Act), Mr Duncan Kang, is the trustee of the Kang Family Trust.
AAT1 disputed the appointment of Mr Duncan Kang to the Kang Family Trust and took the view that Mr Choo Soo Kang remained the appointer of the Kang Family Trust. Although that conclusion by AAT1 is consistent with a reading of the Trust Deed, the Applicant contended that Mr Duncan Kang had succeeded Mr Choo Soo Kang and the Respondent, in submissions before this hearing, accepted that Mr Duncan Kang administered the Trust.
Nothing much turns on this point because each of Mr Duncan Kang and Mr Choo Soo Kang, as the brother and father respectively of the Applicant, plainly is a relative, and therefore is an ‘associate’ of the Applicant in terms of section 1207C of the Act.
The Respondent contended that the control test set out in subsections 1207V(2)(a), (b) and (ca) of the Act are satisfied in this case.
Counsel for the Applicant contended that Mr Harry Kang did not ‘control’ the Trust because he was not capable of exercising control. The Applicant’s legal representative contended (Exhibit A1) that Mr Harry Kang is not an attributable stakeholder but is instead a “beneficiary” of the Kang Family Trust, in fact one of the eligible beneficiaries as defined in the Trust Deed.
The Applicant contended that Mr Duncan Kang is also a beneficiary, because he had lived rent-free at the Philip Street property, which is owned by the Kang Family Trust, for many years.
Counsel for the Applicant contended that the Applicant was totally dependent on his carers. He was not himself aware of the Trust and cannot therefore be said to be in ‘control’. Mr Goldfinch argued that the Respondent does not say how the Applicant can be an attributable stakeholder, with his lack of knowledge, except to say that he is deemed to be an attributable stakeholder under the legislation.
In cross-examination, Mr Duncan Kang explained that he and his mother, Mrs Dyuk-Kyong Kang, live with the Applicant at the Philip Street property. Mrs Kang is the Applicant’s full-time carer but Mr Duncan Kang said he also helps out with his care.
Mr Duncan Kang said that the Applicant cannot look after money and he and his mother make decisions on his behalf. He informed the Tribunal that he holds an Enduring Power of Attorney (PT11 pages 145-148) and that he is compelled to act in the best interests of his brother the Applicant. He told the Tribunal, and I accept, that he would never do anything to the detriment of his brother.
During cross-examination, the Respondent drew Mr Duncan Kang’s attention to paragraph 27 of AAT1’s decision, which states:
Mr Duncan Kang wrote in a letter to Department [sic] on 27 November 2012:
“Mr Chong Soo Kang’s disabled son’s name is Hoil kang [sic]. He is one of the beneficiaries of the trust. The remaining beneficiaries of the trust are Mr Kang’s other children only. The properties held by the trust are used for recreational purposes for his disabled son. However there is an unwritten understanding that if these properties are sold the proceeds are to be used to the benefit of his disabled son.”
Mr Duncan Kang agreed that he did say that at the time.
I also drew Mr Duncan Kang’s attention to paragraph 26 of the AAT1 decision which referred to information Mr Chong Soo Kong had given to the Department and repeated in sworn evidence in a separate matter before the Social Security Appeals Tribunal (SSAT) in 2014, Choo Soo Kang and Secretary and Chief Executive Centrelink SSAT 2014/PO66159 (20 May 2014) (T5 page 51). Paragraph 26 of the AAT1 decision reads:
Mr Chong Soo Kong previously advised the Department and the tribunal that his sole purpose in establishing the Kang Family Trust was to make sure that his son Mr Ho Kang, who has an intellectual disability, would be provided for after he, Mr Chong Soo Kang, was no longer around. Mr Chong Soo Kang said that Mr Ho Kang who is now 45 years hold has an intellectual age of four or five years old. Mr Chong Soo Kang said he wanted to avoid disputes over his will that might jeopardise Mr Ho Kang’s welfare in the future.
(Emphasis added.)
Mr Duncan Kang conceded that that was an accurate representation of what his father had told the SSAT hearing in 2014, but said that evidence was given in the context of his father’s aged pension claim.
Mr Duncan Kang said that the Kang Family Trust does not undertake any business other than holding land and that the funds of the Trust are used for the maintenance of property only, not for anything else.
He advised the Tribunal that a property owned by the Kang Family Trust, 8 Hoil Choi Heights, Karnup, had been sold on 3 October 2013 (i.e. during the Debt Period), and provided evidence of the sale and the transfer of the title (Exhibit A6).
In some of the arguments put forward by the Applicant, there seems to be a misunderstanding of how the relevant provisions of the Act are applied in relation to individuals who are attributable stakeholders in trusts. The Act makes explicit provisions which must be applied and which may differ from how trust law operates in other contexts. The purpose of these provisions is, as the Respondent said during the hearing, to effectively “lift the veil” on trusts which benefit individuals so that the individual’s access to that financial support is taken into account in terms of the income and assets test.
An example of this is the ‘control test’. The Applicant passes the control test set out under section 1207V(2) because his associate Mr Duncan Kang (who is also his legal representative and holds his Enduring Power of Attorney and makes financial decisions for him) is a trustee of Vameze Pty Ltd and apparent appointer of the Kang Family Trust. In order to satisfy this statutory control test, whether the Applicant himself exercises personal control is not relevant.
It is clear to me that the Kang Family Trust was set up for the purpose of making financial provision for Mr Harry Kang. That was the evidence of Mr Harry Kang’s father to the SSAT, which was conceded to be accurate before this hearing by the Applicant’s legal representative Mr Duncan Kang. The fact that the father may have said that in the context of another matter does not affect the fact that the Kang Family Trust was set up for the Applicant.
Mr Duncan Kang, the Applicant’s associate, not only administers the Kang Family Trust, but also has an Enduring Power of Attorney for the Applicant and on his own evidence provides care for his brother.
He said he looked after the Applicant’s financial affairs and one of the reasons the Trust’s funds are not distributed to the Applicant is that, owing to his intellectual disability, he does not have any concept of money.
Section 1207X(2) of the Act states:
(2) For the purposes of this Part, if:
(a)a trust is a controlled private trust in relation to an individual; and
(b)the trust is not a concessional primary production trust in relation to the individual (see section 1208U);
then
(c) the individual is an attributable stakeholder of the trust unless the Secretary otherwise determines, and
(d)if the individual is an attributable stakeholder in the trust— the individual’s asset attribution percentage in relation to the trust is:
(i) 100%; or
(ii)if the Secretary determines a lower percentage in relation to the individual and the trust—that lower percentage; …
(Emphasis added.)
Mr Goldfinch took issue that there is no discretion in the application of this provision. He argued that the Kang Family Trust was “not” for the benefit of Mr Harry Kang, and is more for the benefit of Mr Duncan Kang, who lived in the Philip Street property before the Applicant and his mother came to live in Perth and that if Mr Choo Song Kang had wanted to set the Trust up for the Applicant, it should have been a fixed trust. Mr Duncan Kang also told the Tribunal he was exploring the establishment of a special disability trust for the Applicant.
Unfortunately for the arguments of the Applicant’s representative, the construction of section 1207X(2) is clear. If a trust is a controlled private trust in relation to an individual and not a concessional primary production trust, then ipso facto, that individual’s asset attribution percentage in relation the trust is 100 per cent, unless the Secretary determines otherwise.
I find that the Kang Family Trust was set up for the Applicant. That is clear from the sworn evidence of the person who established it, Mr Choo Soo Kang, to the SSAT. That other persons, the Applicant’s mother and one of his brothers, receive a material benefit by living in a house owned by the Trust is incidental to this fact. I have no doubt from what he said in his submissions and in evidence that Mr Duncan Kang acts in the best interests of his brother and would not do anything which affected him which was not in those best interests.
It follows, because of the operation of section 1207X of the Act, that the Applicant’s asset and income attribution percentage is 100 per cent, because the Secretary has not made a determination otherwise.
Should the attribution percentage be less than 100 per cent?
Applying the Principles, there does not seem to me to be any circumstance affecting Mr Harry Kang’s relationship with the Kang Family Trust which would lead, or should have led, to the Secretary making a determination under the Principles (Principle 16) to set a percentage of attribution less than 100 per cent.
While the Applicant himself is impaired by his disability from exercising ‘control’, the Applicant’s associate who does administer and control the trust does so for the Applicant’s benefit.
While Mr Harry Kang has not made a contribution himself to the Trust (see Principle 17) it was set up for him.
While the Applicant has not received a financial distribution under Principle 18, he has plainly received a valuable benefit under this Principle by the provision of a Trust-owned residence for him at the Philip Street property, for the whole of the Debt Period.
Under Principle 19, it is reasonably foreseeable that the Applicant may receive a future benefit from the corpus of the Trust or any future income it makes.
Under Principle 20, Mr Harry Kang received during the Debt Period, and continues to receive, a benefit by the provision of his accommodation, noting the construction of this Principle extends the concept of “benefit” to include property, services and other things to which the individual may or may not have a legal or equitable entitlement.
Principle 21 is not applicable to Mr Harry Kang because he is not an attributable stakeholder of any other company or trust to the knowledge of the Tribunal.
Therefore, I find that the Respondent applied the Principles set out in the legislative instrument correctly.
I am in no doubt on the papers before me, especially the evidence to the SSAT in 2014, that Mr Harry Kang is an attributable stakeholder of the Kang Family Trust, and that the attribution should be 100 per cent. I so find.
Is there a debt due and payable and is it correctly calculated?
The Social Security system has as its fundamental core that publicly-funded benefits are provided for those people who do not have other assets to support themselves. That is why the Act includes assets and income tests.
The value of the Kang Family Trust (set out in PT15 page 683) on 4 January 2007 (the beginning of the Debt Period) was some $3.9 million. The Applicant’s residence, the Philip Street property, was valued at that time as $1,225,000 (see PT11 page 298). If the value of the Applicant’s residence is deducted from the assets of the Trust, it still exceeds the assets test threshold under the Act in the Debt Period.
I accept the Applicant’s evidence that a property owned by the Kang Family Trust trustee Vameze Pty Ltd was sold on 3 October 2013. The value stated in Exhibit A6 is $577,500.
Prima facie, it would not seem to me that the sale of this property in the Debt Period will have the effect of reducing the value of the Kang Family Trust to the extent of allowing the Applicant to satisfy the assets test, but, for safety, I find that the value of the Applicant’s assets should be recalculated for part of the Debt Period, namely 3 October 2013 to 2 December 2014, accordingly to ensure the calculation accurately reflects the assets at that period of the Trust.
Waiver or writing off of debt
The Act includes provisions (at section 1236) for the writing off or waiving of a debt. The Applicant contended that the debt should be written off because the Applicant has “no interest” in the Kang Family Trust (Exhibit A1) and therefore the significant unencumbered assets of the Trust cannot be “used or realised” to repay the debt.
As I have already found that the law was correctly applied in determining that the Applicant was an attributable stakeholder of the Kang Family Trust, and noting that original purpose of the Trust as stated by the person who established the Trust was to financially support the Applicant because of his severe disability, and noting that the Trust has significant funds which can be used to repay the debt without affecting the residence of the Applicant, I find there is no reason for the Secretary to waive the debt in terms of section 1236 of the Act.
The provisions of section 1236(1A) of the Act are not applicable in the Applicant’s case. He clearly has the capacity, through his legal representative, to repay the debt, as is shown by evidence of the recent sale of a Trust asset. As Mr Duncan Kang wrote to the Department on 27 November 2012, “there is an unwritten understanding that if these [Trust-owned] properties are sold the proceeds are to be used to the benefit of” the Applicant.
Section 1237A provides that the Secretary must waive a debt if the debt is “attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth” and the payments were received “in good faith”. No arguments were advanced by the Applicant in this regard. I find this provision is not applicable in this case.
Section 1237AAD allows a discretionary power for the Secretary to waive a debt if inter alia there are “special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive.
The Applicant’s representative argued that the Applicant’s intellectual impairment, lack of income and assets and his lack of direct access to the Kang Family Trust assets amount to special circumstances. Special circumstances need to be ‘out of the ordinary’ (vide Kiefel J in Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services v Chamberlain [2002] FCA 67) and for the reasons stated above, I do not accept that this quality applies to the circumstances in this case. The Trust has substantial assets and is well able to afford to repay this debt without affecting the provision of continuing care to the Applicant.
I find therefore that a debt is due and payable for the Debt Period.
DECISION
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and decides that the Applicant’s Disability Support Pension was correctly cancelled on 4 December 2014 as his assets were above the limit allowable under the Act. The Applicant is found to be an attributable stakeholder under the Act and the attribution to him should be 100 per cent.
However the amount of the debt due and payable to the Commonwealth for the period 4 January 2007 to 2 December 2014 should be remitted to the Secretary for recalculation for the part of the Debt Period between 13 October 2013 and 2 December 2014, in accordance with this Decision.
I certify that the preceding 80 (eighty) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of D. J. Morris, Member ........[Sgd]................................................................
Administrative Assistant
Dated 21 October 2016
Date of hearing 15 September 2016 Counsel for the Applicant Mr A Goldfinch Solicitors for the Applicant Stables Scott Counsel for the Respondent Mr M Black Representative for the
RespondentMr A Burgess Solicitors for the Respondent
Sparke Helmore Lawyers
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