Kalejs v Republic of Latvia

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kalejs v Republic of Latvia [2001] FCA 676

EXTRADITION – person committed to prison pending surrender under surrender warrant – special circumstances justifying release on bail – whether advanced age and medical condition constitutes special circumstances

WORDS AND PHRASES – “special circumstances”

Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), ss 15, 16, 19, 21

Bertran v Vanstone (1999) 94 FCR 404 applied
Timar v Republic of Hungary [1999] FCA 1559 applied
Timar v Republic of Hungary [1999] FCA 691 referred
Bertan v Vanstone [1999] FCA 464 followed
Cabal v United Mexican States (No 5) [2000] FCA 525 referred
Cabal v United Mexican States [2001] FCA 97 referred
Holt v Hogan (No 1) (1993) 44 FCR 572 referred

KONRADS ALFREDS KALEJS v REPUBLIC OF LATVIA & ANOR
V 615 of 2001

KENNY J
MELBOURNE
6 JUNE 2001


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 615 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

KONRADS ALFREDS KALEJS
Applicant

AND:

REPUBLIC OF LATVIA
First Respondent

LISA HANNAN, M
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE OF ORDER:

29 MAY 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

Pursuant to s 21(6)(f)(iv) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), the applicant be released on bail until the review has been heard and determined on his own undertaking upon the following further conditions:

(1)that he reside that he reside permanently at the Latvian Retirement Village, Fraser Crescent, Wantirna, Victoria;

(2)that he notify the Melbourne Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, in writing, within 24 hours of any proposed change of address;

(3)that he surrender all passports and other travel documents held by him (or held on his behalf), whether in his own name or any other name, to the Officer in Charge, Australian Federal Police, 383 LaTrobe Street, Melbourne, Victoria;

(4)that he not apply for a passport or any other travel document; and

(5)that he not attend at any airport or any other point of international departure.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 615 OF 2001

BETWEEN:

KONRADS ALFREDS KALEJS
Applicant

AND:

REPUBLIC OF LATVIA
First Respondent

LISA HANNAN, M
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

KENNY J

DATE:

6 JUNE 2001

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 29 May 2001, the second respondent, a magistrate acting pursuant to s 19 of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) (“the Act”), determined that the applicant, Konrads Alfreds Kalejs, was eligible for surrender in relation to extradition offences for which surrender is sought by the first respondent, the Republic of Latvia. An order was made pursuant to s 19(9) of the Act that the applicant be committed to prison to await surrender under a surrender warrant.

  2. On 29 May 2001, the applicant filed an application pursuant to s 21(1)(a) of the Act for a review of the second respondent’s order. By way of interlocutory relief, the applicant sought an order releasing him on bail pursuant to s 21(6)(f)(vi) of the Act.…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 676
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Kalejs v Republic of Latvia concerned an application by the eighty-seven-year-old applicant for release on bail pending a review of the second respondent's decision that he was eligible for surrender to the first respondent, Latvia, for alleged war crimes and genocide. The applicant, an Australian citizen born on 26 June 1913, had been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a magistrate and was released on bail on his own undertaking subject to certain conditions. He sought further bail on the basis that there were special circumstances justifying his release until the review had been conducted. The court was required to determine whether the applicant had demonstrated special circumstances justifying his release on bail until the review was completed.

The court considered the purpose of the special circumstances requirement in the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) and the factors that might be taken into account in determining whether such circumstances exist. The court noted that special circumstances refer to those different from the ordinary case of a fugitive remanded in custody and may be demonstrated by a single factor or a combination of factors. The court held that the applicant's age, health, and status as a long-term resident of Australia constituted special circumstances that justified his release on bail pending the review. The court accepted that these factors, particularly the applicant's age and health, demonstrated a departure from the ordinary case and justified the grant of bail.

In light of the special circumstances demonstrated by the applicant, the court ordered his release on bail until the review was heard and determined. The court imposed further conditions on the applicant's bail, including that he reside permanently at the Latvian Retirement Village, notify the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions of any change of address, surrender all passports and travel documents, not apply for any travel documents, and not attend any airport or point of international departure. The court's decision balanced the need to prevent the risk of absconding with the applicant's personal circumstances and broad community standards.

Orders

Orders of the court

Pursuant to s 21(6)(f)(iv) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth), the applicant be released on bail until the review has been heard and determined on his own undertaking upon the following further conditions:

(1) that he reside that he reside permanently at the Latvian Retirement Village, Fraser Crescent, Wantirna, Victoria;

(2) that he notify the Melbourne Office of the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, in writing, within 24 hours of any proposed change of address;

(3) that he surrender all passports and other travel documents held by him (or held on his behalf), whether in his own name or any other name, to the Officer in Charge, Australian Federal Police, 383 LaTrobe Street, Melbourne, Victoria;

(4) that he not apply for a passport or any other travel document; and

(5) that he not attend at any airport or any other point of international departure.

Background

Background to the litigation

When I made my orders, I indicated that I would deliver reasons for judgment at a later date. These reasons follow.background The applicant, who is eighty-seven years of age, was born on 26 June 1913. He emigrated to Australia in 1950 and is an Australian citizen. On 12 December 2000, the first respondent requested that the applicant be returned to it for prosecution for the offences of war crimes and genocide. On 13 December 2000, the Minister for Justice and Customs gave notice pursuant to s 16 of the Act that an extradition request had been received in relation to the applicant from the first respondent. Also on 13 December 2000, a magistrate issued a warrant, pursuant to s 12 of the Act, for the applicant’s arrest. He was arrested the same day and subsequently released, pursuant to s 15 of the Act, on bail on his own undertaking subject to conditions. A hearing under s 19 of the Act in relation to the applicant commenced before the second respondent on 14 May 2001. As already noted, the second respondent made her determination that the applicant was a person eligible for surrender on 29 May 2001, and ordered that he be committed to prison as she was required to do by s 19(9) of the Act. The hearing before this court on 29 May 2001 was concerned only with the question whether the applicant should be released on bail pursuant to s 21(6)(f)(iv) until the review has been conducted. It appears that the applicant complied with the conditions of his bail from the date of his release on 13 December 2000 until 29 May 2001, when he again sought bail in this court.the applicable legal principles Where a magistrate determines under s 19 of the Act that a person is eligible for surrender, the person may make an application for review under s 21(1)(a) of the Act. Section 21(6)(f) provides that the court to which the review application is made may:(iii)order that the person be kept in such custody as the court directs; or(iv)if there are special circumstances justifying such a course, order the release on bail of the person on such terms and conditions as the court thinks fit;until the review has been conducted … . A finding that there are special circumstances justifying the release on bail has been described as a condition precedent to the court exercising its discretion to order release under s 21(6)(f)(iv): see, e.g., Bertran v Vanstone (1999) 94 FCR 404 at 412 and Timar v Republic of Hungary [1999] FCA 1559 at [21]. In the former case, Sundberg and Merkel JJ said at 412-413:It is a condition precedent in the sense that it is a requirement that must be satisfied, though its satisfaction does not conclude the decision-making process because there is still a discretion to be exercised. In Bertran v Vanstone [1999] FCA 464 (upheld on an appeal reported at (1999) 94 FCR 404), I stated at [16]-[19]:The Act does not state expressly what are ‘special circumstances’ for this purpose. In settling upon the relevant criteria by reference to which such a judgment may be made, it is, I think, necessary to consider, first, the objects of the Act, which are set out in s 3, and the purpose of subs 15(2) and subs 15(6). The explanatory memorandum which accompanied the Extradition Bill 1987, set out in Schoenmakers v Director of Public Prosecutions (1991) 30 FCR 70 at 73-4, explained the ‘special circumstances’ requirement in clause 15(6) in the following terms:‘Subclause (6) provides that a person shall not be granted bail unless there are special circumstances. Such a provision is considered necessary because experience has shown that there is a very high risk of persons sought for extraditable offences absconding. In many cases the person is in Australia to avoid arrest in the country where he is alleged to have committed the offence, ie the person left the jurisdiction to avoid justice’.In evaluating whether there are special circumstances shown, the first consideration is, therefore, the purpose of the special circumstances requirement, namely, to take account of ‘the very high risk of persons sought for extraditable offences absconding’: cf Schoenmakers 30 FCR at 74 per French J; Holt v Hogan (No 1) (1993) 44 FCR 572 at 578 per Cooper J; and Kainhoffer 48 FCR at 13 per Spender J. Plainly enough, the risk of absconding is not the only consideration. In Schoenmakers, French J also referred to the need to evaluate the factors relied on as constituting special circumstances (in that case, for the purpose of s 21(6)(f)(iv)) by reference to ‘broad community standards’, including the ‘presumption in favour of liberty and against deprivation of liberty without just cause’: 30 FCR at 75. Cooper J adopted the same approach in Holt v Hogan (No 1) 44 FCR at 579. His Honour added in that case:‘In considering the circumstances of a particular applicant for bail one does not exclude those circumstances which ordinarily would fall for consideration on an application for bail where a person is charged domestically for the commission of a crime in this country. All personal circumstances are taken into consideration, notwithstanding that some or all of them will again fall for consideration if special circumstances are established as a condition precedent to the exercise of a jurisdiction to grant bail.’Ultimately, whether any factor or group of factors will amount to ‘special circumstances’ (when account is taken of the statutory purpose and the circumstances of the case, measured in part at least by broad community standards) will depend upon whether the relevant magistrate is satisfied that that factor or those factors justify departing from the position in the ordinary case where bail will not be granted: cf Holt v Hogan (No 1) 44 FCR at 579. As Burchett J said in Wu v Attorney-General of the Commonwealth (1997) 79 FCR 303 at 307 the expression ‘special circumstances’ ‘refers to circumstances different, in some way that provides a ground for considering a grant of bail more favourably, from those of the ordinary case of a fugitive remanded in custody’. See too McDade v United Kingdom (unreported, R D Nicholson J, 15 February 1999). I accept, as the applicant’s counsel submitted, that ‘special circumstances’ may be demonstrated by a single factor or by a combination of factors: cf Wu 79 FCR at 307. It is unnecessary, if not impossible, to compile an exhaustive list of those circumstances which are relevantly special. The Act, in s 15(2) and s 15(6), requires the magistrate, who is charged with making the decision as to bail, to consider all the facts pertaining to any bail application, before determining whether there are special circumstances which take the case out of the ordinary and justify remand on bail: cf R v Giordano (1982) 31 SASR 241 at 243 per King CJ (with whom Zelling and Matheson JJ agreed) and Forest v Kelly (unreported, Lockhart, Ryan and Heerey JJ, 20 December 1991). A similar approach is taken in determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist justifying a grant of bail for the purposes of ss 4 and 13 of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic): see Application of Michael Kanfouche (unreported, Smith J, 4 April 1991); Application of Matthew Thomas (unreported, Hampel J, 2 October 1996) and Application of John Moloney (unreported, Vincent J, 31 October 1990). If the relevant magistrate decides that there are such special circumstances, then it falls to him to consider whether to remand the applicant on bail and, if so, upon what terms and conditions: see Schoenmakers 30 FCR 74 per French J and Holt v Hogan (No 1) 44 FCR at 580 per Cooper J.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

KENNY J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: KENNY J

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