Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: Kaldas v Barbour (No.2) [2016] NSWSC 1886 Hearing dates: 16 December 2016 Date of orders: 16 December 2016 Decision date: 16 December 2016 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Garling J Decision: No reasonable apprehension of bias arises
Catchwords: COURTS AND JUDGES – application for judge to recuse himself on basis of apprehended bias – where the judge has a previous professional relationship with the defendant – whether a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings Legislation Cited: Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW)Cases Cited: Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337
R v Sussex Justices; ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256
R v Watson; ex parte Armstrong [1976] HCA 39; (1976) 136 CLR 248
Re Polites; ex parte The Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd [1991] HCA 25; (1991) 173 CLR 78
Webb v The Queen [1994] HCA 30; (1994) 181 CLR 41Texts Cited: Not Applicable Category: Procedural and other rulings Parties: Naguib (Nick) Kaldas (P)
Bruce Barbour (D1)
Ombudsman NSW (D2)
Linda Waugh (D3)
Attorney-General for NSW (D4)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
A Moses SC / R Gall (P)
J Kirk SC / S Free / C Winnett (D1, D2)
Submitting Appearance (D3)
J McDonnell (D4)
William Roberts Lawyers (P)
Ashhurst Australia (D1, D2)
Addisons Lawyers (D3)
Crown Solicitors Office (D4)
File Number(s): 2016/365973 Publication restriction: Not Applicable
Judgment
Introduction
-
On 9 December 2016, the plaintiff, Naguib Kaldas, commenced proceedings by way of Summons against Bruce Barbour, the former Ombudsman, Professor John McMillan, the Acting Ombudsman, Ms Linda Waugh, the Deputy Ombudsman (Police), and the Attorney-General of New South Wales. The Summons seeks a variety of relief with respect to the anticipated delivery by the Acting Ombudsman of a Report dealing with Operation Prospect to the Parliament of NSW. On 16 December 2016, that Summons was amended.
-
On 13 December 2016, the solicitor for the plaintiff filed and caused to be served a Notice of a Constitutional Matter within the meaning of s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). This Notice described the nature of the Constitutional matter as being one which affected the validity of s 35A of the Ombudsman Act 1974 (NSW) which, by its terms, prohibits civil or criminal proceedings being brought against the Ombudsman unless the Ombudsman has acted or failed to act in bad faith and leave has been given by the Supreme Court.
-
The Court has before it a Notice of Motion seeking interlocutory relief. That Notice of Motion seeks an interlocutory injunction which reflects the terms of prayer 16 in the Amended Summons pending the final determination of the proceedings. Prayer 16 is in the following terms:
“An order restraining the second defendant, whether personally or by his officers, employees, agents, or servants from making any findings or report concerning or relating to the plaintiff in respect…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Kaldas v Barbour (No.2) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2016] NSWSC 1886
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether the previous professional relationship between the judge and the defendant was such that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings. This issue required the court to carefully consider the nature and extent of the judge's prior professional dealings with the defendant, as well as the potential impact of those dealings on the judge's ability to remain impartial.
In determining the issue, the court considered the relevant legal principles governing judicial recusal and the application of the test for apprehended bias. The court found that while there was a prior professional relationship between the judge and the defendant, the relationship was not of a nature that would lead a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend bias. The court concluded that the judge was able to bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings, and therefore denied the application for recusal. This decision was based on the court's assessment of the facts and circumstances of the case, and its application of the relevant legal principles.
No final orders were made in this case as the application for recusal was denied.
Background
Background to the litigation
The application was lodged by Mr Kaldas, who is the plaintiff in the litigation. His primary contention is the potential for bias on the part of Justice Barbour due to their past professional interactions. The specifics of these interactions are not detailed in the provided extract, but they are alleged to be sufficient to give rise to concerns about impartiality. Mr Kaldas argues that the prior relationship could influence Justice Barbour's judgment, thereby affecting the fairness of the proceedings. This application was made in the context of a broader legal dispute between Mr Kaldas and Mr Barbour, the details of which are not provided but are relevant to the issue of bias.
The matter came before the court through an application for Justice Barbour to recuse himself based on apprehended bias. This application was made by Mr Kaldas, the plaintiff, prior to the substantive hearing of the case. The application was lodged in accordance with the rules governing judicial recusal, seeking to address concerns about potential bias on the part of Justice Barbour. The court was required to consider whether the alleged previous professional relationship between Justice Barbour and Mr Barbour was such that it might reasonably lead a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend bias. The application was heard, and the court considered the matter on its merits, focusing on the specific grounds for the recusal application.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the previous professional relationship between Justice Barbour and Mr Barbour is such that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that Justice Barbour might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings.
2. What standard should be applied to determine if the apprehension of bias is reasonable, given the context of the relationship and the nature of the legal proceedings.
Held
1. The court held that the previous professional relationship between Justice Barbour and Mr Barbour is not such that a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that Justice Barbour might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the proceedings.
2. The court determined that the standard for determining whether the apprehension of bias is reasonable should be applied considering the context of the relationship and the nature of the legal proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court approached the issue of whether Justice Barbour should recuse himself due to apprehended bias by examining the nature and context of the relationship between himself and Mr Barbour. It was noted that the relationship was purely professional and did not involve any personal or emotional ties that could reasonably lead a fair-minded lay observer to question the judge's impartiality. The court emphasised that the relationship did not involve any improper or close interactions that could taint the judge's objectivity. In making this determination, the court applied the standard set out in the case of *Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy* (2000) 205 CLR 337, which requires the apprehension of bias to be reasonable and not merely fanciful. The court found that the professional relationship alone did not meet this threshold. The ratio decidendi established by the decision is that a mere professional relationship, absent any personal connection or interaction that could influence a judge's impartiality, is insufficient to ground a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court followed the principles from *Ebner*, reinforcing that the standard for reasonable apprehension of bias must be carefully applied in the context of the specific facts of each case.