IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M117 of 2012
B e t w e e n -
HARRY KAKAVAS
Appellant
and
CROWN MELBOURNE LIMITED (ACN 006 973 262)
First Respondent
JOHN WILLIAMS
Second Respondent
ROWEN CRAIGIE
Third Respondent
FRENCH CJ
HAYNE J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J
GAGELER J
KEANE J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 5 APRIL 2013, AT 10.00 AM
(Continued from 4/04/13)
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
____________________
FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Young.
MR YOUNG: May it please the Court, I wish to move to the third and fourth propositions on our list of propositions to be advanced orally. They concern the appellant’s ability at all times to self‑exclude. Self‑exclusion is a simple procedure provided by the Casino Control Act 1991 (Vic). It is provided by section 72(2A) and (3). There are copies of the relevant provisions at the rear of our written submissions. There are a number of versions at different dates, but I do not think it matters which one the Court goes to. All it requires under subsection (2A) for an order to be made by the casino operator excluding a person is that person’s “voluntary application” and under subsection (2B), the application:
must be in writing and signed by the applicant in the presence of a person authorised –
That is all that is required for a person with concerns about his gambling to exclude himself from the casino. That mechanism is part of the detailed regulatory scheme in Victoria for the regulation of casino gambling. There are similar simple expedients in other States under their legislation to obtain exclusion. It is the mechanism by which society through Parliament has struck a balance between the business of gambling and its economic benefits on the one hand, and the potential adverse consequences for some individuals of gambling.
That procedure was available to Mr Kakavas at all times. He was extremely familiar with it. He had used it previously in Victoria in 1995, and he had used it in other States to limit or control his access to gambling venues as he saw fit, and he had used it as recently as in 2004 in South Australia. Not only did he know it was available, he was acutely conscious of it at all times through 2005 and 2006, as the evidence shows, and I will go to some of that material in his Honour’s findings but, moreover, he gave assurances to Crown that he would use the procedure if he ever felt any concerns about his gambling. His Honour found at trial that Mr Kakavas never mentioned any such concerns until 17 August for the first time when Crown immediately took action to assist Mr Kakavas.
He gave such assurances in various places but, amongst others, in his application in 1995 to revoke the self‑exclusion from Crown, he gave written assurances to that effect. The learned trial judge refers to them…
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- Case
- [2013] HCATrans 70
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the casino's conduct in allowing Mr. Kakavas to gamble and incur significant losses, despite knowing of his compulsive gambling, constituted unconscionable conduct under the ACL and ASIC Act, and whether the casino owed Mr. Kakavas a duty of care to protect him from his own gambling. The court also considered whether the casino's conduct was unconscionable at common law.
The High Court, by majority, held that the casino's conduct did not amount to unconscionable conduct under the ACL or ASIC Act. The court reasoned that while the casino was aware of Mr. Kakavas's gambling problem, this knowledge alone did not render its conduct unconscionable. The court emphasised that the statutory provisions on unconscionable conduct require more than mere exploitation of a weakness; they necessitate conduct that is oppressive or unfairly burdensome. The court further found that the casino did not owe Mr. Kakavas a duty of care to prevent him from gambling, as this would impose an unreasonable burden on the casino and interfere with individual autonomy. The common law claim for unconscionability was also dismissed.
The appeal was dismissed.
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