KADNI & KEERTHI

[2018] FCCA 3425

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

KADNI & KEERTHI [2018] FCCA 3425

Catchwords:
FAMILY LAW – Parenting – where the father has consciously chosen not to practice time or a relationship with the child as permitted through orders made by the Court – where bringing finality to the proceedings is in the child’s best interests – consideration of section 60CA of the Family Law Act 1975 – Airport Watch List order.

Legislation:

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989, ss.116, 117, 123, 124

Family Law Act 1975 ss.60B(4), 60CA, 61C, 61DA, 64B(6), 65DAA(5), 65Y, 68B
Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990)

Cases cited:

Gordon & Gordon [2015] FamCA 616

Line & Line (1997) FLC 92-729

Applicant: MS KADNI

Respondent: MR KEERTHI

File Number: PAC 4283 of 2014

Judgment of: Judge Harman

Hearing date: 23 October 2018

Date of Last Submission: 23 October 2018

Delivered at: Parramatta

Delivered on: 23 October 2018

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Ms Burrows of Zali Burrows Lawyers

Solicitors for the Respondent: Ms Singh of Rajesh Chand & Associates

Solicitors for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Ms Dodson of Legal Aid NSW Parramatta

ORDERS

1. The child, [X] born 2013, shall live with her mother, MS KADNI.

2. Each of the parties shall, forthwith and within 7 days, do all things, sign all documents and give all consents, authorities and instructions as are necessary to make application for and obtain and Australian Passport for child, [X] born 2013.

3. Subject to Mr Keerthi doing all acts and things and signing all documents necessary to cause the issue of an Australian Passport for [X] (whether the Passport has issued within 7 days or not) then it is noted that no Order for allocation of parental responsibility is made, and accordingly, the provisions of section 61C of the Family Law Act 1975 will apply, such that each parent will have parental responsibility with respect to major issues decisions for [X] at such times as she is in their respective care, provided further, that should Mr Keerthi fail to do all acts and thing and sign all documents necessary to apply for the Passport for [X] within 7 days of the date of this Order, then Mr Keerthi shall have sole parental responsibility for [X] for the purpose of applying for and obtaining an Australian Passport for [X].

4. Pending further Order, the Applicant, MS KADNI born 1983 (female) and the Respondent, MR KEERTHI born 1983 (male), by themselves, their servants or their agents are restrained from removing or attempting to remove the child, [X] born 2013 (female), from the Commonwealth of Australia until her sixteenth birthday.

5. Pending further Order, the Marshal of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and all Officers of the Australian Federal Police and of the Police forces of the States and Territories of the Commonwealth of Australia are requested to give effect to these Orders and to take all necessary steps to restrain either party from removing or attempting to remove the said child from the Commonwealth of Australia.

6. Pending further Order, the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police take all necessary steps to immediately place the said child’s name on the Airport Watch List, also known as the PACE Alert system, at all points of arrival and departure in the Commonwealth of Australia.

7. The Australian Federal Police maintain an airport watch of the said child on all flights leaving any international airport in all States and Territories of the Commonwealth of Australia.

8. The Australian Federal Police and the Police Forces of the States and Territories of the Commonwealth of Australia assist in the implementation of, and give effect to, these Orders.

9. THE COURT NOTES that section 65Y of the Family Law Act 1975 will continue to apply to any proposal for overseas travel with [X] by either parent such that each parent will be required to obtain the written consent of the other parent or an Order from this Court before travelling.

10. Otherwise dismiss all parenting Application by either parent.

11. THE COURT NOTES that the issues which remain extant between the parties relate to property adjustment, departure from administrative assessment for Child Support and lump sum Child Support.

12. The Applicant wife shall, no later than close of business 2 November 2018, file and serve an amended Application and such Affidavit material as will be relied upon at trial, provided further that the Applicant’s trial Affidavit shall be no more than 30 pages, in 12 point times new roman font, 18 point justification and no annexures.

13. The Respondent husband shall, no later than close of business 21 December 2018, file and serve an amended Response and such Affidavit material as will be relied upon at trial, provided further that the Respondent’s trial Affidavit shall be no more than 30 pages, in 12 point times new roman font, 18 point justification and no annexures.

14. The matter is listed for call over 15 January 2019 at 9.30am

15. In the event that both parties have filed their trial material as directed above, the matter will be advanced to hearing expeditiously but provided further that if both parties have failed to comply strictly with the above Orders then the proceedings will be dismissed pursuant to rule 13.03B of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 and if only one party has complied, the matter will be heard and determined on a final and undefended basis as against the party in default.

16. Discharge Independent Children’s Lawyer with the Court’s thanks.

17. The Independent Children’s Lawyer shall cause the sum of $6,660 previously paid by Ms Kadni to the Legal Aid Commission on account of fees to be incurred in preparation of a Part 15 Report to be reimbursed to Ms Kadni.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Kadni & Keerthi is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT PARRAMATTA

PAC 4283 of 2014

MS KADNI

Applicant

And

MR KEERTHI

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. These proceedings are between parties Ms Kadni, the Applicant, and Mr Keerthi, the Respondent. The parties are respectively the mother and father of a young child, Ms Kadni, born 2013, soon to turn five. 

2. The parties are in dispute as to parenting arrangements for [X] and also with respect to property adjustment. The issues of property adjustment are suggested to the parties to be complex but, in reality, they appear relatively straightforward. The property aspect of the proceedings can be listed for a one day hearing and heard and determined relatively quickly. 

3. The parenting proceedings are, at best, curious. Some history of the proceedings is necessary to understand those issues and to be able to understand the course of action that I propose to take with respect to these arrangements today. 

4. The proceedings were commenced by an Application Initiating Proceedings filed a little over four years ago on 9 September 2014.  That Application sought nothing further than the issue of a Passport for young [X]. That Application has subsequently been amended on a number of occasions. The present iteration of the Application seeks Orders in a more expansive fashion, including seeking an Order for:

   a)Sole parental responsibility of the child;

   b)The child to live with the mother;

   c)The child to spend time with the father;

   d)Orders for property adjustment, and, since the filing of the second amended Application in August 2017;

   e)Lump sum child support. The form of order sought with respect to lump sum child support as sought is defective and will require amendment. The presently framed plea does not properly or appropriately address the legislative bases for departure from administrative assessment or calculation of any lump sum by reference to sections 116, 117, 123 and 124 of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989. However, the Application can be amended in short time, and I am satisfied that sufficient due process has been afforded to the father to enable him to understand the issues that the Court is asked to address. 

5. The father’s position, as it presently stands, would appear to be set out in a further Amended Response filed 8 September 2016. That document seeks an allocation of equal shared parental responsibility, that the child live with the mother and that time be spent by the child with the father for fairly limited and frugal periods of time building up, over time, to a more substantial arrangement. The further Amended Response as filed also seeks Orders with respect to property adjustment. 

6. The significant factual issue in the parenting aspect of the matter has been complaint and allegation with respect to the child’s paternal grandfather with whom the father lives or previously lived and suggestions that he poses an unacceptable risk to this young child.  Such is the nature of those concerns, which have been raised consistently throughout the proceedings in their four year history, that a further Application in a Case has recently been filed by the wife, having been filed on 1 August, seeking to suspend all existing parenting Orders and to have the father’s time supervised either formally or informally. 

7. This matter has been before the Court for a significant number of Court events in its four year history. That is of some real significance having regard to the age of this young child.

8. At the time that the proceedings were commenced on 8 September 2014, this young lass, as would be apparent, was not yet one year of age. She will very shortly turn five. Thus, for four fifths of her life, her parents have been involved in active conflict and dispute with each other. 

9. A number of attempts have been made to conclude the matter by final hearing. Trial directions were first made with respect to the matter in August 2015. Further trial directions were made with respect to the matter, listing it for hearing in December 2017. Those trial dates were ultimately varied through no fault of the parties, but as a consequence of judicial resourcing issues. 

10. The matter has been the subject of at least one Appeal. The matter has been the subject of a myriad Applications in a Case. The matter has consumed nearly 20 Court events. All of that is particularly relevant as the existing Order, which provides for the child’s practice of relationship with her father, is an Order, made on 28 January 2015 at a time when this young girl had just turned one.

11. At that time, an Order was made which invested the parents with joint and several parental responsibility, which provided that pending further Order she would live with her mother and that she would spend time with her father for specified periods being two hours on a Wednesday, two hours on a Sunday. The father was to collect the child from the mother’s home or the child’s day care centre and return the child to the same venue. 

12. A number of Orders have been made to engage the parties with family counselling services. At some points that has occurred, although it would not appear to have done anything at all to ameliorate the conflict between these parents. 

13. After the making of the initial interim Order, there have been numerous Applications for either variation or suspension of the time and various interruptions of practice of that relationship have occurred. A fairly consistent theme throughout all of those proceedings has been the issues and allegations raised with respect to the paternal grandfather. 

14. An injunctive Order under section 68B of the Family Law Act 1975 was first made on 6 May 2015. That injunction restrains the father having the child in his father’s (the child’s grandfather’s) presence without the father also being present. That injunction does seem to address the mother’s concerns as raised. It has failed to do so. 

15. When the matter was before the Court on 20 August 2015, it was noted that the father had not been practicing time that was permitted to him, not through the child being withheld, but through conscious choice. It was noted that 21 of 59 periods had not occurred. That is so, notwithstanding, that ultimately an Application for Contravention was brought by the father and was dealt with by another Judge. That determination, amongst other determinations made on that occasion, was the subject of Appeal to the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia.

16. The Full Court’s Judgment and Orders are not present upon the file, thus, it is unclear exactly what occurred with respect to the contravention findings. It is probable that even if the findings of non-compliance were set aside that the Application remains on foot and to be heard. This maelstrom of controversy has surrounded this child’s life for nearly all of her life. 

17. I propose to conclude the parenting aspect of the proceedings today.  That might be seen by one or other of the parties as somewhat controversial in some respects. However, it has been impossible to advance the matter for trial.

18. On the last occasion that the matter was before the Court, Orders were made for preparation of a Part XV Report, such Report to be funded by the parties. The mother has paid her contribution, which can now be reimbursed to her as the Report is not required, and perhaps used by her towards her support and that of the child, (her complaint being that she receives, at present, no financial assistance at all and has not for some months). The father protests that he is unable to make any contribution towards the Report and has, to that end, filed an Affidavit setting out those circumstances.

19. The options that are available are to:

    a)Dispense with the requirement of any Report or further Report, as one was, in fact, prepared quite some time ago;

    b)Stay the proceedings until such time as the father complies with the existing Order by providing his contribution to the costs; or,

    c)Advance the matter to trial. 

20. Ultimately, of those three choices I would prefer the latter. The case has been on foot for so long that a determination is necessary. However, what obviates against the matter being listed for hearing is the father’s position that he is not spending time with the child and does not intend to do so. On that basis, it would seem there is absolutely no purpose to be served by conducting a hearing. 

21. The mother presses to have Orders that the child live with her and that she be relieved of any need to consult with the father with respect to decision-making. That can be achieved through either an Order for sole parental responsibility or leaving the parties to operate under section 61C of the Act. In the latter case, the parties would have joint and several parental responsibility. The mother need not consult the father with respect to any decision that she might make whilst the child is in her care. The uncontroversial position would appear to be that the child is with the mother 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

22. I am not prepared to leave the existing interim Orders on foot. Those Orders clearly do not operate and the father chooses to not spend time with the child in accordance with those Orders. It exposes the Court to ridicule. It is a nonsense to have Orders in place when a party who has sought them and has the benefit of them indicates clearly to the Court, as the father does today, that he does not intend to spend any time with the child. That is not to suggest for one moment that it is the Court’s determination that it is best for this young girl to not spend time with her father. It is simply the father’s choice. 

23. It is possible for the father to renew an Application at some point in time should he wish to do so and should he wish to resume a practice of relationship with his daughter. That time is not now. 

24. I am loath to allocate even more resources to this case, to conduct a hearing as to what arrangements might best meet the child’s needs, when there have already been at least half a dozen interim hearings to determine that very issue and the father has determined that he simply does not wish to avail himself of that which he might.

25. Accordingly, I propose to dismiss the father’s Response to the extent that it relates to the parenting aspects of the dispute. I propose to proceed to determine the Application of the mother, at least insofar as it will grant her relief that she is entitled to. 

26. In relation to the issue of a Passport, it is the child’s right to have a passport or travel document. So much is clearly established by the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, a convention which is incorporated in its totality as an object of the Act by section 60B(4).

27. Holding a Passport does not permit travel through use of the Passport. The father indicates that, notwithstanding that the issue which led to the commencement of these proceedings was the issue of a Passport for the child, he continues to oppose its issue on the basis that it might be used by the mother to transport the child to (country omitted). Of course, that could be obviated through an Airport Watch List Order, which I propose to make and which is not opposed by the mother. That is not to suggest that a positive determination is made that the mother should not and should never remove the child from the Commonwealth for travel, merely that the requirements of section 65Y of the Act will need to be met on any occasion that the mother wishes to do so.

28. I am conscious that an Airport Watch List Order increases, or potentially increases, litigation between the parties as the father may withhold his consent to any travel the mother proposes to undertake. However, section 65Y creates one of two criminal offences under the Family Law Act1975, it being an offence pursuant to the section to remove a child from the Commonwealth of Australia without the written consent of the other parent or an Order made by a Court under the Act. I am conscious that to make an Order, in broad and general terms, which simply obviates against those provisions is, absent either consent of the parties or some specific proposal, contraindicated and inappropriate.

29. Parliament’s intent, through section 65Y of the Act, is that children should not be removed from the Commonwealth save in the circumstances provided. The Court must, pursuant to authorities such as Line & Line (1997) FLC 92-729, assess each proposal on its merits and have regard to the likelihood of return, whether there is any need for security, and, if so, the quantum of any bond or other surety that is provided and the like. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the mother is sufficiently granted the relief that she is entitled to, the child’s rights are sufficiently protected and the door left open to the child travelling with the mother in the future subject to a specific proposal being first put to the father, and, if consent is withheld or refused, Application made to the Court.

30. In relation to the child’s living arrangements with the mother, there is, and has never been, on the evidence, any controversy that the child will live with her mother. Each version of Mr Keerthi’s Response has proposed an Order the child live with the mother. Hence, Mr Keerthi could not be heard to complain that such an Order is made. Beyond that, however, I do not propose to make any parenting Order. 

31. The Orders that are specifically sought by Mr Keerthi with respect to the practice of time and relationship between the father and the child are not pressed and need not be in the sense that Mr Keerthi has had, for some little time, indeed, nearly four years, the benefit of an Order that permits him to practice a relationship with the child, but he declines to do so, at least in the recent past comprising the majority of the past year and certainly a significant portion of 2015.

32. What has occurred in the preceding years is unclear. I am conscious that I have not touched upon each of the factors in Part VII of the Act. They can be touched upon briefly and commencing importantly with section 60CA of the Act, which establishes the Paramountcy Principle, providing that the Court must, in deciding whether to make any particular Order, have regard to the best interests of the child as paramount.

1. I am conscious, as is discussed, for example, by Forrest J in Gordon & Gordon [2015] FamCA 616, at paragraphs 2 to 5 thereof, that the Paramountcy Principle must also extend beyond the making of a parenting Order and deal with any Order that the Court makes in parenting proceedings.

2. In the above case, Forrest J was faced with an Application for final ex parte Orders. As his Honour observed, correctly so, to make final Orders on an ex parte basis would ordinarily be seen as abhorrent to any principle of procedural fairness. However, in the circumstances of the case before his Honour, his Honour was satisfied that it was the appropriate Order to make and the Order that was in the child’s best interests. That included a determination that it was appropriate to proceed without notice to a party.

3. In this case, both parties have been, at various times, in default of Orders of this Court. The Court has been largely unsuccessful in having the parties get their matter ready in an appropriate fashion.

4. I do not suggest that Mr Keerthi ceasing a practice of relationship with the child is either beneficial to the child or in default of an Order. It is, however, a clearly evinced and acted upon intent to not spend time with the child, even when an Order provides for it. Thus, I am not prepared to allocate further resources to deal with that issue until such time as Mr Keerthi determines that he wishes to practice a relationship with the child and spend time in accordance with such Order as he may then obtain or consistent with any consent provided by Mr Keerthi, the latter appearing, on the past dealings of these parties with each other, unlikely.

5. The objects would support the conclusion of these proceedings. The Court must ensure that children have the benefit of both parents having a meaningful involvement in their child’s life to the maximum extent consistent with the child’s best interests. The maximum extent to which the child can have a meaningful involvement with her father cannot be determined as the right to spend time with the child pursuant to Orders, albeit providing for frugal periods, have simply not been taken up. On that basis, any attempt the Court has made over the last four years to engage the child in a relationship with the father has failed, at times possibly through the fault of persons other than the father, but, certainly, for the majority of this year, at the father’s election.

6. The child must be protected from harm through exposure to abuse, neglect or family violence. Whilst it is not a specific object, the child must also be protected from harm through what might be described as “systems abuse”. To continue to agitate an Application before the Court whilst not availing one’s self of that which already obtained Orders permit, is abusive of this child. It creates an expectation in the child that something will happen which then does not. It is also a waste of the Court’s resources and an abuse of the child.

7. This child has, as already observed, spent four fifths of her life involved in proceedings before this Court relating to her welfare. 

8. Children must receive adequate and proper parenting as a consequence of any Order made. This young child will. 

9. Parents should fulfil their duties and their responsibilities. One could not strictly criticise the father for not meeting his responsibilities pursuant to the Order. The strange osmosis that occurs when an Order is made is that the determination of what Order is to be made is by reference to the child’s best interests, but the Order, once made, vests a right in the parent to spend time with the child in accordance with the Order.[1] Accordingly, the father has declined to exercise his own rights, but that has correspondingly affected the child’s right to a relationship with her father. In those circumstances, I am satisfied it is simply inappropriate to allow the farce to continue further. When Orders have already been obtained and are not practiced it is pointless to consider what further Orders should be made. 

   [1] Section 64B(6) of the Family Law Act 1975.

10. The child’s rights established by the principles and the objects of the Act support the conclusion that the proceedings and the making of Orders that are, if nothing else, the minimum common ground, that which is already agreed or which does not impact the rights of either party, being that the child live with the mother, the child have a Passport and travel document together with restraint upon removal of the child from the Commonwealth, save in compliance with the Act. 

11. In turning to section 61DA of the Act, I must consider whether the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility applies and, if it does apply, determine whether the presumption is rebutted.

12. The mother makes significant allegations of family violence. If those allegations were accepted, the presumption could not apply. However, the safer course is to proceed, the evidence being untested, on the basis that the allegations may be true. In any event, the circumstances of this case make quite clear that it is inappropriate and contrary to the child’s best interests for the presumption to apply. These parents do not communicate on any level. They do not cooperate with each other on any level. They have demonstrated consistently, throughout the course of these proceedings, that it is so. 

13. In those circumstances, I do not propose to treat the presumption as applicable, whether that arises through to its non-application or its rebuttal. 

14. That being so, I am not obliged to consider substantial and significant time. The above comments make clear that there is no determination here, nor could there be, of the time arrangement that would best meet the child’s needs as regards her relationship with her father. There is merely the acknowledgement that any determination that has been made by the Court is not taken up by the father.

15. The primary considerations must be considered prior to the additional considerations, being the benefit of the child of a meaningful relationship with both parents and the need to protect the child.  Priority is given to protection. Here, the issue speaking to protection is the child’s ongoing exposure to conflict and engagement in this litigation. The sooner it is concluded the better. At the rate at which these parties have sought to prepare their matter for trial, it is not able to be predicted when the matter would, on a final basis, be heard in relation to parenting.

16. If, for example, the first course proposed above were adopted and a Family Report were now ordered, the case would not be heard until mid-2020, as it would take now 10 to 11 months to obtain that Report and the matter would only then be listed for hearing. Why this child should spend her entire childhood to the age of seven involved in litigation between her parents escapes me completely. I could not think of any valid basis to inflict that upon this child. The father is able to make or resume an Application at any time of his choosing should he seek to spend time with the child.

17. At this point, on the basis that the father has clearly stated to the Court, that he does not intend to practice the time that is already provided for, I am not prepared to proceed further to deal with and determine his Application. 

18. The benefit to the child of a meaningful relationship cannot be assessed as a relationship has not been practiced for such a long time, nor has it ever been practiced consistently or with regularity, whether the fault of one or both of these parents, both of whom have a great deal to answer for to their child for that very issue.

19. I must consider the additional considerations. 

Views

1. There is no view expressed by this child, on the present evidence, other than her clear disquiet, if it might be so described, at exposure to conflict between her parents or repetition to her of matters relating to that conflict or exposure to her parents’ distress and upset as a consequence of that conflict when she is in their care. That would support a conclusion of these proceedings sooner rather than later.

Relationships

1. The child’s relationship with the parents cannot be properly assessed.

The extent to which each parent has participated in decision-making, spending time or communicating with the child

1. This is a very significant issue. Mr Keerthi simply determined that he will not attend to collect the child for periods that he is entitled to and has taken that position for quite some months now. That is a factor in relation to this child’s best interests, which has deserved some priority.  Why that circumstance has arisen is not clear. It would seem to be that the father is concerned that he will be subject to allegations if he is to spend time with the child.

2. What it does ignore, however, is the child’s need and interests in the whole arrangement. I am satisfied this factor is a basis upon which the proceedings would be determined. 

The extent to which each parent has fulfilled or failed to fulfil their obligation to maintain the child

1. It is alleged that the father has failed and failed for some little time in meeting this obligation. Hence, the Application for departure from administrative assessment and lump sum child support has been made.

Likely effect of change

1. There is unlikely to be any change for this child. The father has an Order. He simply chooses not to see her. On that basis, there is absolutely nothing to be gained from continuing this litigation and exposing this child to it. 

Practical difficulty and expense

1. I incorporate herein section 65DAA(5). The parents do not live any significant geographical distance apart from each other. However, as already observed, their capacity to implement an arrangement for time is completely problematic. Their ability to communicate and resolve difficulties is verging upon, if not, in fact, non-existent.

2. The impact on the child of continuing this litigation outweighs any benefit that could be gained from its continuance. 

Capacity of the parents to provide for the child’s needs, including emotional and intellectual

1. I am satisfied that, as already addressed above, that further consideration of the child’s maturity, sex, lifestyle and background, is unnecessary save to observe that this child has grown up with litigation and conflict circumjacent to her childhood and development. The impact it has had on her development is unclear, but it is manifestly open to the Court to assess that it must have had some impact, if not a significant impact.

Aboriginality

1. Neither parent identifies as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander, thus, nor does the child. 

The attitude of the child and responsibilities of parenthood

1. This is already addressed above.

Family violence

1. This is a significant issue raised on the mother’s case. It need not be canvassed further as I do not propose to make Orders which requires inter-parental communication nor time.

Family violence orders

1. It is unclear whether there is a present enforceable AVO. There has been in the past. 

Avoiding future proceedings

1. As to whether it is preferable to avoid future proceedings, the reality for this family is that proceedings will likely occur in the future, whether a continuation of this matter or a fresh Application.

2. The parties have demonstrated that they have a taste, as it were, for litigation, having filed quite a number of Applications in a Case, Applications for Contravention and amended Applications and Responses throughout these proceedings. I am not satisfied that there is anything that can be done to avoid future proceedings, and it may be necessary for future proceedings to be initiated by the father should he desire to resume his relationship with the child and should the mother not agree, and on past experience it is unlikely the parents will reach any agreement on any issue.

3. For all of those reasons, I am satisfied that the Orders that are proposed are appropriate. That would then leave the disposal of the property and child support pleas, which can listed for one day. In light of the fact that both parties are presently in default with respect to preparation for trial, I propose to take the cautious approach of requiring that the case be put on before it is listed for hearing.

4. Directions were made on the last occasion, 12 July 2018, which required that each party file an Affidavit of no more than 30 pages, even specifying the font and line spacing required. No annexures are permitted.  That is in response to the material that the parties have filed in the past, comprising a box of Affidavits of five to six hundred pages each, filed in interim and interlocutory Applications, let alone those previously prepared for trial. Thus, that restriction, prescriptive as it may be upon the material that the parties are to file, will remain, and the dates for filing will vary to afford one further chance.

5. Orders are made as follows.

I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Harman

Date: 23 November 2018