Kabushiki Kaisha Universal v Ainsworth Nominees Pty Ltd

[1996] APO 19

official notice

decision of a delegate of the commissioner of patents

Application        :    No. 630989 in the name of Kabushiki Kaisha Universal

Title:    Game Machine

Action:    Opposition by Ainsworth Nominees Pty Ltd under section 59 of the Patents Act 1952

Decision:    Issued            .

Abstract:    Grounds of prior publication, lack of novelty and obviousness not established.  One section 40 defect identified.

Discussion of appropriateness of unparticularised section 40 matters.

patents act 1990

decision of a delegate of the commissioner of patents

Re:Patent Application No. 630989 by Kabushiki Kaisha Universal and Opposition thereto by Ainsworth Nominees Pty Ltd under section 59 of the Patents Act 1952

background

Kabushiki Kaisha Universal (Universal) filed patent application 59841/90 on 26 July 1990.  Patent application 59841/90 (now 630989) claims priority from JP application 01-195747 which was filed on 28 July 1989.

Patent application 630989 was advertised accepted on 12 November 1992.  Ainsworth Nominees Pty Ltd (Ainsworth) filed a notice of opposition on 12 February 1993.  All evidence was served by 24 January 1994.

The applicant filed a request to amend the specification on 16 March 1994.  The amendments were allowed on 31 August 1995.

As the application was filed before, but accepted after, the commencement of the Patents Act 1990, section 59 of the Patents Act 1952 applies to the opposition but Chapter 5 of the Patent Regulations 1991 applies in relation to the opposition proceedings.

The opposition was heard in Sydney on 27 October 1995.  Universal was represented by Mr Jack Redfern and Mr Peter Heathcote, patent attorneys of Shelston Waters, Sydney.  Ainsworth was represented by Mr Chris Owens, patent attorney of F B Rice & Co, Sydney.

THE SPECIFICATION

The specification commences by indicating that the invention relates particularly to game machines displaying a multiple series of symbols.  Then follows a description of prior art slot machines with traditional three spinning reels.  The specification also indicates that it has been known to provide machines in which the player can re-spin one or more of the reels after all reels have stopped if any reel displays a specific symbol.  This provides in effect an additional game so that interest in the playing of the machine can be prolonged.  However according to the specification this feature does not markedly increase interest in the playing of the machine because the variety of symbol combinations obtained in the additional games is just the same as in the regular games.

The object of the invention is stated to be "to provide a game machine which can give multiplicity to the symbols or can display the symbols in a special manner so as to provide a new amusement for the player".

The specification then includes two statements of the invention which correspond to the two independent claims.  The description then indicates that the invention is applicable to video-type slot machines where symbols are displayed on a CRT screen of a graphic display unit.

The description provides a further explanation of the invention as follows:

"In the game machine according to the present invention, it is possible to play an additional game if the specific symbol is displayed in the display window at the stop of the movement of the first series of symbols, and in the additional game, the moving symbols of the second series are displayed and thereafter one of the second series of symbols is stopped in the position where the specific symbol is displayed.  As the first series of symbols are fixed during the additional game, and both symbols adjacent to the specific symbol are unchanged, such a symbol display is not only visually novel, but also makes it possible to display two series of symbols in a column, so that the number of symbol combination patterns will be easily increased and also the amusement of the game will be improved without enlarging the displaying space."

The specification includes description of a number of embodiments of gaming machines in conjunction with references to the drawings and then ends with 14 claims.  Claims 1 and 9 are the only independent claims and are as follows:

"1.  A game machine comprising:-
     display window means;
     a first and a second series of symbols, each series comprising a plurality of different symbols and said first series including a blank symbol;
     first display control means for displaying in said display window means the first series of symbols in motion and for stopping said first series to display in said display window means a predetermined number of stationary symbols of the first series;
     second display control means for selectively displaying the second series of symbols in motion at the location of said blank symbol when said blank symbol is displayed in said display window means, and for stopping said second series to display a stationary symbol of the second series at the location of said blank symbol."

"9.  A game machine comprising:-
     a first rotational inner reel having a first plurality of symbols arranged in series on its outer periphery;
     an outer reel rotatable around and arranged co-radially and relative said inner reel and having a second outer periphery on which are provided a second plurality of symbols and at least one transparent portion therewith in a series, said transparent portion being at least dimensionally as large or larger than any one of said second plurality of symbols; and
     reel control means for controlling the starting and stopping of the rotation of said inner and outer reels each independently of the other and for enabling at least one of said first plurality of symbols to be co-radially aligned with and thereby visible through said transparent portion when said inner and outer reels are stationary."

STATEMENT OF GROUNDS AND PARTICULARS

The statement of grounds and particulars, which was amended on 6 April 1993, lists four of the grounds of opposition under section 59 of the Patents Act 1952 viz. prior publication, obviousness, lack of novelty and non-compliance with section 40.

In relation to prior publication and lack of novelty, the particulars list 9 patent specifications.

In relation to obviousness, the particulars refer to the previously mentioned 9 documents in support of the identification of the common general knowledge in the art.

In support of non-compliance with section 40, the particulars identify a number of alleged defects in the opposed claims.  The majority of these are directed at lack of clarity in the claims although the particulars do also refer to a lack of fair basis for claims 7 and 9.

EVIDENCE

The evidence in support consists of two statutory declarations, the first of which has been made by Christopher Owens, the patent attorney representing Ainsworth.  This declaration serves to introduce 8 of the 9 particularised patent specifications into evidence and to establish their publication dates.  The second declaration has been made by Richard Edward Smyth who states that he has worked for Ainsworth for 27 years until his retirement in November 1990, the latter 10 years of which was spent in charge of Ainsworth's patent matters.  The declaration has 2 exhibits.

The evidence in answer consists of a declaration by Toshiaki Shimizu who indicates that he is employed as assistant manager of technical planning by Pacific Gaming Pty Ltd which I understand was previously known as Universal Australia Pty Ltd.  There is one exhibit.

The evidence in reply consists of a further declaration by Mr Smyth.

SUBMISSIONS

I will refer to submissions made by both parties in my decision where appropriate.

DECISION

During the hearing, Mr Heathcote raised a procedural issue on the question of whether or not it was appropriate for Mr Owens to provide submissions on section 40 matters which had not been particularised.  Mr Owens argued that the matters he was raising were actually part of the evidence in that the Smyth declaration had referred to them.  The matters referred to in evidence concern possible defects in the description whereas the particulars identify possible defects in the claims only.  Mr Owens also included other unparticularised section 40 matters in his written submissions which do not have any support in the evidence.  These concern alleged defects in the claims.  In this respect, Mr Owens pointed out that the claims had been amended subsequent to the filing of the original and amended statements of grounds and particulars.

I indicated that while I could sympathise with the opponent that the claims had been amended, it was up to the opponent to provide amended particulars if new section 40 matters arose due to those amendments.  I ruled that as the matters being raised were clearly not part of the particulars it was not appropriate for them to be considered as part of the opposition.  I indicated that the whole idea of requiring the opponent to provide particulars was to allow the applicant to know at an early stage what case it has to answer.  I understand that section 40 matters may not necessarily require the support of expert evidence but nevertheless it seems to me that the applicant is entitled to know what case it has to answer at an early stage.

In this respect, I note the delegate's words in Cooper Industries Inc. v Metal Manufactures Limited 29 IPR 106 where he said:

"Although the Patents Act 1990 and its regulations introduced a number of requirements modelled on procedures of the Federal Court (the statement of grounds and particulars, dismissal, directions, and so on), I do not see this as meaning that all procedures adopted by courts have application in the context of Patent Office tribunals. In particular, it has been the long-standing practice that at a hearing of an opposition an opponent may raise issues involving section 40 regardless of whether it has put forward evidence in relation to those issues, provided, of course, that section 40 is a ground of opposition. Indeed, it is not uncommon for a hearing officer of his or her own volition to make an adverse finding on a section 40 matter even where the opponent has omitted to make any mention of it. The fact is that section 40 questions frequently do not lend themselves to being the object of meaningful evidence, but rather must be left to skilled practitioners in the field such as patent attorneys to argue their merits, with the proviso, of course, under the present regulations, that  they have been the subject of adequate particularization.  Apart from this proviso, I discern no valid reason why the previous practice should be overturned.  Were a hearing officer to become aware of a section 40 problem but fail to address it when deciding the opposition, this would necessitate a bar to sealing action.  This would appear to be an unnecessarily roundabout way, given the nature of section 40 issues, of dealing with the situation." (my underlining)

In the present case, the section 40 questions have not been the subject of adequate particularization.

However, unparticularised section 40 matters raised in this fashion have been brought to the attention of the Commissioner and should therefore not be disregarded, entirely.  One course of action might be for the Commissioner to have regard to them in a bar to sealing consideration should this application proceed towards sealing.  However, in the present case, I deal with this issue in my consideration of section 40 matters below.

Section 40

In relation to non-compliance with section 40, the opponent particularised 9 points all dealing with either the lack of fair basis or lack of clarity of the claims.  The applicant argues that some of these issues have been dealt with by the amendments allowed on 31 August 1995.  I agree.  Therefore I will only look at those issues not addresses by the amendments.  I will deal with those points concerning the two independent claims first.

.The opponent submits that claims 1 to 8 are not clear and indefinite because of the use of the term "series of symbols".  The description refers to reels each of which has a series of symbols on its outer periphery.  However the claims do not refer to reels and this implies that the series of symbols are physical components. The claims should more correctly refer to "reels having symbols thereon".  The applicant on the other hand contends that the opponent's witness, Mr Smyth, has no difficulty with this terminology and uses similar terminology in his declarations.  In any case, the claims are not restricted to mechanical reels but includes video versions.

I agree with the applicant that the terminology in the claim is not inconsistent with the terminology used by Mr Smyth who is experienced in the particular technology.  I do not think that the person skilled in the art would have any difficulty with the wording of claims 1 to 8 in this respect.

.The opponent submits that claims 1 to 8 are not clear and indefinite because of the use of the wording "display control means for displaying".  The description only refers to control circuits which do not display symbols but only control rotation of the reels.  The applicant contends that the control circuits control the rotational orientation of the physical reels or the actual symbols displayed on a CRT screen.  Therefore the control circuits effect the appropriate display of the required symbols.

The opponent has selected only a portion of the wording in the claims.  I think that a proper reading of the claims indicates that the display control means are for displaying the first series of symbols in the display window and for displaying the second series of symbols when the blank symbol is displayed.  It seems to me that the control means therefore don't actually display anything of themselves but, as the applicant has said, they effect or control display of the series of symbols.  I do not think that claims 1 and 8 lack clarity in this respect.

.The opponent argues that claim 3 is not clear because the use of the term "activated" in relation to the control means.  Activation of a control means has no intrinsic meaning.  The applicant submits that, since the second series of symbols is selectively displayed, it is not unreasonable to say that the control means must be activated for that selective display.

I agree with the applicant.  I do not think that a person skilled in the art would be unable to determine the scope of this claim due to this wording.

.The opponent points out that claim 7 is not fairly based on the description and contradicts claim 1, to which it is appended, because it refers to a CRT implying series of symbols in the form of images whereas the description describes a series of symbols on physical reels.  Also claim 1 must be taken to represent symbols as physical components and therefore claim 7 does not depend properly form claim 1. The applicant argues that the description quite clearly envisages both physical and pseudo reels.

I note the applicant's submissions in relation to the first point above that claim 1 is not restricted to mechanical reels but includes a video version.  In my discussion of the specification earlier, I noted that the description indicates that the invention is applicable to video-type slot machines.  Therefore, I find that claim 7 is supported by the description and is clear when appended to claim 1.

.According to the opponent, claim 4 is not clear in relation to the phrase "a liquid crystal display panel driven to display the second series of symbols" because the previous claims indicate that the second series of symbols are a physical component and not an image displayed on a liquid crystal display.  The applicant is of the view that claim 1 envisages both physical and pseudo reels and therefore claim 4 which is appended to claim 1 is quite clear.

For similar reasons to those above in relation to claim 7, I do not find any clarity problems with claim 4.

.The opponent alleges that claim 8 is not clear in its use of the term "selecting the activation" and the term "activation" lacks any antecedent.  The applicant refers back to its submissions in relation to claim 3.

I think it is quite in order when discussing a manually actuated button to use the term "the activation" as opposed, presumably, to "an activation".  In relation to the clarity of "selecting the activation", I refer back to my comments in relation to claim 3.

In summary, I have found that none of the points raised on behalf of Ainsworth establish that the claims in suit lack compliance with section 40.

However, in construing the claims in order to determine the points raised in this opposition, I have encountered some difficulty with the wording of the claim 1.

In particular, I have great difficulty in giving a meaning to the phrase "at the location of the blank symbol".  The specification indicates in all its embodiments, including that embodiment which uses a liquid crystal display device at an opening in the reel, that the second or inner series of symbols appears behind the opening or transparent portion in the outer reel.  There is no suggestion that any video version of the machine would simulate an arrangement where the inner symbols would appear anywhere else but behind the blank or transparent portion.  However it seems to me that the phrase "at the location of the blank symbol" includes arrangements in which the second series of symbols appears in front of or instead of the blank symbol.  There is certainly no real and reasonably clear disclosure of such arrangements.  Therefore I am of the opinion that claim 1 is not fairly based on the matter described in the specification. (CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd 1994 AIPC 91-079)

Earlier, I indicated that unparticularised section 40 matters should not be part of this opposition.  I note that Mr Owens argued for their inclusion because they formed part of the evidence.  The only section 40 matter that I can find in the evidence is found in the second Smyth declaration.  In his paragraphs 3 and 7, he comments on the lack of disclosure on how the video version of the invention could be implemented.  I do not believe that any material appearing as part of the evidence, but not particularised, should necessarily form part of the opposition.  However, if I am wrong in this, I would say for the sake of completeness that Mr Smyth, whom the applicant puts forward as a person skilled in the art, states that it would have been obvious to produce the video version of the present invention.  From this, I believe that Mr Smyth is implying that a person skilled in the art, on reading the specification, would be able to make the video version without having to exercise any inventiveness.  Thus, on the evidence before me, I cannot say that the specification is insufficient.  I would add here that the question of whether or not the specification is sufficient requires different considerations to whether or not the claimed invention is obvious where ex post facto analysis is forbidden.  My subsequent findings on obviousness in this decision do not affect the finding that the specification is sufficient in the light of the evidence before me.

As for the other unparticularised section 40 matters, I have considered them and, except for that matter I have dealt with above in relation to the term "at the location of the blank symbol", am satisfied that they do not identify defects which would make a patent, if granted, clearly invalid.  Consequently, I do not believe that it is necessary to consider them further in any bar to sealing action.

Novelty

Although the particulars list 9 documents in support of the ground of lack of novelty, Mr Owens only relied on two of these at the hearing viz. GB 2165074 and AU 556021 (in so far as it is similar to the Olympic machine referred to in the Smyth declarations).

In relation to novelty, both parties referred me to the reverse infringement test for novelty as clearly indicated in the recent Federal Court decisions Werner & Co. v Bailey Aluminium 13 IPR 513 and Nicaro Holdings v Martin Engineering 16 IPR 545. In these decisions, the test for novelty is indeed indicated as being the reverse infringement test as set out by Aickin J in Meyers Taylor v Vicarr Industries (1977) CLR 228 as follows:

"The basic test for anticipation or want of novelty is the same as that for infringement and generally one can properly ask oneself whether the alleged anticipation would, if the patent were valid, constitute an infringement."

In Rodi Wienenberger AG v Henry Showell [1969] RPC 367 at page 391, infringement of a claim is said to occur when "each and every one of the essential integers" of that claim have been taken.

Thus in order to decide whether or not the claims lack novelty, I must determine whether or not each and every essential integer of the respective claim is disclosed in the earlier publication.

In looking at claim 1 it seems to me that the essential integers are as follows:

.    a game machine with:

.    a display window;

.a first and a second series of symbols, each series comprising a plurality of different symbols and the first series including a blank symbol;

.first display control means for displaying in the display window the first series of symbols in motion and for stopping the first series to display in the display window a predetermined number of stationary symbols of the first series;

.second display control means for selectively displaying the second series of symbols in motion at the location of the blank symbol when the blank symbol is displayed in the display window, and for stopping said second series to display a stationary symbol of the second series at the location of the blank symbol.

GB 2165074, which was published in Australia on 30 September 1986, discloses a game machine with a display window and three reels each containing a series of symbols.  One of the reels is transparent with translucent symbols and is aligned with one or more inner reels which may also be transparent.  Each of these inner reels also has a series of symbols the symbols being visible through the transparent outer reels and translucent outer symbols.  The specification does not disclose a blank symbol.  The symbols on the inner reels are displayed every time that the three outer reels are spun and so there is no disclosure of second display control means for selectively displaying these inner symbols when a blank symbol is displayed in the display window.  Therefore all the essential integers of claim 1 have not been disclosed in GB 2165074 and thus Claim 1 does not lack novelty in the light of GB 2165074.

AU 566021 (the Sigma patent) discloses a game machine in which each symbol displayed in a display window can be independently rotated.  In a traditional gaming machine with three reels, nine symbols can generally be observed in the display window.  The Sigma patent envisages the independent rotation of each of these symbols.  Thus, in effect, nine reels are provided, one for each symbol, each of the nine reels having a series of symbols.  The opponent has argued that it is well known to have reels which are not fully populated with symbols and that in effect the Sigma machine is similar to the claimed machine if it had a well known respin feature.  However the Sigma machine discloses neither a blank symbol nor a respin feature.  Even if it did disclose a respin feature, there is no disclosure that the respin feature would occur when a blank symbol appeared.  Therefore the Sigma patent does not disclose all the essential integers of claim 1.  Thus claim 1 does not lack novelty in the light of the Sigma patent.

I believe that the essential integers of the other independent claim, claim 9 are:

.    a game machine with:

.a first rotational inner reel having a first plurality of symbols arranged in series on its outer periphery;

.an outer reel rotatable around and arranged co-radially and relative the inner reel and having a second outer periphery on which is provided a second plurality of symbols;

.the second outer periphery having at least one transparent portion in series with the second plurality of symbols, the transparent portion being at least dimensionally as large or larger than any one of the second plurality of symbols; and

.reel control means for controlling the starting and stopping of the rotation of the inner and outer reels each independently of the other and for enabling at least one of the first plurality of symbols to be co-radially aligned with and thereby visible through the transparent portion when the inner and outer reels are stationary.

GB 2165074 discloses the first three of these integers.  The citation also discloses a transparent outer reel with translucent outer symbols.

If I equate the transparent outer reel with the transparent portion defined in the claim, I cannot say that this transparent outer reel is in series with the plurality of symbols.  The plurality of symbols are in fact located on the transparent outer reel and I do not think that one could in any way say that this represented a transparent portion in series with a plurality of symbols.

Another interpretation is that one of the translucent symbols could be argued to be the transparent portion.  Ignoring for the moment the significance of the term "translucent", it could be argued that the translucent symbol equating to the transparent portion of the claim is in series with the other symbols.  Such an interpretation would include the last essential integer above in that the citation discloses that the inner and outer reels are rotated independently and one of the inner symbols is aligned with and visible through the translucent outer symbol.

The question I need to answer in this interpretation is whether or not the translucent symbol is the same as the transparent portion of the claim.

Mr Owens argued that in the context in which it is used, "translucent" would mean "transparent" in the citation but I do not agree.  This is because the reel is defined as being transparent and therefore the symbols which are defined as being translucent must presumably be something other than transparent e.g. semi-transparent.  However, while I do not believe that the outer symbols are transparent, they must be at least such that the inner symbols beneath them are visible.

The applicant submitted that the machine in the GB citation is directed at providing winning combinations on axial and radial lines which is different to the presently opposed invention.  Therefore the purposes of the two machines are different.  Mr Owens argued that the claims including claim 9 provide no indication of how the machine is to be played. I agree with Mr Owens.  Certainly claim 9 which only defines one inner and one outer reel and not even a display window provides no indication of the purpose of the arrangement.  However, the appearance to the player of the two arrangements would be different.  In the claimed machine, the transparent portion is distinct from the series of symbols on the outer reel so that the inner symbol would be quite clearly visible whereas the machine of the citation would less clearly display the inner symbol, it being overlaid with the translucent outer symbol.

Therefore because there is no disclosure of a transparent portion in series with a plurality of symbols, I am of the opinion that all the essential integers of claim 9 have not been disclosed in the GB citation.

The Sigma patent does not disclose a transparent portion and therefore, it does disclose all the essential integers of claim 9.  Thus claim 9 does not lack novelty in the light of the Sigma patent.

In reaching the conclusion that none of the claims lack novelty in the light of the two citations, I note paragraph 8 of the first Smyth declaration:

"8.  I believe that the invention claimed in Universal's application 59841/90 is novel for machines using physical reels.  I have not previously seen a physical arrangement of "reels within reels" which allows for selective re-spinning of inner reels.

In summary, I have found that the claims are novel in the light of the evidence before me.

Obviousness

In relation to obviousness under the Patents Act 1952, the question I have to ask is whether the invention claimed would have been obvious to a non-inventive worker in the art who is equipped with the common general knowledge in the art in Australia at the relevant date. See Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf (Aust) Ltd 144 CLR 253 and The Wellcome Foundation Ltd v VR Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd 148 CLR 262.

In answering this question, I am not entitled to consider any documents unless they have been proven to be part of the common general knowledge.

The opponent relies on the evidence of Mr Smyth to support its contention that the claims are obvious.

In relation to the Sigma or Olympic machine in which all nine positions in the window are independently spun, Mr Smyth states in the last part of paragraph 6 of his first declaration:

"It occurred to me that it would be better to forget about the extra vertical pay lines and instead have a feature machine where one symbol or one symbol per row was "respun" after selected losing games.  A sub programme might suffice instead of having to completely reprogram a machine for vertical pays."

Also at paragraph 5 of his second declaration, Mr Smyth states:

"I disagree that without hind sight a video version would not have been foreseen by anyone skilled in the art.

The lesson was there for us to see in Sigma's Patent 20082/83 or Olympic's 8 Ways machine which predated the Universal application.

It would have taken  no stretch of the imagination to make only one video symbol appear to spin instead of the nine symbols..."

Thus, it seems to me, that  Mr Smyth's argument in relation to the obviousness of the presently claimed invention is based on either the Sigma patent or the Olympic machine.

However, as pointed out to me by the applicant, Mr Smyth provides no evidence as to whether or not either the Sigma patent or the Olympic machine was part of the common general knowledge in Australia.  He states that he drew his employer's attention to the Sigma patent but this in no way constitutes evidence of what was common general knowledge in the art.  I note the statement in Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co v Beiersdorf ( Australia) Ltd, (supra) at page 294:

"There may be some fields of endeavour in which those who work therein study and make themselves familiar with all patent specifications as they become available for inspection in one or in many countries so that what was contained therein becomes common general knowledge in that particular trade or field of manufacture in the country in question."

However, I have no evidence before me to suggest that the particular field in which the present invention resides is such a field.

Therefore any conclusions Mr Smyth makes about the obviousness of the presently claimed invention based on either the Sigma patent or the Olympic machine do not provide any support for the ground of obviousness.

Even if I were to find that the Sigma patent or the Olympic machine were part of the common general knowledge before the priority date of the claims in question, I note that in his second declaration, Mr Smyth provides an explanation of why a person skilled in the art would not have produced the video version of the presently claimed invention, his reasons including the fact that this sort of machine would be unpopular.

Thus, even if the Sigma patent or the Olympic machine were part of the common general knowledge, the evidence of Mr Smyth indicates to me that, although a person skilled in the art could possibly have made a video version of the claimed machine, there is no suggestion that a person skilled in the art would have done so as a matter of routine.  Indeed this evidence suggests that a person skilled in the art would have been taught away from even trying to do so because the machine would not have been commercially successful.

Therefore I cannot say, on the evidence before me, that the claimed device is obvious.

SUMMARY

I have found that the opposition has failed on the grounds of prior publication, lack of novelty and obviousness but that there is a section 40 defect.  As I believe that this section 40 defect can be overcome, I allow the applicant 60 days from the date of this decision to file amendments to overcome the defect.

COSTS

In decisions of this nature, costs normally follow the event.  The opponent was unsuccessful on all grounds, the only section 40 defect being one that I identified in the course of construing the specification.  However, I note that the applicant has amended the specification, the amendments being allowed some time after the completion of the serving of all evidence.  These amendments have resulted in claim 9, in particular, being reworded from claim 9 as originally accepted.  Therefore, the opponent has been successful in causing amendment of the claims.

I award costs up to 31 August 1995, the date allowance of the amendments was advertised, against the applicant, Kabushiki Kaisha Universal and costs from 31 August 1995 to and including the hearing against the opponent, Ainsworth Nominees Pty Ltd.

R.W. HALLETT

Delegate of the Commissioner of Patents

Patent attorneys for the applicant  :  Shelston Waters, Sydney

Patent attorneys for the opponent   :  F B Rice & Co, Balmain