Junius and Kumar v Messenger Press & Ors No. Scgrg-94-318 Judgment No. S484

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JUNIUS & KUMAR  v  MESSENGER PRESS & ORS
[1999] SASC 484

Full Court:  Duggan, Debelle and Bleby JJ

  1. DUGGAN J.      I agree with Bleby J that the application for leave to appeal is incompetent and must be dismissed.  I also agree with the reasons he has advanced in reaching this conclusion.

  2. I add the following comments on the purpose and operation of the proviso (2)(b) to s 50(1) of the Supreme Court Act, 1935.

  3. The proviso states that no appeal shall lie without leave of the judge from any order “as to costs only which by law are left to the discretion of the judge”.  The origin of this provision can be traced back to s 49 of the Judicature Act, 1873 (UK).  Eventually the provision found its way into s 18(1)(f) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK) which has now been repealed.  There is similar legislation in some of the Australian jurisdictions.  (see Quick on Costs (1996) Vol 1 paras 4.5330, 4.5380, 4.5520, 4.5540).

  4. The obvious purpose of these provisions is to restrict appeals on costs, an issue in respect of which the trial judge is usually well placed to assess the merits and exercise a discretion in what is, essentially, a procedural matter.  (Baltic Shipping Companyv Dillon (1991) 22 NSWLR 1 at 32; In re Beddoe.  Downs v Cottam [1893] 1 Ch 547 at 554). However, the proviso will not prevent an appeal without leave from the trial judge where the discretion has not been exercised at all, or where it has been exercised otherwise than judicially. (Donald Campbell & Co v Pollack [1927] AC 732; Scherer v Counting Instruments Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 615; Bankamerica Finance Ltd v Nock[1988] 1 AC 1002 at 1007).

  5. It is appropriate to consider the operation of the proviso against the background of some of the statutory and regulatory provisions relating to costs. Section 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act provides for a general and unfettered discretion to award costs, subject to the Act and the Rules of Court.  Rule 101.01(1) also confirms that costs are within the discretion of the court.  However, the discretion must be exercised judicially and in accordance with recognised principles, some of which are mentioned in the rules.  Rule 101.02 refers to the well recognised principle that costs should follow the event unless the court otherwise orders.  Although this is a relevant factor to be taken into account, it does not limit the broad discretion provided for by statute.  (Copping v ANZ McCaughan (1995) 63 SASR 523 at 527).

  6. Rules 40.05 and 41.04 which were devised to encourage settlements, provide for a prima facie approach in making a costs order in the circumstances identified in those rules whilst, at the same time, providing scope for the exercise of the court’s discretion.  This concept of a wide discretion, which is nevertheless to be exercised in accordance with principles identified in the rules, is also reflected in r 101.01(3)…

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Details
Case
[1999] SASC 484
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Junius and Kumar v Messenger Press & Ors [1999] SASC 484 involves an application for leave to appeal against a costs order made by the trial judge. The plaintiffs, Junius and Kumar, sought leave to appeal against the order, which required them to pay 60% of their costs on a solicitor and client basis due to their perceived lack of frankness and exaggeration of certain issues during the trial. The defendants, Messenger Press and others, argued that the application for leave to appeal was incompetent as it required leave from the trial judge, as per s 50(1) proviso (2)(b) of the Supreme Court Act. The Full Court considered the application and found it to be incompetent, as the order as to costs fell within the discretion of the judge and required leave from the trial judge before an appeal could be brought.

The court examined the purpose and operation of the proviso (2)(b) to s 50(1) of the Supreme Court Act, which restricts appeals on costs to cases where the discretion has not been exercised at all or where it has been exercised otherwise than judicially. The court found that the order as to costs in this case was one which by law was left to the discretion of the judge, as per s 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act. The rule 41.04, which required the defendants to pay the whole of the plaintiffs' costs of action to be taxed as between solicitor and client, did not detract from the discretion of the Court if it thought proper to order otherwise.

The Full Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, as the order as to costs fell within the discretion of the judge and required leave from the trial judge before an appeal could be brought. The court did not consider the question of whether it would have necessarily refused leave or made the costs order as made by the trial judge, as it was not necessary to venture upon those questions. The only circumstances where there might conceivably be an appeal as of right is where a judge, either in making an order as to costs or in refusing leave to appeal, did so where there was simply no material before the judge upon which the discretion could be exercised in the way it was or that there was some demonstrable error of law which could not possibly justify the exercise of the discretion that way. There was no suggestion of any defect of that nature in this case either in the making of the costs order or in refusing leave to appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

DUGGAN J DEBELLE J BLEBY J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DUGGAN J, DEBELLE J, BLEBY J