JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: JS -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2019] WADC 136
CORAM: TROY DCJ
HEARD: 20 AUGUST 2019
DELIVERED : 23 SEPTEMBER 2019
FILE NO/S: CIV 4083 of 2016
BETWEEN: JS
Plaintiff
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Defendant
ISM
Proposed Third Party
Catchwords:
Civil procedure - Application by a defendant to set aside judgment and settlement - Whether s 91 of the Limitation Act can be utilised by a defendant rather than a plaintiff - Meaning of 'on' a previously barred cause of action - Whether plaintiff's action was dismissed on the ground that the action was statute barred
Legislation:
Civil Liability Legislation Amendment (Child Sexual Abuse Actions) Act 2018 (WA)
Limitation Act 2005 (WA), s 6A, s 89, s 91, s 92
Result:
The defendant's application to set aside the judgment of 20 December 2017 and the settlement of 17 October 2017 is dismissed
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | No appearance |
| Defendant | : | Ms C J Thatcher SC |
| Proposed Third Party | : | Mr T J Palmer |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Not applicable |
| Defendant | : | State Solicitor of Western Australia |
| Proposed Third Party | : | Panetta McGrath Lawyers |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
City of Kwinana v Lamont [2014] WASCA 112
Commonwealth v Baume [1905] HCA 11; (1905) 2 CLR 405
Ethnic Interpreters and Translators Pty Ltd v Sabri-Matanagh [2015] WASCA 186
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd [2012] HCA 55; (2012) 250 CLR 503
Gwilliam v The Queen [2019] NSWCCA 5
JAS v The Trustees of the Christian Brothers [2018] WADC 169
LFG v The State of Western Australia (2015) 48 WAR 178; [2015] WASCA 88
Sgarlata v The State of Western Australia (2015) 49 WAR 176; [2015] WASCA 215
Taylor v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 (2014) 253 CLR 531
TRG v The Board of Trustees of Brisbane Grammar School [2019] QSC 157
TROY DCJ:
Introduction
The plaintiff commenced civil proceedings arising out of alleged historic child sexual abuse, with the State of Western Australia pleaded as the first defendant and ISM as the second defendant. ISM applied for summary judgment in his favour. No summary judgment was entered, but the plaintiff advised the State that she agreed to discontinue her action. She also advised of an intention to recommence once the anticipated legislation removing time limits in such matters was passed. On an unknown date on or before 17 October 2017 the plaintiff reached a confidential arrangement with ISM. By a consent order dated 4 September 2017 and accepted by the court on 20 December 2017, solicitors for the plaintiff, ISM and the State agreed to the plaintiff's action against ISM being reinstated and dismissed.
In March 2018 ISM was convicted of historic child sex offences against two victims and sentenced to a period of 5 years 2 months' immediate imprisonment.
The State now wish to set aside the dismissal of…
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- Case
- [2019] WADC 136
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the language of section 91 and its legislative history to ascertain whether it was intended to be used by defendants. The court also considered the meaning of 'on' a previously barred cause of action and whether it was appropriate to apply the provision in the context of a defendant seeking to set aside a judgment and settlement. Additionally, the court needed to determine whether the plaintiff's action was dismissed on the basis of being statute-barred, which would be a prerequisite for the defendant's application under section 91.
After careful consideration of the legislative provisions and relevant case law, the court concluded that section 91 of the Limitation Act could not be utilised by a defendant to set aside a judgment and settlement. The court found that the provision was intended for use by plaintiffs and not defendants, and therefore could not be applied in the circumstances of this case. Furthermore, the court held that the phrase 'on' a previously barred cause of action did not encompass situations where a plaintiff's action was dismissed for reasons other than being statute-barred. Consequently, the court dismissed the defendant's application to set aside the judgment and settlement.
The court made an order dismissing the defendant's application to set aside the judgment and settlement, and no order as to costs. The court's decision clarified the scope of section 91 of the Limitation Act and provided guidance on the interpretation of the phrase 'on' a previously barred cause of action in the context of a defendant seeking to challenge a judgment and settlement.