JRQF and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)
[2022] AATA 4066
•30 November 2022
JRQF and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2022] AATA 4066 (30 November 2022)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2021/6269
Re:JRQF
APPLICANT
AndSecretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT
Decision
Tribunal:Ms A E Burke AO, Member
Date:30 November 2022
Place:Melbourne
The Tribunal, having considered all the evidence before it, sets aside the decision under review, and in substitution decides that a portion of JRQF’s debt should be waivered in recognition of her special circumstances.
......................[sgd]..................................................
Ms A E Burke AO, Member
Catchwords
SOCIAL SECURITY – parenting payment single - overpayment – debt due to the Commonwealth – did not advised return to work – did not report fortnightly income - should recovery of debt be written off or waived – debt not attributable solely to error made by Centrelink – whether applicant knowingly made false statements or gave false representation in claims - special circumstances not found – decision under review affirmed
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975
Social Security Act 1991Social Security (Administration) Act 1999
Cases
Anderson and Secretary, Department of Families and Community Services (2002) 69 ALD 494
Callaghan and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1996) 45 ALD 435
Ghanem and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2022] AATA 160
Groth and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1995] FCA 1708
Jazazievska v Secretary, Department of Families and Community Services [2000] FCA 1484
Phillips and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2021] AATA 3560
Ryde v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2005] FCA 866
Saab and Secretary, Department of Education, Skills and Employment [2021] AATA 2766
Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Walsh [2008] AATA 75
Secretary, Department of Social Services and Schuh [2022] AATA 53
Secretary, Department of Social Services and Waqar [2020] AATA 1493
Secretary, Department of Social Services and Vella [2021] AATA 4051
Waddell and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2006] AATA 557Woolley and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 26
Secondary Materials
Guide to Social Security Law, Department of Social Services
‘Parenting Payment: Income and Assets Test’, Services Australia (Web Page, 20 September 2022) < FOR DECISION
A E Burke AO, Member
DATE
JRQF (the Applicant) sought a second-tier review of the decision made by the Secretary of the Department of Social Services (the Respondent) that she had a parenting payment single (PPS) debt of $21,261.49 for the period 28 June 2018 to 10 July 2019.
On 26 May 2021, Services Australia (Centrelink) raised a debt of $21,261.49 against JRQF as her income had not been included in the calculation for PPS. As JRQF’s income exceeded the PPS threshold each and every fortnight, she should have been paid $0.00 of PPS.
The application was heard on 15 July 2022 by telephone. JRQF was self-represented. Ms Stefana Doslo, Government Lawyer in the Litigation Branch of Services Australia, appeared for the Respondent. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Tribunal provided JRQF with additional time to submit documentary evidence of her special circumstances and time was also allocated to the Respondent to reply.
BACKGROUND
JRQF is 47-year-old single mother of two who works full time as a Financial Analyst at a superannuation fund and cares for her elderly mother. JRQF came to Australia in 1998 from the USSR and was granted Australian citizenship in 2004.
On 7 September 2017, JRQF applied for PPS. In her application form she answered that she was employed by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) as a Financial Analyst and her regular fortnightly income was $2,000. She stated that she had a daughter born 2017 and a son born 2003.
On 26 September 2017, Centrelink granted JRQF PPS, effective from 14 August 2017.
On 23 February 2018, JRQF’s parental leave from APRA ceased and she commenced unpaid leave. Centrelink then granted and commenced paying her paid parental leave, in addition to her PPS, with an end date of 28 June 2018.
On 28 June 2018, JRQF returned to work full time as a Principal Analyst at APRA earning $5,142.77 a fortnight.
From 28 June 2018 Centrelink paid JRQF PPS at a higher rate as her 18 weeks of paid parental leave had ended and she had not informed Centrelink of any change in her income.
According to Centrelink records, JRQF made the following notifications to Centrelink of her estimated annual income:
(a)1 July 2018: $100,000
(b)17 January 2019: $120,000
(c)1 July 2019: $123,600
(d)8 November 2019: $115,000
On 12 July 2019 JRQF contacted Centrelink to advise that her estimated income for the 2018/2019 financial year was $123,000. Centrelink advised JRQF that her PPS would be cancelled, that she had been overpaid, and that a debt may be raised. JRQF advised Centrelink that she thought that notifying them of her annual income for Family Tax Benefit (FTB) purposes would flow through to her PPS entitlement.
On 26 May 2021, Services Australia (Centrelink) raised a debt of $21,261.49 against JRQF on the basis she had been paid at a rate higher than she was entitled to from 28 June 2018 to 10 July 2019, as her income had not been considered when calculating her rate of PPS. Based on her actual circumstances, she should have been paid $0.00.
On 11 June 2021, a departmental Authorised Review Officer (ARO) affirmed the decision. The reasons for the outcome state:
The amount of income a person earns each fortnight can reduce the amount of Parenting Payment payable for that fortnight.
While you were working for APRA you were reporting earnings and your payments were reduced according to amounts you reported, However, according to the information now available to us, you earned more than you reported and your payments should have been reduced to a lower amount than was paid to you.
From 28 June 2018 to 10 July 2019 you received Parenting Payment totalling $21,261.49. Based on your income, you were not entitled to receive this amount. This means you have a debt of $21,261.49.
I have considered the rules that allow the recovery of a debt to be waived.
A debt must be waived if it was caused solely by an error of the Commonwealth, the debt was not raised within 6 weeks of the incorrect payment and the overpaid amount was received by the person in good faith. If a person knew or had reason to know that they were not entitled to payment they have received, they cannot be said to have received the payment in good faith.
You have a debt because you earned more than you reported.
As the debt was not caused solely by the Commonwealth’s error the debt cannot be waived for this reason.
A debt may also be waived if there are special circumstances that make it desirable to waive. Circumstances need to be sufficiently unusual or uncommon to be considered special.
I am not satisfied there are special circumstances that make waiving the debt desirable.
On 10 August 2021, the Social Security and Child Support Division of this Tribunal (AAT1) affirmed the decision of the ARO. The AAT1 found that as none of JRQF’s income was included when calculating her rate of PPS, she had a debt to the Commonwealth of $21,261.49 for the period 28 June 2018 to 10 July 2019. The AAT1 did not find the debt arose solely due to administrative error, nor were there special circumstances which made it unjust or unreasonable for the debt to be recovered.
On 3 September 2021, JRQF sought a review of the AAT1 decision by this division of the Tribunal, as she disagreed with the decision made, stating:
Centrelink had an obligation to automatically cut off my payment knowing that my income was too high which they did not. Centrelink have committed an act of malfeasance
I have not received any electronic or physical correspondence from Centrelink during the period I have been overpaid
I have not been communicated the full breakdown of the debt
I have infirmed the Commonwealth Ombudsman who are investigating
THE ISSUES IN CONTENTION
The Tribunal needs to consider the following relevant issues:
(a)whether JRQF was overpaid PPS;
(b)if so, is the debt recoverable; and if yes;
(c)should the debt be waived due to administrative error pursuant to section 1237A of the Social Security Act 1991 (the Act); or
(d)whether special circumstances exist, such that the debt should be waived pursuant to section 1237AAD of the Act.
Relevant Legislation
PPS is an income support payment that provides financial assistance to principal carers with parenting responsibilities for a young child and provides them with incentives to increase workforce participation and reduce dependency on income support. It is granted on the basis of an individual meeting certain requirements. As with all social security payments, it is granted on the premise that an individual is unable to support themselves by any other means. The Act provides the mechanism for calculating the rate of pension payable to an individual, taking into consideration their income and assets.
Section 503 of the Act states that if a person is not a member of a couple, their rate of PPS is worked out using the Pension PP (Single) Rate Calculator at the end of section 1068A of the Act which also provides that a person’s PPS must take into account the ordinary income test in Module E.
“Ordinary income” is defined in s 8(1) of the Act to mean “income that is not maintenance income or an exempt lump sum”. In turn, “income” is defined in s 8(1) of the Act to include “an income amount earned, derived or received by the person for the person’s own use or benefit”.
Section 68(2)(a) of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Administration Act) empowers the Secretary to give a notice to a person to whom a social security payment (such as a PPS payment) is being paid, requiring that person to inform the Department (Centrelink) if a specified event or change of circumstances occurs or is likely to occur.
Section 72 of the Administration Act requires that the notice be given in writing (personally, by post, or in any other manner approved by the Secretary); that the notice specify how the information is to be given by the person to the Department; and specify when the information is to be given.
Section 100(1) of the Administration Act allows the Department to reduce a person’s social security benefit if they fail to inform the Department of any change in circumstances as required by a notice issued under section 68(2)(a).
Section 1223 of the Act outlines how debts arise from lack of qualification, overpayment
(1)Subject to this section, if:
a) a social security payment is made; and
b) a person who obtains the benefit of the payment was not entitled for any reason to obtain that benefit;
the amount of the payment is a debt due to the Commonwealth by the person and the debt is taken to arise when the person obtains the benefit of the payment.
Section 1237A(1) of the Act provides grounds for the decision-maker to waive recovery of any part of the debt. The Act provides that the decision-maker must waive a debt if it was attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth and the debtor received the payments in good faith.
Section 1236 of the Act allows the decision-maker to write off a debt if:
(a)the debt is irrecoverable at law; or
(b)the debtor has no capacity to repay the debt; or
(c)the debtor’s whereabouts are unknown after all reasonable efforts have been made to locate the debtor; or
(d)it is not cost-effective for the Commonwealth to take action to recover the debt.
Section 1237AAD of the Act allows the decision-maker to waive all or part of the debt if they are satisfied that:
(a) the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:
(i) making a false statement or a false representation; or
(ii) failing or omitting to comply with a provision of this Act, the Administration Act or the 1947 Act; and
(b) there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and
(c) it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt.
THE TRIBUNAL’S CONSIDERATION AND FINDINGS
Evidence before the Tribunal
The evidence before the Tribunal included documents provided by the Respondent pursuant to s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, referred to as the “T documents”. JRQF provided numerous statements, parenting and court orders, and gave oral evidence at the hearing of this matter
JRQF advised the Tribunal that she:
(a)had a baby in August 2017 and went on maternity leave, during which time she experienced lots of changes, including discovering that her daughter had special needs;
(b)reported her change in income in July 2018 when she returned from maternity leave as advised by a person at Centrelink;
(c)knew that she had to report something when she returned to work as her income had changed, so she notified Centrelink of her income, her income as advised by someone she had spoken to on the phone;
(d)was unaware that she had to report her income fortnightly, as he believed she was only required to notify Centrelink of her annual income;
(e)also understood that when she had reported her income to Centrelink that this should have triggered a requirement for her to report her income fortnightly, but she was never advised of this by Centrelink, so she believes that they were at fault, and if she had known fortnightly reporting was required she would have obviously reported it;
(f)had also been relying on her myGov account to receive all correspondence from Centrelink and she claimed to have never received any correspondence about her PPS on her myGov account;
(g)relied on the fact that she had not received proper notification to argue there had been administrative error on the part of Centrelink and therefore her debt should be waivered;
(h)had done what she thought was expected of her in good faith, with the knowledge she had at the time and so she believed that she should not incur a debt;
(i)she had not picked up the overpayment as she was receiving various payments from different sources, including her employment income and FTB, so she had not picked up this payment as an outlier; and
(j)due to the time taken for the debt to be raised, it has also impacted her child support payments because she overstated her income to child support, which has affected her tax entitlements.
Contentions
The Respondent submitted that JRQF had failed to advise Centrelink that she had returned to work on 28 June 2018, and of her fortnightly employment income, thereafter, as required by sections 66A and 68 of the Administration Act. As a result of this, JRQF was paid at the incorrect rate. Therefore, in accordance with subsection 100(1) of the Administration Act, her rate of PPS can be retrospectively reduced.
The Respondent submitted that applying the ordinary income test in Module E of section 1068A of the Act, JRQF was overpaid $21,261.49 for the period 28 June 2018 to 10 July 2019 and has a debt due to the Commonwealth under subsection 1223(1) of the Act.
JRQF submitted that:
(a)she reported an income change to $100,000, as directed by a Centrelink phone operator, on 1 July 2018 which was the day she returned to work from maternity leave, and then reported a further increase to $120,000 on 17 January 2019 when her pay was adjusted;
(b)she had a full and reasonable belief that the information she was submitting to Centrelink was going to be applied in the calculation and administration of all benefits she was receiving at the time;
(c)she did not knowingly make any false misrepresentation of her income to Centrelink;
(d)she had not received any correspondence from Centrelink during the period in dispute advising her that she needed to report income on a fortnightly basis; she receive all my correspondence from Centrelink via myGov;
(e)a Centrelink representative openly admitted that the agency had committed an act of malfeasance by failing to put her on fortnightly reporting with full knowledge of the information she had supplied to Centrelink about her income;
(f)she believed the overpayment resulted from administrative error on the part of Centrelink; and
(g)Centrelink have taken around two years to raise the debt, thus causing her to get underpaid on child support entitlements and overpay tax. Centrelink have not provided the full and clear amount of debt reconciliation to her.
The Respondent contended that JRQF had received notices form Centrelink in respect of both her PPS and FTB benefits.
The Respondent submitted that JRQF was deemed to have received the notices electronically, as she consented to the use of myGov. They argued that as JRQF had consented to receive correspondence electronically to her designated email address, she was deemed to have received all correspondence.
In addition to deemed receipt, the Respondent submitted it also relied on the Agency’s myGov records, which show that JRQF had in fact received all of the Agency’s notices on her myGov portal and had accessed and opened several notices containing her reporting obligations during the relevant period. The Respondent submitted this clearly demonstrates that she was aware of the notices in her myGov inbox and how to open them.
The Respondent referred JRQF to a notice of 24 December 2018 which clearly indicated that she had received PPS of $768.50 and the information used to calculate her regular payment was an annual income of $1.92. The Respondent took JRQF to the myGov record which indicated that JRQF had accessed this letter on 19 February 2019.
The Respondent submitted that JRQF had failed to inform Centrelink of her fortnightly income, and queried JRQF’s about any evidence indicating that she had reported her income fortnightly as required:
Respondent representative: There is nothing in our records that you reported your fortnightly income, do you have evidence that you did?
Applicant: That’s the whole reason we are here, I didn’t because I had no idea I had to. I didn’t understand the difference between the payments, all payments from Centrelink all come from the same place, I didn’t understand the nuances of them requiring different reporting or them being somehow differently calculated, it was not top of my mind.
Consideration
Does JRQF owe a debt of PPS?
The Tribunal finds that JRQF had failed to advise Centrelink that she had returned to work or report her fortnightly income.
The Tribunal finds that JRQF had accessed her myGov account and reviewed letters from Centrelink which included her reporting obligations and information about her annual income which was clearly inaccurate.
There was no evidence before the Tribunal that JRQF had notified Centrelink of her return to work on 28 June 2018. Centrelink records before the Tribunal did indicate that JRQF had contacted Centrelink around June 2018 on several occasions to discuss her entitlements to child care benefits and had updated her annual income on numerous occasions.
The Tribunal appreciates the social security system is complex and that JRQF was confused about where money was coming from as she was receiving numerous benefits from both her employer and Centrelink at the time of her daughter’s birth. Additionally, the Tribunal accepts that JRQF’s situation was complex and stressful at this time.
However, JRQF is an educated woman, working at a senior level in an organisation tasked with regulating the financial industry, so the Tribunal cannot accept that she did not comprehend her reporting obligations. Additionally, the Tribunal finds it hard to accept that JRQF was not perplexed that her Centrelink benefit increased the day she returned to full time paid work. A date coincidentally that marked the day JRQF’s Centrelink paid parental leave ended.
The Tribunal notes that there is easily accessible information for Centrelink recipients on numerous websites which articulate PPS eligibility requirements which all indicates that PPS payment is dependent on an individual’s fortnightly, not annual, income.
The Service Australia website clearly outlines the income and assets test for parenting payment:
You must meet the income and assets tests to get Parenting Payment. The amount you get depends on your income and assets.
Income test
You can have income up to a certain amount before we reduce your payment.
If your income is above the cut-off point, Parenting Payment won’t be payable.
If you're single
The income you can have before we reduce your payment depends on how many children you have.
Your payment will reduce by 40 cents for every dollar of income you have over the income amount listed in this table.
If your income is over the cut-off point of $2,536.60 a fortnight, we pay you $0 for that fortnight. The cut-off point increases by $24.60 per child if you have more than one child.
The Guide to Social Security at 1.2.4.10 describes what PPS is, how it is paid, and what other benefits you may be entitled to when on this payment:
Single and partnered parents can receive PP, however, PP is only payable to one person at a time. If the other parent (or person with parenting responsibilities) is claiming income support an alternative payment such as JSP may be payable, depending upon their individual circumstances.
There are 2 categories within PP, which have different rules:
PPS for single parents with a youngest child aged less than 8 years old, and
PPP for partnered parents with a youngest child aged less than 6 years old.
How PP is paid
PP is usually paid fortnightly.
Supplementary assistance
Recipients of PP MAY also receive one or more of the following as part of their rate:
·FTB Part A and FTB Part B
·child care subsidy
·additional child care subsidy
·rent assistance
·energy supplement
·pharmaceutical allowance
·basic pension supplement for single recipients under age pension age
·pension supplement if over age pension age
·remote area allowance
The Tribunal finds, based on all the evidence before it, that JRQF had been overpaid $21,261.49 PPS for the period 28 June 2018 to 10 July 2019 as her income exceeded the PPS threshold each and every fortnight.
The Tribunal will now explore if any of the debt was solely attributable to administrative error on the Respondent’s part; or if there were special circumstances to write off or waive all or part of the debt.
Writing-off the debt
The Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the Secretary, has the discretion to write-off the debt under s 1236 of the Act.
The Respondent submitted that JRQF’s debt could not be written off under s 1236 of the act for the following reasons:
(a)the debt was not irrecoverable at law;
(b)JRQF had the capacity to repay the debt;
(c)recovery of the debt would not cause JRQF severe financial hardship; and
(d)her whereabouts were known, and it was cost-effective for the Commonwealth to recover the debt
Based upon the evidence before it, the Tribunal finds it is not reasonable to write off the debt under s 1236 of the Act as JRQF does not meet the requirements of the Act.
Waiver of the debt on the basis of administrative error
Under section 1237A of the Act, the Tribunal has a discretion to waive the right to collect the debt, if it was due solely to administrative error.
JRQF contended that she received the monies in good faith, as she had no idea of what monies were going in and out of her bank account at this time because there was a lot going on in her life. JRQF did not dispute at the hearing that she must have received the notices from Centrelink but had no recollection of seeing any of the documents, arguing that had she done so, she would have reported the anomalies.
The Respondent submitted that JRQF did not receive payments of PPS in good faith throughout the relevant period for the following reasons:
(a)JRQF was issued multiple notices by the Agency under subsection 68(2) of the Administration Act setting out her obligations to advise the Agency within 14 days of when she returned to work, any changes to her income, or to correct any incorrect information within the notices. These notices also informed her of the information used to calculate her rate of payment, that her earnings affected her rate of PPS, and that reporting obligations were different for FTB and PPS.
(b)JRQF was also advised by Agency officers on 2 March 2018 and 25 June 2018 (three days prior to her returning to work) by phone:
(i)that her fortnightly employment income affected her rate of PPS;
(ii)of her responsibility to advise of her fortnightly employment income, and her return to work so she could be put on fortnightly reporting at the end of paid parental leave;
(iii)that the reporting obligations for FTB and PPS differ so she needed to report her earnings to the Agency fortnightly for PPS purposes; and
(iv)if her fortnightly employment income was above $2,124 when she returned to work, she would not be entitled to PPS.
(c)Despite the notices and express advice from Agency officers, there is no record that JRQF advised the Agency of her fortnightly employment income throughout the relevant period, as required. JRQF also did not advise the Agency that the PPS notices stated an incorrect annual income of $1.92, which was significantly lower than her actual annual income of $114,174 during the 2018/2019 financial year.
(d)A lack of good faith will arise when there is a positive belief that the payments are being made in error or when there is doubt as to the entitlement, and previous decisions have found that Applicants should adopt a vigilant attitude when in receipt of public monies.
(e)In this context, the Respondent submits that JRQF knew, or had reason to know, that she was not entitled to any PPS. JRQF could not have had an honest belief that she was entitled to PPS payments when she was earning more than $5,000 per fortnight throughout the relevant period.
(f)Further, it is important to note that JRQF’s rate of PPS more than doubled when she returned to work, despite receiving more income than she had whilst on paid parental leave.
(g)This adds further weight to the argument that JRQF could not have held an honest belief that she was entitled to PPS, or at least must have had a doubt or suspicion as to her entitlement, enough to make reasonable enquiries with the Agency. As the Federal Court in Jazazievska v Secretary Department of Family & Community Services [2000] FCA 1484 made clear at [41], a person does not receive payments in good faith if they turn a blind eye to circumstances which raise doubt as to the entitlement of the person to receive and retain the payment or refuses to make reasonable inquiries where doubt exists.
(h)JRQF must have had (at the very least) a suspicion or doubt that she was not entitled to the payments made at the rate they were.
JRQF contended that the debt was solely attributable to a department error and should be waived in its entirety, as the whole system was so complex, she was confused and uniformed of her reporting obligations. JRQF contended that she had not received any of the notices from Centrelink about her payments or reporting obligations. JRQF contended that Centrelink was fully aware of her income as she had been reporting it in respect of her FTB payments and this should have been factored into the calculation of her PPS entitlement by Centrelink.
The Respondent submitted that the debt had not arisen as a result of administrative error, and consequently section 1237A of the Act was not satisfied. The Respondent argued that the debt had arisen through JRQF’s failure to advise the department that she had returned to work and her fortnightly income.
The Respondent submitted that a number of Tribunal decisions have established that the Agency has no responsibility to ‘police the behaviour’ of social security recipients or follow-up with them. The Respondent argued it is the recipient’s obligation to keep the Agency updated and to provide correct, clear, and complete information. The onus is on the recipient to correct any information that is relied on by the Agency to calculate their eligibility and rate of payments. Sole administrative error cannot be found where a person fails to comply with notices given under subsection 68(2) of the Administration Act and/or correct any errors therein. The Respondent referred to the recent matter of Saab and Secretary, Department of Education, Skills and Employment [2021] AATA 2766, in which Senior Member Puplick stated at [66]-[68]:
While it might be argued that the department had a responsibility to check up on such matters as to whether or not the children were actually receiving the care in question, this is not a sustainable argument. The Department has no responsibility to “police” the behaviour of benefit recipients, rather the obligation lies on the recipients to ensure and maintain conformity with the benefit conditions or requirements, especially when benefits are paid directly to a recipient, but it also applies when the recipient knows that payments are being made to third parties (in this case the alleged service provider) on their behalf or via their instructions. Their personal responsibility includes responding to departmental correspondence and notices.
It is accepted that sole administrative error cannot arise where an applicant has failed in their personal statutory duty to report relevant matters to the Department.
JRQF argued that she was receiving several payments from various sources and simply took it at face value that Centrelink was paying her monies to which she was entitled. JRQF argued that she had advised her annual income to Centrelink in line with advice from Centrelink officers. As such, she contended the debt was attributable solely to the Commonwealth’s administrative error as Centrelink had failed to calculate the correct rate of PPS by reference to the estimates of annual adjusted taxable income that she reported for FTB purposes.
The Respondent contended that Centrelink’s failure to calculate the correct PPS by reference to JRQF’s estimates of annual adjusted taxable income reported for FTB purposes does not constitute sole administrative error for the following reasons:
(a)An annual estimate provided for the purposes of FTB cannot be used to calculate social security payments (such as PPS), which requires information about fortnightly employment income. FTB and PPS are different payment types with different reporting requirements, governed by separate legislation.
(b)JRQF’s FTB annual income estimates do not satisfy her notification obligations in respect of her PPS entitlement. It is not administrative error if the Agency does not use the FTB annual income estimates to calculate her entitlement to PPS, or if it does not follow up with her regarding her fortnightly income based on her annual income estimates.
(c)These points are well established in law, and the Respondent refers to Secretary, Department of Social Services and Waqar [2020] AATA 1493, where the Tribunal explained at [37]:
A report of combined income for FTB purposes is not a report of combined income for PPP purposes for four significant reasons. The first is that the means test for FTB is applied to the recipient’s income over a year whereas the means test for PPP is applied to the recipient’s income over a specific Centrelink pay fortnight. There may be significant differences between these fortnightly entitlements for PPP and the entitlement of the recipient to FTB based on income averaged over the year. The second is that FTB is paid against an estimate of the recipient’s combined income made either by the department or nominated by the recipient of the payment. At the end of the financial year the Australian Taxation Office provides the department with the recipient’s actual adjusted taxable income and this is used to reconcile the year’s FTB payments. This may result in either a top-up payment or a debt, depending on whether the estimated income was above or below the actual income. Many recipients of FTB provide a low estimate of their combined income to ensure that they receive a payment not a debt at the end of the year when their payments are reconciled. Thirdly, what is included in the income calculation differs. Fourthly, FTB and PPP are paid under different legislation and administered separately. For these reasons an update of information for FTB purposes does not satisfy the income notification obligations for PPP purposes.
(d)In Secretary, Department of Social Services and Vella [2021] AATA 4051, the Tribunal stated at [67]-[68]:
It is important to understand that Family Assistance payments (of which FTB is included) and Social Security payments (of which parenting payment is included) are governed by separate legislation, have different definitions of income, have different requirements in relation to reporting income and are calculated on a different basis. For example FTB is calculated based on an income estimate and is reconciled on an annual basis and parenting payment is calculated considering the fortnightly actual earnings of the recipient and their partner.
It is well established that the reporting of FTB income estimate does not satisfy the recipient’s reporting requirements in relation to their social security payments. Further, a failure to meet reporting requirements will more than likely mean that any resulting debts would not be found to have been caused solely be an administrative error made by the Commonwealth. Failure to correctly notify of changes in circumstances as required by an Information Notice issued in accordance with section 68(2) of the Administration Act, more often than not contribute to any resulting debt. Further, reporting in the FTB system is not seen as being automatic reporting or meeting reporting requirements under the social security payment system.
(e)JRQF was made aware that she was required to report her income for PPS purposes separately; it was JRQF’s failure to comply with that requirement which has given rise to her debt.
(f)Further, the Respondent submits that the Applicant’s circumstances can be distinguished from decisions such as Waddell and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2006] AATA 557 and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Walsh [2008] AATA 75 as the principal basis for those decisions was diligent and ‘conscientious’ reporting of FTB income estimates by Applicants that was well beyond the norm for social security recipients. In Waddell, the Applicant provided a FTB income estimate on eight occasions over approximately 12 months. By contrast, in the present case, the Applicant reported on only two occasions during the relevant period.
JRQF argued that the debt was attributable solely to Commonwealth administrative error as Centrelink had both failed to advise her of her reporting obligations and failed to put her on fortnightly reporting.
The Respondent contends that Centrelink’s failure to put JRQF on fortnightly reporting did not constitute sole administrative error for the following reasons:
(a)the Agency could not put JRQF on fortnightly reporting if it did not know she was receiving fortnightly income in the first place, owing to her failure to advise that she had returned to work; and
(b)a failure to put an Applicant on fortnightly reporting does not constitute an administrative error by the Commonwealth, arguing as in the case of Phillips and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2021] AATA 3560, in which the Tribunal stated at [29]:
Put simply, the Applicant was overpaid the age pension during the Debt Period because the information regarding his income was not updated to take account of his commission earnings. The primary responsibility for providing this updated information fell on the Applicant. While it is arguable that Centrelink could have taken steps to obtain updated information, such as data sharing with the ATO or placing the Applicant on fortnightly reporting, it applied the usual notification reporting system and relied on the Applicant to provide information regarding changes to his income as spelled out in the Administration Act and notified to the Applicant in each fortnightly notice. The Applicant’s failure to discharge his obligation to notify Centrelink of the changes was the operative cause of the overpayments and it therefore cannot reasonably be said that they were solely due to an administrative error of the Commonwealth
The Tribunal finds that JRQF had received numerous letters from Centrelink advising her of her obligations to inform Centrelink of any change in her circumstances. The Tribunal found, and was conceded by JRQF, that she had accessed notices which provided information of her obligations via her myGov account. JRQF advised the Tribunal that she had no recollection of receiving or reading this information but did not dispute the evidence, stating: ‘I think that is accurate, I don’t recall but if records say I have to trust and accept they are correct’. JRQF also confirmed that she had returned to work around 2 July 2018 and was earning approximately $5,000 a fortnight.
The Tribunal finds that the evidence of the transcripts of JRQF’s calls to Centrelink does not support JRQF’s assertion that she was unaware of her reporting obligations. The transcripts clearly indicate that JRQF had been advised on several occasions of her repotting obligations. On 2 March 2018, JRQF contacted Centrelink enquiring about her payments and reporting obligations. The transcript states:
JRQF: I've had some changes in payments occurring just recently. I'm not sure I fully understand why they've occurred. I do know that I've had a change in my income situation from 23 February. I had maternity leave payments - on maternity leave at the moment, but they stopped and I started receiving a paid parental leave payment, but for some reason my pension has gone down and some other changes occurred. So can you explain to me why?
OPERATOR: Can I just check - so are you getting paid from APRA at the moment?
JRQF: No.
…..
JRQF: I think I'm talking about Parenting Payment single. So I don't want to exceed the threshold and be receiving something I'm not entitled to.
OPERATOR: You need to tell us if you've got any income changes and report them every fortnight.
JRQF: Okay.
OPERATOR: Parenting Payment single we don't look at the annual estimate. That is for Family Tax Benefit.
JRQF: Oh, now I understand. Okay, so you are aware that I've been receiving payments from APRA, obviously, and that –
OPERATOR: That's what we just took off, correct.
JRQF: Yes, exactly, and then that stopped. So you still think I'm entitled to it, that's what you're saying?
OPERATOR: I've just given you your adjusted rate.
JRQF: Right. So it's not to do with an annual estimate of income?
OPERATOR: No, that's the Family Tax Benefit side of things.
JRQF: Now I understand. Now I understand. Sorry. Okay, I was missing that critical point. Okay.
(c)On 25 June 2018 JRQF contacted Centrelink enquiring about child care subsidy. The transcript states:
OPERATOR: So the pension's a parenting payment single. So you've got your base rate and then you've got a supplement in there, and you've a pharmaceutical allowance and the clean energy supplement.
JRQF: Yes.
OPERATOR: So that's what all of those extra little payments are.
JRQF: Yep.
OPERATOR: On top of your regular payments.
JRQF: What happens to them all? Do they cease because my income changes?
OPERATOR: So it would depend on what your income is.
JRQF: Yep.
OPERATOR: So once - like I said, when you do start going working you're probably best off, um, giving us a call so that we can put you on what's called 'reporting', so that you can report your earnings every fortnight. Because it does depend on what you earn fortnightly, um, in regards to your parenting payment single. Because it affects your payment.
JRQF: So what - what - what - what do you need to earn to still receive it?
….
OPERATOR: …. So the income that you can earn being on parenting payment single a fortnight is $2124.60. But once - so that's - once you earn over that a fortnight you would receive a nil rate.
The Tribunal does not find that JRQF’s debt arose as a result of administrative error. JRQF received advice from Centrelink about her PPS reporting obligations on 2 March and 25 June 2018, prior to her return to work. The transcript identifies that JRQF confirmed that she understood what was required of her. JRQF had received appropriate notices via myGov informing her of her reporting obligations. Centrelink had no requirement, or indeed ability, to place JRQF on fortnightly reporting as she had failed to inform Centrelink of her change of circumstances, that is her return to work. JRQF’s debt arose as a result of her failure to comply with her obligations to inform Centrelink of any change in her circumstances, being her return to work, and report her fortnightly income.
As the Tribunal has found that JRQF’s debt was not attributable solely to administrative error but as a result of her failure to advise Centrelink she had returned to work and report her fortnightly income, recovery of the debt cannot be waived under section 1237A of the Act and as such the Tribunal had no need to address whether JRQF received the payments in good faith.
Waiver of all or part of the debt in special circumstances
The Tribunal, standing in the shoes of the Secretary, also has the discretion to waive all or part of JRQF’s debt in special circumstances. For the discretion to be exercised, all three conditions contained in subsections (a), (b), and (c) of s 1237AAD must be satisfied.
Knowingly
In order to waive part or all of the debt under s 1237AAD of the Act, the Tribunal must be satisfied that JRQF did not knowingly make a false representation to Centrelink or fail to comply with the relevant legislative provisions. The term ‘knowingly’ has not been defined in the Act, although it has been considered extensively by the Tribunal in similar cases.
In Callaghan and Secretary Department of Social Security (1996) 45 ALD 435 at 445, Deputy President Forgie stated:
There is nothing in section 1237AAD which suggests that the word “knowingly” should be given any meaning other than that a person has actual knowledge rather than constructive knowledge, that he or she is making a false statement or representation that he or she is failing or admitting to comply with a provision of the Act. The actual knowledge is to be ascertained by reference to the statements of the person as to his or her actual state of knowledge at the time and to events surrounding the false statement or the act of omission.
JRQF argued that she did not knowingly make any false misrepresentation of her income to Centrelink.
The Respondent contends that the Applicant’s debt cannot be waived under section 1237AAD of the Act as the Applicant knowingly failed or omitted to comply with a provision of the Act for the following reasons:
(a)the Applicant had actual knowledge of her obligations, having regard to the notices issued to her under subsection 68(2) of the Administration Act, and the advice by Agency officers on 2 March 2018 and 25 June 2018 (three days prior to her returning to work). The Agency’s myGov records also show that the Applicant opened PPS and FTB notices, which all clearly stated her reporting obligation;
(b)however, despite returning to work as a Principal Analyst at APRA, the Applicant failed to notify the Agency that she returned to work, and to report her fortnightly employment income;
(c)consistent with the cases of Woolley and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 26, and Secretary, Department of Social Services and Schuh [2022] AATA 53, attached to the receipt of any public money is an ongoing responsibility for the Applicant to ensure information in her control is provided, to ensure that she is qualified to receive the amount paid. An intentional disregard of that responsibility by not reading or not acting upon notices which reminded her of obligations to advise, and her failure to report her income, is a knowing disregard;
(d)in these circumstances, the Respondent contends the Applicant knowingly failed to comply with her notification obligations in sections 66A and 68 of the Administration Act, and therefore that she does not satisfy paragraph 1237AAD(a) of the Act, meaning the debt cannot be waived under this provision.
In Anderson and Secretary, Department of Families and Community Services [2002] 69 ALD 494, the Tribunal stated at [496]:
[…] it is open to the Tribunal to infer that the applicant has actual knowledge of his obligations under the act where there are opportunities for that knowledge to be gained when there are no obstacles to him acquiring knowledge. In this case, the applicant has had the opportunity to gain an understanding of his obligations under the Act to the provision of advice letters to him from the respondent. The Tribunal is not aware of any obstacles that would prevent Mr Anderson from understanding those letters and gaining that knowledge.
The Tribunal finds, based on the evidence before it, that JRQF had accessed notices on her myGov account and record of transcript of phone interactions with Centrelink show that she had sufficient opportunity to gain knowledge of her obligations to advise Centrelink that she had returned to work and report her fortnightly income to Centrelink. The Tribunal finds JRQF would have had some degree of actual knowledge of her reporting obligations.
However, on balance, the Tribunal finds that JRQF was not dishonest in her dealings with Centrelink. Although she did have the opportunity to become aware of her obligations and may be said to have had some knowledge of them, this falls short of a finding that she ‘knowingly’ made a false statement or failed to comply with the relevant legislation. Paragraph (a) of s 1237AAD is therefore satisfied. The Tribunal notes JRQF went to great lengths on numerous calls to Centrelink to ensure she was not going to be overpaid.
Special circumstances
The expression ‘special circumstances’ has not been defined in the Act. However, the meaning of special circumstances has been considered extensively by the Federal Court and the Tribunal.
In Ryde v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2005] FCA 866, Branson J said at [26]:
[…] the evident purpose of s 1237AAD is to enable a flexible response to the wide range of circumstances which could give rise to hardship or unfairness, the statutory requirement for special circumstances discloses an intention to proscribe waiver in ordinary cases. The hardship or unfairness to which French J referred must be understood to be hardship or unfairness sufficient to justify departure from the general rule in the particular case.
In Groth v Secretary Department of Social Security [1995] FCA 1708, Kiefel J said at [12]:
[…] for present purposes it is sufficient to observe that it requires something to distinguish Mr Groth’s case from others, to take it out of the usual ordinary case. That was, I consider, the only enquiry to be undertaken in this case. It would of course follow if one to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary.
JRQF argued that she:
(a)suffered family violence and physical and emotional abuse at the hands of her teenage son and ex-husband whilst pregnant and after her daughter's birth;
(b)was pushed, thrown into the wall and verbally abused by her son on countless occasions whilst heavily pregnant and was forced to defend herself;
(c)was wrongly accused of acts described in an intervention order taken out by her ex-husband which she was forced to defend. She refused to accept the allegations and went through the entire process to a defended hearing which took almost a year. In the meantime, she gave birth and was raising a baby who exhibited developmental abnormalities (which later resulted in an ASD diagnosis) whilst continuing to fend off physical and verbal attacks from her teenage son who was largely living with her;
(d)required Legal Aid involvement with a Victoria Legal Aid appointed barrister representing her for the part of the time. She was forced to take the stand at a defended hearing in Ringwood Magistrates Court for a number of hours whilst breastfeeding her daughter at court. She was successful in having the order refused but it ‘took the life out’ of her;
(e)was dealing with these matters at the time of her debt period. Concurrently with the intervention order, she was involved in another set of Family Law proceedings initiated by her ex-husband in relation to her son. These proceedings first commenced in 2004 with her ex-husband continually reopening the proceedings until after her son turned 16. She was under severe stress during both these proceedings;
(f)was experiencing a very challenging environment upon her return to work being put in charge of an underperforming team who refused to cooperate and behaved aggressively towards her. She eventually resigned as she was suffering mentally at work; and
(g)also had to take care of her elderly mother who is fully dependent on her.
JRQF contended that all these circumstances combined to have had a severe adverse impact on her cognitive ability to ‘compute' what had occurred with the Centrelink payments during the period in question. She was sleep deprived, exhausted, overwhelmed and scared. The whole situation made her forget what she ate on any given day (if anything) let alone what emails she needed to open and obligations to track.
JRQF stated at the hearing:
M. So then consider {Applicant’s daughter’s} needs, what was going on, is there anything in your circumstances that are so extraordinary which means I can waiver it?
A: I don’t think I was extraordinary, just very tired, I was not realising and putting things together
M: You can tell during these conversations how at your wits end you are.
A: I don’t think I was in a good place and I don’t think I was thinking clearly. I don’t dispute I wasn’t entitled to it. I wasn’t thinking clearly at the time and if I had under normal circumstances realised that something wasn’t right and it was too late
The Respondent submitted that the evidence before the Tribunal does not suggest that JRQF’s circumstances as a whole are such that they are sufficiently unusual, uncommon, or exceptional so as to make her case markedly different from the ordinary run of cases and otherwise ‘special’ for the following reasons:
(a)There is nothing to suggest that JRQF’s financial circumstances are special when compared to others on social security payments, and financial hardship alone is not sufficient for special circumstances. In fact, they argued JRQF is earning significantly more than most social security recipients, as her estimated income for the 2020/2021 financial year is $116,997, and $85,000 for the 2021/2022 financial year. Additionally, JRQF is also receiving fortnightly carer allowance and FTB payments in the amount of $136.50 and $224.00 respectively.
(b)It is also not uncommon or out of the ordinary for a person who is receiving carer allowance to have a dependent child with health issues. There is no evidence that any health issues JRQF’s child may have are more severe than that of other social security recipients in a like situation who have incurred debts, which is ordinarily required before the Tribunal will consider finding poor/ill health as a special circumstances factor. Indeed, there is an underlying rationale that for people to qualify for carer allowance, the care receiver must experience some degree of poor/ill health so as to qualify. It is therefore not uncommon that family members are also affected by the health of the care receiver. The Respondent referred to the decision in Ghanem and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2022] AATA 160, where the Tribunal stated at [54]:
Ms Ghanem put a number of matters together collectively that were submitted to be ‘special circumstances’. In some respects, because they were presented together it is a little artificial to consider them separately. It does, however, need to be observed that there is nothing much ‘special’ about some of the things Ms Ghanem relied upon so far as they concern people in Ms Ghanem’s position. In that regard Ms Ghanem, referred to having ‘modest financial circumstances’, suffering from some, albeit not seriously debilitating conditions or illnesses, such as diabetes and depression, and being subject to ‘difficulties’ associated with people they care for and especially having to invest much time in them which is generally in the nature of ‘goodwill’ or ‘charity’ so far as the person they care for. I do not consider that any of these things together or individually take the matter out of the ordinary. They are often the kinds of things that affect people or are associated with people providing care to others, who are receiving carer payments and carers allowances. They are often things that also come together that affect people who take care of others.
The Respondent submitted that JRQF’s family difficulties are not sufficiently unusual, uncommon or out of the ordinary for the following reasons:
(a)JRQF has provided evidence of court proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court. However, most families have conflict to varying degrees, although understandably regrettable. JRQF’s family court proceedings were finalised a few months into the beginning of the debt period, yet she continued to be non-compliant with her obligations for the remaining 10 months of the debt period.
(b)Whilst JRQF has referred to family violence from her son and former partner, however His Honour Judge Williams of the Federal Circuit Court stated in his Reasons for Judgement in JRQF’s court proceedings:
[59] …Both parents are equally responsible for the continuation of the conflict and appear to be unable to recognise that their son has had enough of the ongoing battles between them, and seeks to have a relationship with each of his parents.
[80] At times there have been quite extreme examples of conflict between X and his mother. The events of 3 November 2017, which are referred to in paragraphs 102 to 106 of the mother’s trial affidavit, is an example of X’s desperation, resulting from conflict with his mother.
[103] I have no doubts there have been episodes between the mother and X which have been highly distressing to both of them. The incident on 3 November 2017 is such an example. However, given the mother’s forthright and strong personality, it is inevitable that there will be clashes between herself and her son particularly as he grows older and seeks to assert his personality.
[105] Similarly, I do not consider that the mother’s allegations that the father has undermined her parental authority, can be construed as family violence. [106] The mother obtained an Intervention Order against the father which will expire in 2021. There was little evidence about the circumstances giving rise to the making of the order.
(c)Aside from His Honour Judge Williams’s Reasons for Judgement, JRQF has not provided any other evidence regarding her claims of family violence despite being provided ample opportunities to do so.
The Respondent submitted that JRQF’s employment was not sufficiently unusual, uncommon, or out of the ordinary for the following reasons:
(a)a challenging work environment is not unusual or uncommon, as this is likely to be experienced by most people in employment; and
(b)little weight should be afforded as the Applicant has provided no corroborating evidence.
The Respondent submitted JRQF’s caring responsibilities are also not sufficiently unusual, uncommon, or out of the ordinary for the following reasons:
(a)Whilst it should be commended that JRQF was caring for her mother, it is a normal vicissitude of life to provide care for aging family members and to be ‘sleep deprived’ and ‘exhausted’ in doing so.
(b)Again, little weight should be afforded as JRQF has not provided corroborating evidence.
The Respondent submitted that in considering whether to exercise the special circumstances discretion, it is also relevant to consider how the overpayment came about. Even if the cumulative requirements in section 1237AAD of the Act were satisfied, waiver is not automatic. It still may not be appropriate in the circumstances to exercise the discretion. Given that the overpayments are a result of JRQF’s failure to advise the Agency of her fortnightly employment income as required, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion to waive in this instance.
The Respondent submitted that JRQF has had the benefit of PPS to which she was not entitled and there is no injustice or unfairness in requiring her to repay it.
The Tribunal invited JRQF to provide additional evidence of her circumstances to ascertain if her situation was sufficiently unusual, uncommon or exceptional. The Tribunal has sighted JRQF’s evidence which paints a picture of a complex family situation involving significant family court proceedings, including numerous claims and counter claims in respect of breaches. Additionally, an intervention order filed by JRQF’s ex-husband containing very distressing allegations that JRQF had abused her son which JRQF successfully contested in court proceedings.
The Tribunal does not consider that JRQF’s experience of family breakdown and her subsequent dealings with the family court system to be the ordinary or common experience of other families. The Tribunal also considers that the distressing situation of defending allegations of abuse of her son in respect of the intervention order taken out by her former husband was exceptional.
However, the Tribunal concurs with the Respondent on one point: the court case causing JRQF the most distress concluded on 19 January 2018, several months before she returned to work, and the final parenting orders were made on 16 October 2018, several months after JRQF returned to work. All of which indicates that whilst these were stressfully occurrences, they were not factors that took away from her ability to comprehend her reporting obligations to Centrelink or advise Centrelink that she had returned to full time paid employment. In the same period, JRQF had managed to return to work and ascertain her entitlement to child care benefits for her daughter.
The Tribunal does not consider JRQF’s caring responsibilities for her daughter or her elderly mother to be uncommon or unusual. Sadly, it is the lot of many women to juggle the demands of children and elderly parents. Whilst the Tribunal does not doubt this is a difficult and stressful load for JRQF, it is one many Centrelink recipients grapple with. Indeed, carer allowance is paid in recognition of this added burden, which JRQF has sought and been granted.
The Tribunal had no evidence before it to assess if JRQF’s work situation was so uncommon or unusual to justify waiver of her debt based on special circumstances. JRQF told AAT1 that she had been suspended on full pay while an investigation was underway in relation to her employment and her employment would be terminated. Her evidence to this hearing was that she had resigned due to the stress of managing a poorly performing team and had subsequently found work in a similar role with a superannuation fund. Regardless of the situation with JRQF’s employment during the debt period, the Tribunal does not find that it could be considered a special circumstance. The Tribunal finds that JRQF’s work situation did not arise until she returned to her role and had no impact on her ability to advise Centrelink that she had returned to work.
The Tribunal does find that JRQF’s family situation outside of the debt period was unusual, uncommon and exceptional, though the Tribunal was perplexed that JRQF had the ability to return to a full-time senior role in the area of financial regulation, was able to enquire about other Centrelink entitlements, and deal with the tail end of her family court proceedings, but was not able to comprehend that she was required to notify Centrelink that she had returned to full-time work. However, given JRQF had notified Centrelink of her change in annual salary for FTB purposes in July 2018, shortly after returning to work, and her obvious confusion due to the stressors in her life at that time, the Tribunal determines that part of her debt should be waivered. The Tribunal, based upon the evidence before it, finds that JRQF’s circumstances as a whole were sufficiently unusual, uncommon or exceptional so as to make her case different from the ordinary run of cases and otherwise special. Therefore, her circumstances satisfy s 1237AAD(b) of the Act and make it desirable to waive a portion of her debt, not attributable to administrative error. The Tribunal finds that JRQF’s family situation was obviously complex and distinguishes her from others in similar situations.
The Tribunal finds that JRQF’s salary indicates that she is not facing any particular financial hardship and notes that she had the benefit of the PPS to which she was not entitled. Given all the circumstances, the Tribunal determines that $2,000 of JRQF’s debt should be waived in recognition of her special circumstances.
The Tribunal finds that JRQF had the capacity to understand her reporting obligations, but she was still in a difficult place when she returned to work in June 2018. While not sufficient to meet her obligations, she did report her estimated annual income for FTB purposes in July 2018, and Centrelink, whilst not required to do so, should have picked up the discrepancy in JRQF’s reported annual income versus the nil reported fortnightly income. However, the Tribunal does not consider that JRQF’s debt could be waivered in totality as the debt arose through her failure to notify Centrelink that she had in fact returned to work.
Decision
The Tribunal, having considered all the evidence before it, sets aside the decision under review, and in substitution decides that a portion of JRQF debt should be waivered in in recognition of her special circumstances.
I certify that the preceding 92 (ninety-two) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Ms Anna Burke, AO Member
..........[sgd]........................
Associate
Dated: 30 November 2022
Date of hearing 15 July 2022 Date of final submissions 7 October 2022 Applicant Self-represented Advocate for the Respondent
Solicitors for the Respondent
Ms Stefana Doslo
Litigation Branch
Legal Services Division, Services Australia
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