FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Jovanovski v Telstra Corporation Limited [2008] FCA 465
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether Tribunal erred in determining not to apply s 7(1) of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) – whether Tribunal erred in finding no evidence to establish presumption pursuant to s 7(1)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44(1)
Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), s 7(1)Jovanovski v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2007] AATA 1235 set aside
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 citedLees v Repatriation Commission (2002) 125 FCR 331 cited
GEORGE JOVANOVSKI v TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
NSD 846 OF 2007
GYLES J
11 APRIL 2008
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 846 OF 2007
ON APPEAL FROM THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY SENIOR MEMBER G ETTINGER AND DR MEC THORPE, MEMBER
BETWEEN:
GEORGE JOVANOVSKI
ApplicantAND:
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
Respondent
JUDGE:
GYLES J
DATE OF ORDER:
11 APRIL 2008
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside.
3.The cases be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard again.
4.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal, save for costs already ordered.
5.The costs of the proceedings in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be reserved until the cases are reheard.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NSD 846 OF 2007
ON APPEAL FROM THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL CONSTITUTED BY SENIOR MEMBER G ETTINGER AND DR MEC THORPE, MEMBER
BETWEEN:
GEORGE JOVANOVSKI
ApplicantAND:
TELSTRA CORPORATION LIMITED
Respondent
JUDGE:
GYLES J
DATE:
11 APRIL 2008
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The main point of this appeal – the application of s 7(1) of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (the Act) to the proceedings in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) – is partly procedural and partly substantive.
On 5, 6 and 7 March 2007 the Tribunal heard two applications by the applicant, George Jovanovski, for review of decisions made by the respondent, Telstra Corporation Limited (Telstra), pursuant to the Act, together.
The first was a review decision (made on 15 November 2005) which affirmed a decision of the primary delegate as follows:
Since 1 September 2005 and as at the present date, the condition that occurred on 4 December 1990 for which liability has been accepted for “lumbar disc lesion-exacerbation of previous injury (‘1990 injury”) has no longer resulted in incapacity for work or the need for medical treatment.
Accordingly, since 1 September 2005 and as at the present date, Telstra is not liable to pay compensation under section 16 and Part II Division 3 of the SRC Act in respect of the 1990 injury.
The second was also a…
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- Case
- [2008] FCA 465
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the testimonies of Drs Searle and Dalton, who provided expert opinions on the applicant's condition and the potential impact of vibration on the spine. Dr Dalton acknowledged that exposure to vibration could lead to greater degeneration of the spine, particularly in individuals with a constitutional predisposition. However, Dr Dalton also noted that the correlation between vibration exposure and the development of specific symptoms was not always clear. The court concluded that the applicant's employment involved significant exposure to vibration, and the medical evidence, while acknowledging the difficulties in diagnosing causation, provided an arguable basis for finding that the applicant's back condition was a disorder caused by vibration. The court held that the statutory presumption under s 7(1) applied, as the condition presented was consistent with being caused by vibration, and the applicant's exposure to vibration was a known risk factor.
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the decisions of the AAT, and remitted the cases to the AAT to be heard again. The respondent, Telstra Corporation Limited, was ordered to pay the applicant's costs of the appeal, except for costs already ordered, and the costs of the proceedings in the AAT were reserved until the cases were reheard.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The decisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside.
3. The cases be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard again.
4. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal, save for costs already ordered.
5. The costs of the proceedings in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be reserved until the cases are reheard.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Dr Dalton, when cross-examined by counsel for the applicant, said:… they’re doing jackhammering which has got hours of repeated vibration most days, heavy digging, pits, crowbars, that kind of thing, firstly, you would agree that a lot of stress gets placed on the spine. You would agree with that, wouldn’t you?---Yes.And that if a person has, for example, a constitutionally greater tendency to react in the spine to those kinds of stresses, develop degeneration as a result of those stresses, wearing of the articular cartilage and that kind of thing, then you might expect that that person would develop greater degeneration than someone who didn’t have that constitutional predisposition. Is that correct?---You certainly might expect, you would expect that they would get deterioration; I accept that that’s certainly the case but as I said, it’s interesting people who don’t have load will also get deterioration. So the correlation is not as clear cut as it seems although certainly, if you have a degenerative back and you shovel and dig, it’s not unreasonable that that will render it symptomatic at various times. The extent to which that actually causes acceleration or not is a difficult one and I. think the problem with - - -It’s a difficult one but it’s not, you don’t say, do you, you don’t go as far as saying that doesn’t happen?---No.Ever?---No.All you’re saying is, as I understand you, that in a particular case it may be difficult to determine whether it’s happened?---Yes.(Emphasis added.) Counsel for Telstra submitted that the applicant gave no evidence of experiencing vibration whilst using a jackhammer that caused him any concern or problems and that there is no mention in any of the medical or compensation records of any issue or problem with vibration. It is submitted that, if that question were to be explored, evidence would be needed including, for example, the type of equipment the applicant was using, the amount of vibration emitted, the length of time that the applicant used any such pieces of equipment and any medical evidence as to the effect of such use. It was also submitted that there was no medical evidence before the Tribunal which opined that the applicant was suffering from a “disease of any nature caused by vibration”. There is no doubt that the applicant’s employment involved exposure to vibration via use of jackhammers over many years. The evidence of Drs Searle and Dalton, to which I have referred, would provide an arguable basis for finding that the applicant’s back condition was a disorder of muscles, tendons, bones or joints caused by vibration. That finding as to the existence of the occupational disease does not involve any aspect of causation in the particular case. In particular, it does not require a finding that the disorder was caused by vibration in the particular case under consideration. That is the ultimate fact to be determined, with the benefit of the statutory presumption pursuant to s 7(1) where applicable. In practical terms, the question is whether the condition presented is known to be caused by vibration or, put another way, whether it is consistent with being caused by vibration. Then, if employment involved the exposure to vibration, the statutory presumption applies. This alleviates the difficulty of diagnosis referred to by Dr Dalton that would otherwise exist.