FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Joshi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1239
Citation: Joshi v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 1239 Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Joshi & Anor v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2014] FCCA 1293 Parties: SUMITRA JOSHI and RAJ KUMAR SHRESTHA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 665 of 2014 Judge: WIGNEY J Date of judgment: 7 November 2014 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth)Cases cited: Sami v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 139 ALD 1; [2013] FCAFC 128 Date of hearing: 7 November 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 30 Solicitor for the Applicants: Manning Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: O Jones Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 665 of 2014
BETWEEN: SUMITRA JOSHI
First ApplicantRAJ KUMAR SHRESTHA
Second ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
WIGNEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 NOVEMBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $3,400.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 665 of 2014
BETWEEN: SUMITRA JOSHI
First ApplicantRAJ KUMAR SHRESTHA
Second ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentMIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
WIGNEY J
DATE:
7 NOVEMBER 2014
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT
In February 2013, a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the Minister) decided to refuse to grant Ms Sumitra Joshi a student visa on the basis that she did not meet one of the criteria for the grant of the visa. This also meant that the visa application by Ms Joshi's husband, Mr Raj Kumar Shrestha, which was dependent on Ms Joshi's application, was also refused. Ms Joshi and Mr Shrestha sought a review of the refusal decision in the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal). That application failed. They then challenged the Tribunal's decision in judicial review proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court. The application was dismissed on an interlocutory basis because the primary judge found that there was no arguable case for relief. Ms Joshi and Mr Shrestha now apply for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court.
THE TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS AND DECISION
A criterion for the grant of the student visa that Ms Joshi applied for was that the Minister was satisfied that she was “a genuine applicant for entry and stay…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1239
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicants contended that the Tribunal did not give Ms Joshi particulars of the adverse material before it as required by s 359A of the Act. They argued that the Tribunal's s 359A letter did not refer to certain facts that were required to be included in it, specifically Ms Joshi's course cancellations and her enrolment in a business administration course. The applicants also argued that the Tribunal's decision was not based on the facts as found, and that the Tribunal failed to distinguish between Ms Joshi's intentions and dreams. However, the court found that the Tribunal's s 359A letter gave clear particulars of the information that led it to have concerns about Ms Joshi's intentions and clearly explained the potential relevance of the information. Ms Joshi was able to provide a clear and meaningful response which addressed both the information and its potential relevance.
The court held that Ms Joshi and Mr Shrestha had not demonstrated that the decision of the primary judge is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being revisited on appeal. The proposed ground of appeal and the submissions in support of it had no merit. The primary judge was correct to find that Ms Joshi and Mr Shrestha had no arguable case for relief. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed and the applicants were ordered to pay the first respondent’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicants pay the first respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $3,400.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Ms Joshi and Mr Shrestha sought judicial review of the Tribunal's decision in the Federal Circuit Court. They raised two grounds for review: (1) the Tribunal failed to carry out its Statutory Duty under section 359A of the Migration Act 1958; and (2) the Tribunal’s decision was not based on the facts as found. The primary judge dismissed the application for judicial review and Ms Joshi and Mr Shrestha now seek leave to appeal against that decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It should perhaps be noted that proposed ground 2 of the appeal also appears to allege error on the part of the primary judge in paragraph 8 of her Honour's reasons. It appears to be contended that her Honour applied the wrong test because, in summarising the effect of s 359A in paragraph 8, her Honour did not use the words "clear particulars". No submissions were made by Ms Joshi and Mr Shrestha in relation to that aspect of proposed ground 2. It may be inferred, therefore, that it is not pressed. In any event, it plainly has no merit. The balance of her Honour’s reasons clearly show that her Honour applied the correct test. CONSIDERATION AND DISPOSITION OF THE APPEAL Leave to appeal will not be granted unless it can be demonstrated that the decision sought to be challenged is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being revisited on appeal. Ms Joshi and Mr Shrestha have not satisfied that requirement. They have not demonstrated that the decision of the primary judge is attended with sufficient doubt. Indeed, the proposed ground of appeal and the submissions in support of it have no merit. The primary judge was correct to find that Ms Joshi and Mr Shrestha had no arguable case for relief. Despite the wording of proposed ground 2 in the draft notice of appeal, the only argument ultimately advanced on behalf of Ms Joshi and Mr Shrestha is that the primary judge erred in not finding that the Tribunal failed to comply with s 359A of the Act. The non-compliance is said to arise from the fact that the letter did not refer to certain facts that were required to be included in it. Those facts, in Ms Joshi and Mr Shrestha's submission, related to Ms Joshi’s course cancellations and her enrolment in a business administration course. A fair reading of the Tribunal's s 359A letter reveals that the main issue of concern for the Tribunal was that Ms Joshi had initially enrolled and completed a number of courses relating to hairdressing and had sought a permanent visa on the basis of her skills in that area. When that application failed, she shifted her attention to courses relating to the hospitality industry. Concern also appeared to arise from the fact that Ms Joshi had initially enrolled in and completed a number of inexpensive short courses, but that her new proposed course of study was for a long course (two years). The potential relevance of these matters was that they may have cast some doubt on whether Ms Joshi was a genuine applicant for stay in Australia as a student temporarily. They may have tended to suggest that she simply wanted to stay in Australia permanently. The Tribunal's s 359A letter gave clear particulars of the information that led it to have this particular concern and clearly explained the potential relevance of the information. This is demonstrated by the fact that Ms Joshi was able to provide a clear and meaningful response which addressed both the information and its potential relevance. Ultimately, the Tribunal was not persuaded by Ms Joshi's response, but that is immaterial to the question whether the Tribunal complied with s 359A of the Act.