Joseph Stelnicki (Oral Judgment)

Case

[1982] FCA 225

7 Sep 1982

No judgment structure available for this case.

t

m. JOSEF STELNICKI

REASONS FOR JUDCMENT COX J.
(Delivered Orally)
7th September 1982

,-#C

This is an application under s . s of 'the BanlcruDtcy

-

Act 1966 that the sale by auction of certain chattels of the

estate of the bankrupt proposed to be conducted by the trustee

on Thursday the 9th September 1982 be postponed.
A sequestration order was made on the loth May 1982,

and Mr. Andrew Richard Crawford was appointed trustee. Some

difficulty was encountered by the trustee in obtaining information about the bankrupt's affairs as the latter had been imprisoned some time prior to the date of the sequestration order for failure

to pay income tax and was said not to have co-operated with the
trustee on being interviewed at I-1.14. Prison. He refused t o sign
the statement of affairs which the trustee had prepared from
information supplied by (inter alios) members of the bankrupt's
, family and his solicitors. Subsequently to that interview, the
bankrupt's imprisonment was terminated but he was made subject
to a treatment order, pursuant to the Mental Health Act 1963 and
he is presently held at Milbrook Rise near New Norfolk.

No. ??/l 9:32

According to the unsigned statement of affairs, which

I take as the trustee's best estimate of he bankrupt's affairs
at the time it was compiled in May 1982, his assets consisted
of the following:-
-Stock in trade $10,000.00
Machinery 2,900.00
Household furniture and effects 2,000.00
1.883 hectares Arthur and
Cardigan Streets, Somerset 6,000.00
29.88 hectares Haywoods Lane
Somerset (including house) 25,000.00
Land, 23 View Street, Burnie 1,000.00

:646,900.00

His liabilities were as follows:-
1. Municipality of Burnie $6341.46 Rates
2. Commissioner of Taxes 15.00 Land tax
3. Commonwealth Industrial Gases 145.36 Purchases
4. Deputy Commissioner of Taxation 5,459.53 Income tax
5. Examiner Newspaper 16.64 Advertising
6. Ian Joyce and Brim Adams 229.90 Glasses
7. Wynyard Municipslity 3,292.25 Rates and road

construction

:.bg,530.14

An affidavit by Sir Reginald Wright indicated that the government

capital valuation, as recorded at the Wynyard municipal of€ices,
attributed values of $20,000 and $40,000 respectively to the two
pieces of realty at Somerset, a combined figure of $29,000
greater than that shown in the statement of affairs.
In July 1982 the trustee conducted a sale by auction
of part of what was described as the bankrupt's stock in trade.

No. 77/1932

This consisted of old car bodies and parts of groat variety.
This auction realised a gross figure of $19,675 from which was
deducted a sum of .$4,628.OR which was paid to the auctioneers
to cover:-
- Commission $1,311.62
Hire of crane 1,427.50
Two casual abourers l ~132.x l
Advertising 756.96
(It seems to be common ground that the crane and labourers were
necessary to retrieve the various lots and to lay them out in a
suitable formation for inspection and sale).

After deducting the trustee's proper costs to the end

os' Juiy 1982 amounzing to $6,455.31, a small payment to the
bankrupt's wife of "$85 and bank charges of R3.75, there remained
$8,502.36 to discharge the bankrupt's liabilities. There was
accordingly a shortfall of approximately $1,000.

The trustee has done further work on the estate for

which he claims an entitlement to payment and has decided to
conduct an auction of a further portion of the bankrupt's stock
of motor cars on the 9th Zepternber. Already, he deposes,
substantial expenditure has been incurred in relation to that
sale. He estimates that the costs incurred to date and the hire
of a crane and labour to retrieve the items to be s ld exceeds
$2,000.

Application is now made on behalf of the bankrupt for

a postponement of this auction so as to enable him to raise the
balance required to discharge the debts to his creditors and to
meet any proper fees and expenses associated with the administra-
. tion of his estate. Counsel argues on his behalf that a sale of

No. 77/1982

his stock in trade will in all probability result in a a e at
i considerable under value and that having regard to the excess
of his assets over his liabilities and the nature of those
assets (in the main unencumbered realty) , it is unnecessary to

conduct the auction. It would constitute an unnecessary

hazsrding of the bankrupt's equity in his stock and of his means

of livelihood. Learned counsel expresses confidence that, given a delay of up to a few weeks, arrangements could be made to borrow the amount required to discharge the bankrupt's

liabilities.

Counsel for the trustee argues that the court should

not exercise its supervisory powers to make a commercial decision
in the day to day administration of the estate in substitution
for such a decision of the trustee, unless the latter can be
demonstrated to be clearly wrong. He points to the bankrupt's
disability (E bankrupt) in securing such anticipated loans,
zhe difficulty or' ascertaining with any precision the figure

required to discharge all liabilities and the cost thrown away

by the postponement of the auction. He claims there is

inadequate material to support the making of the orders sought.

The most recent consideration of the principles to
be applied by the court on an apulication under s.178, so far
as I am aware, was that of Deane J. in he Tyndall (1977) 30
F.L.R. p.8 . In that case his Honour noted the difference

between s.176 of the 1966 Act (which provides "If the bankrupt,

a creditor or any other person is affected by an act, omission

or decision by the trustee, he may apply to the Court and the

Court may make such order in the matter as it thinks just and
equitable") and s.148 of the Bankruptcy Act 1924 (which provided
"If the bankrupt or any of the creditors or any other person is
aggrieved by any act or decision of the trustee, he may apply

,

to the Court, and the Court may confirm, reverse or modify the
act or decision complained of, and make such order in the matter
as it thinks justt1). His Honour observed at p.9 hat:-

No. 77/1982

"The provisions of the old s.148 corresponded

closely with comparable provisions f
English bankruptcy legislation. It was
established that, under these Eaglish

provisions, the Courts would only interfere

with the decision of a trustee if it
- appeared that the trustee was acting unreasonably or in bad faith."

and continued:-

"The critical differences in wording between

9.148 of the 1924 Act and s.173 of the

present Act are that the present Act does

not require that the applicant be a person
'aggrieved' as did the previous Act in the
English bankruptcy legislation and that the

present Act does not make the focal point of the jurisdiction the confirming, reversing

or modifying of 'the act or decision

complained of'. Under s.170 the bankrupt,
a creditor or any other person affected by
an act, omission r decision of the trustee
is empowered to apply to the court. The
express requirement that the aplJlicant be

a person 'aggrieved' no longer exists. Nor

is the court, in emress terms, required to

approach the matter on the basis that the

appropriate question is whether 'the act or
decision complained of' should be confirmed,

reversed or modified. Once the natter is

properly before the court, the courk is

the matter 'as It thinks just and equitable'." empowered - and obliged - 'CO make such order in
&S Honour at p.10, in a ?assage to which Mr. Leeman

for the trustee referred, continued:-

"This is not, of course, to say that the

court should either disregard the relevant

decision of the trustee or ignore the well
established policy under bankruptcy

legislation that the court should not unduly interfere with the day to day administration

, of a bankrupt's estate by a trustee. The
trustee is made responsible for the
administration of the bankrupt estate under
the general provisions of the Act. He must,
in the course of that administretion, make a

No. 77/19::2

variety of decisions aimed at enabling the

administration to be carried out with
promptness and efficiency. Some o f these
decisions will be business or commercial

decisions in which the business or comperclal experience of the trustee would itself provide a basis for arguin& that, unless it

was shown'that the trustee's decision was
perverse or clearly wrong, it would be
inappropriate and unjust for the court to

interfere.

Mr. Zeeman also referred to the case of R Mineral
Securities Australia Ltd. (In Liquidation) (1973) 2 N.S.V.L.R.

207 where Street C.J. in Ecuity likened the court's supervisory

control over liquidators to its control over trustees in

bankruptcy, citing the approach of Plowman J. in Leon v.
York-0-Matic Ltd. (1966) 1 ':.L.&. 1450, Jessell M.R. in Ex Parte
Lloyd: Re Peters (1882) 47 L.T. 64 and Gowans J. in Re Teller
Home F'urnishln,qs B y . Ltd. (In Liquidation) (1967) V.R. 313.
Street C.J . in Equity there observed of The supervisory control
of liquidators that heavy burden is placed upon the shoulders

of an applicant under the provisions of the Companies Act he

was there considering, namely:-

"S.236(3) The exercise by the liquidator of

the powers conferred by this section"

(which contains a general power of sale)

"shall be subject to the control of the

court, and any creditor or contributory

may apply to the court wlth respect to
any exerclse or ;~ro;~osed exercise of any
of those powers.
"5.279. Any person aggrieved by any act or

decision of the liauidator may apllly to the

court which may confim, reverse or modify
the act or decision com?lained of and make

such order as it thinks Just."

His Honour said at p.231:-

IIIt is, of course, clear enough that the

court does not simply sit on appeal from

No. 77/1962

decisions of a liquidator. .'! party challenging

a decision may well bear an onus varying
in inverse proportion ' i o the importance of
the decision to be called in question. But
whether the decision be important, or trifling,
the course of the winding up machiner? imposes

upon the liquidator the resJonsibility for

making it, and he is recognised as having both

the qualifications and the access of the multiplicity of information which may be necessary in order to make the commercial

decisions in the windin3 U?."

And further:-

Wltimately every challenge must probably

come back to some more broadly stated

question, such as whether the liquidator's

action has such importance, and can be seen

to have such defects, as to justify the court

exercising its supervisory power."

With respect I do not see those observations as havlng
much bearing on the present case. Street C.J. in Equity was
dealing with a section virtually identical to s.148 of the
Bankruptcy Act 1924 which Deane J. in Re Tvndall (suura) distin-
guished from the ?resent s.178. Furthermore, he was dealing with
the claim of a creditor of a large public company in liquidation
seeking (inter alia) an order reversing the decision of the
liquidator to enter Into an exlsting agreement for sale of a
large parcel of shares and convertible loans in Robe River Limited,

another public company. The application in this case is merely

to postpone a proposed sale.
I respectfully adopt what Deme J. said in Tvndall's
case about the wordlng of s.178, namely that it "is such as to

confer upon the court the widest possible discretion as to the

appropriate order which should be made in the particular Case"
, (at p.lO), whilst acknowledging as he dld the well established

policy under bankruptcy legislaTion that the court should not

unduly interfere with the day to day administration of a bankrupt's
estate by a trustee.

- a -

In the present case the evidence indicates a significant
excess of assets over liabilities after realisation of part of

A'

the assets of the estate. The presently ascertainable deficiencv
is approximately $1,000, while trustee's remuneration and expenses
appear to be of the order of $3,000. On the other hand the
unencumbered real estate of the bankrupt was last valued by the
government valuer at over :i6O0,0OC). It is feared by the bankrupt
that a forced sale of his stock in trade may result in a voidable
loss by depriving him of his means of livelihood on his release

from the institution where he is Fresently receiving treatment.

In the normal run of cases I would be loathe to substitute my
judgment on an essentially commercial matter for that of he

trustee in bankruptcy. Sut the bankrupt seeks the opportunity

of discharging his debts at an early time without recourse to

the sale of his stock by auction and, if he is unable to achieve

this object, then in the circumstances of this case I think it
can fairly be said that only he will be the loser. For the

margin is such that the trustee representing the creditors is
not really at risk through a s ort delay of failing to obtain

payment in full, while the delzy sought is not such as to

seriously suggest any hardship to the creditors.
Although this is not a case in which any error has been
demonstrated in the commercial judgment of the trustee, it is
nonetheless in my view just and equitable that the bankrupt
have the opportunity to discharge the relatlvely small deficlency
without further of his stock in trade being exposed for sale by
auction. I accordingly order that the trustee refrain from
disposing of any of the bankrupt's stock in trade until the
expiration of 28 days, or until this c o u r t further shall order,

whichever event shall occur first.

,

Actions
Download as PDF Download as Word Document


Cases Citing This Decision

0

Cases Cited

0

Statutory Material Cited

0