Joseph Coleiro v Australian Prudential Regulation Authority

[2013] FWC 8864

[2013] FWC 8864

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Joseph Coleiro
v
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
(U2013/2255)

COMMISSIONER BISSETT MELBOURNE, 18 NOVEMBER 2013

Application for relief from unfair dismissal.

[1] Mr Joseph Coleiro (Mr Coleiro or the Applicant) has made an application pursuant to s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). He says he was unfairly dismissed from his employment with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). Mr Coleiro says that his employment was terminated on 18 June 2013 and that it took effect that day.

[2] Mr Coleiro lodged his application for unfair dismissal on 10 July 2013.

[3] Mr Hull sought permission to appear for Mr Coleiro and Ms Raper of counsel sought permission to appear for APRA. I determined permission should be granted as the matter could be dealt with more efficiently taking into account the complexity of the matter (s.596(2)(a)).

394 Application for unfair dismissal remedy

(1) A person who has been dismissed may apply to the FWC for an order under Division 4 granting a remedy.

Note 1: Division 4 sets out when the FWC may order a remedy for unfair dismissal.

Note 2: For application fees, see section 395.

Note 3: Part 6 1 may prevent an application being made under this Part in relation to a dismissal if an application or complaint has been made in relation to the dismissal other than under this Part.

(2) The application must be made:

(a) within 21 days after the dismissal took effect; or

(b) within such further period as the FWC allows under subsection (3).

(3) The FWC may allow a further period for the application to be made by a person under subsection (1) if the FWC is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances, taking into account:

(a) the reason for the delay; and

(b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; and

(c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; and

(d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); and

(e) the merits of the application; and

(f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position.

[4] Mr Coleiro’s application was made 22 days after the date of his dismissal. The application is therefore one day outside the 21 day time limit for the making such an application.

[5] Mr Coleiro seeks an extension of time for the making of his application. APRA objects to the extension being granted.

[6] I now turn to consider those matters in s.394(3) of the Act.

Reason for the delay

[7] Mr Coleiro says that the reason for the delay is representative error.

[8] Mr Coleiro was advised on 18 June 2013 that his employment was terminated. On his own evidence he waited until 23 June (five days after the termination) to contact Ms Healy, a lawyer.¹

[9] Ms Healy replied the next day by email in which she said:

Dear Joseph

I have tried to call you today but to no avail. Could you please give me a call on [number provided]? Unfortunately, I am unable to take on any further work for a number of weeks - until after 17 July. However, I can provide you with a good referral.

Regards²

[10] Mr Coleiro replied to Ms Healy on 29 June 2013, five days after her response and 11 days after his dismissal, and said he would contact her the following Monday³ (which would have been 1 July, 13 days after the termination).

[11] Mr Coleiro spoke to Ms Healy on an unspecified day and says of this discussion that he ‘faced the option of waiting or taking the matter to another practitioner. I got the impression that Ms Healy emphasised the latter option. Ms Healy provided me with the details of Mr Hull. However, at no stage did Ms Healy advise me of a 21 day limitation period for claims for unlawful dismissal.’⁴

[12] Due to his ignorance of the time limit he says he then ‘decided to think through the matter’⁵ before contacting Mr Hull on 10 July 2013, some 22 days after the end of his employment. Mr Hull that day drafted and lodged the application now before the Commission.

[13] Mr Coleiro suggests there is representative error because a legal practitioner is accountable in negligence for bad advice given even when the practitioner is not on a retainer. By advising the Applicant that she could not deal with the matter until 17 July 2013 Ms Healy implied that the Applicant had until 17 July to deal with the matter. Mr Coleiro says that, while he had not formally retained Ms Healy to act for him in this matter, she was a trusted advisor and he should be entitled to rely on her for accurate advice. He suggests that Ms Healy, by her actions or lack of action, caused the delay in lodging his application.

[14] APRA says Mr Coleiro cannot claim representative error as he was not legally represented by Ms Healy in relation to the termination of his employment. APRA submits that as Mr Coleiro had not retained Ms Healy to represent him and there was no obligation on Ms Healy to advise him of any time limits on the matter.

[15] Further, APRA says that to claim representative error a distinction must be drawn between the delay caused by Mr Coleiro and delay caused by some error on the part of his representative. Based on the timelines provided by Mr Coleiro APRA submits that he failed to take proper steps to pursue the matter.

[16] In Burns v Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia (Inc)⁶ a Full Bench of the AIRC found that representative error included inactivity or a failure to act promptly by a representative. Even if it is accepted that Ms Healy was Mr Coleiro’s representative there is no evidence before me of ‘inactivity’ or a ‘failure to act promptly’ by her. In fact Ms Healy responded promptly to Mr Coleiro’s communication to her of 23 June 2013. It was Mr Coleiro who failed to follow up her response until at least 1 July 2013 and then, when given a referral by Ms Healy, who took no action on that until 10 July.

[17] The decision in Clark v Ringwood Private Hospital⁷ makes it clear that the conduct of the Applicant is relevant in assessing representative error:

The question of whether an error by an applicant’s representative constitutes an acceptable explanation for delay in filing an application for relief needs to be considered in the context of the general discretion in s.170CE(8) and having regard to the observations made in Kornicki. In this respect Commission decisions which deal with this question but were decided before Kornicki need to be treated with caution. In our view the following general propositions should be taken into account in deciding whether or not representative error constitutes an acceptable explanation for delay:

1. Depending on the particular circumstances, representative error may be a sufficient reason to extend the time within which an application for relief is to be lodged...

2. A distinction should be drawn between delay properly apportioned to an applicant’s representative where the applicant is blameless and delay occasioned by the conduct of the applicant...

3. The conduct of the applicant is a central consideration in deciding whether representative error provides an acceptable explanation for the delay in filing the application. For example it would generally not be unfair to refuse to accept an application which is some months out of time in circumstances where the applicant left the matter in the hands of their representative and took no steps to inquire as to the status of their claim. A different situation exists where an applicant gives clear instructions to their representative to lodge an application and the representative fails to carry out those instructions, through no fault of the applicant and despite the applicants efforts to ensure that the claim is lodged.

4. Error by an applicant’s representatives is only one of a number of factors to be considered in deciding whether or not an out of time application should be accepted pursuant to s.170CE(8).⁸

[18] The claim of representative error by Mr Coleiro is just one of a number of matters to be considered in this application for an extension of time and is one of the reasons for delay put forward by Mr Coleiro that must be considered.

[19] The delay in making the application for unfair dismissal in this case cannot be placed entirely at the feet of Ms Healy. Mr Coleiro is, at least in part if not totally, responsible for the delay.

[20] There is no evidence to support any suggestion that Ms Helay was negligent in her actions or that she caused the delay in making the application for unfair dismissal. Ms Healy was clear in her communication with the Applicant. She said that ‘unfortunately’ she could not take on any further work for some time – indicating an inability to assist at the time. To overcome this situation she provided a referral for Mr Coleiro. When he finally called her he ‘got the impression’ she wanted him to contact Mr Hull. It is Mr Coleiro who then delayed by some number of days contacting Mr Hull.

[21] Whilst Mr Coleiro says Ms Healy was his trusted advisor (there is no evidence that she saw herself as such) he at no time gave clear instructions to Ms Healy to lodge an unfair dismissal application on his behalf such that any alleged failure by her to act means the delay can be put down to representative error.

[22] Whilst I accept that Ms Healy may not have told Mr Coleiro of the 21 day limit for making an application for unfair dismissal he did nothing to ascertain for himself what action may be necessary for him to take. In any event, Ms Healy did not, by her actions, cause any delay. Mr Coleiro was tardy in contacting Ms Healy in the first instance, in responding to her prompt email response to his query and in contacting Mr Hull after Ms Healy spoke to him. In fact Mr Coleiro does not seem to have treated the matter with any urgency whatsoever.

[23] Mr Coleiro is a highly educated person. He has a Master of Law, a Master of Defence Studies, a Diploma in Financial Advising, a Graduate Diploma in Financial Services, a Graduate Diploma in Notarial Studies and a Certificate in Investigation. He is a member of a number of professional institutes. He is a Barrister and Solicitor and a Senior Notary. He has practised law for over 30 years, at one stage running his own practice. 9 He was engaged as a lawyer by APRA and his Defence reserve role is as a lawyer. Mr Coleiro is not a stranger to the law although he does not practice in employment law.

[24] There is nothing to indicate he could not access information on lodging an unfair dismissal (which is easily found on the Commission’s website). At the time of his dismissal he was working in what appears to be a senior legal position in the Department of Defence. Given his qualifications and experience I find it difficult to accept a reliance on ignorance as an acceptable reason for delay in lodging his application. Many people who make applications for unfair dismissal are initially ignorant of the procedures and time limits that apply. Delay based on ignorance of the need to take action is not a valid reason for delay, with or without representative error. Rather, having sent an email to Ms Healy, Mr Coleiro failed to promptly follow through on the matter.

[25] I cannot accept that, having been in contact with Ms Healy, Mr Coleiro is blameless in the future course of events, including the delay in contacting Mr Hull after Ms Healy clearly indicated this was the path he should follow. I find that Mr Coleiro contributed substantially to the delay in the making of his application for unfair dismissal.

[26] Mr Coleiro further says that the conduct of APRA leading up to his dismissal, in that it sought that he return to APRA prior to a determination of his fitness to do so, is a reason for his delay in making his application. Mr Coleiro provides no evidence to support this assertion. He had been on approved leave including a lengthy period of leave without pay. APRA had refused further leave without pay. He was fit to undertake employment (he was working for the Department of Defence). APRA was within its rights to seek his return to work, subject to a medical clearance. This was a reasonable management request and cannot be blamed for Mr Coleiro’s delay in making his application for unfair dismissal with the Commission.

[27] In all of the circumstances I do not find that there is an acceptable reason for the delay relating to representational error, ignorance, or the actions of APRA in making the application. Further, I find that Mr Coleiro contributed to the delay in making the application.

Whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect

[28] During the hearing of this application for an extension of time Mr Hull for Mr Coleiro said I should consider when Mr Coleiro first became aware the dismissal had taken effect. No evidence or submission was made that this was any date but 18 June 2013.

[29] I find that there is no reason to determine that Mr Coleiro became aware of the dismissal at any time other than 18 June 2013 when he received the letter from APRA which said, in part, that he was ‘treated as resigning and your employment terminated at your initiative, effective today, Tuesday 18 June 2013.’ 10 Mr Hull did not suggest that Mr Coliero became aware of the dismissal at some later time. It was submitted however that this should be considered amongst all of those matter to be considered in determining of exceptional circumstances exist.

[30] APRA submits this is not a factor to be taken into account as Mr Coleiro was aware of the termination of his employment on the day it took effect.

[31] This factor has been considered by me but, because of the circumstances, adds little to my overall consideration in deciding if exceptional circumstances exist.

Action taken to dispute the dismissal

[32] Mr Coleiro submits that he took active steps to dispute his dismissal including seeking legal assistance at the time he was advised of his dismissal.

[33] In February 2013 Mr Coleiro contacted APRA and advised that he had accepted a further assignment with the Department of Defence and was seeking an extension to his leave without pay. APRA rejected his application and asked for a written commitment that he would resume his duties with APRA at the earliest possible time, subject to a fitness for work clearance. Mr Coleiro responded that he would be in Melbourne in the second week of June and would be ‘happy to see [APRA’s] psych and discuss my issues’. 11 He did not respond to the request for a written commitment with respect to his intentions to return to work with APRA. Further he did not respond to APRA’s statement in that letter that if it did not receive the commitment required in writing it would consider exercising its rights under clause 21.4 – Abandonment of Employment in the APRA Enterprise Agreement.

[34] Further, when APRA wrote to Mr Coleiro and asked that he show cause as to why he should not be considered to have abandoned his employment 12 he did not provide a response that went to the matter on which APRA sought his view but rather reiterated his view with respect to returning to work and a medical clearance.

[35] On 18 June 2013 APRA wrote to Mr Coleiro indicating that it considered he had abandoned his employment and that he was being treated as if he had resigned. Mr Coleiro provided no response to that letter. He neither indicated that he considered his employment was terminated at the initiative of APRA nor that he disputed that he had abandoned his employment.

[36] I cannot accept that Mr Coleiro took any action to dispute his dismissal. Whilst I accept that he did respond to some of the correspondence from APRA in the lead up to the termination of his employment which may be seen as disputing the ultimate grounds for the termination, it seems to me that he was more intent on splitting hairs (whether he should have to commit to a return to work subject to the medical assessment or whether he should have the medical assessment and then consider his commitment to return) than responding to the matter APRA placed before him which went to the future of his employment with APRA. This is particularly so in light of his absolute failure to respond to APRA’s show cause letter.

[37] In these circumstances I find that the Applicant took no action to dispute his dismissal until five days later when he first contacted Ms Healy. There is no evidence that, until the application was made for unfair dismissal Mr Coleiro disputed the dismissal with APRA.

Prejudice to the employer

[38] Mr Coleiro says that there is no prejudice to the employer by a delay of one day.

[39] I agree with Mr Coleiro on this point. A delay of one day in the making of the application is not going to adversely affect the ability of APRA to gather evidence, witnesses etc. A greater period of delay where potential witnesses may have long left the organisation or such that records were not maintained may create prejudice to the employer but that is not the case here.

Merits of the claim

[40] From the material submitted it is apparent that Mr Coleiro was suffering some work-related stress as a result of conflict with his manager at APRA. He considered that his manager was micro-managing him and his work, was unduly critical and belittled him and his work both privately and in front of other staff.

[41] During his employment with APRA Mr Coleiro was also an active member of the Defence Reserves.

[42] In October 2011 Mr Coleiro went on sick leave. This was related to the stress apparently arising from his work situation. As part of reviewing that leave, at the instigation of APRA, Mr Coleiro was seen by Professor Lorraine Dennerstein AO, a psychiatrist.

[43] In December 2011 Professor Dennerstein produced a report to APRA on her consultation with Mr Coleiro. That report said, in part, that:

• Mr Coleiro is not fit to discharge his duties in the Melbourne Office of APRA and he should be off all work for the next couple of months.



• He is currently not fit to undertake duties of his APRA and defence reservist roles. This is of a temporary nature.



• He should be able to return to work after a few months of treatment and should not return to work for at least the next two months. 13

[44] In December 2011 Mr Coleiro indicated to APRA that he wished to undertake Defence reservist activities. In correspondence dated 21 December 2011 APRA told Mr Coleiro that if he intended to take up work as a Defence Reservist APRA would take it that he was declaring himself fit for work and he would therefore no longer be considered to be on approved personal leave. Ultimately Mr Coleiro went on other paid leave (annual leave etc) and then leave without pay from APRA. In approving his leave APRA advised that the total period of approved leave ended on 12 April 2013. He was also told that he would be required to be independently assessed for a fitness for work clearance before returning to APRA following the conclusion of his leave without pay period. He was required to contact a designated person at APRA six weeks prior to his anticipated return to APRA to allow time for the assessment to be organised. 14

[45] In February 2013 Mr Coleiro advised APRA that he had been offered and had accepted further assignment with Department of Defence and was seeking an extension of his leave without pay until 31 January 2014. This request was refused by APRA. 15

[46] On 11 April 2013 Mr Coleiro took issue with APRA’s decision not to grant his request for further leave without pay. He stated that he was unable to consider a return to APRA where the issues that caused him to take leave for stress arose. He also indicated that if APRA wished him to undergo a medical assessment they should advise him of the date of such. 16 APRA responded on 11 April seeking some clarification of matters raised by Mr Coleiro.17

[47] On 23 May 2013 APRA again wrote to Mr Coleiro, noted that he had not replied to its last letter of 11 April and reminded him that he was absent without leave and was working for another employer without approval. It asked that he confirm in writing that he would ‘immediately resume [his] employment in the Melbourne [APRA] office at the earliest possible time, subject to a fitness for work clearance.’ Failing such a commitment within seven days APRA indicated it would consider exercising its rights under the abandonment of employment provisions of the APRA enterprise agreement. 18 On 27 May APRA followed this letter up with an email. Mr Coleiro responded on 28 May that he would be happy to meet with APRA’s medical practitioner. Notably he did not give APRA the commitment it sought from him.19

[48] On 4 June 2013 APRA wrote to Mr Coleiro. It noted that Mr Coleiro had refused to clarify his intention to immediately return to APRA. APRA stated that his indication that he was happy to meet with a medical practitioner failed to address the issue of him being absent without approval since 12 April 2013 and his confirmed full time employment elsewhere. In the letter APRA put Mr Coleiro on notice that it intended to proceed to exercise its right under clause 21.4 of the APRA enterprise agreement which would treat him as having resigned from APRA unless he could show cause, within seven days, as to why it should not proceed down such a path. 20

[49] On 14 June 2013 Mr Coleiro replied. His email said:

Thankyou for your email and the attachment.

The pre-condition for my return to work was an assessment by a practitioner; that has not happened and in essence the events as they have transpired indicate that APRA has refused to arrange it. Instead, I am asked to commit to a return to work in the face of a requirement for the pre-return to work assessment that has not been arranged. 21

[50] On the basis of this response APRA wrote to Mr Coleiro and said that it exercised its rights under clause 21.4 Abandonment of Employment of the APRA Employment Agreement 2011. It treated him as having resigned his employment effective 18 June 2013. 22

[51] The abandonment of employment clause of the APRA enterprise agreement states:

Abandonment of employment

21.4 If you are absent for more than 5 working days

• Without communication to APRA;



• Without reasonable explanation; and



• In circumstances where APRA could not reasonably, after due inquiry, have been aware of reasonable grounds for your absence,

APRA will be entitled to treat you as having resigned your employment and your employment terminated at your initiative.

[52] It is arguable that Mr Coleiro was not absent without communication to APRA. He certainly responded to APRA’s letter of 23 May on 28 May 2013. Whether Mr Coleiro’s explanation for his absence was reasonable or not is a matter to be determined after hearing all of the evidence in the matter. APRA was aware of the reason for Mr Coleiro’s absence – this was communicated to them on 22 February and 11 April 2013. It would appear that APRA did not consider these reasons ‘reasonable grounds’ for his absence as it sought a commitment from him that, subject to a medical clearance, he would return to work with APRA.

[53] APRA says in the alternative that Mr Coleiro disobeyed a lawful and reasonable instruction. It is arguable that a direction to provide a commitment to return to work for APRA, subject to a medical clearance, is a lawful and reasonable direction. The direction is not discordant with the approval of Mr Coleiro’s leave in 2012. Mr Coleiro was an employee of APRA. At the time the direction was given to him he was on unauthorised leave and working for another employer without authorisation. His fitness to return to work with APRA was a matter APRA could reasonably pursue with him. They also, in my opinion, had a right to ask him if he intended to return to work for APRA if and when he was deemed fit. In this respect I do not, on the material before me, consider the direction either unreasonable or unlawful.

[54] Mr Coleiro, by his response to the requests from APRA, did not answer the question asked of him. It is arguable that he did not follow a lawful and reasonable instruction.

[55] Whilst there may be merit in Mr Coleiro’s claim that he has been unfairly dismissed should APRA rely only on his abandonment of employment, APRA’s further reliance on his failure to follow a reasonable and lawful direction as a valid reason for his dismissal means the merit question is not so clear-cut. I do accept however that Mr Coleiro may not have fully responded on this part of APRA’s claim as it came about with more limited notice.

[56] It is often the case that it is difficult to determine the merits of a case for unfair dismissal when an extension of time application is being considered. In this case it is not possible to say that Mr Coleiro’s claim is totally devoid of merit but it would appear he does have a hurdle to overcome with respect to whether or not he disobeyed a lawful and reasonable direction given to him by APRA.

Exceptional circumstances

[57] A determination of whether an extension of time should be granted requires the Commission to be satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances justifying such an extension taking into account all of those matters set out in s.394(3) of the Act.

[58] In Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd 23 a Full Bench of Fair Work Australia held that:

the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.

[59] As was succinctly put in submissions it is not necessary that any one circumstance be exceptional nor that all the matters to be considered are exceptional. There is however a requirement to consider all matters before the Commission in reaching a conclusion as to whether the ‘exceptional circumstances’ envisaged by s.394(3) exists.

[60] This application is one day late but the time limit for making applications under s.394 has been set by the parliament at 21 days, presumably because the parliament believed this was a reasonable timeframe within which an application should be made. Whether the application is 1 or 100 days late the test is the same – whether the Commission is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances such that an extension should be granted.

[61] I find nothing persuasive in the reasons for the delay in Mr Coleiro making his application. I find that there was no representative error that caused the delay. Mr Coleiro had not retained Ms Healy nor instructed her to take steps to make an application in the Commission. She can hardly be held responsible for something she had no responsibility for.

[62] It would appear the Mr Coleiro was responsible for much of the delay. In his first contact with Ms Healy she indicated she had a referral for him. After she gave him Mr Hull’s name Mr Coleiro decided to think about it for a while. In all of this time he did nothing to ascertain for himself what the process or time limits might be for making such an application. Mr Coleiro is a highly qualified person in both the law and in financial matters. There is no reason he could not have made such inquiries on his own initiative. Alternatively he could have contacted Mr Hull and then considered his options prior to proceeding with his application. I do not suggest Mr Coleiro is an expert in employment law but I infer, from his qualifications, that he is capable of undertaking such basic inquiries. Ignorance, in conjunction with any other reason for the delay, does not assist Mr Coleiro.

[63] Mr Coleiro was aware of the termination of his employment with APRA on the day it occurred.

[64] I do not consider that Mr Coleiro took any action to dispute the termination of his employment with APRA beyond making this application.

[65] A delay of one day in making the application would not create any prejudice to the employer were an extension of time granted.

[66] There may be some merit in Mr Coleiro’s argument that he did not abandon his employment. I consider, on the basis of the material before me, that APRA may have merit in its claim that he disobeyed a lawful and reasonable direction as a valid reason for his dismissal.

[67] I have carefully considered all of the material put before me in deciding this matter. The lack of a cogent reason for the delay and the lack of activity on Mr Coleiro’s part to get an application in on time has been a major factor, amongst all of those I must consider, in reaching my decision.

[68] In this case I do not consider that any of the matters I am required to consider is exceptional in and of itself nor do I consider that any of these matters, in any combination, creates exceptional circumstances such that I should grant an extension of time for the making of the application.

Conclusion

[69] I am not satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances in this case such that an extension of time for filing the application should be granted. The application for an extension of time within which to file the application is dismissed.

[70] The application for unfair dismissal is therefore filed outside the statutory time limit. That application is dismissed. An order to this effect will be issued in conjunction with this decision.

COMMISSIONER

Appearances:

Mr Hull for the Applicant.

Ms Raper of counsel for the Respondent.

Hearing details:

2013.

Melbourne;

1 November.

1 Exhibit A2.

2 Exhibit A3.

3 Exhibit A4.

4 Exhibit A2, paragraph 29.

5 Exhibit A1 paragraph 30

6 Unreported, Williams SDP, Acton SDP, Gregory C, 21 November 2000, Print T3496, [28]

7 (1997) 74 IR 413

8 Ibid, 418-420.

 9   See Annexure B to APRA’s submission.

 10   Exhibit A1, attachment JC12.

 11   Exhibit A1, attachment JC8.

 12   Exhibit A1, attachment JC10.

 13   See Annexure B to APRA’s submission.

 14   Exhibit A1, attachment JC2.

 15   Exhibit A1, attachment JC3.

 16   Exhibit A1, attachment JC5.

 17   Exhibit A1, attachment JC6.

 18   Exhibit A1, attachment JC7.

 19   Exhibit A1 attachment JC8.

 20   Exhibit A1, attachment JC10.

 21   Exhibit A1, attachment JC11.

 22   Exhibit A1, attachment JC12.

 23 (2011) 20913 IR 1.

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