Jordan and Jordan

[2017] FamCA 416

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

JORDAN & JORDAN [2017] FamCA 416

FAMILY LAW – CHILDREN – With whom the children should spend time – Supervised time – Where the parties agree the eldest child should remain resident with the father and the youngest child should remain resident with the mother – Where the issues distilled to whether or not orders should be made regulating the manner in which the children spend time with each other and/or the non-residential parent – Where the only reliable aspect of the children’s views is probably their mutual wish to retain and promote their sibling connection – Where the eldest child’s behaviour is prone to be aggressive and unruly – Where the eldest child has struck the youngest child – Where the children need respite from involvement in the parties’ antipathy and litigation – Where it is unlikely either party would facilitate the attendance of the children at the other’s home – Concluded neither party is capable of allowing the children the emotional autonomy to enjoy visits with the other party – Concluded supervised interaction between the children is preferable – Ordered the children spend supervised time with each other for two hours each month

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), ss 60CC, 61DA

Jordan & Jordan [2010] FamCA 323

APPLICANT: Mr Jordan

RESPONDENT: Ms Jordan

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Ms Presker, Legal Aid NSW, Newcastle

FILE NUMBER: NCC 1497 of 2007

DATE DELIVERED: 15 June 2017

PLACE DELIVERED: Newcastle

PLACE HEARD: Newcastle

JUDGMENT OF: Austin J

HEARING DATE: 29 May & 1 June 2017

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Not Applicable

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Not Applicable

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ms Carty

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Barbara Garrick & Associates

COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Mr Betts

SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDREN’S LAWYER: Ms Presker, Legal Aid NSW, Newcastle

Orders

1. All former orders in respect of the following children are discharged:

   (a)K, born … 2003; and

   (b)R, born … 2005.

2. The father shall have sole parental responsibility for K.

3. K shall live with the father.

4. The mother shall have sole parental responsibility for R.

5. R shall live with the mother.

6. Each party shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the children spend supervised time with each other, in the absence of the parties, for two hours on the following dates at the venues and commencing at the times nominated by BB Contact Service (“the supervisor”):

   (a)25 June 2017;

   (b)16 July 2017;

   (c)13 August 2017;

   (d)10 September 2017;

   (e)8 October 2017;

   (f)12 November 2017;

   (g)10 December 2017;

   (h)14 January 2018;

   (i)11 February 2018;

   (j)11 March 2018;

   (k)8 April 2018;

   (l)20 May 2018;

   (m)10 June 2018;

   (n)8 July 2018;

   (o)12 August 2018;

   (p)9 September 2018;

   (q)14 October 2018;

   (r)11 November 2018;

   (s)9 December 2018; and thereafter

   (t)The first Sunday of each calendar month.

7. For the purpose of implementing Order 6 hereof, the parties shall:

   (a)Forthwith contact and satisfactorily complete any intake assessments or procedures required by the supervisor;

   (b)Pay in equal shares any costs due to the supervisor; and

   (c)Comply with all reasonable requests and directions of the supervisor.

8. Each party is restrained from causing or permitting the infliction of corporal punishment upon the children.

9. Each party is restrained from denigrating the other in the presence or hearing of the children and from permitting the children to remain in the presence or hearing of another person denigrating the other.

10. The parties shall authorise and request the principals of any schools attended by the children to provide to the other party, at the other party’s expense, copies of all school reports and school photograph order forms relating to the children.

11. Leave is granted to the parties to furnish copies of these orders to:

    (a)       The principals of the schools attended by the children; and

    (b)       The supervisor.

12. Each party shall forthwith inform the other, and keep the other informed, in writing of their respective current residential address and mobile telephone number.

13. Within seven days hereof the parties shall cause the children to be delivered to the Director of Child Dispute Services at the Newcastle registry of the Family Court of Australia to have explained to them the effect of these orders, and if deemed appropriate by the Director, the reasons for such orders.

14. Pursuant to s 65DA(2) and s 62B of the Family Law Act, particulars of the obligations that these orders create, particulars of the consequences that may follow contravention of these orders, and details of assistance to comply with these orders are set out in the attached Fact Sheet, which forms part of these orders.

15. The Independent Children’s Lawyer is discharged upon the expiration of any applicable appeal period.

16. Any and all other outstanding applications are dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Jordan & Jordan has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT NEWCASTLE

FILE NUMBER: NCC 1497 of 2007

Mr Jordan

Applicant

And

Ms Jordan

Respondent

And

Independent Children’s Lawyer

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. These proceedings represent the resumption of open hostility between the applicant father and respondent mother in respect of their two children, who are now aged 14 and 12 years respectively.

2. Litigation between the parties over the children under Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) was last determined in February 2011. The orders made at that time required the children to live with the mother and to regularly spend substantial amounts of time with the father. Now, however, one child lives with each parent and neither child has any contact at all with the non-residential parent.

3. The parties agreed to formalise the existing residential arrangement, but they disagreed over what orders, if any, should regulate sibling interaction and the children’s contact with the non-residential parent.

Background

1. The orders made in February 2011 were preceded by a hearing between the parties, concluded in March 2010, following which orders were made and reasons published in May 2010 (see Jordan & Jordan [2010] FamCA 323). Those orders were made on only an interim basis, due to doubts they would be successfully implemented, and in which event a reversal of the children’s residence would be considered when the orders were reviewed some months afterwards (see Jordan & Jordan at [145]-[155], [251], [269]-[280]). The parties were compliant and so, in February 2011, the interim orders were consensually transformed into final orders.

2. It seems the orders worked satisfactorily for several years, but the mother began to experience trouble controlling the eldest child. Although that fact was uncontroversial, the parties had quite different perceptions about why. The mother believed the father incited the eldest child’s misbehaviour in her home and the father believed the mother and her partner physically abused the eldest child. In any event, with the mother’s consent,[1] the eldest child moved to live with the father in August 2015, while the youngest child continued to live with the mother. Both children then ceased all contact with the non-residential parent and, as a consequence, neither child has seen their non-residential parent since August 2015, save for the eldest child’s very brief encounter with the mother in the Court precincts on the day of the Family Consultant interviews in December 2016.

   [1] Family Report, para 25; Father’s affidavit, para 4, Annex D

3. The father filed contravention proceedings against the mother in October 2015, on account of her failure to ensure the continuity of the youngest child’s visits with him. Those proceedings were commenced in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia and, whilst the proceedings were still pending before that Court, the parties expanded the dispute to propose fresh parenting orders for the children. In March 2016, that Court made interim orders requiring the parties to ensure the children spend one hour together each alternate Sunday in the company of a professional supervisor and then transferred the proceedings to this Court for determination.

4. Once the proceedings were before this Court, a Family Report was ordered in September 2016, it was released in December 2016, and the trial was fixed for May 2017. When procedural orders were made fixing the proceedings for trial, the parties agreed the eldest child should remain resident with the father, the youngest child should remain resident with the mother, and in each case the residential parent should have sole parental responsibility for the child in his or her care.[2] Their positions remained unchanged at trial, so the issues distilled to whether or not orders should be made regulating the manner in which the children spend time with each other and/or the non-residential parent and, if so, the nature of such orders.

   [2] Notation B made on 1 February 2017

5. It is, of course, a serious thing to separate siblings and have them live in different households but, as the Family Consultant tritely observed:[3]

   In this matter, however, that horse has well and truly bolted.

   [3] Family Report, para 156

6. The parties have been unable to manage their conflict in a way that avoids the children’s involvement. The Family Consultant said, and I accept:[4]

   Both parents (and their parents) blame the other parent (and that parent’s parents) for all of the problems. The children have been stuck in the middle and continue to be directly and indirectly exposed to this conflict, criticism and denigration. Both children have been exposed to various forms of domestic violence and it is extremely likely that both children have suffered enormously because of the conflict and continue to do so. This is likely to have long term if not permanent negative impact on their mental health and functioning.

   [4] Family Report, para 148

7. Regrettably, it is all too likely that no remedial order can now be made by the Court which will satisfactorily alleviate the children’s emotional burden.

Proposals

1. The parties failed to comply with procedural orders requiring them to update their respective parenting proposals,[5] even though neither adhered to their initial proposals.

   [5] Orders 4-5 made on 1 February 2017

2. The father abandoned the orders set out in his Initiating Application filed on 27 May 2016 and, upon request at the commencement of the trial, orally outlined his new proposal. In effect, he proposed that each child should spend every third weekend and one-third of all school holidays in the company of their sibling and the non-residential parent, which would mean the children spending two-thirds of their weekends and school holidays together. That would also mean each child would spend one-third of their weekends and school holidays with their non-residential parent.

3. The mother abandoned the orders set out within her Response filed on 27 June 2016. She and the Independent Children’s Lawyer jointly tendered a minute of the orders they proposed.[6] Relevantly, they proposed an order which only provided for the children to spend supervised time together for two hours on one Sunday each month.[7] They proposed that no order be made for either child to spend any time or communicate with the non-residential parent.

   [6] Exhibit A

   [7] Exhibit A, Orders 8-9

Evidence

1. Neither party filed their affidavits within the time stipulated by procedural orders,[8] but neither took issue with the default.

   [8] Orders 6-8 made on 1 February 2017

2. The father relied upon his affidavit filed on 22 May 2017.

3. The mother relied upon the affidavits filed by her and the maternal grandmother on 17 May 2017.

4. The parties and Independent Children’s Lawyer relied upon the Family Report dated 9 December 2016.

5. The parties and Independent Children’s Lawyer agreed, given the limited ambit of the dispute, it was not necessary for any witness to be cross-examined. They agreed the proceedings could be determined on the available evidence, in respect of which they would each make submissions, as they then did.

Best interests – primary considerations

Section 60CC(2)(a)

1. Very little evidence was adduced by the parties to address s 60CC(2)(a) of the Act and no submissions were made directly on the topic. By imputation, each child has a meaningful relationship with the residential parent and their respective relationships with the non-residential parent, though still probably meaningful, have deteriorated as a consequence of their loss of contact over the past two years.

Section 60CC(2)(b)

1. Three issues emerged which implied the children may need protection from harm they could suffer through subjection to abuse and exposure to family violence in the parties’ homes.

2. First, the mother has used corporal punishment on both children, but more regularly upon the eldest child. The mother admitted smacking both children, but said it was only discipline and not “abuse” (s 4),[9] though it may not be so easily passed off. She deposed she “could not control” the eldest child,[10] which implied his behaviour exhausted her parenting capacity. If so exasperated, she may not have been able to carefully measure the level of the discipline she administered. The youngest child told the Family Consultant the mother slapped the eldest child “every night” when he defied her direction to go to his room, verifying her earlier reports to staff of the NSW Department of Family and Community Services. Nonetheless, the youngest child felt completely safe in the mother’s home. The youngest child confirmed the father also sometimes hit the eldest child with a belt, but she still felt reasonably safe in his home.[11]

   [9] Family Report, para 49; Mother’s affidavit, para 103

   [10] Mother’s affidavit, para 35

   [11] Family Report, paras 21, 49, 144

3. An order was made in February 2011, with the parties’ consent, restraining them from inflicting any corporal punishment upon the children,[12] so both parties are plainly inclined to disregard orders when it suits them. Although it may not deter them, an order in those terms again needs to be made.

   [12] Order 1.18 made on 22 February 2011

4. Second, the mother has been in a long-term relationship of some sort with Mr Mr FF. The police have attended the mother’s home on numerous occasions to quell disturbances between them, the last incident occurring only a month before the Family Report was prepared and, on at least one occasion, he was charged with intimidating her.[13] The mother deposed in May 2017 that she has been “friends” with Mr FF for 10 years and, although they do not now live together, he still occasionally stays at her home.[14] Given the way in which their relationship waxes and wanes, whenever Mr FF is at the mother’s home, the children in her care are liable to be exposed to violent conduct between him the mother. Neither party nor the Independent Children’s Lawyer sought an injunction to restrain the mother from allowing the children to be in the presence of Mr FF, so it will remain an unresolved concern. When Mr FF is a welcome guest in the mother’s home, she would not likely comply with any unexpected order restraining her from allowing the children to be or remain in his presence.

   [13] Family Report, paras 12, 16

   [14] Mother’s affidavit, para 43; Family Report, paras 100, 126

5. Third, on occasions in the past, the eldest child struck the youngest child. The mother rose to the youngest child’s defence when that occurred in her home, but she was worried the father would not be similarly vigilant to protect the youngest child if the children are together in his care. Although it is unlikely the father would stand idly by while one child physically abused the other, the eldest child is prone to be aggressive and unruly and there is a risk the father would not always be present to protect the youngest child. The fact the eldest child has, in the past, physically abused the youngest child is one reason why their supervised interaction is preferable.

Best interests – additional considerations

1. The issue of overarching importance in these proceedings is the virulent parental conflict, which precludes any co-operation between the parties and shows no signs of abatement. As an example, the parties only voluntarily arranged for the children to see one another on a few occasions between August 2015 and April 2016, which the Family Consultant correctly described as a “sad reflection” upon them.[15] Even when simple, unambiguous interim orders were made in March 2016, the parties could not consistently implement them. Those orders required the parties to ensure the children spend time together for one hour each alternate Sunday in the presence of a professional supervisor, but the mother overlooked taking the youngest child to the first session in April,[16] she declined the father’s request to change the date of one visit in May to avoid a booked holiday,[17] and she cancelled visits in June, July, August, October, and November without making any alternate arrangements for make-up time.[18]

   [15] Family Report, para 155

   [16] Mother’s affidavit, para 127

   [17] Family Report, para 89

   [18] Family Report, paras 99, 103, 104, 108; Mother’s affidavit, paras 141-145

2. The mother deposed to her knowledge the children want to spend time together,[19] so it is puzzling why she does not diligently ensure their fortnightly visits occur, let alone let them fail without making up for the lost time. Even when the interim orders are faithfully implemented, the children only have one hour together per fortnight, so it is almost inconceivable that an insightful parent would allow such precious little time to escape the children’s use. The irony of the mother’s proposal for final orders to now be made in much the same form as interim orders she has regularly breached was unexplained.

   [19] Mother’s affidavit, paras 124, 166

3. The father believes the mother’s conduct tends to alienate the youngest child from him. The Independent Children’s Lawyer agreed, describing the youngest child as a “classically aligned child”. The youngest child formerly enjoyed a positive relationship with the father and even expressed the wish her parents could reconcile so she could see them equally,[20] but that time has long gone. In August 2015, at about the time the family was cleaved in two, the mother facilitated a telephone call between the youngest child and father on loud speaker, to which she and the maternal grandmother were privy. The youngest child told the father she did not want to visit him the next scheduled weekend and, when the father rudely remonstrated in apparent breach of an order restraining his denigration of the mother,[21] the child became upset, told the father she did not want to talk with him anymore, and ended the call. For reasons best known to the mother, she then had the youngest child listen to an earlier recorded telephone message left by the father for the mother, which was abusive and threatening. The mother believed, as a consequence of listening to the recording, the youngest child was “very upset and concerned for [the mother]” and she made her own decision “there and then” to never see the father again.[22] The child confirmed that sequence of events to the Family Consultant.[23]

   [20] Family Report, paras 5, 154

   [21] Order 1.11 made on 22 February 2011

   [22] Family Report, paras 31, 32

   [23] Family Report, para 141

1. At that point in time, the youngest child was barely 10 years of age. She did not have the maturity to be involved in the parental conflict in that way. Given she lived with the mother, was invited to speak with the father so their telephone conversation could be overheard by both the mother and maternal grandmother, and the mother afterwards played her the recording which cast the father in such a bad light, she must have felt pressured to support the mother in the parental conflict.

2. Even if she did tell the mother she did not want to maintain contact with the father, an insightful parent in the mother’s position would have known a child of that age in that predicament was enticed to express that sentiment and would not have been expressing her genuine desire. Most probably, the youngest child was merely demonstrating loyalty to the mother; nothing more. The mother did not realise that, or alternatively, knew it but deliberately used the artifice to her advantage anyway because, later the same day, purportedly in reliance upon the child’s decision, she sent the father a text message informing him there would be no further contact or communication between him and the youngest child.[24]

   [24] Family Report, para 45; Father’s affidavit, para 8

3. When the mother conferred with the Family Consultant in December 2016, she asserted she was only supporting the youngest child’s choice not to spend time with the father – but it is really her choice, not the child’s. The mother co-opted the maternal grandparents to keep the youngest child “out of sight” of paternal family members to avoid her interaction with them on the day of the Family Consultant interviews,[25] even though no harm could possibly have come to the youngest child by merely seeing and exchanging pleasantries with the father and other paternal family members in a public space. The mother did not even want the youngest child interviewed alone by the Family Consultant,[26] for which there could be no proper reason. The most probable inference is that she wanted the child, under the maternal grandfather’s supervision, to adhere to and reiterate her “choice” not to see the father. The mother recently deposed the youngest child still “refuses” to see the father.[27]

   [25] Family Report, para 125

   [26] Family Report, para 137

   [27] Mother’s affidavit, paras 117, 119, 124; Family Report, para 114

4. The youngest child was never previously fearful of the father and could not explain to the Family Consultant why she now feels less safe with him than with the mother,[28] but it is most probably because the mother induced such apprehension by involving her in the parental conflict. The Family Consultant said, and I accept, it reflects “extremely poorly” on the mother that she played the father’s threatening message to the youngest child and it reflects “very poorly” on the father that he would disparage the mother as he did.[29]

   [28] Family Report, paras 21, 154

   [29] Family Report, para 154

5. Whether the mother induced the youngest child’s apprehension about the father deliberately or inadvertently is immaterial because the repercussions are identical. Either way, the youngest child is alienated from the father. The mother refers to the father as a “psychopath” who has caused her to suffer “PTSD”,[30] so she is unable to moderate her strongly held views about him. The youngest child must be alive to her sentiments.

   [30] Family Report, para 29

6. The mother must realise children are susceptible to parental pressure because she believes that dynamic of importunity now exists between the father and eldest child. In October 2015, when the eldest child told her he wanted to stay with the father and not return to live with her, she believed he was intimidated by the father and was not speaking truthfully.[31] She might be right. The father might also be acting in a way that either deliberately or inadvertently causes the eldest child to feel obliged to demonstrate loyalty to him, since his views of the mother are just as critical as her views of him.

   [31] Family Report, para 61

7. The eldest child has certainly not coped with the conflict between the parties, which is evident from the way he rebelled against both parents and was in repeated conflict with peers and teachers at school.[32] His counsellor opined he was “traumatised” and had “post traumatic stress disorder” and the Family Consultant attributed his emotional turmoil to his exposure to the parental conflict.[33] Their concurrent views are compelling.

   [32] Exhibit B

   [33] Family Report, paras 6, 90, 148

8. In such circumstances, very little weight can be reposed in the children’s expressed views about the parties and their residential circumstances. Most likely, they are both just trying to survive emotionally by pleasing the adult with whom they live. In any event, neither party heeds the children’s views unless it suits them. For example, the eldest child said he would spend time with the mother in the absence of Mr FF,[34] but she did not seek any order for them to spend any time together. She apparently disbelieves he wants to see her.[35] Similarly, the youngest child said she did not wish to spend any time with the father,[36] but he sought an order that she do so. The Family Consultant opined that considerable weight should be placed in the eldest child’s view not to return to live with the mother,[37] but that result must necessarily follow from the parties’ agreement about the children’s future residential placement.

   [34] Family Report, paras 132, 133

   [35] Mother’s affidavit, para 124

   [36] Family Report, para 143

   [37] Family Report, para 152

9. The single reliable aspect of the children’s views is probably their mutual wish to retain and promote their sibling connection.[38] The conflict between their parents is unlikely to distort the genuineness of their feelings for each other. The orders proposed by the parties and Independent Children’s Lawyer make provision, albeit differently, for the children to spend time together.

   [38] Family Report, paras 84, 85, 131, 142, 143; Mother’s affidavit, para 124

Conclusions and orders

1. The evidence easily rebuts the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility (s 61DA(4)). Exclusive parental responsibility in respect of each child falls to the residential parent in each case, as was mutually proposed.

2. Two conclusions flow from the evidence: the children should spend some time together, but neither child should be forced to spend time with the non-residential parent.

3. The first conclusion was ultimately uncontentious and accords with the Family Consultant’s opinion.[39] The only controversy concerned the manner in which it would be implemented. The children’s interaction should occur at a neutral venue because it is unlikely either party would facilitate the attendance of the children at the other party’s home. Save for rare occasions, the parties have been unable to make that happen for nearly two years and so any orders compelling them to do so now would certainly result in non-compliance and further litigation. The children need respite from their involvement in both the parties’ antipathy and their litigation.

   [39] Family Report, para 156

4. The only real option is to ensure the children see each other under professional supervision. The children’s delivery to and collection from any neutral venue by the parties would ensure their personal proximity and inevitably result in either their overt conflict or silent fury, to which the children would be exposed. The presence of a professional supervisor in a public place might be an incentive for them to deliver the children and depart and then later collect the children and depart without aggressive confrontation. The presence of the supervisor would also abate the mother’s concern about the youngest child’s physical safety in the company of the eldest child.

5. Those findings dictate, or at least influence, the second conclusion. Neither party is capable of allowing the children the emotional autonomy to enjoy visits with the other party, irrespective of whether they are supervised or not. Making orders of the type proposed by the father would be futile because they would not be implemented. As the Family Consultant correctly observed, any attempt to return to the regime that existed before August 2015 would be “extremely likely” to fail.[40]

   [40] Family Report, para 152

6. The father’s proposal was apparently an attempt to adopt the Family Consultant’s recommendation for the children to spend some time in the company of both parties,[41] but it is rejected as fanciful. The Independent Children’s Lawyer correctly described the recommendation as the triumph of hope over experience. Such optimism on the Family Consultant’s part was entirely unwarranted. In submissions, the father explained his recollection of happier times, before August 2015, when the children visited him in accordance with the orders made in February 2011, to which regime he would understandably prefer to return, but those times are past. They cannot be recovered by the Court making aspirational, but surely futile, orders. The father truly believes the mother manipulates the youngest child, in which event he must realise the orders he proposed are bound to fail.

   [41] Family Report, paras 159, 161, 162

7. The Independent Children’s Lawyer recognised the orders she jointly proposed were not ideal and were, in fact, the “least worst” option, which was an entirely apt characterisation. It was submitted they were designed for “damage control”. While the parties may not be able to objectively appreciate it, their antipathy for one another overshadows their love for the children. If it were otherwise, they would be able to put their differences aside so the children could enjoy unencumbered relationships with all members of their family.

8. The orders therefore reflect those jointly proposed by the mother and Independent Children’s Lawyer, other than in two respects. First, the initial visit will occur one week later than the date proposed because these orders are pronounced and these reasons delivered after that date. Second, the proposed orders expired in December 2018, but the orders will continue indefinitely. While the eldest child might be old enough to make his own decisions by December 2018, when he will be nearly 16 years of age, the youngest child will not. The cessation of the orders in December 2018 might simply result in the need for more litigation to regulate the family affairs from January 2019 onwards. That scenario should be avoided at almost any cost.

9. No order is made for the children to have any form of communication with their sibling or the non-residential parent. None was sought.

10. The injunction restraining the infliction of corporal punishment upon the children has already been explained.

11. The other injunction restraining the parties from allowing the children to be exposed to denigration of them could not be the subject of reasonable opposition, even though it was made and breached in the past.

12. Since each party will be effectively eliminated from the life of one child for the balance of their minority, the orders allow each party to procure details about the scholastic progress of both children. Orders to that effect were also made in the past without opposition.[42]

    [42] Orders 1.13 and 1.14 made on 22 February 2011

13. The orders require the parties to keep each other appraised of one another’s home address and mobile telephone number. There should be a line of communication available between the parties in case it is needed. They sought an order to that effect before and neither submitted such an order should not now exist.[43]

    [43] Order 1.17 made on 22 February 2011

14. An order is made requiring the parties to present the children to the Director of Child Dispute Services for a proper and unvarnished explanation of the orders and, if considered appropriate by the Director, an explanation of the reasons for them. Such an order was not proposed, nor was it raised for discussion during submissions, but it is almost inconceivable such an order could be reasonably opposed. The children deserve an unbiased explanation of orders that will regulate their future and it may be doubted they will get it from the parties, since they are both the subject of criticism in these reasons and would likely be embarrassed by the children being aware of it.

I certify that the preceding fifty (50) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Austin delivered on 15 June 2017.

Associate: 

Date:  15 June 2017