Jopling v Jopling

Link copied
Case Copied 18 min read
8 CLR 33

JOHN JAMES JOPLING

MARGARET MARIA JOPLING

RESPONDENT. Arbitration-Award, - validity -Uncertainty-Refusal to hear evidence-Specific

performance of agreement ordered-Lease, time of commencement-Covenant

On a reference to arbitration to determine all disputes between A. and B. the deed of submission gave the arbitrators or their umpire power to order what they or he should think fit to be done by either of the parties. By his award the umpire found that on a certain day an agreement had been entered into between the parties to the effect (inter alia) that A. should pay to B. a certain sum in settlement of all claims between them up to the date of the agreement, that A. should lease to B. certain premises for a certain term at a certain rent, and that A. should not alter the terms of her will. He also found that the agreement had been partly performed by B. having on a cer- tain day been admitted by A. into possession of the premises agreed to be leased, and that B. had altered his position and incurred expense on the faith of the agreement. He then ordered and determined that A. should specifi- cally perform her part of the agreement and should forthwith execute all deeds and documents necessary to effectuate such agreement, including a covenant that she would not alter her will, and that B. should execute all leases and documents and do all such things as might be necessary to effectu- ate the observance by him of the agreement. On a motion by A. to set aside the award,

Held, that the award was not uncertain, for (1) by reference to the agree- ment as to the lease and the finding that possession had been taken pursuant to that agreement on a particular day, the proper inference was that the lease was to begin on that day; (2) it was not necessary that the deeds and docu-

8 CLR 34

ments directed to be executed should be further specified; and (3) that it was not necessary to set out the terms of the will referred to.

Held, further, that, as by the award it was found that an agreement had been made between the parties for the payment of a certain sum in settlement of all disputes between them, and specific performance of that agreement was directed, it was not necessary to go into evidence as to what were the dis. putes, and, therefore, that there had been no such refusal to hear evidence as

Judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Hood J.) reversed.

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of Victoria.

John Robertson Jopling, the husband of Margaret Maria Jopling and father of John James Jopling, who died in 1901, by his will left all his property to his widow. The property included certain bone mills and a farm known as Rose Hill Farm. The business in connection with the bone mills was thereafter carried on by Mrs. Jopling under the management of John…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Jopling v Jopling and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[1909] HCA 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This case involved an appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria, which had set aside an umpire's award. The dispute arose between Margaret Maria Jopling (the respondent) and her son, John James Jopling (the appellant), concerning the settlement of various claims and the terms of leases for bone mills and a farm. Following disagreements, the parties submitted all matters in difference to arbitration, with the umpire ultimately making an award.

The High Court was required to determine whether the umpire's award was valid and enforceable. Specifically, the court had to consider whether the award was uncertain in its terms, whether the umpire had improperly refused to hear material evidence, and whether the umpire had exceeded his jurisdiction by ordering specific performance of an agreement and directing the respondent not to alter her will.

The High Court, in allowing the appeal, reasoned that the award was not uncertain. It found that the commencement date of the leases could be inferred from the umpire's finding that possession was taken on a specific date pursuant to the agreement. The court also held that it was not necessary for the award to specify the exact terms of the will or the precise nature of all deeds and documents to be executed, as these could be determined by reference to the agreement and general legal principles. Furthermore, the court determined that the umpire had not refused to hear material evidence, as once the existence of a settlement agreement was established, evidence regarding the specific nature of prior disputes became irrelevant. The direction regarding the will was considered enforceable through an action for damages for breach of covenant.

Consequently, the High Court reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria, discharged the order setting aside the award, and reinstated the umpire's award.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.