WOLTER JOOSSÉ -v- DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
VID 552 of 2005
RYAN J 28 MARCH 2007 MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIADISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 552 of 2005
On appeal from the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia
BETWEEN:
WOLTER JOOSSÉ Appellant
AND:
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Respondent
JUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 MARCH 2007
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2.The respondent’s costs of the appeal be taxed and paid or allowed as part of the petitioning creditor’s costs in the bankruptcy.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIADISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 552 of 2005
On appeal from the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia
BETWEEN:
WOLTER JOOSSÉ Appellant
AND:
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Respondent
JUDGE:
RYAN J
DATE:
28 MARCH 2007
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an appeal from orders of the Federal Magistrates Court constituted by Hartnett FM on 13 May 2005. On that day her Honour made a sequestration order against the estate of the applicant and noted the date of the act of bankruptcy as 23 September 2003. In the course of her reasons for making the sequestration order, the learned Federal Magistrate noted that the creditor’s petition had been founded on a judgment debt of $249,637.94 resulting from an order made by default in the County Court of Victoria on 2 August 2001 for payment of $200,019.43 plus interest. The act of bankruptcy was non-compliance with a bankruptcy notice deemed to have been served on 29 August 2003.
‘4. The bankruptcy petition is founded upon a judgment debt being a default judgment entered in the County Court of Victoria on 2 August 2001. An application to set aside the defaultjudgment was heard on 5 November 2001 in the County Court with such application being dismissed by Holt J.
5. The respondent was refused leave to appeal (from the County Court judgment) by the Victorian Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal considered affidavit material not previously before the County Court and thereafter concluded that the respondent had no arguable defence to the claim which gave rise to the judgment debt. I note that as part of the history in this matter as this court may go behind a judgment debt to ascertain whether there is a debt in truth and reality if there is substantial reason for doing so. (Wren v Mahony(1972) 126 CLR 212). The respondent then sought leave to appeal to the High Court. On 14 February 2003 the…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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The appeal in Joossé v Commissioner of Taxation was brought against the decision of Hartnett FM, who made a sequestration order against the estate of the applicant. The order was founded on a judgment debt resulting from a default judgment in the County Court of Victoria, which had been affirmed by higher courts. The primary issue for the court was whether there were substantial reasons to go behind the judgment debt, which had been asserted by the applicant. The court needed to determine if the applicant had a valid defence against the claim that gave rise to the judgment debt.
The Federal Magistrates Court, in dismissing the appeal, found that the applicant had not provided substantial reasons to question the validity of the judgment debt. The court noted that the applicant had already litigated and lost the issue of whether Bellhop Pty Ltd, of which the applicant was a director, had employees during the relevant period. The court further held that the applicant had not provided any new evidence or argument to support his claim that Bellhop had no employees, and thus, the penalties imposed were valid. The court concluded that the applicant had not met the threshold for questioning the judgment debt, and therefore, the sequestration order was appropriately made.
The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's costs of the appeal were ordered to be paid as part of the petitioning creditor’s costs in the bankruptcy.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The respondent’s costs of the appeal be taxed and paid or allowed as part of the petitioning creditor’s costs in the bankruptcy.
Background
Background to the litigation
This is an appeal from orders of the Federal Magistrates Court constituted by Hartnett FM on 13 May 2005. On that day her Honour made a sequestration order against the estate of the applicant and noted the date of the act of bankruptcy as 23 September 2003. In the course of her reasons for making the sequestration order, the learned Federal Magistrate noted that the creditor’s petition had been founded on a judgment debt of $249,637.94 resulting from an order made by default in the County Court of Victoria on 2 August 2001 for payment of $200,019.43 plus interest. The act of bankruptcy was non-compliance with a bankruptcy notice deemed to have been served on 29 August 2003. Background The events that preceded the present appeal are conveniently summarised by Hartnett FM at [4]–[14] of her reasons in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Joossé [2005] FMCA 507. There, her Honour stated: ‘4. The bankruptcy petition is founded upon a judgment debt being a default judgment entered in the County Court of Victoria on 2 August 2001. An application to set aside the default judgment was heard on 5 November 2001 in the County Court with such application being dismissed by Holt J. 5. The respondent was refused leave to appeal (from the County Court judgment) by the Victorian Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal considered affidavit material not previously before the County Court and thereafter concluded that the respondent had no arguable defence to the claim which gave rise to the judgment debt. I note that as part of the history in this matter as this court may go behind a judgment debt to ascertain whether there is a debt in truth and reality if there is substantial reason for doing so. (Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212). The respondent then sought leave to appeal to the High Court. On 14 February 2003 the High Count dismissed the application for special leave. 6. The bankruptcy notice was issued on 19 March 2003. The respondent sought to argue before Gray J in the Federal Court of Australia and on his application to set aside the bankruptcy notice that there were substantial reasons for going behind the judgment debt. Justice Gray concluded in decision of 29 October 2003 that no substantial reason was advanced by the respondent as to why the Court should go behind the judgment debt.7. The judgment debt arose from the respondent's personal liability as a director of a company known as Bellhop Pty Ltd (Bellhop) for the estimated amount of unremitted group tax under the provisions of Divisions 8 and 9 of part VI of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (the ITAA). Bellhop as an employer was required to deduct amounts in the nature of income tax instalment deductions from the salaries and wages that it paid to its employees. It was also required to remit the deducted amounts to the Commissioner by the due date. In the currency of these proceedings, the respondent asserted that Bellhop had never been an employer and submitted that this is an assertion that he has made numerous times in numerous proceedings. The matter has been litigated and determined and should not, as a matter of discretion, be re-litigated by the respondent (Makhoul v Barnes (1995) 60 FCR 572 at 582). I refer to the following:a)in the judgment of Marshall J of the Federal Court of Australia (which has not been overturned on appeal) in the matter of Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia v Bellhop [1999] FCA 1095 the Court ordered on 23 July 1999 that a penalty of $2,500 be imposed on Bellhop in respect of breaches for non-observances of Clause 50 of the Textile Industry Award (1994). The declaration which preceded that imposition of penalty was one wherein the court declared that Bellhop had committed breaches or non-observances of Clause 50 of the Textile Industry Award (1994) by failing to make contributions to the Australia Retirement Fund in respect of each of the persons named in the schedule attached to the orders for the periods referred to therein. In his reasons for judgment, Marshall J found that each of the persons referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the judgment had been continuously employed by Bellhop or other companies, the relevant business of which had been transmitted or assigned to Bellhop. In paragraphs 12 and 13 of those reasons, his Honour set out the 10 employees of the first respondent (Bellhop) and the periods for which they were so employed; b)in his judgment of 29 October 2003 Gray J said, at page 13, paragraph 41:The combination of facts in the evidence before me suggests that the applicant would have no chance at all of succeeding in relation to a defence that Bellhop Pty Ltd had no employees in the relevant period and for that reason the penalties could not have been imposed.8. If the Commissioner had reason to suspect that an employer had made deductions but not remitted them by the due date, the Commissioner was empowered pursuant to section 222AGA of the ITAA to make an estimate of the amount of the deductions and was required to advise the employer of the amount of the estimate by a notice pursuant to section 222AGB of the ITAA. Notices of estimate were sent to Bellhop.9. Division 9 of the ITAA provided relevantly that the directors of a company must within 14 days after the day in which notice of the estimates was sent to the company, cause the company to pay the amount of the estimates or cause it to "begin to be wound up" within the meaning of the Corporations Law in force at the time (hereafter referred to as the Corporations Law). Section 222APC of the ITAA provided that if the estimates were not paid or the directors did not cause the company to be placed into liquidation within the 14-day period, the directors were liable to pay to the Commissioner, by way of penalty, an amount equal to the unpaid amount of the estimates.10. As a director of a company that was sent notices of estimate, the respondent was personally obliged to ensure, within 14 days of the dates when the notices were sent, that Bellhop:a) paid to the Commissioner the amount of the estimates; orb) entered into an agreement with the Commissioner to pay the amount of the estimates by instalments; orc) was put into administration; or d) had commenced to be wound up.The applicant maintains that the respondent did not ensure that Bellhop did any of those four things within the 14 days. Accordingly the respondent became liable at the end of the 14 day period to pay penalties equal to the amount of the unpaid estimates.11. However, the Commissioner was not entitled to recover the director penalties until 14 days after the Commissioner had given the respondent a notice stating inter alia that the penalty would be remitted if, at the end of 14 days after the notice was given, one of the four things referred to in the preceding paragraph had been done (section 222APE of the ITAA).12. Director penalty notices under section 222APE of the ITAA in respect of different components of the debt were given to the respondent on 15 June 1999, 15 September 1999 and 16 October 1999. Two notices in respect of the bulk of the debt were given to the respondent on 16 October 1999. Accordingly, for the bulk of the penalty to be remitted, the winding up of Bellhop had to have commenced by 30 October 1999 or one of the other things referred to in section 222APE needed to have been done by that date. This was an issue before Gray J in Joossé v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia [2003] FCA 1325; that is whether Bellhop commenced to be wound up within 14 days of the day on which two of the statutory notices were given. However, the issue in that case turned solely upon the date of service of the two notices. It is also implicit in the reasons of Gray J and as found by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Joossé v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 245 per Jacobson J at [16] that the winding up of Bellhop began on 3 November 1999.13. In the hearing of the creditor's petition before the Chief Federal Magistrate (as she then was) the respondent swore for the first time in proceedings that the directors had resolved on 10 September 1999 to place Bellhop into voluntary liquidation. A photocopy of a purported resolution was exhibited to the affidavit of the respondent. This evidence was not put before Gray J or the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court.14. If Bellhop had been wound up voluntarily under Part 5.5 of the Corporations Law pursuant to a valid special resolution passed on 10 September 1999, the winding up of Bellhop would have commenced on that date. If the winding up had commenced on that date, the director penalty notices given on 16 October 1999 would have been complied with within 14 days, or rather before they were given, and the bulk of the penalty would have been remitted. However, the applicant submits in the proceedings before me that Bellhop was not wound up voluntarily under Part 5.5 of the Corporations Law pursuant to a valid special resolution passed on 10 September 1999. Rather the applicant submits that Bellhop was wound up in insolvency under Part 5.4 of the Corporations Law pursuant to the order made in the Supreme Court on 3 November 1999, such that the winding up of Bellhop commenced on 3 November 1999 being the date of the winding up order.’Federal Magistrate’s decision
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
RYAN J
The events that preceded the present appeal are conveniently summarised by Hartnett FM at [4]–[14] of her reasons in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Joossé [2005] FMCA 507. There, her Honour stated: ‘4. The bankruptcy petition is founded upon a judgment debt being a default judgment entered in the County Court of Victoria on 2 August 2001. An application to set aside the default judgment was heard on 5 November 2001 in the County Court with such application being dismissed by Holt J. 5. The respondent was refused leave to appeal (from the County Court judgment) by the Victorian Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal considered affidavit material not previously before the County Court and thereafter concluded that the respondent had no arguable defence to the claim which gave rise to the judgment debt. I note that as part of the history in this matter as this court may go behind a judgment debt to ascertain whether there is a debt in truth and reality if there is substantial reason for doing so. (Wren v Mahony (1972) 126 CLR 212). The respondent then sought leave to appeal to the High Court. On 14 February 2003 the High Count dismissed the application for special leave. 6. The bankruptcy notice was issued on 19 March 2003. The respondent sought to argue before Gray J in the Federal Court of Australia and on his application to set aside the bankruptcy notice that there were substantial reasons for going behind the judgment debt. Justice Gray concluded in decision of 29 October 2003 that no substantial reason was advanced by the respondent as to why the Court should go behind the judgment debt.7. The judgment debt arose from the respondent's personal liability as a director of a company known as Bellhop Pty Ltd (Bellhop) for the estimated amount of unremitted group tax under the provisions of Divisions 8 and 9 of part VI of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (the ITAA). Bellhop as an employer was required to deduct amounts in the nature of income tax instalment deductions from the salaries and wages that it paid to its employees. It was also required to remit the deducted amounts to the Commissioner by the due date. In the currency of these proceedings, the respondent asserted that Bellhop had never been an employer and submitted that this is an assertion that he has made numerous times in numerous proceedings. The matter has been litigated and determined and should not, as a matter of discretion, be re-litigated by the respondent (Makhoul v Barnes (1995) 60 FCR 572 at 582). I refer to the following:a)in the judgment of Marshall J of the Federal Court of Australia (which has not been overturned on appeal) in the matter of Textile Clothing and Footwear Union of Australia v Bellhop [1999] FCA 1095 the Court ordered on 23 July 1999 that a penalty of $2,500 be imposed on Bellhop in respect of breaches for non-observances of Clause 50 of the Textile Industry Award (1994). The declaration which preceded that imposition of penalty was one wherein the court declared that Bellhop had committed breaches or non-observances of Clause 50 of the Textile Industry Award (1994) by failing to make contributions to the Australia Retirement Fund in respect of each of the persons named in the schedule attached to the orders for the periods referred to therein. In his reasons for judgment, Marshall J found that each of the persons referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the judgment had been continuously employed by Bellhop or other companies, the relevant business of which had been transmitted or assigned to Bellhop. In paragraphs 12 and 13 of those reasons, his Honour set out the 10 employees of the first respondent (Bellhop) and the periods for which they were so employed; b)in his judgment of 29 October 2003 Gray J said, at page 13, paragraph 41:The combination of facts in the evidence before me suggests that the applicant would have no chance at all of succeeding in relation to a defence that Bellhop Pty Ltd had no employees in the relevant period and for that reason the penalties could not have been imposed.8. If the Commissioner had reason to suspect that an employer had made deductions but not remitted them by the due date, the Commissioner was empowered pursuant to section 222AGA of the ITAA to make an estimate of the amount of the deductions and was required to advise the employer of the amount of the estimate by a notice pursuant to section 222AGB of the ITAA. Notices of estimate were sent to Bellhop.9. Division 9 of the ITAA provided relevantly that the directors of a company must within 14 days after the day in which notice of the estimates was sent to the company, cause the company to pay the amount of the estimates or cause it to "begin to be wound up" within the meaning of the Corporations Law in force at the time (hereafter referred to as the Corporations Law). Section 222APC of the ITAA provided that if the estimates were not paid or the directors did not cause the company to be placed into liquidation within the 14-day period, the directors were liable to pay to the Commissioner, by way of penalty, an amount equal to the unpaid amount of the estimates.10. As a director of a company that was sent notices of estimate, the respondent was personally obliged to ensure, within 14 days of the dates when the notices were sent, that Bellhop:a) paid to the Commissioner the amount of the estimates; orb) entered into an agreement with the Commissioner to pay the amount of the estimates by instalments; orc) was put into administration; or d) had commenced to be wound up.The applicant maintains that the respondent did not ensure that Bellhop did any of those four things within the 14 days. Accordingly the respondent became liable at the end of the 14 day period to pay penalties equal to the amount of the unpaid estimates.11. However, the Commissioner was not entitled to recover the director penalties until 14 days after the Commissioner had given the respondent a notice stating inter alia that the penalty would be remitted if, at the end of 14 days after the notice was given, one of the four things referred to in the preceding paragraph had been done (section 222APE of the ITAA).12. Director penalty notices under section 222APE of the ITAA in respect of different components of the debt were given to the respondent on 15 June 1999, 15 September 1999 and 16 October 1999. Two notices in respect of the bulk of the debt were given to the respondent on 16 October 1999. Accordingly, for the bulk of the penalty to be remitted, the winding up of Bellhop had to have commenced by 30 October 1999 or one of the other things referred to in section 222APE needed to have been done by that date. This was an issue before Gray J in Joossé v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia [2003] FCA 1325; that is whether Bellhop commenced to be wound up within 14 days of the day on which two of the statutory notices were given. However, the issue in that case turned solely upon the date of service of the two notices. It is also implicit in the reasons of Gray J and as found by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Joossé v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCAFC 245 per Jacobson J at [16] that the winding up of Bellhop began on 3 November 1999.13. In the hearing of the creditor's petition before the Chief Federal Magistrate (as she then was) the respondent swore for the first time in proceedings that the directors had resolved on 10 September 1999 to place Bellhop into voluntary liquidation. A photocopy of a purported resolution was exhibited to the affidavit of the respondent. This evidence was not put before Gray J or the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court.14. If Bellhop had been wound up voluntarily under Part 5.5 of the Corporations Law pursuant to a valid special resolution passed on 10 September 1999, the winding up of Bellhop would have commenced on that date. If the winding up had commenced on that date, the director penalty notices given on 16 October 1999 would have been complied with within 14 days, or rather before they were given, and the bulk of the penalty would have been remitted. However, the applicant submits in the proceedings before me that Bellhop was not wound up voluntarily under Part 5.5 of the Corporations Law pursuant to a valid special resolution passed on 10 September 1999. Rather the applicant submits that Bellhop was wound up in insolvency under Part 5.4 of the Corporations Law pursuant to the order made in the Supreme Court on 3 November 1999, such that the winding up of Bellhop commenced on 3 November 1999 being the date of the winding up order.’Federal Magistrate’s decision