JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL
CITATION: JONES -v- WATERDALE ENTERPRISES PTY LTD [No 2] [2025] WASC 71
CORAM: WHITBY J
HEARD: 26 FEBRUARY 2025
DELIVERED : 6 MARCH 2025
FILE NO/S: CIV 2326 of 2022
BETWEEN: TREVOR JONES
Plaintiff
AND
WATERDALE ENTERPRISES PTY LTD
Defendant
WATERDALE ENTERPRISES PTY LTD
Plaintiff by counterclaim
TREVOR JONES
Defendant by counterclaim
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Application for a trial of preliminary issues - Whether court required to determine disputed facts - Whether evidence of surrounding circumstances may be adduced to assist construction of contract - No sufficient saving of time, inconvenience and costs by determination of preliminary issues - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA)
Result:
Application dismissed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | P Fletcher |
| Defendant | : | C P K Russell SC |
| Plaintiff by counterclaim | : | C P K Russell SC |
| Defendant by counterclaim | : | P Fletcher |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Fletcher Law |
| Defendant | : | HHG Legal Group |
| Plaintiff by counterclaim | : | HHG Legal Group |
| Defendant by counterclaim | : | Fletcher Law |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Briggs v Curtis Quick & Associates [1999] WASCA 139
Lansdale Pty Ltd v Moore [2009] WASCA 176
Mount Bruce Mining Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 37; (2015) 256 CLR 104
Palmer v Citic Ltd [No 2] [2019] WASC 14
WHITBY J:
Introduction and summary
The plaintiff was a finance broker from 2002 until he retired on 16 February 2022. As a finance broker, the plaintiff earned two types of commissions:
(1) an 'upfront' commission that was paid upon approval of a loan application the plaintiff submitted to a financier; and
(2) a 'trailing' commission that was paid on an ongoing basis on approved loans until each loan was repaid or refinanced. The trailing commission was calculated by reference to the outstanding amount under a loan and would reduce as the outstanding amount reduced.
The defendant carries on business under the name of 'Peel Finance Brokers' as trustee of the Boag Family Trust (PFB). The defendant provides a service to finance brokers and specified financiers (the PFB Panel Lenders) which facilitated the submission of loan applications from the finance brokers to the PFB Panel Lenders and the collection and distribution of commissions earned by the finance brokers.
On or about 8 September 2003, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with PFB by which PFB agreed to provide its services to the plaintiff and the plaintiff agreed to be paid 80% of his upfront commissions collected by PFB, and 75% of his trailing commissions collected by PFB. The parties refer to this agreement as the Sub‑Originators Agreement (SOA).
Up until January 2013, the plaintiff completed loan applications for his clients and submitted them to various PFB Panel Lenders using PFB's facilities.
From late 2004 to January 2013, each month the PFB Panel Lenders paid PFB the upfront and the trailing commissions referable to the current loans in place.…
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- Case
- [2025] WASC 71
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the defendant's argument that there was a clear demarcation between the issue of the proper construction of the Statement of Agreement (SOA) and the issue of quantum. The defendant contended that determining the preliminary issues would only require the court to examine the terms of the SOA and the facts set out in the proposed statement of agreed facts, without the need for evidence of surrounding circumstances. However, the court found that the plaintiff's opposition was based on the premise that determining the preliminary issues would not necessarily save time or costs, as it would require the court to resolve disputed facts, such as whether the plaintiff repudiated or breached the SOA.
The court ultimately decided against the defendant's application for a trial of preliminary issues. The court held that determining the preliminary issues in this case would not sufficiently save time, inconvenience, and costs. The court noted that the determination of disputed facts was integral to the resolution of the case and that the evidence of surrounding circumstances might be relevant to the construction of the contract. Therefore, the court found that the application for a trial of preliminary issues should be dismissed.
The court did not make any specific orders regarding the determination of preliminary issues but indicated that the matter should proceed to trial without a determination of preliminary issues. The court's decision highlighted the importance of considering the specific facts of each case when deciding whether to determine preliminary issues before trial.
Background
Background to the litigation
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court is required to determine disputed facts in deciding the preliminary issues.
2. Whether evidence of surrounding circumstances may be adduced to assist in the construction of the contract.
3. Whether there is a sufficient saving of time, inconvenience, and costs by determining the preliminary issues.
Held
1. The court is not required to determine disputed facts in deciding the preliminary issues. It found that the determination of the preliminary issues could be made by reference to the terms of the Statement of Agreed Facts (SOA) and the correspondence between the parties.
2. The court held that evidence of surrounding circumstances may not be adduced to assist in the construction of the contract. It found that neither party had pleaded any surrounding circumstances relevant to the construction of the SOA.
3. The court concluded that there is not a sufficient saving of time, inconvenience, and costs by determining the preliminary issues. It found that determining the preliminary issues would not necessarily lead to a resolution of the case or reduce the overall time and costs of the proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the arguments presented by both parties regarding the determination of preliminary issues. It noted the defendant's submission that there was a clear demarcation between the construction of the SOA and the issue of quantum, and that the determination of the preliminary issues could be completed in one day as opposed to a six-day trial. However, the court was of the view that the determination of the preliminary issues would not necessarily lead to a resolution of the case or reduce the overall time and costs of the proceedings. The court held that the plaintiff's contention that the court would be required to determine disputed facts was well-founded, and that such a determination would not save time or costs, but rather may increase the costs and delay the resolution of the issues between the parties. The court further held that evidence of surrounding circumstances was not relevant to the determination of the preliminary issues, as neither party had pleaded any surrounding circumstances relevant to the construction of the SOA. The ratio decidendi of this case is that in cases where the determination of preliminary issues would require the court to determine disputed facts or where there is no sufficient saving of time, inconvenience, and costs, the court should not determine the preliminary issues prior to trial. The court distinguished this case from prior authority that had held that the determination of preliminary issues could be appropriate in certain circumstances, as the facts of this case were unique and did not lend themselves to such a determination.