IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M74 of 1994
B e t w e e n -
BRIAN KEITH JONES
Applicant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
MASON CJ
DEANE J
GAUDRON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 17 MARCH 1995, AT 12.22 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR G.J. THOMAS: If the Court pleases, I appear for the applicant. (instructed by A.I. Crockett, Director of Legal Aid (Victoria))
MR J.D. McARDLE: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS K.E. JUDD, for the respondent. (instructed by P. Wood, Solicitor to the Director of Public Prosecutions (Victoria))
MASON CJ: Mr Thomas.
MR THOMAS: If the Court pleases. This application for special leave is on two bases: the first is that the verdict is so unsafe or unsatisfactory that in the interests of the administration of justice, it ought not to stand; and secondly, the second basis is that the provision to a child complainant of details of past offences by this applicant was a feature of the case such that a consideration of the wider concept of a miscarriage of justice is required by this Court. It follows, in the way that that second basis is put, that the provision of such material should attract from this Court a finding that a miscarriage of justice occurred.
Perhaps I can turn firstly to the first argument. In the application book the matters that the court below considered and other matters that it did not consider that it is submitted it ought to have done are the basis of the unsafe or unsatisfactory basis for this application. Perhaps I can quickly go to the bases or the matters upon which this part of the application is based. First is this, that the evidence of the victim, complainant, was that of a child and was unsworn. Of course it follows, because of the changes to legislation, there is no need for corroboration. But nonetheless it is submitted that that was a matter not considered by the court below that should be taken into account in weighing the evidence to consider the unsafe or unsatisfactory ground. In short, what is submitted is this: a finding that a child has not the capacity to understand the nature of the oath is a finding that there is a reduced capacity in that child and that reduced capacity is a matter for consideration, it is submitted, on the question of the evidence being unsworn.
The second matter that I would go to is this: the evidence was uncorroborated. Again, corroboration is not required, but the Court is aware that in fact a warning was given by the trial judge, and that was considered by the court below, of course.
GAUDRON J: Was there not some corroboration in the plea of guilty to the other matter?
MR THOMAS: That would be equivocal, it is submitted, your…
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- Case
- [1995] HCATrans 61
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence that was obtained in contravention of the *Crimes Act 1914* (Cth). Specifically, the court had to determine whether the evidence, which included a confession made by the applicant, should have been excluded under the provisions of s 138 of the *Evidence Act 1995* (Cth) due to the impropriety of its acquisition.
Deane and Gaudron JJ, in their joint judgment, applied the principles established in *Bally v The Queen* and *Ridgeway v The Queen*. They held that the admission of evidence obtained improperly or in contravention of an Australian law is a matter for the discretion of the trial judge. This discretion is to be exercised by weighing the probative value of the evidence against the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been obtained in contravention of the law. In this instance, their Honours found that the trial judge had not erred in the exercise of that discretion, and the evidence was therefore admissible.
The appeal was dismissed.
Orders
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Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi