Jones v Howell & Associates No. Scciv-01-1020

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JONES V HOWELL & ASSOCIATES

[2002] SASC 152

Full Court: Doyle CJ, Perry and Lander JJ

  1. DOYLE CJ.          I agree with the orders proposed by Lander J, and with the reasons that he gives for those orders.  There is nothing that I wish to add.

  2. PERRY J.                          I agree with the reasons of Lander J and with the orders which he proposes.

  3. LANDER J.          This is an appeal by a plaintiff (appellant) whose claim for damages against a firm of solicitors was dismissed by a District Court Judge on the basis that there was no case to answer.  The appellant was unrepresented both at trial and on appeal.  It is the appellant’s contention that a case was made out and the defendants (respondents to this appeal) should have been called upon to elect and call evidence in answer to that case to answer.

  4. The appellant has not identified in his notice of appeal the orders which are sought on appeal.  I think it may be assumed from the submissions which have been made that the appellant seeks an order remitting the matter to the trial judge for further hearing on the basis that a case to answer was made out.

  5. The plaintiff is the ex-husband of Linda Jones.  In 1996 she complained to the police that on 27 September 1996 the appellant had committed an assault upon her.  The appellant was arrested by the police and granted police bail to appear in the Adelaide Magistrates Court to answer the information against him.

  6. His former wife complained that on 27 September 1996 the plaintiff had committed domestic violence upon her and sought a restraining order against him under the Domestic Violence Act1994 (SA).

  7. On 30 September 1996 an order was made in the Adelaide Magistrates Court restraining the appellant.

  8. The respondent is a firm of solicitors.  In or about October 1996 the appellant retained the respondent to represent him in proceedings in the Adelaide Magistrates Court with respect to the criminal prosecution for assault and the restraining order.

  9. The appellant pleaded that the implied terms of the retainer were:

    “(a)The defendant would accept the instructions of the plaintiff and take no action in the said proceedings that was contrary to his expressed instructions;

    (b)that the defendant and its legally qualified solicitors will provide proper and competent advice in or about the representation of the plaintiff;

    (c)that the defendant would use all proper and appropriate care in the custody of the said shirt and note (sic) dispose of same prior to completion of the claims of the said Linda Jones or any claim that the plaintiff made against the said Linda Jones.”

  10. When the appellant retained the respondent to act as his solicitors he deposited a shirt with them which he expected to be used as evidence in one or other of the proceedings for which the respondent had been retained to act.  The reason for keeping the shirt was that he believed it was asserted by Mrs Linda Jones that…

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Details
Case
[2002] SASC 152
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, Jones, the appellant, appealed against a decision of the District Court dismissing his claim for damages against Howell & Associates, the respondent, a firm of solicitors. The appellant, who was unrepresented, contended that a case was made out and the respondent should have been called upon to elect and call evidence in answer to that case. The Full Court agreed with the reasons of Lander J and with the orders proposed by him.

The appellant had retained the respondent to act as his solicitors in proceedings in the Adelaide Magistrates Court with respect to the criminal prosecution for assault and the restraining order. The appellant had deposited a shirt with them which he expected to be used as evidence in one or other of the proceedings. The appellant's claim was that breach of the retainer and the duty of care caused him damage. The damages pleaded were psychiatric injury, restriction of his freedom of movement, anxiety, frustration, disappointment, distress, and legal costs.

The respondent admitted that it accepted a retainer to act on behalf of the appellant in respect to the two complaints made by the appellant's wife. The respondent admitted that it received the shirt but denied that the shirt had any material value as an item of evidence. The respondent admitted that it was an implied term of the retainer that it would not consent on behalf of the plaintiff to an order of the Court without the plaintiff's instructions and that it would provide proper and competent advice in or about the representation of the appellant.

The trial judge allowed the submission without calling upon the respondent to elect. The trial judge found that there was no breach of the retainer or any duty of care. The trial judge further found that the civil proceedings commenced by the appellant against his former wife did not amount to an abuse of process and were not discontinued by reason of any conduct on the part of the respondent. They were discontinued for financial reasons. The trial judge found that there was no case to answer.

The Full Court found that there was no breach of the retainer or any duty of care in respect of two of the allegations. In respect to the third matter, the Full Court found, implicitly, a breach of contract but no damage. The Full Court found that the trial judge should have called upon the respondent to elect. If the respondent had elected to call evidence in answer to the appellant's claim for breach then the trial judge would have needed to decide whether there was a breach. If on the other hand, the respondent elected to call no evidence, then in my opinion, the appellant would be entitled to a judgment for nominal damages for that breach of contract.

The Full Court proposed that the reasons of this Court should be published and the parties allowed to consider their position. The appellant would need to formulate an amendment to his Notice of Appeal. The appellant would need to seek leave to add a ground of appeal to the effect that the trial judge erred in failing to find that the appellant had made out a case to answer with respect to the appellant's claim that the respondent was in breach of contract in failing to look after and care for the appellant's shirt. If such an amendment is sought and allowed the respondent will have to decide whether it wishes to call any evidence in respect of the lost shirt. If an amendment is proposed and allowed and if the respondent advises the Court it would not call evidence if the matter was remitted to the trial judge, this Court should allow the appeal, set aside the order dismissing the appellant's claim and in lieu therefore enter judgment for the appellant against the respondent for nominal damages, say $10. That would leave the question of costs of the trial if the judgment in the Court below were set aside.

The Full Court would need to consider whether it is in as good a position as the trial judge on the question of costs of the trial. The parties would need to be heard on that. If the appellant succeeds in obtaining an award of nominal damages that does not necessarily mean that he would be entitled to costs. Moreover, a defendant may be entitled to costs where a plaintiff has obtained only a verdict for nominal damages. The particular circumstances of the case will need to be examined to determine the appropriate order for costs. The parties also need to be heard on the costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Neil Trevor Jones (appellant) brought a claim against Howell & Associates (respondent), a firm of solicitors, alleging breaches of retainer and duty of care. The appellant had retained the respondent to represent him in criminal proceedings for assault and in proceedings for a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Act 1994 (SA). The appellant's former wife, Linda Jones, had alleged that he assaulted her on 27 September 1996, leading to a restraining order against the appellant. The appellant believed his shirt, which he deposited with the respondent, would be used as evidence to prove it was covered in paint, not blood as alleged by Linda Jones.

The respondent, through solicitor John Williams, consented to the confirmation of the restraining order on 6 March 1997, on the condition that the prosecution would withdraw the assault charge. The appellant alleged this was a breach of the retainer terms and of the duty of care. He further alleged that the respondent failed to care for his shirt, disposing of it before the conclusion of his claims, thereby preventing him from proving Linda Jones' statements were false. The appellant sought damages for psychiatric injury, restricted freedom of movement, and legal costs.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's claim, finding no breach of retainer or duty of care. Regarding the restraining order, the judge found that the appellant had signed instructions consenting to the order and that there was no evidence of coercion. The lost shirt, while a breach of retainer, caused no damages as the appellant could have proven its contents through other means. The appellant discontinued his civil proceedings against Linda Jones for financial reasons related to his children's education. The Full Court agreed with the trial judge's findings on the first two breaches but found the appellant had established a prima facie breach regarding the lost shirt, warranting nominal damages.

This case is an appeal brought by the appellant, Neil Trevor Jones, against the respondent, Howell & Associates, a firm of solicitors. The appeal arises from a decision of the District Court dismissing the appellant's claim for damages against the respondent on the basis that there was no case to answer. The appellant contends that a case was made out and the respondent should have been called upon to elect and call evidence in answer to that case. The matter before this Court is the appellant's appeal against the District Court's decision. The appellant was unrepresented both at trial and on appeal. The appellant's case against the respondent is founded on three alleged breaches of retainer and/or duty of care. These are: (a) the respondent's solicitor, Mr John Williams, advised the appellant to consent to the making of the restraining order and then commence alternate civil proceedings when he knew or should have known that such subsequent civil proceedings would be an abuse of process thereby preventing the appellant from having the truth of his claims established; (b) Mr Williams, notwithstanding the expressed instructions of the appellant, reported on his behalf to consent to confirmation of the restraining order; and (c) the respondent failed to look after and care for the shirt placed in its custody and disposed of the same prior to the conclusion of the claim, thereby endangering the appellant's ability to substantiate the malicious and false nature of the statements of the appellant's ex-wife. The trial judge found that there was no case to answer in respect of the first two allegations and that while there had been a breach of contract in respect of the third allegation, no damages had flowed from that breach. This Court agrees with the trial judge's finding in respect of the first two allegations but disagrees with his finding in respect of the third allegation. This Court is of the opinion that the trial judge should have called upon the respondent to elect. If the respondent had elected to call evidence in answer to the appellant's claim for breach then the trial judge would have needed to decide whether there was a breach. If on the other hand, the respondent elected to call no evidence, then in this Court's opinion, although this is really a matter for the trial judge, the appellant would be entitled to a judgment for nominal damages for that breach of contract.

Decision

Reasons for decision

DOYLE CJ PERRY J LANDER J
Issues
1. Did the trial judge err in finding that there was no case to answer with respect to the appellant's claim that the respondent breached the retainer by advising the appellant to consent to the making of the restraining order, knowing that subsequent civil proceedings would be an abuse of process?
2. Did the trial judge err in finding that there was no case to answer with respect to the appellant's claim that the respondent breached the retainer by consenting to the confirmation of the restraining order notwithstanding the appellant's expressed instructions?
3. Did the trial judge err in finding that there was no case to answer with respect to the appellant's claim that the respondent breached the retainer by failing to look after and care for the appellant's shirt and disposing of it prior to the conclusion of the claim, thereby endangering the appellant's ability to substantiate the malicious and false nature of the statements of the appellant's wife?
4. If the trial judge erred in finding that there was no case to answer with respect to the appellant's claim that the respondent breached the retainer by failing to look after and care for the appellant's shirt, should the Full Court remit the matter to the trial judge for further hearing or enter judgment for the appellant against the respondent for nominal damages?

Held
1. The Full Court held that the trial judge did not err in finding that there was no case to answer with respect to the appellant's claim that the respondent breached the retainer by advising the appellant to consent to the making of the restraining order, knowing that subsequent civil proceedings would be an abuse of process. The appeal in this respect was dismissed.
2. The Full Court held that the trial judge did not err in finding that there was no case to answer with respect to the appellant's claim that the respondent breached the retainer by consenting to the confirmation of the restraining order notwithstanding the appellant's expressed instructions. The appeal in this respect was dismissed.
3. The Full Court held that the trial judge did err in finding that there was no case to answer with respect to the appellant's claim that the respondent breached the retainer by failing to look after and care for the appellant's shirt and disposing of it prior to the conclusion of the claim, thereby endangering the appellant's ability to substantiate the malicious and false nature of the statements of the appellant's wife. The Full Court found that the appellant had established a prima facie case to answer in that regard.
4. The Full Court held that if the trial judge erred in finding that there was no case to answer with respect to the appellant's claim that the respondent breached the retainer by failing to look after and care for the appellant's shirt, the Full Court should enter judgment for the appellant against the respondent for nominal damages, say $10. The Full Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order dismissing the appellant's claim, and entered judgment for the appellant for nominal damages.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOYLE CJ, PERRY J, LANDER J

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia considered an appeal by the appellant, Mr Jones, against a decision by a District Court Judge that there was no case to answer on his claim that his solicitors, Howell & Associates, had breached his retainer agreement. The Full Court found that the trial judge erred in finding that there was no case to answer with respect to the claim that the respondent breached the retainer by failing to look after and care for the appellant's shirt and disposing of it prior to the conclusion of the claim. The Court held that the loss of the shirt amounted to a breach of the retainer but found that the appellant did not prove any damage arising from that breach.

The Court examined the appellant's claims that the respondent breached the retainer agreement by advising him to consent to the making of the restraining order, knowing that subsequent civil proceedings would be an abuse of process; by consenting to the confirmation of the restraining order notwithstanding the appellant's expressed instructions; and by failing to look after and care for the appellant's shirt and disposing of it prior to the conclusion of the claim.

The Court found that the appellant did not establish the breaches particularised in sub-paragraphs 12(a) and 12(b) of the Statement of Claim. With respect to the claim that the respondent advised the appellant to consent to the making of the restraining order, knowing that subsequent civil proceedings would be an abuse of process, the Court held that there was no suggestion that the appellant's proceedings were dismissed because they were an abuse of process or that they could have been dismissed for that reason. The Court also found that there was no evidence that the appellant complained about the respondent's advice before bringing separate proceedings against his wife.

With respect to the claim that the respondent consented to the confirmation of the restraining order notwithstanding the appellant's expressed instructions, the Court found that the appellant had given instructions to the respondent to confirm the restraining order, without acknowledging the contents of his wife's affidavit, as the price for the withdrawal of the charge of assault. The Court held that the appellant was faced with incontrovertible evidence that he had instructed the respondent to do that which the respondent did on 6 March 1997. The appellant's presence in court when the orders were made, his failure to complain of the respondent's actions on 6 March or at any time before bringing proceedings against his wife, and his plea in the proceedings brought against his wife were inconsistent with a claim that he was coerced.

However, the Court found that the loss of the shirt amounted to a breach of the retainer. The Court held that whether the respondent was the bailee of the shirt did not matter much and that if there was a bailment, it arose out of the contract of the retainer. The Court further held that the loss of the shirt had not led to any loss or damage. The Court found that the appellant could still establish that his wife had lied to the police about the shirt by calling the police officers and solicitors to prove that the shirt was not covered in blood at all but was covered in red paint. The Court held that the loss of the shirt had not led to any loss or damage as the appellant had discontinued his proceedings against his wife and the shirt would never be an exhibit in any proceedings.

The Court concluded that the trial judge should have called upon the respondent to elect. If the respondent had elected to call evidence in answer to the appellant's claim for breach, then the trial judge would have needed to decide whether there was a breach. If the respondent elected to call no evidence, then in the Court's opinion, the appellant would be entitled to a judgment for nominal damages for that breach of contract. The Court proposed that the reasons of this Court should be published and the parties allowed to consider their position. The appellant would need to formulate an amendment to his Notice of Appeal and seek leave to add a ground of appeal to the effect that the trial judge erred in failing to find that the appellant had made out a case to answer with respect to the appellant's claim that the respondent was in breach of contract in failing to look after and care for the appellant's shirt. If an amendment was proposed and allowed and if the respondent advised the Court it would not call evidence if the matter was remitted to the trial judge, the Full Court should allow the appeal, set aside the order dismissing the appellant's claim, and enter judgment for the appellant against the respondent for nominal damages. The Court would need to consider the appropriate order for costs and the costs of the appeal.