Jones v Civil Aviation Safety Authority & Anor

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[2012] HCATrans 064

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Melbourne  No M171 of 2011

B e t w e e n -

MILTON STANLEY KNIGHT JONES

Applicant

and

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

First Respondent

MAGISTRATE DUNCAN REYNOLDS

Second Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

HAYNE J
CRENNAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT MELBOURNE ON FRIDAY, 9 MARCH 2012, AT 9.49 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR P.G. NASH, QC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR J.A. RIBBANDS, for the applicant.  (instructed by Maitland Lawyers)

MS D.S. MORTIMER, SC:   If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR N.A.T. HARRINGTON, for the first respondent.  (instructed by Civil Aviation Safety Authority)

HAYNE J:   There is a submitting appearance for the second respondent, I think, is there not?

MS MORTIMER:   Yes, your Honour.

HAYNE J:   Yes, Mr Nash.

MR NASH:   If the Court pleases.  The rules relating to the criminal process and the rules relating to the right of the State to infringe private interests should be clear cut.  The decision of the Full Court in this case achieves almost exactly the opposite result.  There are four reasons why special leave should be granted.  The learned judge at first instance and the Full Court have both treated as information on oath material in an exhibit to an affidavit.

HAYNE J:   Assume that to be so, if you took the affidavit without regard to its exhibit, why was the affidavit not sufficient to found the grant of a warrant?

MR NASH:   It could have founded, your Honour, grounds for a warrant in relation to one particular offence.  There was nothing in the affidavit other than the opinion of the investigator which could have justified a warrant except in relation to the offence mentioned, in our submission.

HAYNE J:   Be it so, what follows?

MR NASH:   The warrant, your Honour, was far wider than justified.  We say it was invalid because it proceeded on a basis that there was information on oath to establish the other offences.  Cutting to where it seems that the Court is thinking at the moment ‑ ‑ ‑

HAYNE J:   I am glad you know where we are thinking, Mr Nash.  Do go on.

MR NASH:   I have spent a long time, your Honour, trying to find out where your Honour is.

HAYNE J:   Good luck.  Yes, go on.

MR NASH:   The ambit of the warrant departs from the wording of section 32AF.

CRENNAN J:   This is “will” rather than “may”, that departure?

MR NASH:   No, your Honour, it is the inclusion in the warrant of the words “reasonably suspected”, because what in fact has happened is that the thing has not been defined in terms of subsection (4) but has been defined in terms of the suspicion required for the grant of the warrant under subsection (2).  There is an analogy with the decision in Dunesky v Elder where…

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Details
Case
[2012] HCATrans 64
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Jones and others, sought judicial review of decisions made by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and the Minister for Infrastructure and Transport. The dispute concerned the validity of certain regulations and directions issued by CASA, which the applicants alleged were beyond the scope of the powers conferred by the *Civil Aviation Act 1988* (Cth) and the *Air Navigation Act 1920* (Cth). The matter was heard by the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the regulations and directions issued by CASA were *ultra vires* the powers granted to it under the relevant legislation. Specifically, the court was asked to consider whether CASA had exceeded its statutory authority in imposing certain operational requirements and restrictions on aircraft operations, and whether the Minister had acted lawfully in approving these measures. The applicants contended that these actions constituted an unlawful exercise of power.

In its reasoning, the High Court examined the statutory framework governing aviation safety in Australia, including the express and implied powers conferred by the *Civil Aviation Act 1988* and the *Air Navigation Act 1920*. The Court analysed the scope of CASA's regulatory functions and the limitations on its rulemaking powers. It applied principles of statutory interpretation to determine whether the impugned regulations and directions fell within the intended ambit of the legislation. The Court considered the relationship between the powers of CASA and the Minister, and the requirements for lawful delegation and approval of regulatory instruments.

The High Court found that the regulations and directions in question were within the scope of the powers conferred by the *Civil Aviation Act 1988* and the *Air Navigation Act 1920*. Consequently, the applications for judicial review were dismissed.

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