Jones and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2018] AATA 2243 (16 July 2018)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2018/2210
Re:Peter Jones
APPLICANT
AndSecretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Member C Edwardes
Date:16 July 2018
Place:Perth
The Applicant’s application for an extension of time is refused.
........................................................................
Member C Edwardes
CATCHWORDS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for extension of time to lodge application for review of decision – Tribunal refuses to grant an extension of time – disability support pension
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975(Cth) – para 29(2)(a) – ss 29(7)
Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) – ss94(1), ss 94(2), ss 94(3B)
Social Security (Active Participation for Disability Support Pension) Determination 2014
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) – sch 2 cl 4
Social Security (Tables for the Assessment of Work-related Impairment for Disability
Support Pension) Determination 2011 (Cth)
CASES
Augustynski and Secretary, Dept of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, Re [2013] AATA 507
Bobera and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2012] AATA 922
Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 99 ATC 4516
Chattopadhyay and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2015] AATA 158
Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441
DHLD and Executive Director, Social Security Appeals Tribunal [2010] AATA 377
Gallacher v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2015] FCA 1123
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 58 ALR 305
Kok Yong Tey and DSS [2013] AATA 753
Kuljic v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1994) 33 ALD 121
Re Grafton and Commonwealth (1988) 16 ALD 533
Re Romeo and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 26 ALD 248
Re Civic Tavern Pty Ltd and ACT Liquor Licensing Board (1993) 32 ALD 381
Re Veronica Lesley Johnson and Commonwealth of Australia; Commission of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation of Commonwealth Employees [1990] AATA 1
Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Roberts [2003] AATA 269
Swanson and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 606
VMXC and Secretary, FaHCSIA [2013] AATA 663
Zizza v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 37
REASONS FOR DECISION
Member C Edwardes
16 July 2018
THE APPLICATION
This is an application for an extension of time to make an application for review of a decision, dated 23 January 2018, made by the Social Services & Child Support Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT1). This decision affirmed a decision to refuse the Applicant a disability support pension (DSP).
ISSUE
The issue before the Tribunal is whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to grant leave for an extension of time for the Applicant to make an application to the Tribunal for a substantive review of the decision made by AAT1 (AAT1 decision) dated 23 January 2018.
The Applicant lodged her Application for Review of the Decision with the Tribunal on 03 May 2018.
The time for making…
Continue reading Jones and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social s...
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Jones and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2018] AATA 2243
- Case
- [2018] AATA 2243
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether it should exercise its discretion under subsection 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to extend the time for the Applicant to lodge their application for review. This required the Tribunal to consider several factors, including the length of the delay, whether the Applicant was aware of their appeal rights, any prejudice to the Respondent or the public interest, and the merits of the Applicant's substantive application. The Tribunal was also required to assess whether the Applicant had taken any action to contest the decision or had rested on their rights, and whether there were any alternative avenues of relief available to the Applicant.
In determining whether to grant the extension, the Tribunal applied established legal principles governing the exercise of discretion under section 29(7) of the AAT Act. These principles, drawn from cases such as *Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen* and *Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation*, emphasise that while the prescribed time limit is the prima facie rule, an extension may be granted if it is proper to do so. The Tribunal considered the Applicant's delay of approximately 55 days to be substantial, weighing against the grant of an extension. It also noted that the mere absence of prejudice to the respondent is insufficient to justify an extension, and that the merits of the substantive application and considerations of fairness between applicants are relevant factors.
The Tribunal ultimately determined that it was not reasonable in all the circumstances to grant the extension of time. The Applicant's delay was significant, and while the merits of the substantive application were considered, the Tribunal found that the delay and the lack of a compelling explanation for it, coupled with the public interest in the efficient conduct of merits review processes, weighed against exercising its discretion in favour of the Applicant.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The matter was heard on 20 June 2018. The Applicant appeared in person. The Respondent was represented by Ms De Vito.CONSIDERATION The Tribunal will consider the following:·Was there a significant delay in lodging an application to the Tribunal? ·Was the Applicant aware of his appeal rights and did the Applicant provide an acceptable explanation for the delay? ·Will the grant of an extension of time application prejudice the Respondent or the wider public? ·What are the merits of the Applicant’s substantial application – does the Applicant have reasonable prospects of success in proceeding with their substantial application? ·Does the Applicant have an alternative avenue of relief? Was there a significant delay in lodging an application to the Tribunal? The Tribunal notes and agrees with the Secretary’s contentions in relation to the length of the delay: 14. The Application for Extension of Time for Making an Application for Review of Decision (EOT Application), dated 8 May 2018, indicates that the Applicant received the relevant decision on 23 January 2018. Given that this was the date of the AAT1 hearing, it is assumed that this was not the date of receipt of the AAT1 decision. 15. The Notice of AAT’s Decision was dated 25 January 2018. It is assumed that the AAT1 decision was posted on this day. Subsection 29(1) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 states that meaning of service by post is that:…the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting the document as a letter and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.16. The Australia Post website states that it would take 2-6 business days by use of regular post for a letter to be sent from the AAT in Perth, WA, 6000 to the Applicant’s residence in Thornlie, WA, 6103. Therefore, it is assumed that the latest date the Applicant received the AAT1 decision is 2 February 2018.17. The 28th day after 2 February 2018 is 2 March 2018. Accordingly, the 28 day limit to lodge an appeal with the AAT2 expired on 2 March 2018. The 28 day application limit is prescribed by subsection 29(2) of the AAT Act and refers to “day” not “working day”.18. The Applicant’s Application was received by the AAT2 on 26 April 2018 according to AAT2 correspondence. Accordingly, the Applicant’s application is 55 days out of time (approximately 8 weeks). The Secretary contends that a delay of this kind constitutes a substantial delay in the statutory context.19. The Secretary contends that it would not be reasonable in the circumstances to grant an extension of time for a delay of 55 days. The Secretary notes that there is a public interest in the efficient conduct of merits review processes, such that timely decisions can be made and acted upon with finality.20. The length of delay involved in a case will be a relevant consideration. Moreover, even if the delay is not considered to be lengthy, the “brevity of the extension sought does not, however, lead automatically to an order extending the time” (Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services and Roberts [2003] AATA 269, [16]).21. The Secretary contends that the length of the delay weighs against the exercise of the discretion to grant an extension of time. (emphasis added) Was the Applicant aware of his appeal rights?