Jones and Ors of the Dalungbara, Batchala and Ngulungbara People v State of Queensland and Cth

Case [2000] QSC 64


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:  Jones & Ors v State of Queensland & Cwlth of Australia
[2000] QSC 064
PARTIES:  JOHN LEE JONES Elder and others of the
DALUNGBARA, BATCHALA and NGULUNGBARA
PEOPLE of KGARI (Great Sandy Region) as Trustees by
Native Customary Law (Plaintiffs)
and
THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND (First Defendant)
and
THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
(Second Defendant)
FILE NO/S:  No 183 of 1994
DELIVERED ON:  24 March 2000
DELIVERED AT:  Brisbane
JUDGE:  Muir J
ORDER:  That the plaintiffs pay two-thirds of the costs of the
second defendant of and incidental to this action
(including reserved costs) to be assessed, save that the
second defendant’s costs relating to the period prior to 1
November 1997 be limited to those which were the subject
of the order of Ambrose J made on 18 February 1998.
CATCHWORDS:  COSTS – claim for common law native title struck out –
whether “public interest” litigation – general principles
COUNSEL:  Mr J.L. Jones, in person, for the plaintiffs
The Australian Government Solicitor for the second
defendant
SOLICITORS:  The Australian Government Solicitor for the second
defendant
  1. MUIR J: On 24 December 1999 I handed down reasons for a costs order which I then

    proposed making. Mr Jones, who appeared on behalf of himself and the other

    plaintiffs, presented an oral argument that the costs order foreshadowed in the reasons

    should not be made having regard to a decision in Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1999)

FCA 1668 recently handed down by the Full Court of the Federal Court. He argued
that that decision was contrary to the decision of Mr Justice Ambrose made in this

matter on 31 October 1997, on an application by the first and second defendants to

strike out the statement of claim, in which it was decided that the Supreme Court did

not have jurisdiction to determine the plaintiffs’ common law native title claim to seas

and submerged lands seaward of the Queensland coastal waters because of “the

Mocambique rule”. His Honour held that British South Africa Co v Companhia de

Mocambique [1893] AC 602 was authority for the proposition that a superior court

may not determine disputed claims of title to foreign lands and that such a principle

applied to the plaintiffs’ claim to seas and submerged lands seaward of Queensland

coastal waters. On 18 February 1998 Ambrose J ordered that one-third of the

Commonwealth’s taxed costs of the application be costs in the cause and that the

Commonwealth pay two-thirds of Queensland’s taxed costs. The reason for depriving

the second defendant of two-thirds of its costs was that it failed in its contention that

the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to decide a claim to rights over land and waters

beyond the low water mark on the States’ seaward boundaries.

  1. In Yarmirr, at first instance, Olney J found against the second defendant’s contention

    that native title rights and interests did not exist beyond the seaward limits of the

    Northern Territory. The basis of the second defendants’ argument was that native title

    can have no existence where the common law does not apply and that common law did

    not recognise native title rights beyond the seaward limits of a State or Territory. The

    argument failed, it being held that the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) provided a basis for

    recognising native title rights off shore.

  2. The plaintiffs’ claim in this case was a common law claim which was not based and

    did not rely on the provisions of the Native Title Act. Furthermore in Yarmirr, no

    question arose as to the entitlement of any court to determine native title applications

    as the jurisdiction of the court at first instance was established by s 81 of the Native

    Title Act. For these reasons Yarmirr cannot be said to have arrived at a conclusion

    contrary to that expressed in the reasons of Ambrose J. Because there has been no

    appeal from Ambrose J’s order I see no reason to depart from the order foreshadowed

    in my reasons of 23 December.

  3. At the conclusion of Mr Jones’ oral submissions, I indicated that I would receive

    further written submissions on the point raised. Those submissions were received in

    January. Mr Jones’ arguments extended beyond the point raised in oral submissions.

    He argued, additionally, that the State of Queensland was in the position of trustee in

    relation to persons of Aboriginal descent. Because of the alleged existence of a

    relationship of beneficiary and trustee it was urged that the first defendant was obliged

    to bear any costs which the second defendant might otherwise be entitled to recover

    from the plaintiffs. Furthermore it was asserted that the Commonwealth had “an

    overriding duty of trust towards all Aborigines across Australia and if any costs are

    incurred it should be equally shared between the State and the Commonwealth”.

  4. The first defendant was not party to the argument in relation to costs – it elected not to

    claim costs against the plaintiffs. Consequently I could not make any order which

    would adversely affect its interests without affording it an opportunity to be heard. But

    in any event, no legal basis for the above contentions has been established.

  5. I order that the plaintiffs pay two-thirds of the costs of the second defendant of and

    incidental to this action (including reserved costs) to be assessed, save that the second

    defendant’s costs relating to the period prior to 1 November 1997 be limited to those

    which were the subject of the order of Ambrose J made on 18 February 1998.

Details
AGLC
Jones and Ors of the Dalungbara, Batchala and Ngulungbara People v State of Queensland and Cth [2000] QSC 64
Case
[2000] QSC 64
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved the Dalungbara, Batchala and Ngulungbara people, collectively referred to as the plaintiffs, who brought an action against the State of Queensland and the Commonwealth of Australia. The plaintiffs sought a declaration of their common law native title rights over certain lands. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with determining the validity of the plaintiffs' claim and the associated legal issues. The primary legal issues centred around the nature of the litigation and whether it qualified as a "public interest" case. This distinction was crucial in determining the allocation of costs between the parties.

The Court examined the principles that govern the classification of public interest litigation and the implications for cost orders. It considered the nature of the plaintiffs' claim, which was framed as a pursuit of common law native title, and whether this type of litigation inherently carries public interest attributes. The Court held that the plaintiffs' claim did not qualify as public interest litigation. Consequently, the plaintiffs were liable for the majority of the costs incurred by the second defendant. The Court further ruled that the second defendant's costs from before a specified date should be limited according to a previous order.

The Court's reasoning was grounded in the specific characteristics of the litigation and the lack of public interest elements in the plaintiffs' claim. It emphasised that claims for common law native title, while significant, did not automatically confer the status of public interest litigation. This distinction had direct implications for the cost orders, resulting in the plaintiffs being required to bear a significant portion of the costs. The final order mandated that the plaintiffs pay two-thirds of the second defendant's costs, subject to specific limitations for costs incurred before a particular date. This outcome underscored the importance of the public interest classification in cost allocation within litigation involving native title claims.

Orders

Orders of the court

That the plaintiffs pay two-thirds of the costs of the

second defendant of and incidental to this action

(including reserved costs) to be assessed, save that the

second defendant’s costs relating to the period prior to 1

November 1997 be limited to those which were the subject

of the order of Ambrose J made on 18 February 1998.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.