Jonathan Mullins v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia

[2014] FWC 7035

[2014] FWC 7035

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy

Jonathan Mullins
v
Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia
(U2014/1510)

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT ACTON MELBOURNE, 20 OCTOBER 2014

Application for costs - unreasonable act or omission in connection with conduct or continuation of matter - discretion not to order costs exercised.

Introduction

[1] This decision deals with an application for costs made by the Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (CEPU) in accordance with s.400A of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the FW Act) against Mr Jonathan Mullins. With the consent of the parties, this costs application has been dealt with by way of written submissions and witness statements.

Relevant background

[2] Mr Mullins was dismissed by the CEPU on 9 April 2014. Mr Mullins made an application against the CEPU to the Fair Work Commission (the FWC) for an unfair dismissal remedy (UDR application) on 30 April 2014.

[3] The CEPU filed its response to Mr Mullins’ UDR application in the FWC on 14 May 2014. In its response the CEPU advised that it had no jurisdictional objection to Mr Mullins’ UDR application. The response stated that Mr Mullins’ wage or salary at the time of his dismissal was $116,136 and, in addition, at the time he was entitled to other benefits being the full use of a motor vehicle, a mobile phone, a fuel card, a laptop computer and a camera.

[4] On 25 June 2014, the FWC listed the UDR application for determination on 4 and 5 September 2014. The notice of listing contained directions for Mr Mullins to file an outline of his submissions in the matter and any witness statements on which he intended to rely in the FWC and serve it on the CEPU by 7 July 2014, and for the CEPU to file and serve such material by 28 July 2014. Subsequently these dates were extended by the FWC to 10 and 31 July 2014 respectively.

[5] Mr Mullins filed and served his material by 10 July 2014. The material filed and served was prepared by B2B Lawyers (B2B) on the instructions of Mr Mullins and settled by counsel.

[6] On 17 July 2014, Maurice Blackburn Lawyers (MBL) filed in the FWC a “Notice of Representative Commencing to Act” for the CEPU in the matter.

[7] Also on 17 July 2014, MBL for the CEPU emailed the following letter to B2B for Mr Mullins:

“B2B Lawyers

[Address]…

WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAVE AS TO COSTS

Dear Mr Walton,

RE Jonathon Mullins v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia, U2014/1510

We act for the Respondent in this matter.

We have been instructed to make a jurisdictional objection to your client’s claim as he is not protected from unfair dismissal. The basis of our client’s application will be that by reason of subparagraph 382(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) your client’s annual rate of earnings is above the high income threshold.

The high income threshold for the period 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 was $129,300. Your client’s annual rate of earnings for the purposes of s 332 of the Act can be summarised as follows:

Item	Amount (before tax)
Wages	$116,136
Superannuation (amount above 9.25% only: s 332(2)(c), the Act)	$12,484
Fringe benefits tax	$10,729
TOTAL	$139,349

In addition, to the amount above your client had the use of a motor vehicle (Ford Territory) and mobile phone for work and private purposes. Should this matter proceed to a jurisdictional argument before the Fair Work Commission we will include amounts for private use of a motor vehicle and mobile phone in accordance with the formulas set out in Kunbarllanjnja Community Government Council v Fewings (unreported, AIRC, Ross VP, Watson SDP and Bacon C, Q0675, 7 May 1998 and Slavin v Horizon Holdings Pty Ltd [2012] FWA 2424; Roberts v High Professional Productions Pty Ltd[2010] FWA 3462 respectively.

We are instructed to demand that your client discontinue his unfair dismissal proceeding by close of business, Friday 18 July 2014. If your client’s unfair dismissal proceeding is discontinued by this time our client will not make an application for its costs in these proceedings.

However, if your client continues with this application in the face of the matters set out above, our client may rely on this letter for the purpose of a costs application pursuant to section 400A of the Act.

Our client reserves all of its rights.

Should you wish to discuss this matter please call Daniel Victory or Tim Wetherell of this office.

Yours faithfully

[Signed]

Daniel Victory…

Lawyer

MAURICE BLACKBURN”.

[8] Section 382 of the FW Act is as follows:

“382 When a person is protected from unfair dismissal

A person is protected from unfair dismissal at a time if, at that time:

(a) the person is an employee who has completed a period of employment with his or her employer of at least the minimum employment period; and

(b) one or more of the following apply:

(i) a modern award covers the person;

(ii) an enterprise agreement applies to the person in relation to the employment;

(iii) the sum of the person’s annual rate of earnings, and such other amounts (if any) worked out in relation to the person in accordance with the regulations, is less than the high income threshold.”

[9] B2B for Mr Mullins advised MBL for the CEPU that it would respond by 23 July 2014 to the 17 July 2014 letter, but did not do so beyond noting to MBL for the CEPU that the CEPU did not make a jurisdictional objection when it responded to Mr Mullins UDR application and Mr Mullins had incurred considerable costs in connection with a conciliation conference and material it had prepared in relation to the matter.

[10] On 23 July 2014, MBL for the CEPU filed its jurisdictional objection to Mr Mullins’ UDR application. The jurisdictional objection was based on Mr Mullins not meeting the requirements of s.382(b) of the FW Act. In respect of their jurisdictional objection, the CEPU stated:

“1. The Applicant for the purposes of subsection 382(b) of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) is not protected from unfair dismissal for the following reasons:

a. At the time of dismissal the Applicant was not covered by a modern award or an enterprise agreement; and

b. The Applicant’s annual rate of earnings is above the high income threshold.

2. At the date of the Applicant’s dismissal on 9 April 2014 the high income threshold was $129,300.00.

3. By reason of subsection 332(1) of the Act, an employee’s ‘Earnings’ relevantly include:

a. Wages;

b. The agreed money value of non-monetary benefits; and

c. Amounts or benefits prescribed by the regulations as set out in regulation 3.05 of the Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth).

4. Relevantly, contributions made by the Respondent to the Applicant’s superannuation fund above the compulsory contribution required under the Superannuation Guarantee Charge Act 1992 (Cth) are not excluded in the calculation of the Applicant’s earnings: s 332(4), the Act.

5. At the date of his dismissal the Applicant’s wages were $116,136.

6. In addition to this the Respondent made contributions towards the Applicant’s superannuation of 20% of his wages. Therefore the amount of superannuation paid by the Respondent over and above its superannuation guarantee charge obligations was $12,484. These amounts alone add to $128,620.

7. In addition to the above:

a. the Applicant was entitled to personal use of his work vehicle with fuel card;

b. the Applicant was entitled to personal use of his work mobile phone; and

c. the Respondent paid the fringe benefits tax of $10,729 associated with the Applicant’s personal use of the work vehicle.

8. We respectfully submit that the above amounts push the Applicant well beyond the high income threshold.” 1

[11] On 29 July 2014, the jurisdictional objection was listed for hearing by the FWC on 29 August 2014, with directions for the CEPU to file and serve its material in support by 11 August 2014 and Mr Mullins to file and serve his material in opposition by 21 August 2014. The previously listed proceedings for 4 and 5 September 2014 were effectively cancelled.

[12] On 1 August 2014, MBL for the CEPU sent a letter to B2B for Mr Mullins on a “without prejudice save as to costs” basis as follows:

“B2B Lawyers

[Address]…

WITHOUT PREJUDICE SAVE AS TO COSTS

Dear Mr Walton,

RE Mullins, Jonathon v CEPU, U2014/1510

As you would be aware arising from our client’s jurisdictional objection the merits hearing in this matter has now been cancelled. Instead a jurisdictional hearing has been scheduled for 2.00pm on 29 August 2014 with the Respondent required to file and serve its material by noon on 11 August.

Our client is about to commence preparing material in relation to the jurisdictional hearing. In doing so, our client will incur considerable legal costs. We have not received any indication about the basis on which your client alleges he is eligible to make an unfair dismissal application.

We are instructed that if your client withdraws his application by close of business on 4 August 2014. Our client will not make an application for costs incurred in relation to this unfair dismissal proceeding.

If our client is successful in its jurisdictional objection or your client discontinues his application after our client has incurred costs preparing the material for the jurisdictional hearing our client may rely on this letter on the question of costs.

If you wish to discuss this matter please contact the writer or Timothy Wetherell of this office.

Yours faithfully

[Signed]

Daniel Victory…

Associate

MAURICE BLACKBURN”.

[13] MBL for the CEPU also sent the following letter to B2B for Mr Mullins on 1 August 2014:

“B2B Lawyers

[Address]

Dear Mr Walton,

RE Mullins, Jonathon v CEPU, U2014/1510

We write in relation to the jurisdictional hearing at the Fair Work Commission scheduled for 29 August 2014.

Our jurisdictional objection relates to your client’s annual rate of earnings, and such other amounts, for the purposes of section 382 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act), was above the high income threshold.

To date, we have received no indication from you about whether your client intends to oppose the jurisdictional objection and if so on what basis.

There is no indication from the evidence filed by the Applicant to date that he is covered by a modern award or enterprise agreement. In our view, that is because your client is not covered by a modern award or enterprise agreement.

We therefore intend to prepare our material on the basis that your client does not allege that he is covered by a modern award or enterprise agreement. However, if your client does allege that he is covered by a modern award or enterprise agreement please inform us as soon as possible of:

a) the name of the modern award or enterprise agreement; and

b) the basis on which you say your client is covered by the modern award or enterprise agreement;

so that we may prepare our case accordingly.

If you wish to discuss this matter please contact the writer or Timothy Wetherell of this office.

Yours faithfully

[Signed]

Daniel Victory…

Associate

MAURICE BLACKBURN”.

[14] On 4 August 2014, B2B for Mr Mullins advised MBL for the CEPU that they considered Mr Mullins was covered by the Plumbing and Fire Sprinklers Award 2010 2 by virtue of its clause 4.5 since the CEPU provides group training services for apprentices engaged in the plumbing industry. The letter sought the CEPU’s acceptance that Mr Mullins was covered by that modern award or, alternatively, advice as to why the CEPU maintained he was not so covered.

[15] On 11 August 2014, MBL for the CEPU sent the following email to B2B for Mr Mullins:

“Dear Mr Walton,

We refer to the above matter and your below email.

Despite our letter of 1 August 2014 you have not indicated whether or not your client accepts his earnings are above the high income threshold. We have therefore prepared our material on the basis that your client does not accept his earnings are above the high income threshold. We anticipate filing and serving this material on you.

We maintain our view that your client is not covered by a modern award.

Regards

Daniel Victory│Associate…

Associate

Maurice Blackburn Lawyers”.

[16] On 12 August 2012, MBL for the CEPU filed and served its material on its jurisdictional objection. That same day, they sent an email to B2B for Mr Mullins advising that the onus was on Mr Mullins to establish that he is covered by a modern award and that once he had articulated the basis on which he maintained he was so covered by way of his to be filed and served material then they would respond.

[17] Neither B2B for Mr Mullins nor Mr Mullins filed and served any material by the due date of 21 August 2014.

[18] On 25 August 2014, MBL for the CEPU sent the following email to B2B for Mr Mullins:

“Dear Mr Walton

We act for the Respondent in this matter.

I write in relation to the jurisdictional hearing scheduled for this Friday (29 August 2014).

I called your offices this morning, but understand that you are currently unwell and therefore not in the office.

The Directions arising from our jurisdictional objection to your client’s application require material, including an Outline of Submissions and Witness Statements, to be filed and served by noon on Thursday, 21 August 2014.

At the time of writing, despite the FWC’s Directions, we have not received any material on behalf of the Applicant in preparation for the hearing on Friday.

Please indicate at your earliest convenience as to, if, and when you expect to file and serve material on behalf of your client in this matter.

If you wish to discuss this matter please call the writer or Daniel Victory.

Kind regards

Timothy Wetherell│Lawyer…

Maurice Blackburn Lawyers”.

[19] On 26 August 2014, B2B for Mr Mullins discontinued his UDR application.

[20] On 2 September 2014, MBL for the CEPU sent a letter by email to B2B advising that the CEPU was considering making a costs application but would not do so if Mr Mullins executed an enclosed settlement agreement. On 3 September 2014, B2B rejected that offer.

Statutory provisions

[21] Section 400A of the FW Act provides as follows:

“400A Costs orders against parties

(1) The FWC may make an order for costs against a party to a matter arising under this Part (the first party) for costs incurred by the other party to the matter if the FWC is satisfied that the first party caused those costs to be incurred because of an unreasonable act or omission of the first party in connection with the conduct or continuation of the matter.

(2) The FWC may make an order under subsection (1) only if the other party to the matter has applied for it in accordance with section 402.

(3) This section does not limit the FWC’s power to order costs under section 611.”

[22] The Explanatory Memorandum to the Fair Work Amendment Bill 2012 (Cth) said the following in respect of now s.400A of the FW Act:

“168. Item 4 inserts a new section 400A to enable the FWC to order costs against a party to an unfair dismissal matter (the first party) if it is satisfied that the first party caused the other party to the matter to incur costs by an unreasonable act or omission in connection with the conduct or continuation of the matter.

169. As with the new power to dismiss applications under section 399A, the power to award costs under section 400A is not intended to prevent a party from robustly pursuing or defending an unfair dismissal claim. Rather, the power is intended to address the small proportion of litigants who pursue or defend unfair dismissal claims in an unreasonable manner. The power is only intended to apply where there is clear evidence of unreasonable conduct by the first party.

170. The FWC’s power to award costs under this provision is discretionary and is only exercisable where the first party (whether the applicant or respondent) causes the other party to incur costs because of an unreasonable act or omission. This is intended to capture a broad range of conduct, including a failure to discontinue an unfair dismissal application made under section 394 and a failure to agree to terms of settlement that could have led to the application being discontinued.

171. However, the power to award costs is only available if the FWC is satisfied that the act or omission by the first party was unreasonable. What is an unreasonable act or omission will depend on the particular circumstances but it is intended that the power only be exercised where there is clear evidence of unreasonable conduct by the first party.”

CEPU submissions in chief

[23] The CEPU maintains the following were unreasonable acts or omissions by Mr Mullins:

(a) failing to accept the offer of the CEPU as set out in its 17 July 2014 letter, and/or

(b) failing to accept the offer of the CEPU as set out in its 1 August 2014 letter.

[24] The CEPU submits that as a result of these unreasonable acts or omissions the CEPU has incurred costs in connection with the conduct or continuation of the matter, associated in particular with:

(a) the preparation, filing and serving of its jurisdictional objection, and

(b) the preparation, filing and serving of its material for the jurisdictional objection hearing.

[25] The CEPU seeks that the FWC order that Mr Mullins pay:

(a) the CEPU’s legal costs incurred since 17 July 2014, or

(b) the CEPU’s legal costs from 1 August 2014.

Mr Mullins’ submissions

[26] Mr Mullins opposes the costs application on the basis that the CEPU’s offers of 17 July 2014 and 1 August 2014 required him to accept the CEPU’s late jurisdictional objection and abandon his UDR application after he had incurred significant costs pursuing his UDR application. They required him to do so on the basis of the CEPU’s assertions about the amounts attributable to his earnings from non-monetary benefits, at a time when B2B was researching and considering whether he was covered by a modern award. In those circumstances, Mr Mullins submits it was not unreasonable for him not to accept the CEPU’s offers.

[27] Further, he submits that he acted reasonably in discontinuing his UDR application after due consideration of the CEPU’s material filed and served on 12 August 2014 and B2B’s research and consideration of whether he may be covered by a modern award, and prior to the jurisdictional objection hearing.

[28] The evidence of Mr Demian Walton, a Partner of B2B, in respect of the matter includes the following:

“13. The offers made by Maurice Blackburn dated 17 July 2014 and 1 August 2014 required the applicant to abandon his claim for unfair dismissal. Upon my instructions, the applicant’s salary and superannuation in excess of the statutory minimum were close to, but below, the jurisdictional earnings limit for an unfair dismissal application. I was further instructed that the applicant was provided by the respondent for use in his employment with a motor vehicle, mobile phone and camera, but which he was also permitted to use for personal purposes, as well as certain small allowances the purposes of which were not apparent to me. My instructions did not enable me to quantify the extent to which those provisions by the respondent constituted the applicant’s earnings. Whilst assertions about those matters were made in various letters by Maurice Blackburn as referred to in Mr Wetherell’s witness statement, it was not until the provision of the witness statement of Quyen Ngo dated 12 August 2014 that those assertions were supported by evidence, being the relevant internal records of the respondent. Additionally, it was not readily apparent to me whether or not the applicant was covered by a Modern Award. I conducted detailed research into whether the applicant’s employment had been covered by a Modern Award. Having originally considered that the applicant’s employment may have been covered by the Plumbers and Fire Sprinklers Award 2010, upon further consideration I concluded it was inapplicable, but I then considered that the applicant may be covered by the Miscellaneous Award 2010. After consulting with counsel, I concluded that the applicant was unlikely to be covered by the Miscellaneous Award, and on 26 August 2014 I obtained the applicant’s instructions to discontinue his unfair dismissal application, prior to the parties incurring the costs of the jurisdictional hearing listed for 29 August 2014.” 3

[29] In addition, Mr Mullins submits the FWC should exercise its discretion not to make an order for costs against him. This is said to be because:

“4. First, such an order would have a punitive effect in circumstances where the lateness of the respondent’s jurisdictional objection has already caused the applicant to incur considerable wasted costs in connection with a conciliation conference and thereafter preparing a detailed witness statement and outline of submissions in support of his unfair dismissal application, at a time when the respondent, whose financial resources dwarf those of the applicant, had elected not to incur the costs of legal representation.

5. Second, given that:

(a) the costs of the present application are likely to be about the same as or more than the costs the subject of the application, and much more if a costs hearing is required;

(b) the respondent has at no time sought to quantify or ask for an amount in settlement of its costs; and

(c) instead, the respondent has sought a release by the applicant, for no payment, of substantial claims he may pursue against the respondent in other jurisdictions arising from the facts set out in his witness statement,

it is fair to infer that recovering costs is not the genuine purpose of the respondent’s costs application, and rather the real purpose of the application to cause the applicant to abandon his substantial claims in other jurisdictions, alternatively to cause the applicant to incur more wasted costs and thereby to impair his ability to fund the litigation of those other claims.” 4

CEPU submissions in reply

[30] The CEPU submits in reply that Mr Mullins knew or ought to have known the amount of remuneration he was paid by the CEPU and could not have been in any doubt his remuneration was above the high income threshold after receiving the 17 July 2014 letter from MBL.

[31] Further, the CEPU submits Mr Mullins ought to have satisfied himself that he was protected from unfair dismissal under the FW Act, including whether he was covered by a modern award, prior to filing his UDR application. In addition, the CEPU submits Mr Mullins should have made inquiries and consulted with legal counsel prior to rejecting the offers in the letters of 17 July 2014 and 1 August 2014.

[32] The CEPU also submits that the timing of its jurisdictional objection is not relevant. However, even if the FWC forms the view such timing is relevant, it is not a factor weighing against the ordering of costs against Mr Mullins because:

“a. The obligation is on the Applicant to ensure he is protected from unfair dismissal before filing an unfair dismissal claim;

b. The Respondent was entitled to see the basis on which the Applicant alleged he was protected from unfair dismissal before deciding whether to make a jurisdictional objection;

c. Shortly after receiving the Applicant’s material the Respondent sought legal advice and made a jurisdictional objection.” 5

[33] The CEPU’s evidence is that from 17 July 2014 to 26 August 2014 it incurred some $4,959.50 in costs in, amongst other things, preparing its material for the jurisdictional objection hearing.

[34] Finally, the CEPU rejects the contention that its costs application is brought to cause Mr Mullins to abandon other claims or to punish him. MBL for the CEPU wrote to B2B for Mr Mullins on 30 September 2014 as follows:

“B2B Lawyers

[Address]

Dear Mr Walton,

RE Jonathan Mullins v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia, Matter No. U2014/1510

This is an open letter.

We refer to the above matter and to the material filed and served by the parties in the above proceeding in the application filed by our client on 9 September 2014 (Costs Application).

As you will be aware, we consider that the correspondence referred to in paragraphs 14 and 15 of you Mr Walton’s witness statement were without prejudice to the Costs Application. The exception of ‘save as to costs’ related to costs of the costs application. We invite you to withdraw and not read paragraphs 14 and 15 of Mr Walton’s witness statement into evidence and any material filed that refers to the correspondence referred to in those paragraphs.

We note that it is alleged in the material filed on behalf of your client that the Costs Application is not brought for the genuine purpose of recovering costs because, inter alia;

a. The amount of legal costs had not been quantified; and

b. The costs of the Costs Application may exceed the costs sought by the Respondent in the Costs Application.

Our client rejects the contention that the Costs Application is not brought for the genuine purpose of recovering its costs. It also rejects that the matters referred to above are relevant to the Costs Application.

You are now in receipt of the Respondent’s material in reply in relation to the costs application. In particular, you are in receipt of the witness statement of Mr Tim Wetherell stating that the Respondents costs from 17 July to 26 August 2014 were $4,959.50.

If your client agrees to pay our client $4,959.50 in respect of legal costs incurred between 17 July and 26 August 2014 our client will discontinue the Costs Application on the basis that both parties bear their own costs of the Costs Application. This offer is open until 5pm on 9 October 2014 or 5pm on the day before the hearing of the Costs Application, whichever is sooner, after which time it is expressly revoked.

Should you wish to discuss this matter please call Daniel Victory or Tim Wetherell of this office.

Yours faithfully

[Signed]

Daniel Victory…

Lawyer

MAURICE BLACKBURN”.

Consideration

[35] The CEPU has made an application for a s.400A(1) order in accordance with s.402. I am prepared to assume and, accordingly, I am satisfied that Mr Mullins caused costs to be incurred by the CEPU because of an unreasonable act or omission by him in connection with the conduct or continuation of the matter U2014/1510, being Mr Mullins’ UDR application.

[36] I am not persuaded however that, in the exercise of my discretion pursuant to s.400A of the FW Act, I should make an order for costs against Mr Mullins for the costs incurred and sought by the CEPU.

[37] The CEPU filed its response to Mr Mullins’ UDR application in the FWC on 14 May 2014. In their response, the CEPU stated Mr Mullins’ wage or salary at the time of his dismissal was $116,136 and that in addition at the time he was entitled to other benefits being the full use of a motor vehicle, a mobile phone, a fuel card, a laptop computer and a camera. The CEPU also stated in their response that they had no jurisdictional objection to Mr Mullins’ UDR application. The CEPU did not raise their jurisdictional objection to Mr Mullins’ UDR application, being that Mr Mullins was not protected from unfair dismissal due to the provisions of s.382(b) of the FW Act, until 17 July 2014. No adequate reason for their delay in raising that jurisdictional objection has been given.

[38] In the meantime, Mr Mullins had B2B prepare and counsel settle material going to the merits of his UDR application and also had that material filed and served. However, Mr Mullins’ merits material became unnecessary when his UDR application was discontinued following the filing and serving of the CEPU’s material on its unnecessarily delayed jurisdictional objection.

[39] The CEPU submits their delay in raising the jurisdictional objection should not weigh against the making of an order for costs against Mr Mullins. However, their reasoning is not persuasive. While the CEPU criticises Mr Mullins for not ensuring that he was protected from unfair dismissal before making his UDR application, the CEPU’s response to Mr Mullins’ UDR application filed in the FWC on 14 May 2014 did not raise that he was not so protected. Further, the bases on which the CEPU ultimately raised their jurisdictional objection, as well as the facts on which the bases were founded, were or should have been within the knowledge of the CEPU at the time of their 14 May 2014 response to Mr Mullins’ UDR application. They did not need to see, and ultimately did not rely on, any bases and facts provided by Mr Mullins about his protection from unfair dismissal to decide whether to make, and to make, their jurisdictional objection. Although the CEPU sought legal advice and made their jurisdictional objection shortly after receiving Mr Mullins’ merits material on 10 July 2014, the reason for their delay in doing so is not adequately explained.

[40] In the circumstances, in the exercise of my discretion pursuant to s.400A of the FW Act, I decline to make an order for costs against Mr Mullins for the costs incurred and sought by the CEPU.

Conclusion

[41] For the above reasons, the CEPU costs application in matter U2014/1510 is dismissed. An order 6 to that effect is being issued at the same time as this decision.

SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT

 1   Form F4 in matter U2014/1510.

 2   MA000036.

 3   Witness Statement of Demian Walton dated 19 September 2014 in matter U2014/1510.

 4   Written submissions of Jonathan Mullins dated 19 September 2014 in matter U2014/1510.

 5   Written submissions of the Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia dated 24 September 2014 in matter U2014/1510.

 6   Jonathan Mullins v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia, PR556296.

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