FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Johnston v Challen, trading as Hawthorn Cappaidge and Badgery [2006] FCA 401
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appellate jurisdiction – application for extension of time for leave to appeal from judgment of Federal Magistrates Court - whether special reason exists for extension of time – merits of appeal
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 153B
Federal Court Rules O 52 r 15
Gough v Myall Pty (2001) FCA 1692 applied
Heinrich v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2003) FCAFC 315 referred to
House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 referred to
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 cited
Jess v Scott (unreported Full Court of the Federal Court, Lockhart, Sheppard and Burchett JJ, 4 November 1986) applied
Kalaba v R (unreported, 13 September 1996, Finn J) applied
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 referred to
Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666 cited
Stankiewicz v Plata (2002) FCA 1185 appliedLORIS JOHNSTON v PETER LESLIE CHALLEN, TRADING AS HAWTHORN CAPPAIDGE AND BADGERY
QUD 460 OF 2005COLLIER J
18 APRIL 2006
BRISBANE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
QUD 460 OF 2005
BETWEEN:
LORIS JOHNSTON
APPLICANTAND:
PETER LESLIE CHALLEN, TRADING AS HAWTHORN CAPPAIDGE & BADGERY
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 APRIL 2006
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
QUD 460 OF 2005
BETWEEN:
LORIS JOHNSTON
APPLICANTAND:
PETER LESLIE CHALLEN, TRADING AS HAWTHORN CAPPAIDGE & BADGERY
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
COLLIER J
DATE:
18 APRIL 2006
PLACE:
BRISBANE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application by Ms Loris Johnston (‘the applicant’) for an extension of time to file and serve a Notice of Appeal from the decision of Federal Magistrate Jarrett made on 30 September 2005, wherein the learned Federal Magistrate refused an order that the applicant’s bankruptcy be annulled pursuant to s 153B Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (‘the Act’).
The respondent to this application is the petitioning creditor to the bankruptcy of the applicant. Another creditor, I & L Securities Pty Ltd (‘I & L Securities’), and the trustee in bankruptcy were also represented at the hearing.
Time limits for filing and serving a notice of appeal from a decision of the Court or the Federal Magistrates Court are determined by O 52 r 15 Federal Court Rules. This rule provides as follows:
‘(1) The notice of appeal shall be filed and served -
(a) within 21 days after -
(i) the date when the judgment appealed from was pronounced;
(ii) the date when leave to appeal was granted; or
(iii) any later date fixed for that purpose by the court appealed from; or(b) within such further time as is allowed by the Court or a Judge upon application made by motion upon notice filed within the…
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- Case
- [2006] FCA 401
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether Johnston's application for leave to appeal the decision to dismiss her application for bankruptcy annulment should be granted. The court considered whether the delay in lodging the appeal notice was justifiable, and if the appeal had a prima facie merit. The court also examined whether the discretionary factors considered by Jarrett FM, such as Johnston's failure to disclose assets and comply with her obligations under the Act, justified the refusal to annul the bankruptcy.
The court found that while Johnston's explanation for the delay in lodging the appeal notice was plausible, the discretionary considerations highlighted by Jarrett FM were significant. The court concluded that the appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant granting leave to appeal. The court further held that allowing the appeal would potentially cause undue delay and cost to all parties involved, without a reasonable prospect of a successful outcome. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and Johnston was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: COLLIER J
A supporting affidavit, also filed by the applicant on 17 November 2005, elaborates slightly on each of these grounds, however supplements them with additional evidence namely:·A claim by the applicant that she had $6756 in her bank account as of 18 May 2006, with all rates and accounts paid to that date;·Claims by the applicant that she had receipts ‘for most of the china’ and in respect of boats and motor vehicles, which indicate that these assets were not hers;·A statement that she was waiting for a report from a barrister in relation to the debt claimed by I & L Securities;·A statement that she has obtained approval to be refinanced for her other creditors; and·A statement that she has ‘statutory declarations from tenants at the boarding house that (she) was not there on 2.5.05’;·A request that evidence be produced from a third party that ‘at approx 7.15 am on 2nd May, 2005 on my way from home in Slacks Creek to the Boarding House in Wooloowin I stopped at her home at 77 Kneale Street, Holland Park West to drop off plant cuttings’.CONSIDERATION OF RELEVANT PRINCIPLES I note that the applicant actually lodged the notice to extend time to file the notice of appeal within a week of the expiry of the prescribed time period. In my view, the delay is not substantial, or such that, in itself, it is likely to prejudice the respondent. In my view the applicant’s explanation for her delay in lodging a notice of appeal is prima facie plausible. No evidence has been produced to this court in relation to the claimed conversation between the applicant and ‘the Registrar’, other than evidence of the applicant. For the purposes of this application, I am prepared however to find that, through misunderstanding or otherwise, the applicant genuinely believed that she could file her notice of appeal from the decision of the learned Federal Magistrate the week after the expiry of the 21 days prescribed by O 52 r 15(1)(a). I am also prepared to accept the claim of the applicant that she believed that she needed the funds from her Centrelink payment to pay the filing fee for lodgement of the notice. In my view, the key question is whether, prima facie, the merit of the applicant’s case is such that the Court should exercise its discretion to allow additional time to file a notice of appeal. To paraphrase Finn J in Kalaba v R (unreported, 13 September 1996 at p 6, quoting in turn the Full Court in Jones v The Queen (unreported) Federal Court, 17 August 1984), has the applicant demonstrated that her appeal may have sufficient prospect of success to make it just that she should not be allowed to proceed with it? The other side of this coin is clearly that it is potentially unjust to all parties to this matter to allow the applicant to proceed with a case, where there are not sufficient prospects of success, but which would cause all parties to perhaps futilely incur costs, and introduce improper delay into the affairs of the parties. It is appropriate that I should then consider the prima facie merit of the applicant’s appeal case should she be granted leave to now file her notice of appeal.