Johnston v Challen, trading as Hawthorn Cappaidge and Badgery

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Johnston v Challen, trading as Hawthorn Cappaidge and Badgery [2006] FCA 401

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – appellate jurisdiction – application for extension of time for leave to appeal from judgment of Federal Magistrates Court - whether special reason exists for extension of time – merits of appeal

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 153B

Federal Court Rules O 52 r 15

Gough v Myall Pty (2001) FCA 1692 applied
Heinrich v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2003) FCAFC 315 referred to
House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 referred to
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1984) 3 FCR 344 cited
Jess v Scott (unreported Full Court of the Federal Court, Lockhart, Sheppard and Burchett JJ, 4 November 1986) applied
Kalaba v R (unreported, 13 September 1996, Finn J) applied
Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 referred to
Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666 cited
Stankiewicz v Plata (2002) FCA 1185 applied

LORIS JOHNSTON v PETER LESLIE CHALLEN, TRADING AS HAWTHORN CAPPAIDGE AND BADGERY
QUD 460 OF 2005

COLLIER J
18 APRIL 2006
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 460 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

LORIS JOHNSTON
APPLICANT

AND:

PETER LESLIE CHALLEN, TRADING AS HAWTHORN CAPPAIDGE & BADGERY
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 APRIL 2006

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

QUD 460 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

LORIS JOHNSTON
APPLICANT

AND:

PETER LESLIE CHALLEN, TRADING AS HAWTHORN CAPPAIDGE & BADGERY
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

COLLIER J

DATE:

18 APRIL 2006

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is an application by Ms Loris Johnston (‘the applicant’) for an extension of time to file and serve a Notice of Appeal from the decision of Federal Magistrate Jarrett made on 30 September 2005, wherein the learned Federal Magistrate refused an order that the applicant’s bankruptcy be annulled pursuant to s 153B Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (‘the Act’).

  2. The respondent to this application is the petitioning creditor to the bankruptcy of the applicant. Another creditor, I & L Securities Pty Ltd (‘I & L Securities’), and the trustee in bankruptcy were also represented at the hearing.

  3. Time limits for filing and serving a notice of appeal from a decision of the Court or the Federal Magistrates Court are determined by O 52 r 15 Federal Court Rules. This rule provides as follows:

    ‘(1) The notice of appeal shall be filed and served -

    (a) within 21 days after -

    (i) the date when the judgment appealed from was pronounced;
    (ii) the date when leave to appeal was granted; or
    (iii) any later date fixed for that purpose by the court appealed from; or

    (b) within such further time as is allowed by the Court or a Judge upon application made by motion upon notice filed within the…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 401
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Johnston v Challen, trading as Hawthorn Cappaidge and Badgery, the applicant, Johnston, sought the annulment of her bankruptcy under s 153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The application was dismissed by Jarrett FM, and Johnston subsequently applied for leave to appeal the decision. Johnston's bankruptcy arose from a debt owed to the respondent, Challen, her former solicitor, for professional costs related to litigation between Johnston and I & L Securities, as well as a dispute involving a storm water drain. The debt was initially pursued through the Magistrates Court of Queensland, where Johnston failed to defend the claim, resulting in a default judgment. A subsequent compromise agreement between Johnston and Challen was not honoured, leading to a second judgment against Johnston, which was the basis for the second bankruptcy notice.

The central legal issue before the court was whether Johnston's application for leave to appeal the decision to dismiss her application for bankruptcy annulment should be granted. The court considered whether the delay in lodging the appeal notice was justifiable, and if the appeal had a prima facie merit. The court also examined whether the discretionary factors considered by Jarrett FM, such as Johnston's failure to disclose assets and comply with her obligations under the Act, justified the refusal to annul the bankruptcy.

The court found that while Johnston's explanation for the delay in lodging the appeal notice was plausible, the discretionary considerations highlighted by Jarrett FM were significant. The court concluded that the appeal did not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant granting leave to appeal. The court further held that allowing the appeal would potentially cause undue delay and cost to all parties involved, without a reasonable prospect of a successful outcome. Consequently, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and Johnston was ordered to pay the costs of the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the costs of the respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

It is useful to examine the background to this case, and then return to these principles.BACKGROUND The relevant facts of this case are set out in the judgment of Jarrett FM, delivered 30 September 2005. As noted earlier in this judgment, the proceeding before the learned Federal Magistrate was an application, brought by the applicant in the case before me, for her bankruptcy to be annulled pursuant to s 153B of the Act. Section 153B provides as follows:‘(1)If the Court is satisfied that a sequestration order ought not to have been made or, in the case of a debtor’s petition, that the petition ought not to have been presented or ought not to have been accepted by the Official Receiver, the Court may make an order annulling the bankruptcy.(2)In the case of a debtor’s petition, the order may be made whether or not the bankrupt was insolvent when the petition was presented.’ The applicant became bankrupt following an order for the sequestration of her estate in accordance with s 43(2). Therefore only s 153B(1) is relevant. Section 153B(2) is irrelevant for the purposes of this application. The debt which eventually formed the basis of the sequestration order related to monies claimed by the respondent, who was at one point the applicant’s solicitor. The debt was incurred for professional costs and outlays of the respondent in relation to litigation between the applicant and I & L Securities, and also in relation to a dispute between the applicant and a third party involving a storm water drain. The litigation between the applicant and I & L Securities, which is described in some detail in the judgment of Jarrett FM, commenced in 1997, and included a successful default judgment obtained by I & L Securities in the District Court of Queensland in April 1999. This default judgment was subsequently set aside. I & L Securities applied for judgment again in June 2003 but I am unaware whether any orders have been made. On 18 December 2002 the respondent issued proceedings out of the Magistrates Court of Queensland in Brisbane in relation to monies owed by the applicant, claiming $13 362.75 and interest. The applicant did not file a defence to the respondent’s claim, and default judgment was entered against her on 5 February 2004. Relying on the default judgment of the Magistrates Court, the respondent issued a bankruptcy notice, which was served on the applicant. It appears that on 19 May 2004, which was the same date as the hearing of the creditor’s petition, the applicant filed an application to set aside the Magistrates Court judgment. The applicant and the respondent agreed to compromise the respondent’s claim by the applicant paying $6000, by instalments, in full and final satisfaction of the claim made by the respondent. The agreement of the applicant and the respondent was formalised by a deed. However, the applicant apparently did not pay any of the instalments agreed. Consequently, the respondent sought to enforce the deed of settlement, and was successful in obtaining a second judgment against the applicant in the Magistrates Court of Queensland on the basis of the applicant’s failure to comply with the deed. A second bankruptcy notice (‘the second bankruptcy notice’) was issued by the respondent, based on this second judgment, and served on the applicant on 24 March 2005.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

COLLIER J
The applicant has also claimed that she now has additional resources, in the form of refinancing from other creditors. It is difficult to know how to view this evidence. While it may be evidence of solvency, the fact of the matter is that, if the applicant has recently managed to obtain additional credit while she has been a bankrupt (TS p 57 ll 24-28), her actions are likely to have been in breach of s 269 of the Act and hence unlawful. I make no finding in relation to this issue.CONCLUSION In my view the case put to me by the applicant does not on its face disclose any basis upon which I would disturb the findings of the learned Federal Magistrate on appeal. His Honour heard the evidence before him, and refused to annul the bankruptcy of the applicant under s 153B(1) of the Act. The applicant has made submissions concerning comments of his Honour in refusing to exercise his discretion in the applicant’s favour, including the view of his Honour that the applicant’s affairs were deserving of further investigation, as she failed to disclose assets to the trustees, failed to comply with her obligations under the Act, and there was uncertainty with respect to ownership of assets. In view of the nature of the case, I am not prepared to hold that his Honour was in error in so finding. As stated succinctly by the learned authors of McDonald Henry and Meek Australian Bankruptcy Law and Practice at par 153B.0.07:‘The discretionary consideration is an important factor and is often overlooked by applicants. Despite an applicant demonstrating that the sequestration order ought not to have been made or the debtor’s petition ought not to have been presented the discretionary factors may result in the application being refused.’ On review of the case and the evidence before me, in my view an appeal from the decision of the learned Federal Magistrate would be bound to fail. I find there are no special reasons within the meaning of O 52 r 15(2) to extend time to the applicant to file her notice of appeal from the decision of Jarrett FM. Accordingly, I dismiss the application with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: COLLIER J

A supporting affidavit, also filed by the applicant on 17 November 2005, elaborates slightly on each of these grounds, however supplements them with additional evidence namely:·A claim by the applicant that she had $6756 in her bank account as of 18 May 2006, with all rates and accounts paid to that date;·Claims by the applicant that she had receipts ‘for most of the china’ and in respect of boats and motor vehicles, which indicate that these assets were not hers;·A statement that she was waiting for a report from a barrister in relation to the debt claimed by I & L Securities;·A statement that she has obtained approval to be refinanced for her other creditors; and·A statement that she has ‘statutory declarations from tenants at the boarding house that (she) was not there on 2.5.05’;·A request that evidence be produced from a third party that ‘at approx 7.15 am on 2nd May, 2005 on my way from home in Slacks Creek to the Boarding House in Wooloowin I stopped at her home at 77 Kneale Street, Holland Park West to drop off plant cuttings’.CONSIDERATION OF RELEVANT PRINCIPLES I note that the applicant actually lodged the notice to extend time to file the notice of appeal within a week of the expiry of the prescribed time period. In my view, the delay is not substantial, or such that, in itself, it is likely to prejudice the respondent. In my view the applicant’s explanation for her delay in lodging a notice of appeal is prima facie plausible. No evidence has been produced to this court in relation to the claimed conversation between the applicant and ‘the Registrar’, other than evidence of the applicant. For the purposes of this application, I am prepared however to find that, through misunderstanding or otherwise, the applicant genuinely believed that she could file her notice of appeal from the decision of the learned Federal Magistrate the week after the expiry of the 21 days prescribed by O 52 r 15(1)(a). I am also prepared to accept the claim of the applicant that she believed that she needed the funds from her Centrelink payment to pay the filing fee for lodgement of the notice. In my view, the key question is whether, prima facie, the merit of the applicant’s case is such that the Court should exercise its discretion to allow additional time to file a notice of appeal. To paraphrase Finn J in Kalaba v R (unreported, 13 September 1996 at p 6, quoting in turn the Full Court in Jones v The Queen (unreported) Federal Court, 17 August 1984), has the applicant demonstrated that her appeal may have sufficient prospect of success to make it just that she should not be allowed to proceed with it? The other side of this coin is clearly that it is potentially unjust to all parties to this matter to allow the applicant to proceed with a case, where there are not sufficient prospects of success, but which would cause all parties to perhaps futilely incur costs, and introduce improper delay into the affairs of the parties. It is appropriate that I should then consider the prima facie merit of the applicant’s appeal case should she be granted leave to now file her notice of appeal.