Johnson v The Queen - [2003] HCATrans 416

[2003] HCATrans 416

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Perth No P44 of 2003

B e t w e e n -
CHAD JOHNSON
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT PERTH ON TUESDAY, 21 OCTOBER 2003, AT 12.36 PM

MR D. GRACE, QC: If the Court pleases, I appear with MR M.L. TUDORI for the appellant. (instructed by Michael Tudori & Associates)

GLEESON CJ: And we will note that Mr Bugg, QC appears with Mr Renton for the respondent. Yes, Mr Grace.

KIRBY J: Have you heard from Mr Bugg? Do you know if he is in the precincts or ‑ ‑ ‑

MR GRACE: I have no idea, your Honour. I have not seen him.

GLEESON CJ: Never mind. Go ahead.

MR GRACE: The Deputy Registrar informs me that Mr Bugg will be here in five minutes.

GLEESON CJ: Good. Go ahead.

MR GRACE: Your Honours, in this case the provisions of Part 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) as supplemented by the common law were applicable in the sentencing of the appellant.

KIRBY J: Now, that was drawn to the notice of the Full Court, was it not? It was referred to by the primary judge I think.

MR GRACE: Yes.

KIRBY J: It is mentioned in his reasons?

MR GRACE: Yes.

KIRBY J: So he knew about it.

MR GRACE: He knew about it.

KIRBY J: The question I suppose is whether he did enough to attend to it.

MR GRACE: Yes. We submit that the learned sentencing judge erred in two major respects. Firstly, he did not adopt the process and principles applicable to the sentencing of federal offenders, but instead applied the principles applicable, or more applicable, to the sentencing under Western Australian State law and adopting Western Australian State law and its applicable principles and practices. In so doing, the one transaction rule and the totality principle, which were common law principles recognised by Part 1B of the Crimes Act, were not observed or properly applied at all.

The errors were perpetuated when the matter came up before the court below. It is clear – and I do not believe there is any dispute about this – that the sentence to be imposed upon the appellant had to be determined in accordance with Part 1B. That was the first port of call. The applicable sentencing principles to be applied were those, first of all, guided by Part 1B and, secondly, where there was a gap or an omission by the common law. If I could take your Honours firstly to Part 1B itself and take you through the applicable provisions.

GUMMOW J: What is now the issue between you and the respondent?

MR GRACE: The respondent says that the court below and the learned sentencing judge, even though they may not have gone about it the right…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Johnson v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Johnson v The Queen [2003] HCATrans 416
Case: [2003] HCATrans 416
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Mr. Johnson, against his conviction for murder. The dispute centred on the admissibility of certain evidence obtained during police investigations and the fairness of the trial process.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence that was allegedly obtained in contravention of the applicant's rights, and whether the overall conduct of the trial had been unfair, thereby vitiating the conviction. Specifically, the Court examined the application of the exclusionary rule in relation to evidence obtained improperly or in contravention of law, and the principles governing the exercise of judicial discretion to exclude such evidence in the interests of a fair trial.

The Court's reasoning focused on the balance between the need to admit relevant evidence and the imperative to ensure that convictions are not secured through unfair means. It was held that while evidence obtained in contravention of legal rights may be excluded, the discretion to do so is not unfettered. The Court considered the nature of the contravention, the importance of the evidence, and the potential prejudice to the accused. Ultimately, the Court found that the admission of the evidence in question did not render the trial unfair to the extent that the conviction should be quashed.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the applicant's conviction for murder.

Orders