Johnson v The Queen - [2003] HCATrans 417

[2003] HCATrans 417

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Perth No P44 of 2003

B e t w e e n -
CHAD JOHNSON
Appellant
and
THE QUEEN
Respondent

GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J
KIRBY J
CALLINAN J
HEYDON J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT PERTH ON WEDNESDAY, 22 OCTOBER 2003, AT 10.02 AM

(Continued from 21/10/03)

GLEESON CJ: Yes, Mr Bugg.

MR BUGG: Thank you. If I could just very quickly recap on some matters which I covered yesterday afternoon. His Honour, we say, did apply Commonwealth provisions, and I refer again to the passages from the appeal book. The requirement which the appellant argues for that an actual date to be given for the commencement of a cumulative sentence is, we say, not required in the Act. The explanatory memorandum clearly indicates a broad basis upon which that cumulative sentencing process should take place.

Interestingly, one of the authorities referred to by Justice McHugh in Postiglione, Holder and Johnston [1983] 3 NSWLR 245 – it is not in the authorities but just examining that. It is a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales. There the court commented upon the process of trying to fix a date specific for the commencement of a cumulative sentence. If I may refer to the headnote and then give your Honours the passages from the judgments from which that headnote is drawn. The headnote says:

When sentencing a person already serving a sentence, it is inappropriate to try to calculate the likely remission release date and then to use that or some other specified future date from which to commence the sentence then to be imposed, the proper form of order being to impose a sentence to be served concurrently with the unexpired balance of the previous sentence or to have the sentence commence at the expiration of the sentence then being served.

The passages from Holder at page 245 is the commencement of the report in the New South Wales Law Reports, page 257 from the judgment of the then Chief Justice Sir Laurence Street at paragraph D where his Honour refers to R v Maggs from the Court of Criminal Appeal, an unreported judgment on 13 November 1981. The passage from Justice of Appeal Priestley is on page 272.

GLEESON CJ: But there would be a very simple practical reason for that problem. Remissions could be given in New South Wales at the time on account of good behaviour, for example. How would you know whether a prisoner was going to be of good behaviour? Or remissions used to be given because of a visit of the Queen.

MR BUGG: I doubt that would occur now, your Honour, but, yes, I appreciate your Honour’s point.

KIRBY J: Why do you say that? Of course it will occur now. I would hope so. Why would it not?

MR BUGG: Well, it is unlikely within – it was…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Johnson v The Queen

Details

AGLC: Johnson v The Queen [2003] HCATrans 417
Case: [2003] HCATrans 417
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal by the applicant, Mr. Johnson, against his conviction for murder. The dispute centred on the admissibility of certain evidence obtained during police investigations and the fairness of the trial process.

The primary legal issues before the Court were whether the trial judge had erred in admitting evidence that was allegedly obtained in contravention of the applicant's rights, and whether the overall conduct of the trial had been unfair, thereby vitiating the conviction. Specifically, the Court examined the application of the exclusionary rule in relation to evidence obtained improperly or in contravention of law, and the principles governing the exercise of judicial discretion to exclude such evidence in the interests of a fair trial.

The Court's reasoning focused on the balance between the need to admit relevant evidence and the imperative to ensure that convictions are not secured through unfair means. It was held that while evidence obtained in contravention of legal rights may be excluded, the discretion to do so is not unfettered. The Court considered the nature of the contravention, the importance of the evidence, and the potential prejudice to the accused. Ultimately, the Court found that the admission of the evidence in question did not render the trial unfair to the extent that the conviction should be quashed.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the applicant's conviction for murder.

Orders