John Young and Commissioner of Taxation

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[2013] AATA 347

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Division              Small Taxation Claims Tribunal

File Numbers      2011/3256-3264

Re  John Young

APPLICANT

And  Commissioner of Taxation

RESPONDENT

AND

File Numbers      2011/3187-3195

Re  John Lyon

APPLICANT

And  Commissioner of Taxation

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal              Deputy President D G Jarvis

Date  28 May 2013

Place                   Perth

1.  In matters number 3256-3258 of 2011:

(a) the Tribunal sets aside the objection decisions under review insofar as they included a surcharge on the notional superannuation contributions attributed to the applicant during the periods from 15 December 1996 to 31 January 1997 and 31 March 1998 to 8 April 1999 (when the applicant was an Acting Deputy Crown Solicitor), and from 9 April 1999 to 30 June 1999 (when the applicant was a Deputy Crown Solicitor), and in substitution therefor decides that the Superannuation Contributions Tax (Members of Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) Assessment and Collection Act 1997 (Cth) and the Superannuation Contributions Tax (Members of Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) Imposition Act 1997 (Cth) (the Surcharge Acts) are invalid insofar as they purport to create the liability of the applicant to superannuation contributions surcharge in respect of his membership of the Gold State Super Scheme; and

(b)  the Tribunal otherwise affirms the objection decisions.

2.  In matters number 3259-3264 of 2011, the Tribunal sets aside the objection decisions under review, and decides in substitution therefor that the Surcharge Acts are invalid insofar as they purport to create the liability of the applicant to superannuation contributions surcharge in respect of his membership of the Gold State Super Scheme.

3.  In matters number 3187-3194 of 2011, the Tribunal sets aside the objection decisions under review, and in substitution therefor decides that the Surcharge Acts are invalid insofar as they purport to create the liability of the applicant to superannuation contributions surcharge in respect of his membership of the Gold State Super Scheme.

4.  In matter number 3195 of 2011, the Tribunal sets aside the objection decision under review, and in substitution therefor decides that the Surcharge Acts are invalid insofar as they purpose to create the liability of the applicant to superannuation contributions surcharge in respect of his membership of the Gold State Super Scheme.

........... [Sgd] ............
Deputy President D G Jarvis

CATCHWORDS

TAXATION - Superannuation contributions surcharge assessments - Deputy State Solicitors of Western Australia - implied constitutional limitation on Commonwealth legislative power - held that Commonwealth legislation did not validly apply to applicants - objection decisions set aside.

LEGISLATION

Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 1900 (Imp) 63 and 64 Vic, c 12

Constitution Act 1889 (WA)
Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA)
Salaries and Allowances Act 1975 (WA)
Superannuation Contributions Tax (Members of Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) Assessment and Collection Act 1997 (Cth)
Superannuation Contributions Tax (Members of Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) Imposition Act 1997 (Cth)

Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA)

CASES

Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129

Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185
Clarke v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 240 CLR 272

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Details
Case
[2013] AATA 347
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of John Young and Commissioner of Taxation, the applicants, John Young and Mr Lyon, challenged the constitutional validity of the Surcharge Acts, which imposed a surcharge on superannuation contributions for certain individuals. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) was tasked with determining whether these Acts validly applied to the applicants in their roles as Deputy Crown Solicitors or Deputy State Solicitors. The applicants argued that the Acts were unconstitutional as they impaired the ability of the State to attract or retain senior legal officers. The Commissioner of Taxation contended that the Acts did not infringe upon the State's capacity in this regard.

The primary legal issue before the AAT was whether the Surcharge Acts were valid under the Australian Constitution, particularly in light of the implied limitation on the Commonwealth's legislative power, which prevents the Commonwealth from significantly impairing the States' capacity to exercise their constitutional powers and functions. The AAT had to assess whether the Acts unconstitutionally burdened the applicants' employment by imposing a surcharge on their superannuation contributions, thereby affecting their retirement benefits.

The AAT concluded that the Surcharge Acts did not validly apply to the applicants in their roles as Deputy Crown Solicitors or Deputy State Solicitors. The Tribunal found that the Acts were invalid as they imposed a surcharge on the applicants' superannuation contributions, which significantly affected their retirement benefits. The AAT held that the Commonwealth's legislation could not validly apply in a manner that impaired the States' capacity to attract or retain senior legal officers. Consequently, the AAT set aside the objection decisions and determined that the Surcharge Acts were invalid in their application to the applicants.

In summary, the AAT ruled that the Surcharge Acts were unconstitutional as they impaired the applicants' capacity to attract or retain senior legal officers by affecting their superannuation contributions. The Tribunal set aside the objection decisions and declared the Acts invalid in their application to the applicants.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The issues raised in the applications for review by Mr Young and by Mr Lyon are the same, and with the consent of all parties, I directed that they be heard together, and that evidence in each matter should be treated as evidence in the other.[5] [5] In these reasons I will refer for convenience to the Consolidated Book of Documents prepared in respect of Mr Young’s applications, unless otherwise specified.BACKGROUND FACTS The following background facts are not in contention. They are based on the applicants’ joint summary of evidence,[6] and refer to the period during which the Surcharge Acts were in operation.[6] Consolidated Book of Documents, Exhibit A1, pages 65-89. The steps leading to the applicants’ appointments as Deputy Crown Solicitors were as follows. In the case of Mr Young, he was appointed to a Class 4 Legal Officer position as from March 1990. The appointment was made by the then Public Service Commissioner on the recommendation of the Crown Solicitor. Following subsequent reclassifications he was appointed to the position of Deputy State Solicitor following the advertising of the position and a merit selection process, in accordance with the requirements of the Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA). In the case of Mr Lyon, he was appointed an Assistant Crown Solicitor in 1974, and a letter from the Chairman of the Public Service Board advised him that his promotion to that position had been approved by the Governor in Executive Council.[7] An agreement between Mr Lyon and the then Crown Solicitor recorded that Mr Lyon agreed to convert his appointment as Deputy Crown Solicitor to a term appointment expiring on his 60th birthday, and later agreements further extended the term until the date of his subsequent requirement.[8][7] Exhibit A7. A subsequent change to the title of his office with effect from 1 November 1985, is evidenced by an extract of a letter from the Public Service Board.[8] Consolidated Book of Documents, Exhibit A1, page 93. The State Solicitor’s Office was at all material times the prime provider of legal and related services to the government of Western Australia, including its ministers, departments and agencies. Legal work having a governmental character, or being of particular sensitivity or significance to the government, was provided exclusively by the Office. Other than on limited occasions where a firm had been included on a panel appointed through a tender process, private law firms providing services to the government were ordinarily briefed directly by the Office, on behalf of the departments or agencies to which the services were to be provided, in accordance with rates and terms determined by the Office. The State Solicitor’s Office was one of a number of administrative divisions of the Department of Justice, previously known as the Ministry of Justice. The Attorney-General was at all times the Minister responsible for the Department.[9][9] Consolidated Book of Documents, Exhibit A1, page 68, paragraph 3.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

After evaluating the relevant factors and the evidence as to the role and functions of the applicants, I have concluded that the Surcharge Acts did not validly apply to them in their role as Deputy Crown Solicitors or Deputy State Solicitors, or (in the case of Mr Young) when he was acting as a Deputy Crown Solicitor.DECISION In matters number 3256-3258 of 2011:(a)the Tribunal sets aside the objection decisions under review insofar as they included a surcharge on the notional superannuation contributions attributed to the applicant during the periods from 15 December 1996 to 31 January 1997 and 31 March 1998 to 8 April 1999 (when the applicant was an Acting Deputy Crown Solicitor), and from 9 April 1999 to 30 June 1999 (when the applicant was a Deputy Crown Solicitor), and in substitution therefor decides that the Superannuation Contributions Tax (Members of Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) Assessment and Collection Act 1997 (Cth) and the Superannuation Contributions Tax (Members of Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) Imposition Act 1997 (Cth) (the Surcharge Acts) are invalid insofar as they purport to create the liability of the applicant to superannuation contributions surcharge in respect of his membership of the Gold State Super Scheme; and (b)the Tribunal otherwise affirms the objection decisions. In matters number 3259-3264 of 2011, the Tribunal sets aside the objection decisions under review, and decides in substitution therefor that the Surcharge Acts are invalid insofar as they purport to create the liability of the applicant to superannuation contributions surcharge in respect of his membership of the Gold State Super Scheme. In matters number 3187-3195 of 2011, the Tribunal sets aside the objection decisions under review, and in substitution therefor decides that the Surcharge Acts are invalid insofar as they purport to create the liability of the applicant to superannuation contributions surcharge in respect of his membership of the Gold State Super Scheme.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

During the hearing, the Commissioner contended that there was no evidence that the Surcharge Acts would have made it more difficult for the State to attract or retain persons in senior positions in the State Solicitor’s Office as a Deputy State Solicitor. Because this issue had not been raised in the Commissioner’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, I gave leave to Messrs Young and Lyon to file any further witness statements or documents on which they intended to rely in response to this contention.[32] They then filed supplementary statements and estimates of the effect of the surcharge assessments on their retirement benefits. They also filed a statement by his Honour Judge Timothy Sharp, a former State Solicitor. In response, the Commissioner contended that the estimates were speculative and should not be given any weight, but also conceded that in the light of the further evidence generally, he no longer pressed his above submission. [32] I also ruled that the Commissioner was not precluded from raising this matter notwithstanding that it had not been included in his Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, because proceedings in this tribunal are not adversarial, and the tribunal’s role is to arrive at the correct or preferable decision by conducting a hearing de novo to consider all relevant issues.CONSIDERATION For the reasons I explained in some detail in Re Walsh and Commissioner of Taxation[33] I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to reach an opinion on the constitutional validity of the Surcharge Acts in their application to the applicants, and to act on that opinion in determining their applications for review of the objection decisions. The Commissioner has accepted this, and has also accepted that the reasons that I gave in Walsh for not referring the issue that has arisen to the Federal Court are equally applicable to the present matters,[34] and did not request me to refer the issue to the Federal Court.[33] [2012] AATA 451 at [14], [19(c)] and [20].[34] [2012] AATA 451 at [21]-[25]. Since the Engineers’ Case[35] the High Court has interpreted the Constitution on the following basis (as explained by Dixon J in Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth):[36]“The prima-facie rule is that a power to legislate with respect to a given subject enables the Parliament to make laws which, upon that subject, affect the operations of the States and their agencies.”[35] Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129.[36] (1947) 74 CLR 31 at 78. However, it is also clear (adopting the summary of French CJ in Clarke) that:“The constitutional implication considered in Austin and its precursors means that the Commonwealth cannot, by the exercise of its legislative power, significantly impair, curtail or weaken the capacity of the States to exercise their constitutional powers and functions (be they legislative, executive or judicial) or significantly impair, curtail or weaken the actual exercise of those powers or functions. The Constitution assumes the existence of the States as ‘independent entities’. This implies recognition of the importance of their status as components of the federation.”[37][37] (2009) 240 CLR 272 at [32].