[2013] AATA 347
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Division Small Taxation Claims Tribunal
File Numbers 2011/3256-3264
Re John Young
APPLICANT
And Commissioner of Taxation
RESPONDENT
AND
File Numbers 2011/3187-3195
Re John Lyon
APPLICANT
And Commissioner of Taxation
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal Deputy President D G Jarvis
Date 28 May 2013
Place Perth
1. In matters number 3256-3258 of 2011:
(a) the Tribunal sets aside the objection decisions under review insofar as they included a surcharge on the notional superannuation contributions attributed to the applicant during the periods from 15 December 1996 to 31 January 1997 and 31 March 1998 to 8 April 1999 (when the applicant was an Acting Deputy Crown Solicitor), and from 9 April 1999 to 30 June 1999 (when the applicant was a Deputy Crown Solicitor), and in substitution therefor decides that the Superannuation Contributions Tax (Members of Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) Assessment and Collection Act 1997 (Cth) and the Superannuation Contributions Tax (Members of Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) Imposition Act 1997 (Cth) (the Surcharge Acts) are invalid insofar as they purport to create the liability of the applicant to superannuation contributions surcharge in respect of his membership of the Gold State Super Scheme; and
(b) the Tribunal otherwise affirms the objection decisions.
2. In matters number 3259-3264 of 2011, the Tribunal sets aside the objection decisions under review, and decides in substitution therefor that the Surcharge Acts are invalid insofar as they purport to create the liability of the applicant to superannuation contributions surcharge in respect of his membership of the Gold State Super Scheme.
3. In matters number 3187-3194 of 2011, the Tribunal sets aside the objection decisions under review, and in substitution therefor decides that the Surcharge Acts are invalid insofar as they purport to create the liability of the applicant to superannuation contributions surcharge in respect of his membership of the Gold State Super Scheme.
4. In matter number 3195 of 2011, the Tribunal sets aside the objection decision under review, and in substitution therefor decides that the Surcharge Acts are invalid insofar as they purpose to create the liability of the applicant to superannuation contributions surcharge in respect of his membership of the Gold State Super Scheme.
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Deputy President D G JarvisCATCHWORDS
TAXATION - Superannuation contributions surcharge assessments - Deputy State Solicitors of Western Australia - implied constitutional limitation on Commonwealth legislative power - held that Commonwealth legislation did not validly apply to applicants - objection decisions set aside.
LEGISLATION
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 1900 (Imp) 63 and 64 Vic, c 12
Constitution Act 1889 (WA)
Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA)
Salaries and Allowances Act 1975 (WA)
Superannuation Contributions Tax (Members of Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) Assessment and Collection Act 1997 (Cth)
Superannuation Contributions Tax (Members of Constitutionally Protected Superannuation Funds) Imposition Act 1997 (Cth)Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA)
CASES
Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129
Austin v Commonwealth (2003) 215 CLR 185
Clarke v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 240 CLR 272
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- Case
- [2013] AATA 347
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the AAT was whether the Surcharge Acts were valid under the Australian Constitution, particularly in light of the implied limitation on the Commonwealth's legislative power, which prevents the Commonwealth from significantly impairing the States' capacity to exercise their constitutional powers and functions. The AAT had to assess whether the Acts unconstitutionally burdened the applicants' employment by imposing a surcharge on their superannuation contributions, thereby affecting their retirement benefits.
The AAT concluded that the Surcharge Acts did not validly apply to the applicants in their roles as Deputy Crown Solicitors or Deputy State Solicitors. The Tribunal found that the Acts were invalid as they imposed a surcharge on the applicants' superannuation contributions, which significantly affected their retirement benefits. The AAT held that the Commonwealth's legislation could not validly apply in a manner that impaired the States' capacity to attract or retain senior legal officers. Consequently, the AAT set aside the objection decisions and determined that the Surcharge Acts were invalid in their application to the applicants.
In summary, the AAT ruled that the Surcharge Acts were unconstitutional as they impaired the applicants' capacity to attract or retain senior legal officers by affecting their superannuation contributions. The Tribunal set aside the objection decisions and declared the Acts invalid in their application to the applicants.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
During the hearing, the Commissioner contended that there was no evidence that the Surcharge Acts would have made it more difficult for the State to attract or retain persons in senior positions in the State Solicitor’s Office as a Deputy State Solicitor. Because this issue had not been raised in the Commissioner’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, I gave leave to Messrs Young and Lyon to file any further witness statements or documents on which they intended to rely in response to this contention.[32] They then filed supplementary statements and estimates of the effect of the surcharge assessments on their retirement benefits. They also filed a statement by his Honour Judge Timothy Sharp, a former State Solicitor. In response, the Commissioner contended that the estimates were speculative and should not be given any weight, but also conceded that in the light of the further evidence generally, he no longer pressed his above submission. [32] I also ruled that the Commissioner was not precluded from raising this matter notwithstanding that it had not been included in his Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, because proceedings in this tribunal are not adversarial, and the tribunal’s role is to arrive at the correct or preferable decision by conducting a hearing de novo to consider all relevant issues.CONSIDERATION For the reasons I explained in some detail in Re Walsh and Commissioner of Taxation[33] I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to reach an opinion on the constitutional validity of the Surcharge Acts in their application to the applicants, and to act on that opinion in determining their applications for review of the objection decisions. The Commissioner has accepted this, and has also accepted that the reasons that I gave in Walsh for not referring the issue that has arisen to the Federal Court are equally applicable to the present matters,[34] and did not request me to refer the issue to the Federal Court.[33] [2012] AATA 451 at [14], [19(c)] and [20].[34] [2012] AATA 451 at [21]-[25]. Since the Engineers’ Case[35] the High Court has interpreted the Constitution on the following basis (as explained by Dixon J in Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth):[36]“The prima-facie rule is that a power to legislate with respect to a given subject enables the Parliament to make laws which, upon that subject, affect the operations of the States and their agencies.”[35] Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129.[36] (1947) 74 CLR 31 at 78. However, it is also clear (adopting the summary of French CJ in Clarke) that:“The constitutional implication considered in Austin and its precursors means that the Commonwealth cannot, by the exercise of its legislative power, significantly impair, curtail or weaken the capacity of the States to exercise their constitutional powers and functions (be they legislative, executive or judicial) or significantly impair, curtail or weaken the actual exercise of those powers or functions. The Constitution assumes the existence of the States as ‘independent entities’. This implies recognition of the importance of their status as components of the federation.”[37][37] (2009) 240 CLR 272 at [32].