John O'Brien and Civil Aviation Safety Authority

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Administrative Appeals Tribunal

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL             )

)        No: 2014/1361

General Administrative Division               )

Re: John O'Brien

Applicant

And: Civil Aviation Safety Authority

Respondent

DIRECTION

TRIBUNAL:             The Honourable Justice Benjamin

DATE:   11 March 2015

PLACE:                  Brisbane

The Tribunal directs the Registrar, pursuant to subsection 43AA(1) of the

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, to alter the text of the decision in this

application so that:

  1. The words ’casual’ in line 6 at paragraph 106 is now ‘causal; and
  2. The word ‘casual’ in line 4 at paragraph 107 is now ‘causal’; and
  3. The word ‘casual’ in line 3 at paragraph 114 is now ‘causal’; and
  4. The Counsel for the respondent on page 50 of the decision be altered to

‘Ian Harvey’.

..........................[Sgd].........................................

The Honourable Justice Benjamin

[2015] AATA 93

Division GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION

File Number

2014/1361

Re

John O'Brien

APPLICANT

And

Civil Aviation Safety Authority

RESPONDENT

Decision

Tribunal

The Honourable Justice Benjamin
Dr W Isles, Member

Date 20 February 2015
Place Brisbane

The Tribunal varies the decision of the Civil Aviation and Safety Authority dated 
7 March 2014 and the conditions attached to the applicant’s
class 1 medical certificate by providing:

(a)The class 1 medical certificate is only valid for operations within Australia;

(b)The applicant is not permitted to conduct night time operations other than as or with a qualified co-pilot; and

(c)The applicant must disclose to his employer, any person lawfully training, assessing, endorsing or re-endorsing him on any aircraft in respect of his
Air Transport Pilot Licence, and other assigned flight crew members of his
colour vision deficiency.

..............................[Sgd]..........................................

The Honourable Justice Benjamin

CATCHWORDS

CIVIL AVIATION – progression from co-pilot to captain – progression from co-pilot to pilot in command – progression from first officer to officer in command – colour vision deficiency (CVD) – protanopia – protanope – Air Transport Pilot (Aeroplane) Licence (ATPL) – Commercial Pilot (Aeroplane) Licence (CPL) – conditions imposed on class 1 Civil Aviation medical certificate –conditions imposed on applicant  – Colour Assessment and Diagnosis (CAD) test – Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) – Pseudo-isochromatic Plates (PIP) – Ishihara plates – lantern tests – applicant does not meet medical standard – failure to meet medical standard not likely to endanger the safety to air navigation – decision varied – conditions attached to class 1 Civil Aviation medical certificate varied – only valid for operations within Australia – applicant not permitted to conduct night time operations other than as or with qualified co-pilot – applicant must disclose colour vision deficiency to specified persons.

LEGISLATION

Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth)

CASES

Re Denison and Civil Aviation Authority (1989) 19 ALD 607
Re Becker and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1977) 1 ALD 158; [1977] AATA 12

Re Pape and Secretary, Department of Aviation (1987) 16 ALD 97; [1987] AATA 354

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth), regs 11.055, 67.010, 67.150, 67.165, 67.180
Milburn NJ, Gildea KM, Perry DL, Roberts CA and Peterson LM, “Usability of Light Emitting Diodes in Precision Approach Path Indicator…

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Details
Case
[2015] AATA 93
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case between John O'Brien and the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) involved a dispute over the applicant's ability to progress from co-pilot to captain due to his colour vision deficiency (CVD), specifically protanopia. CASA had imposed conditions on Mr O'Brien's class 1 Civil Aviation medical certificate, restricting his ability to operate as a pilot in command, particularly outside Australia and at night, unless accompanied by a qualified co-pilot. The court had to determine whether these conditions were justified, given the risk Mr O'Brien's CVD posed to aviation safety.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the conditions imposed by CASA were necessary to ensure air safety and if Mr O'Brien's CVD constituted a significant enough risk to warrant such restrictions. The court examined the statutory obligations of CASA under the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth) and considered expert evidence on the implications of CVD in aviation.

The court found that while Mr O'Brien's CVD posed some risk, the evidence suggested this risk was manageable given his extensive experience and the presence of a co-pilot. CASA's conditions, particularly the restriction on night flights and international operations, were deemed reasonable to mitigate any potential safety issues. The court concluded that these conditions were not overly burdensome and were necessary to ensure the safety of air navigation.

The court varied CASA's decision, attaching specific conditions to Mr O'Brien's class 1 medical certificate. These conditions included limiting his operations to within Australia and prohibiting him from conducting night flights unless accompanied by a qualified co-pilot. Mr O'Brien was also required to disclose his CVD to specified persons. These measures balanced the need for aviation safety with Mr O'Brien's professional aspirations, ensuring that any residual risk was adequately managed.

Background

Background to the litigation

CASA have a statutory obligation to determine who should operate aircraft, particularly in the case of aircraft carrying the general public.[7] Almost no human activity is without risk and CASA have a statutory obligation to measure the risk against the consequences that may arise from such risk. Those two assessments must then be weighed against each other.[7] Contained in the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth).Aeronautical Background Mr O’Brien:(a)was born in 1983 and was aged 31 at the time of this decision;(b)was granted a CPL in 2002;(c)was issued with an ATPL on 19 December 2005;(d)was awarded a Bachelor of Aviation from Griffith University in 2006;(e)has logged up to more than 6000 flying hours consisting of at least:[8][8] See above n 5; Respondent’s further submissions dated 19 November 2014.(i)Pilot in Command: 3707 hours(ii)Dash 8 experience: 3707 hours(iii)Night experience: 575 hours(iv)Instrument experience: 445 hours(v)Instructor: 3180 hours;(f)currently holds conditional class 1 and class 2 medical certificates. The conditions prevent Mr O’Brien from performing duties authorised by his ATPL; (g)is endorsed to fly a variety of single engine and multi-engine aircraft, including the Dash 8;(h)was the Senior Base Pilot and Dash 8 simulator instructor as at the date of hearing;(i)has a colour deficiency in terms of his sight, he is a dichromatic protanope. This comes as no surprise to CASA and when he was asked to undertake a CAD test[9] it was uncontroversial that, given his deficiency, Mr O’Brien would and did perform poorly; and (j)in the context of the evidence of Associate Professor Navathe,[10] Mr O’Brien asserts (and we accept) that in all of his flying experience he has never confused lights, including the glideslope assistance, provided at some airports in the form of a Precision Approach Path Indicator (“PAPI”). [9] See para 51 of this decision.[10] See statement of Associate Professor Navathe dated 3 October 2013, Exhibit 1A, T24, p 568: “Looking outside the aircraft, aviation uses colours in several places. Airfield lighting is arranged in a manner that has differences for taxiways and runways, and there are differences in colours to indicate where to stop the aircraft etc. The aircraft wing tips carry a red and a green navigation light, and these also help to identify the direction of flight of the aircraft. There are also documented examples of pilots losing orientation by reference to an approaching aircraft because of an inability to correctly identify the colours of the navigation lights [PAPI]”. The regulatory framework We need to identify the legislative provisions in terms of aeromedical certification. Regulation 67.180(1) of the CASR provides as follows:(1) Subject to subregulation (7) and regulation 11.055, on receiving an application under regulation 67.175, CASA must issue a medical certificate to the applicant if the applicant meets the requirements of subregulation (2). Regulation 67.180(2)(e) of the of the CASR provides that Mr O’Brien must either meet the medical standard or satisfy the decision-maker that such failure to meet that standard is not likely to endanger the safety of air navigation.

Decision

Reasons for decision

If Mr O’Brien had persuaded us that there were no issues with regard to his CVD, then removal of this condition (and all other conditions) would be a sensible and reasonable approach. However, given our finding that there is a risk (albeit a minor one, and one to which CASA has accepted given the high quality of this pilot in other areas) and given that Mr O’Brien will only ever fly as or with a co-pilot, this condition can hardly be regarded as being onerous or unreasonable.Conclusion Associate Professor Navathe agreed that there is always some risk inherent in flight. We find, in terms of Mr O’Brien, that any risk has been properly and effectively managed, and as a captain, given the conditions, that approach will continue. We say this having regard to Mr O’Brien’s visual acuity and high levels of flight competence, and at the same time noting what we have said earlier and the following. Stephen John Dain:[92]56This ability to use brightness clues can also be a problem and the dichromat can be induced to make lots of errors if the normal hierarchy is abandoned. In practical reality the light being observed could be dimmer or distant yellow or a brighter or closer red. The best example of the effects of removing the brightness clue is in PIC tests where the colours used are made to reflect equal amounts of light. In all lantern tests, the stimuli are deliberately varied in luminous intensity (the total amount of light). 57So, under some circumstances, the congenital dichromat can compensate, with acute observation, for their loss of colour discrimination. However, this is far from being a reliable clue.[92] Exhibit 1A, T23, p 500, report of Stephen John Dain, dated 27 September 2013. Dr Dougal Watson:[93][93] Exhibit 1A, T25, pp 625 and 647, report of Dr Dougal Watson, dated 3 October 2013.Increasingly, during recent decades, the cockpit instrumentation of aircraft has included complete multifunctional colour displays.The ubiquity of color-coded [sic] information in the aviation environment has resulted in recognition of the importance of pilots and air traffic controllers being able to rapidly and accurately differentiate and identify colours…10Is it possible to safely mitigate the risks that apply to a colour defective pilot? If so, how would this be achieved?Some of the risks relating to particular coloured elements of the aviation environment could be mitigated for some CVD applicants. For example it might be possible to design charts and instruments interfaces to better accommodate certain types of CVD. I doubt that any such re-engineering would be practical for all CVD subtypes, without reducing the speed and quality (and redundancy) of information transfer to the colour normal majority.Some regulators attempt to mitigate the risk associated with a particular part of the operational environment, by using some sort of specific take simulator to screen pilots for their ability to perform that task. The validity of such methods is very limited, although the underlying reasoning has some attraction or face credibility.Some regulators attempt to mitigate some of the operation risk of CVD applicants by precluding them from night-time operations. It is not always clear whether this is because night flight presents less room for error during critical phases of flight, whether the combination of night instrument flight and visual approach aids in borderline weather is considered a problem, whether the restriction is intended to steer such applicants away from the higher profile airline operations, or some combination of a number of these factors.Some regulators attempt to mitigate some of the third-party risk posed by CVD pilots by precluding them from airline operations.Many regulators mitigate the professional pilot risks associated with CVD pilots by precluding all except the most minor examples from licensing / certification.11In relation to O’Brien, please provide comments on his ability to differentiate colour inside and outside the cockpit, and the implications thereof (if you consider you are sufficiently briefed to do so).Given my understanding that the appellant is unable to pass the Ishihara screening test, and also has been unable to pass any formal colour vision test he has taken, I find it difficult to believe that he would be interpreted as having “the ability to perceive readily those colours then perception of which is necessary for the safe performance of duties”.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the light of our findings and other factors, we now consider the evidence in relation to each of the conditions of Mr O’Brien’s class 1 medical certificate and set out our findings as follows.Condition 1 – that Mr O’Brien’s class 1 medical certificate is not valid for an ATPL operation This is the most contentious and difficult aspect of the determination. If this condition remains, Mr O’Brien will be able to continue operating aircraft as a first officer but will not be permitted to fly in a command position as a captain. This will seriously and significantly reduce Mr O’Brien’s ability to reach his full potential in his chosen career. The change in roles as it relates to technical skills is, in many respects, relatively minor. CASA has accepted that Mr O’Brien is safe to conduct flights as a first officer and in those circumstances would fly sectors and undertake almost all of the roles that a captain would undertake in an aircraft. The concern from CASA’s point of view seems to fall into two areas. Firstly, as we have discussed earlier in these reasons, and as is described by Mr Banks in his evidence:[84]The role of the captain versus that of the co-pilot.37.CASA requires a higher minimum standard for aircraft captains than co-pilots which allows for the development of the co-pilot from a minimum acceptable standard to participate competently in the role of co-pilot to a standard where they can perform the role of captain. While the technical skills required are often of a similar standard in which greatest development is expected in terms of aviation relating to knowledge and non-technical skills such as those required for effective Crew Resource Management (CRM).38.Ultimately the captain is responsible for decisions made by the crew and therefore typically has the final say although achieving effective crew coordination and cooperation typically enables better quality decisions as other perspective and options can be considered. As noted by Don Harris (2011), delivering the message is easier to achieve for the captain than the co-pilot as the co-pilot must be both assertive and subordinate. In highly time constrained situations it is the captain who will likely take control of the aircraft and respond based on experience rather than seeking input from crew members. This naturalistic decision making method is less likely or appropriate for a co-pilot who doesn’t have the authority or potentially the necessary experience to act in this expert fashion. It does however mean that the deficiencies in colour vision of a co-pilot are potentially less critical of that of the captain as decisions taken by the co-pilot are more likely to be subject to consideration and input by the entire crew.[84] See above n 70, pp 692 – 693. In terms of that evidence, it must be seen that the issue raised in the 1971 and the 1993 references referred to above in paragraph 93 of these reasons, have to some degree been addressed in training of cockpit management since those times.